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Abstract 
This study explores and critically examines the role of indigenous 
mechanisms (the Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences-ITRCs) in resolving 
tribal conflicts in South Darfur State of Western Sudan. The fundamental 
question raised by this study is: have these reconciliation conferences- 1989-
2009- been able to address the root causes of the tribal conflicts and are they 
capable of serving the same role that they once did? 
Tribal leadership structures, such as Native Administration (NA) and their 
mechanisms of conflict resolution/management in Darfur, have been 
subjected to highly significant changes over time. The question is to what 
extent these changes further fuelled tribal conflicts and/or have negatively 
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affected the capability of the NA and the ITRCs to deal with these conflicts?  
 
This thesis relies on archive records and reports of the ITRCs and data 
generated through interviews conducted with key informants. Through a 
detailed analysis the study: 1) presents a detailed account of the major 
conflicts and their causes in South Darfur; 2) identifies the changing identities 
of the protagonists and of the perceived causes; 3) assesses the 
effectiveness of the agreements reached by these conferences when 
considered alongside the causes identified. 
 
Analysis of the ITRCs shows that tribal conflicts in Darfur (from1980s), and 
South Darfur in particular, were connected to the wider political conflict in the 
Sudan and the region respectively. The analysis suggests that the history of 
neglect/marginalisation of the region by successive governments, and the 
political manipulation of the NA and local government, have negatively 
affected the performance of these institutions. The experience of the ITRCs 
indicates that they were unable to address the underlying causes of the tribal 
conflicts, such as land disputes, the manipulation of the NA and local 
government, rape and mass killings.  
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH INTRODUCTION, DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Introduction 
This study aims to explore and critically examine the role of indigenous 
mechanisms of conflict resolution, such as the judiyya and the Inter-Tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) in resolving tribal conflicts in South Darfur 
State of Western Sudan.  This study argues that tribal leadership structures, 
and their mechanisms of tribal conflict resolution/management in Darfur, have 
been subjected to highly significant change and manipulation over time, and 
perhaps these changes and manipulation have both fuelled tribal conflicts and 
undermined the ability of “al-idara al-ahliya” which translated the Native 
Administration (NA) to undertake effective conflict resolution / management 
measures to resolve them.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 introduces the research 
such as location, topic and genesis of the research, aim and objective of the 
research, statement of the problem and research questions. Section 2 focuses 
on the research design and methodology, such as epistemological approach, 
data collection process, sampling methods and selection of participants, data 
analysis and interpretation, as well as ethical considerations and research 
structure. 
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Section 1: Research Introduction 
 
Research location  
Darfur, which is about 500,000 square kilometres, is located in the further 
western side of Sudan (Collins, 2008:277) (see the map 1 below). With 
exception of the capital Khartoum and the Gazira states, Darfur is the most 
populous region. The total population of Darfur is about 7.5 million, though 
contested by some Darfurians including rebel groups, this is what was officially 
proclaimed by the national census conducted in 2009 (Musa, 2011:91), with 
the highest annual rate of growth in comparison to other regions in the country, 
which is 4.15 % (O’Fahey, 2008:7). The region is surrounded by Chad in the 
west, Central Africa Republic in the south, Libya in the North West and Egypt 
in the north. Darfur is land-locked, and at the centre of the region there is a 
range of mountains known as Jebel Mara. The peak of these mountains is 
around 3,000 metres. Based on rainfall and soils, Darfur region can roughly be 
divided into three areas (Prunier, 2007:2-3):  
1. The northern dry belt; with about 300mm of rainfall per year. In terms of 
economic activities, this area is predominately occupied by the camel 
herders.  It has no agricultural activities other than those limited to the 
seasonal valleys (wadi). 
2. The central semi-fertile sands (goz); with annual rainfall of about 
500mm. In this area, agro-pastoral is common practice even though 
productivity is said to be very low. 
3. Southern and South-western semi-humid belt; with rainfall of between 
800 and 900 mm a year, which is the highest. The population here is 
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both sedentary farmers and cattle herders (“Baggara”, which is an 
Arabic word means those who breed cattle).  The soil is much more 
fertile in this area. Farmers here use more developed agricultural 
techniques, which enable them to yield higher productivity than the two 
others. 
 
           Map 1: Map of Sudan shows Darfur geographical location 
 
Source: www.unamid.unmission.org 
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South Darfur is selected as a case study. Darfur region consists of three 
states; Shamal (North), Janub (South), and Gharb (West) Darfur (see map 2 
below).  Although from 2012 it was further divided to become five states). Due 
to the large size of the population and region the study focuses on South 
Darfur State. This area is chosen as it includes almost all tribes of different 
ethnicities of Darfur region. The association of ‘tribe’ with negative colonial 
interpretations led some African countries to reject the use of the word tribe, in 
favour of ethnic group, for some time (Jenkins, 1997: 16), but this did not 
happen in Sudan, perhaps because most of the Sudanese historical 
Sultanates were ruled by tribal aristocracies (Mohammed, 2000:43). In Darfur 
in particular, the complex and changing hierarchies of identity through 
membership of tribe, sub-tribe, clan, etc. have retained currency throughout its 
history. South Darfur represents a typical instance for the rest of the region in 
terms of ethnicity, tribal groups, and livelihoods.  
South Darfur is much more diversified with regard to social composition and 
livelihoods, with the highest number of population and events of tribal conflicts. 
Its population is about 3, 161,393 (Takana, 2009:53), and includes tribes of 
both African and Arab origin. The former are mostly sedentary farmers 
whereas the latter are mostly pastoralists. Recently, in Jan. 2012, South Darfur 
State was divided into two; East Darfur State and South Darfur State (this 
study covers the entire area of both states). 
South Darfur state, the focus of this study, is located in the South and South-
West of Darfur region in western Sudan. Compared to the other parts of the 
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region, this area is characterized by the highest rate of rainfall in this overall 
low-rainfall area; between 800 and 900 mm a year. The soil is much more 
fertile in this area than in other parts of Darfur. Farmers here use more 
developed agricultural techniques, such as using oxen plough and tractors, 
which enable them to yield higher productivity than the two other states, north 
and West Darfur. 
 In the early 1970s and mid-1980s, this area witnessed an increasing internal 
migration from the northern part of the region due to drought and famine. Thus, 
in South Darfur conflicts reflect a greater challenge with wider implications than 
in other parts of Darfur. It reflects the intra and interethnic diversity of conflict in 
the entire region such as: tribes of Arab origin (Ar/o) vs. tribes of African origin 
(Af/o); tribes of Arab origin vs. tribes of Arab origin; and tribes of African origin 
vs. tribes of African origin as well. Also this area witnessed the establishment 
of the “Arab Gathering or the Arab Alliance” in 1987 as a protest against a 
perceived political domination of tribes of African origin. The inter-ethnic 
conflict between Arabs and non-Arabs that broke out in 1988 was started in 
this area and later on spilled over to the northern and western parts of the 
region. 
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Map 2: The three states of Darfur (North, South and west) and their 
administrative units (up to 2010). 
 
Source:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B00A078FFE249F
94C1256F780033E175-ocha_sdarfur_sdn051104.pdf 
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Preliminary overview 
In spite of regime and policy changes, tribe as a social organization has 
persisted throughout the recent history of Darfur (1898-2009) without much 
change in terms of organizational form or the role assigned to it ( Mohammed, 
2009:19-22). This role extends to all aspects of life; socio- economic, cultural 
and political.  Disputes and tensions occur, both within a single tribal entity-
between different groups or members of the tribe- and between one tribe and 
another. In response, these communities developed their own means and 
mechanisms, derived from their local experiences and environment, to address 
such problems. Judiyya was the best example; which is “an Arabic term 
meaning the process of intervention by a third party to mediate a conflict 
situation” (Ali, 2002:39). The Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conference (ITRC) is a 
modified form of judiyya. 
 
ITRC refers to a meeting that is specially organized for mediating a conflict 
between or amongst tribal groups. This is clearly stated in the ITRC’s archives 
and reports “Al-musalahat al-ahliya alati tamat fi wilayat Janub dar Fur fi alfatra 
min 2003-2008 ” (in Arabic), which I have translated as “ Tribal Reconciliations 
in South Darfur, 2003-2008” and referred to it in the text of this thesis as 
TRSD, 2003-8 (Vol.1 & Vol.2). The main role of the ITRCs as reflected in the 
ITRCs’ archives and reports was to bring tribes involved in fighting together to 
the negotiating table with the aim to engage in a peaceful settlement for the 
conflict. Through the colonial period up to 2009, this practice was taking place 
in a form of a big meeting sponsored by the government. The attendees of 
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such meetings were representatives of parties to the conflict, mediators, and 
government officials. 
The ITRCs, as a government sponsored mechanism for conflict resolution, 
have been used to resolve tribal conflicts in Darfur from the colonial period 
(1916-1956) until the present day. The ITRCs are referred to in Darfur as 
“Mu’tamarat alsulh”, which literally means ‘reconciliation conferences’. 
However, ‘reconciliation’  "refers to a large number of activities that help turn 
the temporary peace of an agreement which ends the fighting into a lasting 
end to the conflict itself" (Miall, 2005:27).  The ITRC reports show that  
speeches delivered by government officials, mediators, and tribal leaders in 
these conferences, mostly indicate that indigenous conflict resolution 
mechanisms (mainly referring to judiyya and the ITRC) are seen by these 
people as intrinsically most suitable in dealing with tribal conflicts in Darfur 
(TRSD, 2003-08: vol.1 & 2). This claim was also reinforced by some key 
informants (KI/1: 3/6/10; KI/5: 4/6/10; KI/6: 5/6/10; KI/7: 5/6/10; KI/8: 5/6/10; 
KI/9: 6/6/10; KI/10/6/10;  KI/11: 6/6/10; KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/25: 13/6/10; KI/26: 
13/6/10). The ITRC reports also show that the aim was to achieve 
reconciliation. However the outcomes are far from the expectations, especially 
with regard to addressing structural discrepancies and root causes of tribal 
conflicts (chapter 5 gives detailed account of this). Therefore, this study 
explores and examines whether the ITRCs were truly a reconciliation 
mechanism as the term reflects, or only a mechanism for conflict containment 
which could assist in ending the violence, but not to sustain peace through 
genuinely addressing the underlying causes of the tribal conflicts.  
  
9 
 
 
Tribe and ethnicity 
It has been argued that during the colonial period, social anthropological 
studies were employed to serve colonial agendas (Rex, 1986). During that 
time tribe was perceived by social anthropologists as a primitive and backward 
form of human organization (Jenkins, 1997: 16). Jenkins (1997) claims that the 
term was used within the context of differentiation between civilized and non-
civilized structures and organizations; i.e. the developed and underdeveloped 
societies. Thus, tribe was associated with ‘primitiveness’ and ‘backwardness’, 
a description which embodies a negative and derogatory viewpoint. Some 
anthropologists warned that it might be much better to avoid using such 
concepts with such negative connotations (Fried 1975). In my opinion, these 
warnings came too late as the harm had already taken place as a result of 
such pejorative definitions and also due to the practical policies adopted by the 
colonial rule which further cement these theoretical perceptions. Hence, “tribes 
continued to be viewed as local and primitive by virtue of being isolated 
communities” (Mair 1967: 15). 
 
Tribe has been defined in a number of different ways: 
  “A term refers to people who share a distinctive and enduring collective 
identity based on common descent, shared experiences, and cultural traits. 
They may define themselves, and be defined by others, in terms of any or all 
of a bundle of traits: customary behaviour and dress, religious beliefs, 
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language, physical appearance, region of residence, traditional occupations, 
etc.” (Harff and Gurr, 2004) 
It is also defined as: “A group united by a common name in which the 
members take a pride, by a common territory and by a feeling that all who do 
not share this name are outsiders” (Mohammed, 2009:81).   
However, in this study tribe is defined as: 
“A group of people sharing or purporting to share a common ancestry, 
organized accordingly for political and other purposes. They claim descent 
from a founding father and owe allegiance to hereditary heads of family, sub 
clan, clan, and, finally, the tribe itself. [They are united by common name and 
common territory, meanwhile their] Political, economic and social life is 
endogenous, and the tribe deals as one with outsiders, whether individuals, 
groups or the state” (Daly, 2007:12).  
There is a debate over the intrinsic nature of ethnicity in terms of identity and 
flexibility of identity. Scholars’ views in this regard, could be classified into two 
main clusters; ‘primordial’ and ‘instrumental’ (Gurr, 2000:4). The primordial 
view sees “ethnic identities as more essential, transcendent, and more 
enduring than other collectivities” (Gurr, 2000:4). The primordial approach 
looks to the concept of tribe as something that associated with backwardness. 
This perception was further supported by the ‘theory of racial typology’ 
(Banton, 1977). This theory concluded that based on their physical 
appearance, people could be differentiated and accordingly classified. 
Furthermore, the theory claims that difference in appearance is an indication of 
  
11 
 
distinct racial type. Thus cultures differ due to racial types that produce it. This 
implies that it is the biological status that determines culture. Against this 
postulation, human beings were classified into different races based on colour. 
The white colour was assumed the top of the ladder with the white people as a 
super race. The rest of the colours came behind in descending order with the 
black people located at the end of the racial hierarchy. Rex (1986) emphasizes 
that it is more likely that this theory of race could had been deliberately used to 
justify unequal treatment and to provide a rationale for the exploitation of other 
nations, especially black Africans by white Europeans during the colonial era. 
Thus, the ‘primordial’ approach perceives the phenomenon of armed disputes 
and civil wars in Africa as a primitive tendency of behaviour “rooted in the 
underlying phenomenological features and differences among the 
‘heterogeneous’ communities and ethno-cultural/ regional groups arbitrarily 
bunched together by colonial diktat to form sovereign states” (Omeje, 2008:71-
72).  
 
While for the instrumentalists “ethnicity is one of many alternative bases of 
identity”; i.e. in principle, ethnicity gains social importance due to political 
manipulation by which ethnic symbols are invoked as a result of threats or 
purposively to achieve certain interests (Gurr, 2000:4).  Although recognizing 
the reality of the primordial features, such as ethnicity, tribalism, and religion, 
instrumentalists contest primordial theory on the basis that these features on 
their own do not certainly lead to violent disputes. “Primordial factors instigate 
and affect conflicts only to the extent that they are deliberately manipulated 
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and politicized by political actors and local elites, usually for their self-seeking 
advantages” (Omeje, 2008:71-72). 
In Sudan the two terms; ‘tribe’ and ‘ethnic’ (even in Arabic, gabilla and ergiya 
respectively) are used interchangeably, as reflected by some Sudanese 
authors (see Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007). Taking the Fur (the biggest ethnic group 
in Darfur which the region is named after) as an example, they were described 
by some Sudanese scholars both as tribe and ethnic group. However, in his 
elaboration on the definition of tribe, Daly describes the Fur as ‘people’, neither 
ethnicity nor a tribe. Accordingly he defined ‘people’ as “a large group sharing 
an ethnic identity (not necessarily with a tribal organization) and a language” 
(Daly, 2007:12). O’Fahey comments that “…the use of terms like ‘people’ or 
‘tribe’ does not indicate ethnicity; at best they indicate locality and self-identity” 
(O’Fahey, 2008:9-10). He added that “ethnicity is a very moveable and slippery 
concept” (O’Fahey, 2008:9).Thus, O’Fahey prefers to describe what exists 
there in the reality as a “catalogue of labels; what content of this or that label is 
or was at any given time or place it is impossible to say definitely” that is 
because some labels are nonspecific; used by outsiders to describe those 
‘over there’ (O’Fahey, 2008:9).   
Genesis of the Research 
As a national of Darfur, I have developed a special interest and concern about 
the conflict in the region. This study is motivated by my personal experience. I 
personally conducted and contributed to a number of research and surveys 
related to the role of Native Administration (NA) in conflict mitigation and 
conflict management. Further my work experience with the United Nations 
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Mission in Sudan-UNMIS- in South Darfur (from January, 2005 to November, 
2007) also enticed my interest to undertake this study.   I was assigned to 
monitor, facilitate and report on civil engagement in the process of resolving 
conflicts, peace and reconciliation amongst communities in the area. As such I 
contributed to carrying out surveys which targeted the Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs), community and tribal leaders. The following are some of the 
research activities that I had contributed to: 
1. I participated, as research assistant with Dr. Rofael Badal, in research 
commissioned by the Life and Peace Institute (Sweden) on the role of 
Native Administration in Conflict management, which was conducted in 
North Darfur in 1996. Even though my role was restricted to data 
collection. 
2. I participated, as research assistant, in research project on “The 
Socioeconomic impact of the Ingaz continental road, Western Kordofan 
Sector” carried out by the University of Khartoum’s Consultancy 
Corporation in 1998. 
3. In 2003 I did an exploratory dissertation for fulfilment of Master’s Degree 
on the mechanisms of Peaceful co-existence amongst tribes in the 
entire region of Darfur. 
4. During my work with the UN in South Darfur (2005-2007), I participated 
in number of surveys on conflict related issues. I was assigned to 
monitor, facilitate and report on civil engagement in the process of 
resolving conflicts. Issues covered by these surveys included the 
socioeconomic impact of the conflict on the civilians, main stakeholders, 
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including the government, rebels, tribal leaders, civil society 
organizations, the IDPs; their concerns and coping mechanisms, etc. 
 
My grandfather was a sheikh and was succeeded by my father. My father also 
served as a dimilij, a rank within the tribal leadership system, which refers to 
someone who is responsible for collecting diyya (blood money) and 
compensations (O’Fahey, 2008). Therefore I grew up to see elderly and 
community leaders such as omdas, sheikhs and other Native Administration 
staff received by my grandfather and father at home to discuss issues related 
to disputes between individuals and groups. I used to serve them refreshments 
when I was a youngster and as such spent much time listening to their stories 
and discussions on different issues in normal situations and when conducting 
judiyya. In the early 1980s my father was selected (among others) as a 
member of the local court (called People’s local court). The “People’s court” 
was located in Adyla (headquarter of the rural council at the time). However 
the tradition was that the court should appoint members at some populous 
villages. Our village (Hillal) was considered as such. These members were 
authorized to serve as adjudicators in their areas and if they were unable to 
resolve a dispute then they could refer it to the Headquarters in Adyla. These 
members at village level were volunteers. The court did not have formal 
permanent offices at village level; they only paid visits to these villages on an 
irregular basis to hold hearings. As such dispute settlements among 
individuals and groups were mediated by court members at village level. 
Meetings used to take place at the market or the members’ residence. 
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Frequently, such meetings were held at our home and I had an opportunity to 
observe such practices. 
 
A particular event that further drew my attention at early stage to the issue of 
tribal conflicts was the dispute that erupted in 1965 between the tribe I belong 
to; the Maaliya and another neighbouring tribe; the Rezeigat. At the time I was 
only one year old, but later on I came to realize some of the devastating 
consequences of this dispute. Three of my uncles (two of them direct brothers 
of my father and one was his cousin and brother in law) were killed in that 
conflict. I had to grow up with orphans, some of whom were my age, looked 
after by their grandparents, uncles and aunts.  Because of my age I could not 
imagine how someone can live without the presence of his/her father or 
mother. Since then I kept thinking about why people fight and why they do 
harm to each other, and is there any possibility to avoid such situation? 
 
Aim and objective of Research 
This study aims to explore and critically examine the role of the Inter-Tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) in resolving tribal conflicts in South  Darfur 
State of Western Sudan; specifically: 
- To investigate the ways these mechanisms work and their effectiveness in 
resolving conflicts among different tribes.  
- To reveal different factors that contribute to the success/or failure of these 
mechanisms. 
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-To look into the impact of governance on these mechanisms, particularly the 
impact of central government’s policies on the systems of local government 
and Native Administration. 
- To investigate their origins and the current philosophy / political ambitions 
attributed to them by different parties. 
 
Statement of the problem 
The ability of the ITRCs in resolving tribal conflicts in South Darfur seems to 
have been diminishing as time passes.  Perhaps that was due to obstacles 
related to the governance system. This particularly might be true in Darfur. The 
tribal leadership system was officially recognized and adopted in Darfur by the 
British colonials (1916-1956) as the main system of governance at the local 
level and continued to be in practice after Sudan’s independence up to the 
present, although in some periods it was officially not recognized (1970s-
1985).  
Governments’ intervention in tribal structures by abolition and alteration 
without providing an alternative efficient system of local government, perhaps 
has paved the ground for tribal conflicts and disputes to escalate. In Darfur, as 
I personally observed, this is particularly reflected in the meagre presence or 
total absence-sometimes- of government institutions that abide by the rule of 
law and are capable of addressing the ever increasing conflicts between and 
amongst local communities. Also, this can be seen in the increase in the 
number and escalation of tribal conflicts. For example in South Darfur alone 
more than 37 conferences of a kind were held in the period from 2003 to 2009, 
which almost equals the number of conferences held in the entire region of 
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Darfur in a period of seventy years; between 1932 and 2002 (Mohammed, 
2009: 82-83).  
The fundamental question here is, to what extent has the changing of regimes, 
policies, and deliberate politically motivated government interventions in tribal 
and local government structures, negatively affected the efficacy and the 
legitimacy of the ITRCs in dealing with tribal conflicts in South Darfur? 
 
Research questions 
 What were the key features of the Native Administration, 
the local government and the central government during 
the British colonial period? 
 What was the role played by the colonial government in 
the ITRCs; particularly the enforcement of rule of law and 
the effectiveness of the government to serve as guarantor 
for the implementation of reconciliation agreements? 
 What changes have been taking place in the government-
Native administration relationship at central and local 
levels since Sudan’s independence?  
 What were the main factors behind these changes?  
 How far have these changes influenced the competency 
and the effectiveness of government institutions to enforce 
the rule of law and to act as guarantor for the 
implementation of the reconciliation agreements? 
 What have been the repercussions of these changes on 
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the effectiveness of the institutions, structures, and 
consequently the role of the Native Administration in 
conflict resolution? 
 Are the ITRCs still valid as conflict resolution and 
reconciliation mechanisms? 
 Have these reconciliation conferences-at least for the last 
two decades- been able to address the root causes of the 
tribal conflicts? 
 Have they addressed new issues that have been provoked 
by the Darfur current crisis? (Including specific issues 
such as the mass killings, rape, burning of villages, forced 
displacement, and land occupation). 
 What were the main impediments and challenges that 
faced the ITRCs in dealing with these issues?  
 
Research hypothesis 
 The old established mechanisms and structures of conflict-
management/resolution have mostly collapsed due to government 
interference and political instability, which has resulted in the dismantling of 
NA on occasions and the ineffectiveness of the newly adopted alternating 
systems. 
 Despite the changes in the lives of communities, issues of conflict, and 
government policies, the ITRCs remained employed and portrayed by 
some as if they are an unchanging mechanism.  
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 The exclusion of key people and issues from discussions during the 
meetings, has negatively affected the performance of the ITRCs in 
resolving tribal conflicts in South Darfur. 
 
Section 2: Research Design and methodology 
Introduction 
As provided by Oliver, (2004) an appropriate evaluation to the methodology is 
necessary prior to starting research. Methodology “refers to the choices we 
make about cases to study, methods of data gathering, forms of data analysis, 
etc. in planning and executing research study” (Silverman, 2005:109). This 
study adopts case study strategy of research design. Case study allows 
making in-depth investigation to gain valuable and unique insights, as it 
focuses on relationships and processes within social settings which tend to be 
interrelated (Denscombe, 2003:32).  Mixed qualitative methods of data 
collection and analysis were employed. Due to the complexity of the social 
phenomena the use of mixed methods approach in social research is a very 
helpful way to better understand that complexity (Greene, 2007). 
Epistemological approach 
The tribal conflicts seem to be related to multiple factors, and as a social 
phenomenon they are inevitably shaped by socio-economic and historical 
developments. Therefore, tribal conflicts and their settlement need to be 
understood in a wider socio-economic and political context than as an isolated 
social phenomenon. Bhaskar, (1998b) argues that reality encompasses three 
layers: the empirical layer, the actual layer, and the real layer. The first is 
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observable by individuals, the second associates to time and space, and the 
last one exists, but beyond the facts, and is linked to perceptions and 
experiences.  The role of research is to examine and try to unearth the 
processes and mechanisms in the real world, however these processes and 
mechanisms might be or might not be seen (Sayer, 2000). 
From an epistemological point of view this study is guided by critical theory 
(CT).  Epistemology is the study of knowledge; “the term is concerned with the 
nature of knowledge and justification, how we know what we know” (Miller and 
Brewer, 2003:94). Hence, epistemology focuses on the means for acquiring 
knowledge and how it could be possible to make a distinction between truths 
and fallacy (Smith, 2003:48 – 60). A long critical realism tradition, CT takes a 
middle position between empiricists who view reality as independent from the 
mind (Materialism) and idealists who argue that reality is a creation of mind. 
For Critical theorists reason is the highest potential of human beings and that, 
it is possible to use it to criticize and change the nature of the existing societies 
(Blaikie, 1993:52).  They argue that social scientists need to be critical in order 
to be able to understand social phenomena. In order to uncover social 
behaviour, therefore, factors such as power relations, unseen cultural aspects 
and political agendas have to be taken into consideration (Hoper and Powel, 
1985). Socio-economic and political aspects of a phenomenon do not appear 
overnight, they evolve and develop over time. This necessitates historical 
analysis for better understanding of the evolution of a social phenomenon. In 
this respect Chua, (1986) indicated that Critical theorists frequently rely on 
historical, ethnographic research and case studies.   
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Two points distinguish CT approach from the interpretive and positivistic 
(Johnson and Duberly, 2000), which are: 1/ CT argues that knowledge of 
social reality could be obtained through critical discussion, 2/ it claims that 
social reality has a potential emancipatory role. CT asserts that social research 
will always be influenced by values; it is not possible to accomplish value-free 
social research. The argument of CT, in this respect is that research is a 
political activity, “working either for or against the status quo” (Miller and 
Brewer, 2003:60).  
The good thing about CT is that it sheds light on how ideology, systems and 
structures can influence freedom of human beings and shape reality. One 
could say among the advantages of critical theory is reflexivity as a process of 
self-reflection; for openly acknowledging and identifying the emancipatory aims 
one might hold, as well as the factors that make oneself and one’s setting 
particular and relative (Parker and Sim, 1997:130).  
 
Data collection process 
The research generated data from both primary and secondary sources. 
Methods used to obtain the data were review of documentation (archive 
records and reports) and literature review, semi-structured interviews and 
observation.   Using multiple sources served an additional purpose which was 
correcting and checking on possible biases of different sources of information 
(Casley and Lury, 1981:21; Tansey, 2007:7). Data from secondary sources 
was made possible from books, journals, dissertations, as well as internet 
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sources. Records, relevant reports and documents related to ITRCs during the 
British colonial period were made available from National Records Office of 
Sudan and some articles and books.  
Meanwhile, more recent ITRCs (e.g. for the last two decades) were obtained 
from the Office of the Wali’s (Governor) Advisor for Intertribal and 
Reconciliation Affairs of the South Darfur State. Also, such documents and 
reports were made available from individual staff of the Native Administration 
such as omdas and other community leaders. This included notes of meetings 
for the “Reconciliation Commission” (RC) which was established following the 
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006, and which I refer to in 
the text of this thesis as (RC, 2010). Primary data were generated mainly 
through archival review and semi-structured interviews, conducted with key 
informants from the area. Purposive sampling was employed to select key 
informants as is explained below.  
 
Literature Review 
The methodology for this case study combined a literature review with 
fieldwork. An intensive literature review was carried out with the purpose to 
precisely cover literature related to my research topic and to identify the gap 
within the literature that this study might contribute to fill-in. Also, another 
purpose behind the literature review was to identify possible potential sources 
of secondary data for my research. Therefore comprehensive reading was 
conducted. This included books, articles, journals, periodicals, PhD theses and 
Dissertations. In this respect I covered three aspects of literature (highlighted 
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in chapter 2): 1/ Literature related to theoretical concepts of conflict resolution, 
2/ Literature related to conflict resolution in Africa, and 3/ Literature related to 
conflict resolution in the Sudan with especial focus on Darfur (tribal conflicts 
and its resolution).  
 
 
Interviews: Sampling strategy and selection of participants   
As provided by David and Sutton, (2004) there is no clear cut answer with 
regard to the correct sample size, as sampling often depends on the 
research’s purpose and the nature of the population subject to investigation 
(e.g. degree of heterogeneity). The interviews were meant to be used to 
generate supplementary data and to check on the accuracy of the information 
generated from the archives and secondary data.  
 
“Elite interview data is rarely considered in isolation, and the goal of collecting 
such data is often to confirm information that has already been collected from 
other sources … and  to contribute towards the research goal of triangulation, 
where collected data is cross-checked through multiple sources to increase the 
robustness of the findings” (Tansey, 2007:7).   
 
This study aims to appraise the capability of the ITRCs in resolving tribal 
conflicts. It looks into how the changes on the NA and local government 
structures, which resulted from changing regimes and policies- including 
deliberate politically motivated interventions- have led to increasing disputes 
along tribal lines and contributed to the erosion of the competency of the 
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ITRCs in addressing these conflicts. Thus, purposive sampling was employed 
to select key informants who were involved on these processes and were in a 
position to provide useful insights. 
 
Semi structured interviews 
To allow respondents to develop narration on his/her own terms is vital to 
generate reliable data (Enosh and Buckbinder, 2005: 589). For this reason 
open-ended question design was adopted (See attached appendix for samples 
of questions). This was meant to allow flexibility and good explanation. 
Tansey, (2007:7) indicated that unlike surveys, an interview enables 
researchers ‘to ask open-ended questions’, which allows the research 
participant to express himself/herself freely. Also interviews have another 
advantage in that they enable researchers to obtain first-hand information and 
gain insights from key informants who are directly involved in the events and 
processes of decision making (Tansey, 2007:9). However, I am aware of some 
shortcomings of the interviews where, sometimes, respondents might 
misrepresent their positions which raise reliability concerns (George and 
Bennett, 2005:99). A remedy to avoid such bias of respondents, as well as 
other sources of primary data, is that four questions should frequently be 
asked by researchers which are: “Who is speaking?, Who are they speaking 
to?, For what purpose are they speaking, and under what circumstances?” 
(George and Bennett, 2005:99). During conducting the interviews, I have made 
use of all this advice. Furthermore, skills gained from my previous work and 
research experience were also employed and proved to be very useful.  
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Number of interviews and Criteria of Selection 
Based on purposive sampling, semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with 26 key informants from South Darfur State in June, 2010. I 
personally conducted all these face-to-face interviews, which included 
representatives of NA staff and elderly people, practitioners, women, 
government officials, rebels, and voluntary NGOs. The representation included 
different tribal groups, from the main two ethnicities in south Darfur; tribes of 
African origin and Arab origin as well (see the list of key informants in the 
appendix). The selection of the key informants was based on the following 
characteristics: a) their knowledge of customary law and/or previous 
experience of participation in ITRCs and tribal conflict resolution/management 
in general; b) Having an administrative role in dealing with tribal conflicts and 
their resolution/ management; c) Government officials or civil servants directly 
relating to tribal conflicts and ITRCs; d) Civil society activists who are active in 
advocacy on human rights and gender issues; e) Those who may argue 
against the continuation of the  role of the Native Administration in Darfur, such 
as educated people and the rebels. Accordingly, the key informants were 
selected from the following groups: 
 
1. Tribal and community leaders. 
2. Civil society activists, including women. 
3. Local government administrators 
4. Government officials responsible or related to conduction of the ITRCs. 
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5. Representatives of rebel groups. 
6. Academics 
Based on my own previous experience in dealing with different groups in the 
area, key informants were identified. I also held brief discussions on the phone 
with some former colleagues who are still working with the UN in Darfur, some 
members of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and some colleague 
researchers at home universities who have done similar research in the area. 
The aim of the contact was to update my own database, with regard to names 
and contacts of people, which I established during my most recent work with 
the UN in South Darfur. 
 
 Reflection on Field work: 
Two weeks prior to leaving UK for Sudan, I established contacts with some of 
the targeted potential respondents and briefed them about my research topic 
and sought their agreement to participate in this study. Following my arrival in 
Sudan, I started contacting my potential key informants, briefed them about the 
research project and confirmed their interest and readiness to take part. All 
these contacts were made through phone calls. As I had initiated contact with 
the respondents previously, a reasonable but short time (3-7days) for the 
respondents to get ready for the meeting was allowed. 
 
Following contact and receiving their initial consent to participate in the 
research, a specific date and time of the interview were identified for each 
respondent. I started to make a list of the potential respondents with their 
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contacts and an agreed schedule of meetings to make sure that the targeted 
number of respondent was secured and to remind them prior to the meeting in 
order not to miss it. Furthermore, I made an additional list of potential key 
informants, more than the required number. This was to serve as a reserve list, 
in case any of the potential respondents could not make her/ himself available 
or change his/her mind to participate, which I found very useful. 
 
Then interviews were started with those who coincidentally were in Khartoum 
and meetings continued in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur. However before 
the interview began, information about the research and the researcher 
together with a written ‘consent form’ (all attached to the appendix) were 
usually provided for each respondent (a further account in this respect will be 
provided below when elaborating on ethical considerations). As per the 
mechanism used to establish a respondent’s consent, there are two 
alternatives (Oliver, 2003:31); a simple oral agreement or a written agreement-
consent form. Which one is most suitable depends on the educational 
capability of the respondents. Accordingly, the former method was mostly used 
to establish informants’ consent. This was mainly because of the sensitivity of 
signing forms which the respondents were very reluctant to accept; perhaps 
either because they were not familiar with, which was the justification mostly 
mentioned or maybe because they feared the consequences of putting their 
signature on something that might fall into the hands of the authorities; even 
though I assured them regarding the confidentiality and the anonymity. 
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Risks and problems encountered: 
As was expected, undertaking this kind of research in the disturbed region of 
Darfur involved some risk and complications. Financial and security risks were 
both encountered. I was lucky to have help from a number of support groups 
and networks regarding safety issues. However, finances were harder to 
tackle. It is only thanks to family support I was able to complete this research. 
 
Observations and Memos 
Observation is defined as “A purposeful, systematic and selective way of 
watching and listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place” 
(Kumar, 2005) and it could be used as a method of data collection. 
Observation involves watching, listening and writing all that is seen (May, 
1993). 
As a Darfurian who was born, grew up and finished school education in a 
number of different parts of South Darfur, I had already developed a sense of 
observation. Also, this experience of living in different areas inhabited by 
different tribal groups familiarised me with a variety of traditions and customs. I 
was able to make comparisons and closely observed similarities and 
differences in patterns of culture and livelihood.  Recently (2005-2007), in my 
capacity as a UN staff, I was invited by the authorities to observe ITRCs held in 
South Darfur State. During the years 2005-2007, I attended over 20 ITRCs. In 
1996 I attended the Arabs/Massalit conference in Al-Geneina, West Darfur, 
from the beginning up to the end. This accumulated experience of observation 
has given me sufficient familiarity with peoples’ (individuals and groups) 
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actions, reactions, interactions, perceptions, attitudes patterns of behaviour 
and gestures in these settings. I employed observation as a method of data 
collection and more importantly to check on the accuracy of the information 
provided by the informants and when reviewing archival data; i.e. to validate 
data obtained from these sources. 
 
Data analysis and interpretation 
 
Introduction 
Data analysis is a very sensitive process in a sense that it is much often 
possible to be affected by researcher’s own biases, feelings and 
interpretations of data. When starting to analyse data therefore, a researcher 
should bear in mind the need to be honest about his/her theoretical 
perspective and values. This is imperative as “Research is all about the power 
to define reality” (Lewis, et al 2003:26-27); when someone claims to be 
carrying out research this means he or she is undertaking methodical inquiry to 
make some statement about the world. In this respect data analysis can be 
defined as:  
“a process of piecing together data, of making the invisible obvious, of 
recognizing significance from insignificance, of linking seemingly unrelated 
facts logically, of fitting categories one with another and attributing 
consequence to antecedents” (Morse, 1994:25). However, case study  “does 
not call for a particular approach of analysis of qualitative data which it 
produces” (Robson 2002). Therefore, “It is not an easy task to provide robust 
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accurate analysis for case study evidence, because the strategies and 
techniques have not been well defined” (Yin, 2003:109).  
Despite the disagreement with regard to strategies and techniques in the 
analysis of data, still there is agreement on the importance and the need to 
analyse data for the purpose of drawing conclusions and verifications that 
make it much more meaningful and useful. In this study more than one method 
of qualitative analysis is applied. For example, I applied stakeholders’ analysis 
and conflict mapping methods. Stakeholders’ analysis is a method for 
understanding the conflict system and identifying the major players in that 
system; their roles attributes, interrelationships, interests and factors (triggers 
and root causes) which contributed to these disputes (Ali, 2002:9). The 
research also used conflict mapping method to identify major conflict events 
and major ITRCs that took place in South Darfur to tackle them.  
Also, I drew upon Miles and Humberman’s approach in analysing the ITRC 
documents. This approach drew attention to the importance of data reduction, 
data display, conclusion drawing and verification (Miles and Humberman, 
1994:10-12). Also, it provides a general framework for conceptualizing 
qualitative data analysis, and as such is relevant to case studies analysis 
(Robson, 2002:473-479).  Data reduction is the process of sorting  out key 
words, themes or responses whereas further reduction of data through 
presentation, such as tables and diagrams, is referred to as data display, 
which contribute to make the data more understandable (Bryman 1989). Below 
is an adapted diagram of the Miles and Humberman approach.  
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Figure 1: Miles and Humberman Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Miles and Humberman, 1994:12). 
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After my return from the field, I started an immediate transcribing of the field 
data. First, I started reviewing the interview sheets, and labelling them in order 
to flag specific observations and write down comments related to each 
interview separately.  After that, I read the interviews thoroughly in their original 
language, which was Arabic, and then started translating each interview 
literally into English. The transcribing process took me seven months to 
complete. I took note of transcription rules related to spoken discourse 
suggested by Bruce, (1992:145), which stated that “transcription system 
should be easy to write, easy to read, easy to learn, and easy to search”.  
 Coding and development of categories 
Coding and development of categories is a sorting out process which involved 
comparing, contrasting and combining data (Gibbs, 2002). I used an excel 
programme to establish tables and draw diagrams following manual counting 
to identify some interrelated factors, their relationships and their frequencies. 
This process was directed by the research questions. Thus my focus at this 
stage was to identify and select the issues, categories that appear relevant to 
each question or group of questions and put them together. After completing 
the coding and development of categories I drafted an initial summary of 
findings which was shared with my supervisor to have her initial comment 
before I went further in my analysis. 
 
 
Generating meaning and verification 
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Generating meaning and verification represents a very important stage of data 
analysis, during which the researcher should guarantee that the research has 
attained good quality data. After finishing transcribing the data, coding, and 
developing categories, I started observing patterns and trends, and making 
further categories. This helped me to establish some meanings and associated 
terms and to start drawing initial conclusions based on the display of data that I 
had conducted in the earlier stage. As provided by Robson, (2002:473-485) 
data display is a tactic for drawing meanings and making verifications, the 
latter means going back to the original sources of data to assure that 
meanings and conclusions drawn do not contradict  with the data. This was a 
continuous process of review, correction, and modification with the aim to 
develop categories patterns and provide genuine logical interpretation of the 
data. Sometimes I referred to my records or compared sources/and or recalled 
my personal observations to check whether different expressions used by 
different respondents/data sources might establish the same meaning/and or 
refer to same event, a process which entails data verification.  
Ethical considerations 
In relation to social research, ethics refers to the moral deliberation, choice and 
accountability on the part of researchers throughout the research process 
(Mauthner et al, 2002:14). Ethics in research is becoming increasingly 
important due to a number of influential factors such as the rise of 
consciousness with regard to the right of individuals, the emergence of new 
research approaches such as critical, participatory and feminism, furthermore, 
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the establishment of ethic committees in the universities and research 
institutions (de Laine, 2000:16).   
 
There is no common ground among researchers on what might constitute an 
ethical issue. Ethical rules in research differ from one research to another 
depend on the adopted methodological approach. However there is a common 
agreement among researchers that ethical responsibility represents an integral 
part that should be appropriately incorporated in the research topic, design and 
plan (Miller& Brewer, 2003:96). In this regard I was to abide by the ethical 
procedures adopted by the University of Bradford, specifically; Participant’s 
voluntary consent, the central point of which is that the relationship between 
the researcher and the respondent should be based on no harm and voluntary 
consent (Miller& Brewer, 2003:96). Also, as a part of research ethics 
confidentiality and anonymity should be considered. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality   
“Anonymity means that the researcher will not and cannot identify the 
respondent, while confidentiality means that the researcher can match names 
with responses but ensure that no one else will have access to the identity of 
the respondent” (Miller& Brewer, 2003:97).  
Confidentiality is not limited to the statement of assurance but it includes the 
concrete steps that will be taken to ensure that this measurement will be 
genuinely maintained and the information will not fall into the wrong hands 
(Oliver, 2003:78). 
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 To ensure confidentiality and/or anonymity of personal data, those answers 
which might easily be attributed to a particular participant were paraphrased. 
During the process of data collection, processing and analysis, all the names 
of the participants were changed, together with any other details that might 
identify his or her personality and codes were used instead (see appendix for 
the coded list of respondents). I have transcribed the interviews myself on a 
password protected computer. Other than me, only the supervisor can access 
such data. The computer where the information is stored is now located at the 
University of Bradford. This information will be kept for the duration of a PhD 
research project (2010-2013). It will be used solely for the purpose of this 
project and then destroyed following a reasonable period of time, so as to 
ensure that participants will not find themselves at risk due to public disclosure 
of any information they have made available to the researcher. Confidentiality 
and anonymity could be lifted in the event of situations changing and where 
the consent of the respondents is secured. 
 
Principle of no harm 
This means the participation of the respondent in the research must be 
voluntary and entails no harm on a respondent. Potential physical or mental 
harm to the participant in the research must be avoided (Miller& Brewer, 
2003:98); this includes sensitive issues related to dignity, which might make 
participants feel annoyed or depressed. Participants may not feel comfortable 
to talk about certain issues or may be willing to talk about but not in front of the 
other people (Miller& Brewer, 2003:98). Sensitive issues related to killings, 
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torture and rape, which might make participants feel annoyed or depressed, 
were discussed in the interviews, though these issues were only brought into 
discussions voluntarily and spontaneously by the respondents themselves. I 
was aware of the sensitivity of these issues.  Based on my own previous 
research experience I knew that some informants might not feel comfortable to 
talk about such issues or might be willing to talk about them but in privacy. 
However, the good thing about this point was that the focus of my research is 
retrospective, i.e. it is reviewing the past practices of the ITRCs, NA and local 
governance, rather than only focusing on current ones, which made 
questioning less contentious.  I avoided asking direct questions about sensitive 
issues. The strategy I followed was that I used general terms to ask questions 
(see the attached appendix of the interview questions) and left it for the 
respondent to decide to touch on these issues or not. Yet, most of the 
respondents did choose to touch on these issues. In such cases, I took the 
opportunity to probe, even though I put no pressure on them for further 
elaboration. While respondents showed willingness to talk about such issues, 
their right to avoid doing so was guaranteed. I kept reminding those who 
voluntarily engaged in discussing these sensitive issues about their right to 
stop talking and/or rephrase their information or withdraw the information 
provided in full or part, if they so wished.  
 
 
Role of the researcher 
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A part of implementing the no harm principle is that a researcher should not 
put himself/herself or others at risk (Goodhand, 2001:13).  South Darfur State 
is my homeland, where I was born, grew up, went to schools and lately 
worked. I maintained broad   social networks which included tribal and 
community leaders at urban centres and at grass-root levels across the state. 
Also, I have good connections and networks within government institutions; 
some of my school mates and university colleagues are now civil servants or 
government officials. Furthermore, I am in contact with some colleagues who 
are working with local and international NGOs, and the United Nations and 
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  
 
 The researcher is quite aware of the challenge of accessibility to information 
and people in generating data and information. However being from the region 
with previous research experience on similar issues and practical work 
experience in the region helped me to overcome such difficulty. Though this 
familiarity with the area and the people might pose challenges such as 
subjectivity or a negative perception of the researcher as an insider, I persisted 
in being open about my research topic, ethnic background and the objective of 
the research. I took the responsibility to provide accurate and sufficient 
information about my research. As asserted by Miller& Brewer, (2003:97) apart 
from the prerequisites of individual’s participation in the research process, a 
researcher should provide them with accurate information about his/her 
research. Respondents should be fully informed about the research. Oliver, 
(2003:28) stated that “a broad definition to fully informed” should include any 
information which a participant might conceivably need in order to make a 
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decision about whether or not to participate in a research process. It is 
preferable to give people sufficient time to make up their mind and decide 
freely whether to accept to be participants in the research or not (Oliver, 
2003:27-28). 
 
After briefing through the phone as explained earlier, a ‘Research Information 
Sheet’, which included the following three parts, was prepared and shared with 
the respondents (see the appendix for the details):  
1) Information related to the researcher. 
2) Information related to the research. 
3) Informed consent Statement and Consent form. 
A simple, easy and understandable Arabic language was used to present 
research information and ‘informed consent form’ for the respondents.  Arabic 
is the shared common language for different communities in Darfur. For me, 
Arabic is my mother tongue and I speaking the local dialects of Darfur Arab 
tribes, and I understand the common language of most of the other tribes of 
South Darfur.  
 
Reflections on data sources 
 
Archive: Problem of missing data and citation  
The archives related to the ITRCs, especially with regard to the last two 
decades (1989-2009), were made available to me by the office of the South 
Darfur State’s Governor ( refers to as Wali in Arabic); particularly, the office of 
the “Wali’s Advisor for Tribal and Reconciliation Affairs”. In this respect I 
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particularly refer to reports compiled by the above mentioned office in two large 
volumes in Arabic “Al-musalahat al-ahliya alati tamat fi wilayat Janub dar Fur fi 
alfatra min 2003-2008”, which I have translated as “The Tribal Reconciliation 
Conferences in South Darfur, 2003-2008”, which I refer to in the text of this 
thesis as TRSD, 2003-8 (Vol.1 & Vol. 2). They represent a collection of 
documents related to ITRCs conducted in South Darfur State under the 
auspices of the Governor of south Darfur state during the above mentioned 
period. These collections, in particular, were not well organized. Some pages 
were missing and the existing ones, most of the time, were not in order. Also, 
some parts of or whole letters submitted by the parties to the conflict, copies of 
supportive documents, and names of participants were also sometimes 
missing. Details about the Methodology followed at ITRCs, and how decisions 
were reached, sometimes lacked clarity. All these things were either not clearly 
stated in these documents or were somehow distorted. I suspect that this level 
of disorder is not unusual in local government records at this time in Sudan, 
due to the under-resourcing of such activity.  
Nonetheless, these documents remained important because they reflect claims 
and counter claims made by different parties to the conflict, give background to 
the conflict, show the names of the participants, the mediators and other 
attendees, such as government officials, and finally they include the 
agreements and the recommendations made for resolving the concerned 
disputes. These documents are not collected elsewhere to the best of my 
knowledge, and so I am probably in possession of the only copy outside 
Sudan. Moreover the collection of documents/reports relating to a single ITRC 
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sometimes includes letters that contradict one another. For example you can 
find a letter submitted by one group which refers to claims made by their 
opponents/and or a statement made by a government official or chairperson of 
the ITRC which summarizes issues put forward by the parties to that conflict 
and their names. So, through comparison, synthesis and   careful analysis, I 
was able to generate useful data from these reports and documents. Also, the 
interviews which I conducted with the key informants, some of whom 
personally participated in these ITRCs, proved to be very useful to fill-in some 
of the gaps and to verify some information.  This process took me a lot of time 
and effort to accomplish.  
Another problem with this part of the archival documents of ITRCs in particular 
was the citation. The problem was that they were unpublished and at the same 
time disorganized in a sense that some pages are missing and each ITRC 
related document was not always included in a consistent order. Therefore, 
following consultation with my supervisor and other African History colleagues 
on the best way to reference these documents, we agreed that I should 
reorganize the documents according to each ITRC that they related to so that 
they are in a more recognisable and logical order, which makes the citing  
straightforward (see the attached appendix which shows the new 
organization). This was another challenging and time consuming process. 
 
 
Limitations of the Interviews 
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South Darfur state, as part of greater Darfur, was put under a state of 
emergency in 2002 which remains in force up to the present time (2013) due to 
the civil war. There has been an apparent connection and overlapping 
between the tribal conflicts and the on-going government/ rebels’ struggle, 
which made the authorities, particularly security organs, consider tribal 
conflicts as a sensitive issue which threatens state sovereignty. This situation 
left me with limited space in which to meet people and discuss some issues 
with them in a comfortable and a secure way that avoided risk to both the 
researcher and the participants. As a result, I was restricted to meeting with 
this limited number of key informants as stated above.  
 
 It should be noted that the respondents came from different backgrounds and 
had different types of expertise and as such they did comment on different 
issues, even though they were asked the same questions, and I personally 
observed that each person tended to talk about issues related more to his/her 
own experience.  For example, the tribal leaders focused more on the history 
of the tribal relations and their actual experience in relation to the ITRCs and 
judiyya. Meanwhile, the local government administrators were more concerned 
about the overall governance issues and the negligence of the central 
government to local government as well as the overlap between the role of the 
NA and the local government administrators. This is why, although they 
presented diverse views and conclusions, they rarely contradicted each other. 
Another point regarding the key informants is that they often gave narratives 
which mixed up events from the past and present, as if they were not clear 
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about the period they were describing or/ do not have a clear sense of the 
historical moments, at which things changed. They often referred to events in 
the past by using present tense. This presented a challenge as to whether to 
present their deliberations in the past or present. This was particularly so when 
they were talking about judiyya practice. Therefore with regard to chapter 6 
(focusing on judiyya), I have presented the details in the present tense, unless 
referring to a specific historical event or period, as this was their testimony, 
even though at times I think that they were referring to different periods in the 
past, and this issue is discussed in further detail in that chapter. 
 
Research limitations 
The interview samples were drawn from a limited number of key informants, 
some of whom were associated with urban centres, even though they originally 
came from rural areas and still uphold strong connections with  their people in 
rural areas through their involvement in ITRCs, either as mediators, 
representatives of their tribes or serving as advisors. Their deliberations 
reflected their experiences and memories of such roles or previous life 
experiences in South Darfur. Therefore, in spite of the similarity with regard to 
the social context of the entire region of Darfur, the study is limited to a certain 
area which is South Darfur State; as such the findings cannot simply be 
generalized to the other parts of the region (West and North Darfur).  
Reliability and Validity  
Reliability can be defined as “The degree of consistency with which instances 
are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
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observer on different occasion” (Hammersley, 1992a:67).  In other words it 
means the extent to which a study would give consistent conclusions if carried 
out by the same person or different researchers more than once with the same 
people under similar standard conditions (Hall and Hall, 1996). Thus, regarding 
the measurement of reliability the meaning of consistency is central (Punch, 
2005). 
As far as my study is concerned, the issue of reliability was genuinely dealt 
with.  This was reflected in the simple nature of the design of my interview 
questions (open-ended) and the clarity of their meanings and logical flow. The 
purpose was to make it easier for the respondents to understand and at the 
same time open-ended questions allow flexibility for the respondents’ response 
and provide opportunity to generate accurate and more reliable data. I 
observed that respondents were able to understand the questions clearly 
without asking for clarification, a thing which was reflected in their readiness to 
provide answers straightaway. Furthermore, such an objective was made 
possible due to the adoption of certain additional measures, such as pre-
testing of questions and applying probing-when necessary- for further 
clarification and assurance of exact meaning of words and expressions, exact 
dates and places of events as well as names of people. Also, I found out that 
adopting consistent standard methods for writing down field notes and 
transcripts was especially useful in cross-checking of data. 
Data related to case study research might be limited in perspective and scope 
as it studies partial views and reality. In this respect I applied triangulation of 
data collection, using three methods: documentation and literature review, 
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interviews, and non-participatory observation. The aim was to make sure that 
the weakness of one method is recompensed by the strength of another 
(George and Bennett, 2005:99). I was aware of the technique of checking for 
negative evidence, by giving back the collected data to the respondents to 
seek their confirmation and comments (Robson 2002). However due to time 
constraints and other factors which were out of my control, I only read them a 
summary of their answers following the interview and sought their confirmation, 
with the option to withdraw data or rephrasing  responses. 
Validity 
The importance of the validity, as argued by Harvey and Macdonald, (1993) 
emerges from the fact that it assists to ensure the suitability of questions for 
the answers/ideas the researcher is attempting to extract from the 
interviewees. For Bryman, (2001) validity relates to the effectiveness and 
accuracy of the measuring tools. This means validity involves that the methods 
and techniques used to generate data for the research are genuine and 
suitable to achieve the purpose. Furthermore, criticism could be applied by the 
researcher and others to verify the truthfulness of the data. In this regard any 
information found to be incomplete, distorted or doubtful, including false 
arguments, was excluded. As asserted by Neuman, (2007) it is essential that a 
firmed vigorous link is maintained between the ideas and the reality of the 
social phenomenon on the ground.  
In this respect, socially desirable responding is considered to be threat to 
validity. This might result from fear or suggested value judgements related to 
close-ended questions. However, in order for the respondents not to feel 
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worried or threatened because of the information they released I assured them 
of confidentiality and anonymity and I only did face-to face interviews that 
included one person separately. To avoid suggestions of value judgements I 
opted for open-ended questions and only intervened to make clarification or 
probing. Furthermore to reduce any bias of the researcher and respondents, I 
used the field notes, documentation review, and observation to cross- check 
data. Finally, the process of data analysis, which employed Miles and 
Humberman approach to data analysis, has served to ensure data validation 
as well. 
 
Reflexivity 
The subjectivity of the researcher and the respondents is part of the research 
process which should be considered (Wengraf, 2000:144). The researcher’s 
self-awareness about how her/his own social identity and background 
influences the research process is referred to as reflexivity (Robson, 2002:22). 
The researcher is quite aware of the challenge of accessibility to information 
and people in generating data and information. Being from the region and with 
previous research experience on similar issues and practical work experience 
in the same area most likely helped me to overcome such difficulty. However 
this familiarity with the area and the people poses another challenge, which is 
subjectivity. In this regard what is expected from the researcher is to 
acknowledge and identify openly the emancipatory aims he/ she might hold, as 
well as the factors that make one’s setting particular and relative (Parker and 
Sim, 1997:130).  
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During the first years of my undergraduate studies in Khartoum, I was an 
active member of a number of advocacy groups and students societies. I was 
a co-founder of an advocacy group which was calling for equal rights and fair 
policies for university admission as the then policies were considered to be in 
favour of the students from the centre of the country. I was motivated by my 
background as someone from a periphery area and realized the disparity 
between Khartoum and Darfur with regard to standard of living and social 
services.  Following the military coup of 1989, I was an active member of the 
Umma political party. During the 1990s I was also an active member of local 
advocacy and human rights’ organizations.   
 
After graduation, I developed a special interest in conflict and peace studies 
and I received good training in  conflict resolution and also became a trainer 
myself; facilitating training workshops on awareness raising and advocacy on 
conflict mitigation/resolution and management for community leaders and local 
staff.  During my work with the UN in Darfur, I also facilitated training 
workshops on the dissemination of information and gauging of views on peace 
initiatives and peace agreements, namely; the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan, and the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) between some rebel groups in Darfur and the central 
government in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The targeted groups in these 
workshops included IDPs, tribal and community leaders, as well as police and 
military personnel. These accumulative experiences enabled me to obtain 
ideas and better understanding of the dynamic of tribal conflicts in Darfur, their 
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triggers, root causes and mechanisms used to deal with them. Also, these 
activities enlightened me about human rights and gender issues. Eventually, 
and since the end of 1990s I opted to publicly criticise the deteriorated 
situation in Darfur, especially with regard to the escalation and increasing of 
tribal conflicts and the way the government has been dealing with them. This 
was again influenced by my personal experience when my own tribe was 
attacked in May 2002 and more than 50 civilians were killed. I therefore 
approached the research as someone who already had strong views about 
what was happening in Darfur and so had to take special care in not allowing 
these views to bias my data collection or analysis.  
 
Research structure 
This research consists of eight chapters.  Chapter one concerns itself with the 
“research introduction, design and methodology”. These are issues such as 
research area, preliminary overview, genesis of the research, research 
problem, research questions, aims and objectives as well as research design 
and methodology. Chapter two discusses “conceptual framework and literature 
review”. This is connected to three aspects of literature: a/ Literature related to 
theoretical concepts of conflict resolution, b/ Literature related to conflict 
resolution in Africa and c/ Literature related to conflict resolution in the Sudan 
with especial focus on Darfur (tribal conflicts and its resolution). Chapter three 
focuses on the “political legacy in Darfur”. This chapter aims to show that tribal 
leadership structures and local governance in Darfur have been subjected to 
highly significant changes over time and mostly these were deliberate and 
politically motivated. This process was started by the British colonial power and 
  
48 
 
continued following Sudan’s independence. 
Chapter four discusses “the anatomy of conflicts in Darfur” in general mainly 
since British colonial period in 1916 up to 1956.  Backgrounds on geographical 
location of Darfur, tribal composition, concepts of tribe and ethnicity, tribal 
leadership system, NA, local governments and land tenure system were all 
discussed. 
Chapter five focuses on the “The Anatomy of Conflicts in South Darfur”, 
particularly reflects on the Root, Proximate causes and Triggering factors. It 
identifies the main actors and their interests and influences, different factors, 
triggers and underlying causes, and as such serve as a platform for the 
following two chapters, which looked into how indigenous mechanisms 
addressed these issues. Chapter six “Beyond the ITRC: Indigenous 
mechanisms of conflict resolution / management in Darfur” is devoted mainly to 
discuss the judiyya as an indigenous community sponsored mechanism. It 
reflects on the practices of this mechanism and offers some accounts provided 
by the key informants in this regard. 
Chapter seven focuses on the experience of the ITRCs and their attempts to 
resolve tribal conflicts in South Darfur. This chapter is divided into a number of 
subsections. The sub-sections include reflections on the principles of the 
ITRCs, the role and the way they were functioning, the main actors, including 
tribes involved, the key issues addressed by these conferences. Political 
ambitions attributed to ITRCs were also highlighted and examined.  
Chapter eight offers an overall conclusion to the thesis and particularly sheds 
light the extent to which the thesis was able to address the main research 
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questions. Also, the conclusion highlights the main impediments and 
challenges faced by the ITRCs, which need further investigation and as such it 
could be a focus of the future research in South Darfur.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
 
 Conceptual framework for Analysis  
Introduction  
Sudan (which refers to the territory up to 9th July2011-the date when the 
southern Sudan became a separate independent country-see the map below) 
did not know a serious attempt to create a central political entity prior to the 
nineteenth century. The only attempt of a kind started during the Turkish 
Egyptian colonial era; 1821- 1881 (Harir and Tvedt, 1994: 96). However, the 
territories named Sudan, as of today, have a deeply rooted history, but as a 
scattered political entities with different names. These were independent 
Kingdoms and Sultanates; for example, in the further north there was the 
Kingdom of Kush with its two branches ( Nabta and Marrawe ,750 BC- 350 
BC), which was followed by the Christian kingdoms; Alwa and Almagara 
(Terefi, 1988:39-41). The latter two kingdoms lasted until the fifteenth century 
and ended with the establishment of the Kingdom of Funj, 1504-1821 (also 
known as Sennar Islamic Kingdom) in the centre of the current Sudan, which 
included in addition to the territories of the above two Christian kingdoms some 
parts of the current region of Kordofan and Beja territories in the west and 
eastern of Sudan respectively (Terefi, 1988:40). In the west there were Islamic 
sultanates; Such as Musabaat Sultanate and the Kingdom of Tagali in 
Kordofan, besides the Fur Sultanate and the Massalit Sultanate in Darfur. The 
South experienced no unified independent political entity; but rather separate 
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entities according to their own local and tribal constituencies led by tribal 
leaders. From 750 BC through the Nubian Christian kingdoms, the Funj 
sultanate and up to the nineteenth century (1821), no single central authority 
experienced political control over the territories that came to be known later as 
Sudan (Woodward, 1990:19).   
 
Map 3: Sudan up to 8th July 2011(before the separation of the South Sudan) 
 
Source: http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://burningbillboard.org/wp-
content/maps/sudan/demarcation 
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Map 4: Sudan after the separation of the South Sudan in 9th of July 2011 
  
Source: http://www.maps.com/ref_map.aspx?cid=694,720,730,954&pid 
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The concepts of Nation-state and Nation-building 
Lapalombara, (1974:33) defines nation-state as a sovereign national entity 
which extends its legislation and authority to prevail and includes every person 
living within its territories. Other definitions identify the following as the most 
fundamental elements of nation-state: government, people, land, and 
sovereignty.  Albathani, (1988:9) for example, elaborates that sovereign state 
is the one that has the ability of formulating its foreign policy according to its 
own interests and internally to have the ability to extend its sovereignty over its 
members and its surroundings with legislation extending to include every 
citizen lives within its territory. The idea of a nation-state entails a government 
that derives its legitimacy from the people and that citizenship is the basis of 
rights and obligations. Such government should work towards maintaining 
social harmony among different groups, a thing which does not come only as a 
result of coexistence and interaction among groups during an extended period 
of time within geographic boundaries, but rather could be achieved through the 
encouragement of these groups to establish common interests, feelings and 
affinities (Lapalombara,1974:41); i.e. the encouragement, promotion and 
facilitation of the process of interaction and overlapping between groups 
through using different patterns of mobilization.  
 
Furthermore, the role of the modern nation-state extends to deliver what 
Robert (2002) came to describe as political goods. These include a range of 
services such as security, education and health services, economic 
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opportunities, basic infrastructures, etc., in addition to “ a legal framework of 
order and a judicial system to administer it” (Robert, 2002:87). 
 
Nation building, on the other hand is defined as “…a community of equal, 
rights-bearing citizens united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values” (Seymour et al, 1996:32). Colonial rulers were driven by 
their own colonial interests, which was necessarily contrasting with the 
philosophy of building a nation (Collins, 2008:21). This was evidenced in the 
divide and rule policies and other related systematic efforts contributed to 
maintain society fragmented in the African colonies (Duignan and Gann, 
1975). Artificial boundaries with communities of diverse cultures, ethnic and 
religious backgrounds  forced to be part of these territories was another 
example, in addition to the British policy of indirect rule  which recognized dual 
systems of judiciary and governance (See chapter 3 for further account with 
regard to Sudan).  In spite of these challenges, “opportunities for nation-
building were present at independence”, such as public consciousness and 
enthusiasm due to mobilization for independence, civil service and other 
establishments, which could be built on to achieve  genuine nation-building 
(Doe,2009 :92-93). Regrettably, no efforts were exerted to build on these 
basics. Using the excuse of abolishing traditional structures and loyalties to 
build a broader nation and identity, the new ruling elites often adopted one 
party systems and a single ideology which often became a means of 
suppression and, as described by Davidson, (1992) no more than vehicle for 
autocracy. 
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Sudan was not an exception to this pattern; following independence third world 
countries tended to face challenges of nation-building. However, regardless of 
the variety of strategies adopted by different countries, a general theoretical 
framework under which these challenges of nation-building was maintained 
was referred to as the “transformation process”, which involves a shift in the 
policies and structures inherited from colonial authorities, towards new policies, 
and perhaps new/modified structures, in line with the requirements of nation-
building after independence (Zarnouqa, 1994:97). 
 
In this respect, the patterns of the ‘transformation process’ varied from one 
country to another (Zarnouqa, 1994:97-99). There are countries (namely, 
some of Asian countries) that achieved national unity through building and 
supporting institutions which assisted in maintaining a reasonable level of 
political stability. The latter was made possible through establishment of 
bodies and mechanisms enabled peaceful handover of power and that were 
capable to resolve the contradictions regarding power and wealth sharing arise 
from time to time in a peaceful manner as well. Other countries followed the 
same direction but were faced with the problem of political instability and 
regime change due to struggles over power and wealth sharing. Here we can 
imagine more than one scenario; some countries were able to overcome such 
difficulties, after some time. Other countries found themselves in a vicious 
circle of civil war and political instability due to struggle over power (most of 
which were African countries). The third group was exposed to civil wars, 
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which led to the secession of some parts (e.g. Ethiopia and Sudan) or collapse 
of the state itself (e.g. Somalia).  
 
Experience of Nation-state in the Sudan 
With the beginning of the Egyptian-Turkish rule in Sudan (1821- 1885), 
attempts to strengthen the central authority in Khartoum began, which were 
merely motivated by colonial interests (Collins, 2008:10). This could be 
considered the first genuine attempt of creating central authority in Khartoum 
to control the scattered political entities. For example, the attempts to attach 
the Southern Sudan to the central government in Khartoum started only in 
1839 onwards; before this time, the Southern Sudan remained isolated from 
the political developments in the north (O’Fahey, 2008:262).  
Then came the attempts made by the Mahadist state (1885- 1898); which was 
the first national rule in the Sudan. Mohammed Ahmed Al Mahdi (the leader of 
the Mahadist revolution) and his successor (Khalifa); Abdullah Altaaishi 
managed to establish a central authority in Omdurman (O’Fahey, 2008). They 
made considerable efforts to create a national entity, on an ideological Islamic 
basis. The territories of the Mahadist state, which lasted for about thirteen 
years(1885- 1898), included most of the territory of the modern Sudan in the 
north, west, east, and parts of the southern Sudan-the northern parts of Upper 
Nile and Bahr el Ghazal (Collins, 2008:21-27).  
 
The third attempt at strengthening and expanding the central authorities in 
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Khartoum could be attributed to the second colonial period (the Condominium 
(Anglo-Egyptian rule, 1899-1955), at the end of which the modern Sudan came 
into being (Holt, 1965).  Most of the territories which came to be known as 
modern Sudan were annexed during Condominium rule; the best example was 
the Fur and the Massalit Sultanates, which were  officially annexed to the 
central government in Khartoum, only  in the years 1916 and 1922 respectively 
(de Waal, 2009:8; Daly, 2007:120). Then Sudan became the biggest country in 
Africa in terms of territory and a highly diversified state in terms of geography, 
ethnicity, and culture. The then Sudan included 19 major ethnic groups and 
597 sub-groups (tribes) speaking more than 115 languages and local dialects, 
with about 70% Muslims and 30% Christians and other local spiritual beliefs 
(Ahmed, 1988:16-19; Malwal, 1981). The influence of religious and ethnic 
factors appears from the fact that those who claimed to be Arab and/or 
Muslims lived in the north and those who claimed African origin and believed in 
Christianity or other religions lived mostly in the South.  
Strategy of Nation-building in the Sudan 
Having become an independent country in 1956, some scholars identified the 
most prominent challenges faced by Sudan as (Bashir, no date: 36): 1) How to 
achieve national unity, which entails dealing with a diversified society in terms 
of culture ethnicity, and religion, and 2) How to realize even development 
amongst different regions. Accordingly, the following were pointed out as the 
most fundamental pillars to achieve such objectives (Albathani, 1988:9): 
1. Establishment of a compromise political system acceptable to different 
groups, which advocates equality among citizens on the basis of 
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citizenship and allows for equitable power sharing, distribution of wealth 
and development among regions. 
2.  As a sovereign state is expected to have the ability to extend its 
sovereignty over its members and its surroundings and externally to 
have the ability of formulating its foreign policy according to its own 
interests. 
3.  To develop economic and social policies necessary to achieve 
equitable balanced development and modernization of the economy 
and society structures in line with local needs of state and society. 
 
Nation-building encompasses “a process whereby individuals and communities 
are socialised into a larger political community and to which they remain 
devoted and loyal” (Seyon, 1977: 20).  From a theoretical point of view, we can 
mainly talk about three strategies to achieve such an aim (Zarnouqa, 1994:97-
99): 
 1) The strategy of modernization and social change, which aims to bring about 
change in a deliberate and planned manner so as to eliminate the traditional 
beliefs and values and to replace them with modern ones, 2) The cross-cutting 
strategy, which consider various issues and challenges facing the nation-
building in an integrated manner, 3) The strategy of national ideology, which 
heavily relies on ideology as a backbone and driving force to achieve national 
unity.   
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In Sudan the strategy of national ideology based on Arabic-Islamic culture was 
the main strategy that was employed by the liberation movements in mobilizing 
people to fight colonial authorities. This was the case of the Mahadist 
revolution, which fought the Turkish-Egyptian colonial power and was able to 
defeat them and to establish a first national central authority in 
Omdurman/Khartoum. Then the same strategy was used again to resist Anglo-
Egyptian rule.  
 
Following Sudan’s independence all the successive national regimes, both 
military and civilian, reinvented this same strategy to strengthen the legitimacy 
of the ruling elites and as a basis for building a Sudanese nationalism, as they 
claimed (Musa, 2011:120-122). Practical experience has shown the failure of 
this strategy in achieving its stated goals, especially in light of the monopoly of 
wealth and power by minority groups and the perpetuation of a policy of 
uneven development. This failure appeared earlier and has manifested itself in 
the following examples; the emergence of rebel movements in southern Sudan 
since 1955 (Malwal, 1981) up to 2005, with only limited periods of peace. The 
emergence of regional and ethnic political entities in other regions of Sudan in 
early 1960s; for example, the Union of the Nuba Mountains in southern 
Kordofan, Darfur Development Front in Darfur and the Beja Union in eastern 
Sudan due to the fact that successive governments insisted not to admit the 
right of these groups in power and wealth sharing, and continued to adopt the 
same strategy (Prunier, 2007:40).  These peaceful political formations in the 
above mentioned areas shifted to armed resistance movements; during the 
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1980s, 1990s and 2002 respectively. Civil wars in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Nuba 
mountains are still on-going.  The Separation of Southern Sudan in July 2011 
was but an obvious end result of the prolonged civil war between north and 
south Sudan that continued for about half a century (1955-2005, with only 
short periods of peace).  
 
The peripheries of the Sudan have been waging resistance against the 
domination of the centre in different ways and scales. It was also a battle 
against different aspects of socio-economic inequality and marginalization, 
which appeared in the uneven development with regard to certain regions and 
the imposing of a single culture under an ideological religious justification (see 
chapter 3 for more details).  Rothchild et al, (1996) argued that struggle over 
power; including minority and ethnic conflicts, is a central factor behind 
intrastate wars. In Africa, practical experience however indicates that in many 
cases the majority-dominated government system did not assure minority 
rights, a thing which led to further fears and made minority groups opt for 
armed resistance and secession (Fearon, 1994:7-12). As observed by 
Rothchild et al, (1996) a feeling of insecurity contributes to ethnic conflicts; 
when one group or each group is becoming suspicious of the intention of the 
other a reciprocal antagonistic relation emerges. Conca et al, (2000) refers 
specifically to the competition over resources and stressed that struggling to 
control or get access to resources such as land, oil, water, etc. is an imperative 
factor behind intrastate conflicts. The above arguments were reinforced by 
Rugumamu, (2002), who indicated that intrastate conflicts in Africa are mostly 
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motivated by underlying causes related to economic and political imbalances, 
which are further aggravated by state repression, poor governance, ethnic 
composition and the repercussions of previous history of inter-relations of such 
groups.  
 
Approaches to dealing with conflicts 
Reinmann, (2005:7) refers to three main approaches in dealing with conflicts, 
which are conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. 
These three approaches could be more relevant in providing the conceptual 
basis for this study and to comprehend to what extent the mechanism of the 
ITRCs fit either of them.  
 
Conflict settlement aims to put an end to the different forms of apparent 
violence, which does not necessarily imply that the underlying causes of the 
conflict are addressed (Zartman, 1989). This approach perceives conflict as 
something negative which hampers development. Further to using peaceful 
tactics such as negotiation and mediation, it incorporates forcible measures 
such as military and/or economic sanctions. Conflict resolution on the other 
hand considers conflict as a manifestation of dissatisfaction in relation to 
human needs (Kelman et al, 2003). This approach distinguishes between 
interests (economic, political, etc.), which it describes as changeable and 
negotiable, and needs (security, justice, recognition), which it considers as 
natural non-negotiable issues. The focus here is on the issues of conflict and 
the concern is how to resolve these issues rather than looking for a frame of 
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reference that focuses on the restoration and building of relationships 
(Lederach, 2006:24). The aim thus is not to end the conflict, but rather to get 
rid of the violent nature of the conflict and transform it into a non-violent one 
through encouraging communication and improvement of an interest-based 
mutual understanding of all parties (Burton, 1990). This approach uses a range 
of methods to achieve such objectives, which are mediation, negotiation and 
arbitration. Conflict transformation perceives conflict as normal and 
“continuous dynamic within human relationships” (Lederach, 2003:15). In this 
regard Conflict transformation is defined as: 
 “envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving 
opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, 
increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-
life problems in human relationships” (Lederach,2003:14).  
In other words, conflict transformation: “is a process of engaging with and 
transforming the wider social, economic and political structures underlying a 
conflict, including transformation of the relationships, interests, discourse and, 
if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of 
violent conflict” (Miall et al. 1999:4). In this sense conflict resolution is mostly 
suitable to address open conflicts whereas conflict transformation is suitable to 
address both open and latent conflicts (Omeje, 2008:70). 
 
Having these definitions in mind, I could claim that the approach adopted by 
the successive Sudanese governments (since independence 1956 up to 
present) in dealing with conflicts has constantly been a conflict settlement 
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approach. Particularly in Darfur, regardless of the nature and levels of conflicts, 
it is evident (further elaborations is provided in chapter 7) that in most cases, 
the eruption of a conflict is usually faced by security measures and an 
excessive use of force rather than negotiation (Mohammed, 2009:33). It seems 
that the first thing a government thinks about is declaring a state of 
emergency, imposing military rule, creating special courts to prosecute what 
they describe as outlaws, elements of banditry and  armed robbery, and to 
confiscate weapons claimed to be possessed illegally. All these measures are 
then followed by mediation and arbitration under government auspices, as the 
documents of the ITRCs indicate. 
 
 Literature Review and Research Contribution 
Although many African countries have undergone similar experiences of 
colonialism during which ‘indigenous Mechanisms’ were adopted as an integral 
part of their systems of justice and administration, they do not all share 
‘Common Systems of Conflict Resolution’ (Alie, 2008). Experiences of 
colonialism differ and traditions and customs differ as well from one country to 
another and within each country, depending on the ‘style of colonialism’ on one 
hand and the patterns of ethnic and cultural diversity on the other (Doe, 
2009:90-91). Accordingly, each country has its own unique experience 
regarding the way they have employed these mechanisms.  
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There is a growing body of literature on African indigenous systems1 and their 
role in conflict resolution and peace-building in post conflict. In spite of the fact 
that Sudan is largely excluded from this literature, and the focus is more on the 
experience of a few selected countries, the overall analysis seems to be 
persuasively applicable to all African countries including Sudan, as this 
literature reflects on the main structural features and relations of the colonial 
state which are common to many of the African countries, regardless of the 
nationality of the colonizers. Also, a considerable part of this literature focuses 
on peace, justice, and reconciliation in the post conflict period, and the 
interrelationship and the overlapping of these issues. Furthermore, the 
literature has also elaborated on the experience of employment of the 
indigenous systems and mechanisms in post conflict peace building in some 
African countries. The common factor of this literature was the role of the 
indigenous systems and mechanisms in conflict settlement and achieving 
peaceful coexistence amongst communities.  
                                                          
1 . Examples: 
 1.World Bank Indigenous Knowledge Database on Africa Region, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/guidelines/. 
2. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (ed.) (2008), Traditional Justice and Reconciliation 
after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm. 
3. Peace and Conflict in Africa, edited by David Francis (2008), Zwd Books Ltd: 
London. 
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In his book, which is titled "Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism", Mamdani, 1996 has given a considerable space 
for discussions on ‘Native Authority’, Customary law and the relationship of the 
tribal leaders with the colonial authorities. All that was reflected within the 
context of the British Indirect Rule; a policy which, as stated by Mamdani, has 
resulted in: two separate, yet related, forms of authority: the central ‘modern 
state’ and the ‘Native Authority’ at the local levels. The former applied civil law, 
meanwhile the latter adopted customary law along ethnic and tribal lines 
(Mamdani, 1996:11).  
Due to this historical reality, Mamdani, argues that one of the core agenda 
items faced by African states after independence was how to deal with this 
legacy of a divided conflicting society; with a dual demographic nature: 
urban/rural communities and dual legal system: civil law/customary law 
(Mamdani, 1996:11). A part of the debate raised by the author was about what 
constitutes customary law? Mamdani’s argument is that tribal leaders who 
were backed by colonial administrations possessed arbitrary power to decide 
the content of customary law (Mamdani, 1996:12). Mani, (2002:82) agrees with 
Mamdani that rules which are derived from what came to be known as 
customary law “do  not necessarily  produce laws which were well designed to 
achieve justice”. Furthermore, sometimes it seems to be more problematic to 
deal with local systems in the situation of post- conflict, especially with regard 
to transitional justice, as it is difficult to decide whether these structures are 
sufficient and capable of being built on or whether they are best ignored 
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(Pankhurst, 1999:243). Wassara, (2007) indicated that wars bring political and 
administrative instability that hits formal and informal structures and institutions 
in a given society. For instance, as observed by the same author, the return-
home process following post conflict generates competition between tribal 
leaders over local tribal authority as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and 
refugees’ chiefs are more exposed to new values (Wassara, 2007). Mani, 
(2002:82) states that the worse situation is the simplistic supposition made by 
the colonial administrators that customary law is static and uniform which is 
often repeated by the UN rule of law reform programmes of today. 
Another type of literature focuses on issues of peace, justice and 
reconciliation. A good example is an article which is written by Pankhurst, 
(1999) and is titled: “Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political 
Emergencies: conceptualising reconciliation, justice and peace”. The focus in 
this article is how to achieve balance between demands for peace, justice and 
reconciliation in the post-conflict situation. The author provides five different 
linguistic meanings for the word reconcile, the common factor among which is 
individual focus and that they describe reconciliation as to get friendly 
relationship (Pankhurst, 1999:240). However distinction has been made when 
it comes to reconciliation within political contexts; issues such as forgiveness 
and truth come forward (Pankhurst, 1999: 241). As defined by one of the 
authors, reconciliation "refers to a large number of activities that help turn the 
temporary peace of an agreement which ends the fighting into a lasting end to 
the conflict itself" (Spanger et al, 2003). In this regard Alie, (2008) agrees with 
Pankhurst (1999) that justice and reconciliation are fundamental components 
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to achieve peace. However as convincingly put by Pankhurst: "There is no 
common understanding of the political conditions under which efforts on 
reconciliation should be minimal in relation to focus on justice in order to 
achieve the 'best' peace, or of those where the pursuit of justice should 
become paramount." (Pankhurst, 1999: 239).That seems to depend on specific 
concurrences of political, cultural and historical forces (Alie, 2008:08). The 
study makes an important clarification of what is the differentiation between the 
descriptive- negative peace and positive peace. Very often the ending of 
violent is referred to as peace. However, Pankhurst, (1999:239) and Miall 
(2005:27) agree on Azar’s definition that positive peace is a situation whereby 
future potential cultural and structural violence is overcome.  
Regarding the concept of justice, Pankhurst (1999) argues that sometimes 
justice is defined to mean the rule of law. However, she added that there are 
two versions of rule of law; a minimalist version which is associated with the 
short term and related to personal security and rights of protection from 
arbitrary violence, and the maximalist conception which is associated with the 
long term and related to issues like human rights democracy and good 
governance (Pankhurst, 1999). Mani, (2002) also has referred to the two 
concepts of Minimalist and the Maximalist that relate to the rule of law; 
however she considers the rule of law as only one dimension of justice. For 
Mani, (2002) justice consists of three dimensions: legal justice relates to legal 
institutions and rule of law enforcement, rectificatory justice which relates to 
gross human rights abuses and distributive justice that addresses socio-
economic and political discrimination and inequalities. 
  
68 
 
 Furthermore, Pankhurst,(1999:239) and Mani, (2002:53) agree on the 
potential role that the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations and 
other international actors can play with regard to justice. However Mani (2002) 
emphasizes issues that might hinder this role. First, the rule of law reform 
programs that have been carried out to provide legal justice to citizens in post-
conflict has adopted a minimalist approach which, ‘tends to treat rule of law as 
a mechanism for establishing order rather than a vehicle to restore justice 
within society’(Mani, 2002:53) . Secondly, outsiders are faced with the problem 
of how to identify what is considered as ‘authentic’ and accepted’ customary 
law and legal traditions for a given society in order to integrate within the legal 
framework of reform programmes they propose to adopt(Mani, 2002). 
A third type of literature focuses on “Traditional Justice and Reconciliation”. A 
good example, here, is a study on "Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after 
Violent Conflicts: Learning from African Experiences" undertaken by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in 2008 and 
edited by Huyse, L. And Salter, M. The study explores the increasing role of 
the indigenous  techniques in transitional justice and reconciliation policies. It 
reflects on the experience of Rwandan, Mozambique, Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
and Burundi. Also, Murithi, (2008) provided brief examples of the experience of 
what he called the ‘indigenous’ and ‘endogenous’ mechanisms of conflict 
resolutions in some selected African countries such as the Jir in Nigeria, Guurti 
in Somali land, Mato Oput in Uganda, and the Ubuntu which is used in a 
number of societies  across Southern, Central and East Africa (Murithi, 
2008:19-26).  These studies examine the difference in implementation and 
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nature of these indigenous mechanisms, which range from secular to religious 
practices. Omeje, (2008) argued that the common factor among the African 
approaches to conflict resolution is that they seemed to be inspired by the 
“Swahili (originally Bantu) concept of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is a humanistic 
philosophy (which has no English synonym) and connotes ‘collective 
personhood’, and is best captured by the Zulu maxims: ‘a person is a person 
through other persons” (Omeje, 2008:89).  
Issues addressed by these indigenous mechanisms include offences ranging 
from minor injustices like theft to more serious issues involving violence 
between members of a society, murder or manslaughter (Murithi, 2008:24). In 
Somaliland, for example, Guurti is a method of dispute settlement. According 
to a Guurti-based governance structure in Somaliland, “supreme authority in 
decision-making, peace-making, adjudication and reconciliation of disputes 
rests with a council of community elders that as a matter of rule excludes 
women, youth and social minorities within the clan” (Omeje, 2008:90).  
In South Africa, for example, the main task of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was ‘the promotion of national unity and reconciliation’; 
justice has not been included in the name of the TRC. Malan, (2008:138) 
argued that  justice, in the general terms to mean equal rights and treatment of 
all groups was adhered to by the TRC, but mostly as Ubuntu-friendly 
restorative justice which could contribute to building a new society and 
facilitate integration of perpetrators. In Rwanda, for example, the ‘Gacaca’ only 
became the combined mechanism for restorative and punitive justice following 
the modification made on it by the Rwandan parliament, and accordingly an 
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adapted form of Gacaca system was incorporated into the judiciary system and 
Gacaca courts were established by the government to serve couple of 
purposes: justice and reconciliation (Malan, 2008:135). 
 
Regarding the implementation of justice, the concerned political leaders, 
lawyers, members of civil society and academics debate whether priority 
should be given to achieving peace/reconciliation and political stability or 
should the emphasis be on prosecution of perpetrators (Alie, 2008). 
Negotiated peace often results in a compromise agreement between the 
warriors (Pankhurst, 1999). So, the legitimate question is how to balance the 
demands for justice against the many socio-economic and political constraints 
(Alie, 2008)? In this respect the suggestion is to look for other alternatives, 
which tend to be the ‘traditional’ mechanisms for justice and reconciliation, to 
avoid 'the dangers of too much and of too little criminal justice' (Alie, 2008: 03).  
 
Indigenous mechanisms have sometimes proved to be useful in conflict 
management, resolution and peace building, however they have their own 
limitations, such as the alteration in form and substance due to three factors: 
colonization, modernization and civil wars (Alie, 2008:08). Furthermore, there 
is a shift with respect to the issues over which people used to struggle (Irobi, 
2005). In this regard, though used interchangeably, it is useful to make a 
distinction between two terms; dispute and conflict. Spangler and Burgess, 
(2003) indicate that disputes are short-term disagreements that involve 
interests and needs, which are relatively negotiable and easy to resolve while 
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long-term, deep-rooted problems that involve seemingly non-negotiable 
issues- such as identity, autonomy and recognition- are referred to as conflicts.  
 
The main conclusion is that African indigenous/ traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms are restorative justice-oriented. These mechanisms were also 
criticised on the basis that they were slow in bringing about agreements 
because their procedures based on consensus-building as they are guided by 
the principle of consensus, collective responsibility and communal solidarity 
(Yakubu, 1995:4-13). In Rwanda between 1994-2003 “some ten thousand of 
Gacaca-based courts reported to have been established, yet during this period 
only 10% had held pre-trial hearings and none had begun to try alleged 
perpetrators” (Malan, 2008:136). Also settling land related disputes in 
Somaliland proved to be problematic because elders have no training on 
conflicts concerning land tenure in urban centres, and where the situation is 
further complicated by the loss or destruction of property titles during the 
Somali civil war (Hart and Saed, 2010:8). Another disadvantage of the 
indigenous methods of conflict resolution is that they are highly context specific 
with the honour and the respect of the outcomes often depending on the 
competence of mediators, and the traditions and values of the communities 
(Omeje, 2008:90). Murithi, (2008:26) observed that there is a rich oral history 
of these local mechanisms, but a lack of documentary records. 
 
Further to the above a couple of other issues are also problematic with regard 
to the study of the role of indigenous/ traditional mechanisms in post-conflict 
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situations. First: the term "traditional" is of Eurocentric notion which tends to 
describe an existence of static normative structure, however in reality these 
structures are subject to change due to socio-economic and political factors 
(Alie, 2008:08). Second: the strong tendency within European and North 
America academic and NGO communities to visualize traditions as persistent, 
which has been added to the already existing cultural barriers such as 
language (Alie, 2008: 08). Thus Ethnocentrism represents a basic source of 
misconceptions in looking at the outside world. For example, concepts that 
prevail in Europe and North America such as 'amnesty', 'impunity' and 
'forgiveness' do not necessarily exist/or have the same meanings in the African 
local languages (Alie, 2008:08). In this regard Murithi, (2008) made a 
distinction between two terms ‘indigenous’ and ‘endogenous’. “Indigenous 
refers to that which is inherent to a given society but also that which is innate 
and instinctive. Endogenous refers to that which emerges from a society; 
processes that are generated and systematically reproduced by such a 
society” (Murithi, 2008:17).  This indicates that traditions and customs are not 
static but dynamic and change over time. Hart and Saed, (2010:17) asserted 
that due to its ‘organic and flexible nature’, customary law, “has the potential to 
integrate into its system of rule-based problem solving the values, strategies, 
and practices of conflict transformation”. 
 
However a couple of important questions remain with regard to the potential 
role of the indigenous mechanisms in post conflict peace building: First; “are 
these indigenous tools able to deal with war crimes, genocide and crimes 
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against humanity? Second; do they have the capacity to restore years and 
sometimes decades of material and social destruction?” (Huyse and Salter, 
2008:184). The study provided that the answer is not straightaway ‘yes’  in a 
sense that  “tradition-based practices have the potential to produce a dividend 
in terms of the much needed post-conflict accountability, truth telling and 
reconciliation that is not negligible”( Huyse and Salter,2008:192).  
 
This leads to a question of what kind of justice is required in the post conflict 
situation. While international tribunals focus on retributive justice, UN and sub-
regional organizations are more conflict regulation and conflict management-
oriented but have not been designed with the view to fostering reconciliation 
(Malan, 2008:144). On the other hand African conflict resolution mechanisms 
mostly are restorative justice-oriented. Transitional justice (TJ) comes in the 
middle between two extremes; it is described as “the interrelated processes of 
restorative and retributive justice that usually play a crucial part in the period of 
politico-socio-economic transition between the resolving of a conflict that 
managed to oust an unjust authoritarian regime and the effective 
establishment of a new and just democratic dispensation” (Malan, 2008:147). 
The restorative and retributive justice are core components of TJ; practical 
experiences, such as the case of South Africa and Rwanda showed whichever 
of the two is given priority the other also has to be taken into account (Malan, 
2008:147). Perhaps this is one of the strongest reasons of the increasing 
tendency of incorporating endogenous/ indigenous approaches as an 
alternative form of restorative justice (Murithi, 2008:25). The emphasis here is 
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on rebuilding of social trust, healing of social divisions and restoration of 
broken relationships, something which continued to represent challenge for the 
liberal peace approaches of peace building. Restorative justice is rooted in 
indigenous and religious systems of problem solving, however it was only over 
the last thirty to forty years has been integrated on a global basis into formal 
legal systems (Hart and saed, 2010:16). This leads us to the issue of hybridity 
approach in dealing with the post conflict situation. As defined by MacGinty 
(2011:1) 
“I understand hybridity as both a process and a condition of interaction 
between actors and practices. It is a process of social negotiation, conflict and 
coalescence and can be found in all societies and social interactions. It is not 
the grafting together of two discrete entities to produce a third entity. Instead, it 
is a more complex and fluid process of interchange. It is assumed that actors, 
norms and practices are the result of prior-hybridisation”.  
MacGinty, (2010) calls for employing hybridity approach in dealing with post 
conflict situation. He argued that the purpose of using hybridity as a tool is to 
provide a more accurate view of the dynamic and diverse nature of actors, 
ideas and practices that contribute to peace building and aid during a post 
conflict situation (MacGinty, 2010: 2).   
 
As conflict resolution in Sudan has not been included in many studies that 
have covered conflict resolution in Africa; only very little literature on Sudan is 
available. With the exception of a joint survey conducted by the UNDP and the 
UNICEF on ‘Conflict Mapping in Sudan’, 2002 the different regions of Sudan 
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were rather studied separately.  The emphasis has been on Southern Sudan 
and recently on Darfur in general due to the civil war that broke out in both 
regions. However such literature focuses on the civil wars and the causes of 
these wars rather than focusing on conflict resolution.  In relation to the 
literature on South Darfur, there is no literature that covers this area with this 
focus. With regard to Darfur in general there is very little literature of any kind. 
In this regard the existing literature could be divided into two:  
1) Literature concerned with the conflict in Darfur in general, most of  which 
reflects on tribal conflicts to present historical background to the armed 
resistance that recently took place in the region (1991 and then from 2002 
onwards). This group could be represented by De Waal, 1993; Harir, 1994; De 
Waal; 2005b; De Waal, 2007; Daly, 2007; Marchal, 2007; Tubiana, 2007; 
Totten and Markusen, 2006; Prunier, 2005 and 2007; Collins, 2008; Mamdani, 
2009 and Musa, 2011. 
2) Literature with a focus on the causes of tribal conflicts in Darfur partially 
covers conflict resolution and tends to offer general descriptions of the ITRCs. 
Here, there are many studies among which, the most relevant are: Ali, 1999; 
Ali, 2002; Ayoub, 1991; Bashar, 2003; Hagar, 2003; Mohammed, 1998; Salih, 
1999; Mohammed and Badri, 2005; Mohammed, 2009 Rabah; 1998; Takana, 
2009. The common feature of these studies is that they only partially address 
the Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs).  Most of this literature was 
Masters Dissertations focused on the causes of the inter-tribal conflicts in 
Darfur and tangentially refers to the ITRCs within this context. For instance, 
Bashar, 2003 was an exploratory dissertation on the mechanisms of Peaceful 
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co-existence amongst tribes in the entire region of Darfur; Salih (1999) has 
devoted only 11pages out of 209 to discuss the reasons behind the failure of 
the ITRCs. Ayoub, (1991) has focused entirely on one intertribal reconciliation 
conference as a case study (Fur/Arabs conflict in 1987-88). Rabah, (1998) 
selected  two ITRCs( Arabs/Massalit and Fur/Arabs) to focus on as a case 
study in her attempt to look into the role of the NA and the Central Government 
in resolving intertribal conflicts. Ali, (1999), has also studied three ITRCs from 
two different regions (Darfur and Kordofan) as case studies to investigate the 
role of indigenous mechanisms in resolving intertribal conflicts in Darfur and 
Kordofan. Ali, 2002 selected one case study of the Arab/Massalit conflict in 
Western Darfur in 1996-1999.  
With exception of Ali, 2002 and Bashar, 2003, most of these studies have also 
overlooked and/or marginalised the key features of the Native Administration, 
the local government and the central government during the British colonial 
period and post-independence. Also, with exception of the above two cases, 
no sufficient consideration was given to how the relationship between these 
levels of governance have influenced the role of the Native Administration in 
dealing with intertribal conflicts.  
Another point of limitation with regard to the latter group of writings is 
methodological. I observed that issues related to concepts, framework of 
analysis and methodology have not been clearly stated or adopted. In this 
regard again the only exception is, to some extent, Ali, 2002 and Bashar, 
2003. No definitions of concepts such as conflict resolution, settlement, and 
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reconciliation were presented. Furthermore, archival data were rarely referred 
to in most of these studies.  
 
Conclusion 
Like many other African countries, for more than fifty years after independence 
Sudan has been unable to transform the multiple cultural societies within its 
inherited boundaries into a coherent political entity. Woodward (1990:39) 
indicated that in Sudan “the state was being built from the centre outwards, 
[thus] peripheral areas were not nearly as well represented in the 
establishment”. Before and after independence, both the colonial governments 
and the successive national governments focused efforts of development in 
the centre (further elaboration is provided in chapter 3). Peripheries, including 
Darfur were excluded from genuine representation in state apparatus, decision 
making and an effectual fair ‘delivery of political goods’. Accordingly, exercise 
of effective control by the government over peripheries has not been achieved. 
Instead tribes, in most cases, were used as agents for governments to provide 
political support ; a process started earlier during the Fur Sultanates, officially 
legalized by the colonial rule (the Indirect Rule Policy) and  continued in one 
way or another up to present (see chapter 3).  
 
Tribal conflicts in Darfur, thus, should be looked at in this wider context which 
encompasses the process of nation-building and governance policies at 
central and local levels, i.e. the role played by the successive Sudanese 
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regimes to encourage nation-building on a basis that could accommodate 
diversity of tribe, ethnicity and religion. 
As such no in-depth studies were carried out with regard to ITRCs in Darfur 
and South Darfur in particular, making this study unique in analysing tribal 
conflicts within a wider context related to the unresolved issues of nation-
building and in the sense that it depends, to a large extent, on archival data 
supported by interviews. Also, it offers clarity with regard to terms, concepts, 
framework of analysis and adopted methodology. This research, thus, makes a 
significant contribution to the literature on conflict resolution in Sudan in 
general and Darfur in particular in two respects: 1) the practice of the ITRCs in 
South Darfur, and 2) with regard to the conceptualization of the ITRCs. 
 
  
  
79 
 
CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL LEGACY IN DARFUR 
  
Introduction  
This chapter aims to show that tribal leadership structures and local 
governance in Darfur have been subjected to highly significant changes over 
time and mostly these were deliberate and politically motivated. This process 
was started by the British colonial power and continued following Sudan’s 
independence. However in the last two decades the acceleration of these 
changes increased significantly and thus have both fuelled tribal conflicts and 
undermined the ability of the Native Administration (NA) to undertake effective 
conflict resolution / management measures. These structures and their 
mechanisms have been described to me by tribal leaders (KI/1: 3/6/10; KI/5: 
4/6/10; KI/6: 5/6/10; KI/7: 5/6/10; KI/8: 5/6/10; KI/9: 6/6/10; KI/10/6/10; KI/11: 
6/6/10; KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/25: 13/6/10; KI/26: 13/6/10) and identified by 
government officials (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1& Vol. 2) as though they have 
remained unchanged since pre-colonial times. Studies such as Ali, (2002), 
Mohammed, (2009), Abdul-Jalil et al, (2007),  De Waal, (1993), Tubiana, 
(2007), Mamdani,( 2009), Prunier, (2007), and others have pointed to some of  
these changes, but have overlooked their impacts on the Inter-Tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences (IRCs), which was not a focus of any of these 
studies. This research focuses specifically on the ITRCs. This chapter 
examines the key features of the Native Administration and the local 
governance and the changes that have been taking place in this regard during 
the colonial period and after the independence of the Sudan. Detailed 
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accounts of the consequences of these changes on the NA, tribal conflicts and 
ITRCs will be presented in the following chapters, especially chapter 4, 5, and 
7. 
 
Darfur: Ethnic and tribal composition 
 In terms of ethnicity, Darfur is characterized by complexity and diversity (see 
the map below). The Fur, which the region is named after, is the largest ethnic 
group in Darfur, with about one third of the total population (O’Fahey, 
2008:10). The Massalit, which is another tribe of an African origin, is the 
second largest. There are the Zaghawa, Tunjur, Daju, Birgid, Berti and many 
other tribes of African origin. With the exception of the Zaghawa, some of 
whom are still pastoralists; tribes of African origin are predominantly sedentary 
farmers (Prunier, 2007:47). This represents one big block of ethnicity in Darfur, 
which recently (at least from 1980s) came to be known the “African tribes” to 
differentiate them from the other block which are tribes of Arab origin in Darfur. 
The latter consists of a wide range of tribes, mostly pastoral in livelihood, either 
cattle or camel herders (Mamdani, 2009: 167). The pastoralist camel herders 
(Aballa) are located in the north of the region. The cattle herders who came to 
be known as the Baggara are located in the south and south west parts of the 
region. Within this block there are the Habaniyya, Falata, Taaisha, Maaliya, 
Benihalba, Salamat and Rezeigat. The Arab camel herders are in the northern 
part of the region such as the Zayyadiya, and northern Rezeigat (Erigat, Etifat, 
Mahriya and Mahameed). With exception of the Zayyadiya, camel herders do 
not own hakura (see Tubiana, 2007:69-70).  
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       Map 5: Map of Darfur region shows some main ethnic groups 
 
      Source: http://www.hrw.org/campains/Darfur/map.htm  
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Fur Sultanates and administrative set up, 1650-1916  
Historically speaking, Sudan was the land of kingdoms. All these kingdoms, 
such as Funj in central Sudan and the Fur Sultanates in the west, were ruled 
by tribal aristocracies through tribal leadership systems (Mohammed, 
2000:43). Fur sultanates ruled the Darfur from the 1650s up to 1874 and again 
from 1899-1916-the period of sultan Ali Dinar which was considered as 
continuation of the Fur sultanates (O’Fahey, 2008:137). During this period, a 
tribal leadership System of Administration based on administrative structures 
of tribal sheikhdoms “Al-mashiakhat al-gabaliya”, was the predominant system 
of governance (O’Fahey, 2008:164). Tribal leadership was a type of 
decentralized governance, which was adopted by Fur Sultanates as a formal 
system of government administration. According to this system tribes were 
enjoying a sort of self-rule whereby each tribal group was administered 
through their own tribal leaders (O’Fahey, 2008:163).  
The Darfur Sultanates adopted an administrative system based on three levels 
of governance whereby, to a large extent, people were governed by their own 
local leaders (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:42). According to this system, the entire 
territories were divided into four administrative areas known as Magdomates 
(provinces) run by magdoom (see Figure 2 below). Each Magdomate was 
divided into a number of shartays (chiefdoms) run by shartai (see figure 4 
below). The shartays, in return, were further divided into a number of local 
chiefdoms known as dimlijiyyas run by a dimilij. The villagers’ and nomads’ 
sheikhs represent the lower level of administration.  The position of the shartai 
was an inherited one. As a representative of the sultan, however, shartai was 
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either appointed, or his appointment was to be confirmed, by the Sultan 
himself. The main responsibilities attached to this position were the 
implementation of justice, tax assessment and tax collection. The sheikhs and 
the dimilijs used to be responsible for issues related to the direct administration 
such as settlement of low-scale disputes, land, tax assessment and collection, 
and other activities of ceremonial nature related to the higher ranks in the 
scale of administration system. In order to guarantee efficiency of the system a 
chain of command was maintained whereby heads of the family were 
responsible to their respective sheikhs. As an example, the sheikhs, in turn, 
were held accountable to the omda; a middle rank position and usually head of 
sub tribe, in the tribal leadership hierarchy, and the latter were held 
responsible to the nazir which is the case for most tribes of Arab origin and 
other tribes such as Zaghawa (see figure 3 below). The titles and 
administrative structures differ from one tribe to another. However in general 
we can speak about eight common titles for top tribal leaders in the entire 
region (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:47) which are Sultan (e.g. Daju, Massalit, Fur, 
Zaghawa), magdoom and Dimingawi (Fur), Malik (e.g. Berti, Zaghawa and 
Midob), Nazir (Birgid  and tribes of Arab origin, especially cattle herders), 
Sheikh (e.g. tribes of Arab origin especially camel herders), shartai (e.g. Fur, 
Birgid, Zaghawa) and Omda (Arabs, Zaghawa, etc.). These were the titles that 
referred to by the colonial authorities as the tribal chiefs or paramount chiefs in 
their respective tribes, as will see when talk later about the NA during the 
British colonial period. Sometimes the same tribe with sub divisions that 
located in different separate places had different structures and titles; for 
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example, the Fur Magdomate in South Darfur and the Fur Dimingawiyya in 
Zalingei (see figure 4 below). Another point is that within the tribes of Arab 
origin in South Darfur nazir is the top tribal leader and the Sheikh comes at the 
end of the ladder. For the camel herders the top tribal leader labelled the 
Sheikh and then there is another sheikh at the lower level. 
 
 
Figure 2: Tribal leadership system during the Fur Sultanates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: I have developed this figure for the purpose of this research; however 
the source of information is (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:47). 
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Figure 3: Tribal leadership structure of main tribes in Darfur up to present. 
                              Fur tribe                                  Massalit tribe 
 
                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I have developed these diagrams for the purpose of this research, however 
the source of information is (Ali, 2002). 
 
                 Arabs and Birgid tribes     Zaghawa tribe          Berti tribe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have developed these diagrams for the purpose of this research. Source of 
information: (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:47). 
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Figure 4: Structure of the Fur Magdomate in Nyala and the Dimingawiya in 
Zalingei 
      South Darfur Magdomate                       the Dimingawiya of Zalingei  
 
 
 
I have developed this figure for the purpose of this research. Source of 
information: (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:47). 
 
It was during the Fur Sultan, Musa the son of Suleiman (1670-1682), that a 
comprehensive policy with regard to land was put in place (Abu saleem, 
1975:56). Based on this policy the entire land of the Fur sultanate became 
solely owned by the sultan who could use it the way he wanted, a practice 
which was continued by his successors. Accordingly, a land tenure system 
was developed by the Fur Sultanates, land used to be distributed by the Sultan 
to the notables and leaders of his own tribe (Tubiana, 2007). Leaders from 
other tribal groups and notable figures such as religious men (Muslim scholars 
locally known as Fugara; plural of Faqi or Fageer) also received land as a gift 
from the Sultan. The Fur land tenure system was based on hakura; tribal 
homeland (Young, 2009:42). In Darfur; Hakura means a piece of land strictly 
allocated to an individual or group of people. This includes a hakura provided 
to a given tribal leader, which he could use to locate his group or to use as 
grazing land, but this entails no right of ownership (Abu saleem, 1975:59). 
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Sometimes later based on this tradition, some tribal leaders were able to make 
up their people’s own dar, an Arabic word that means homeland (Tubiana, 
2007:73), and this continues up to today.  
 
Colonial rule in Darfur, 1916-1955 
Despite the fact that Sudan came under colonial authority in 1821, the first 
time Darfur came under the control of a colonial power was in 1874 (O’Fahey, 
2008). The control of the Turkish/ Egyptian colonial power over Darfur, 
however, did not last long (the Turkish/ Egyptians ruled Darfur from 1874 to 
1883). It was only nine years before the Mahdiyya revolution broke out. 
Consequently, Darfur came under the Mahdiyya rule from 1983 to 1898. What 
is worth mentioning in this regard is that during the period 1874 to1898, there 
was no central authority able to exercise full control over the region (O’Fahey, 
2008). Darfur (Fur and Massalit Sultanates), thus remained independent 
territories and were only annexed to Sudan in 1916 and 1922 respectively (de 
Waal, 2009:8; Daly, 2007:120). The Turkish/ Egyptian period of colonial rule 
(1874-1884) did not change the administrative system they found in Darfur 
(O’Fahey, 2008). In spite of the Mahdiyya’s attempt (1885-1898) to create a 
system of their own in Darfur when they took over, these attempts also did not 
materialize as the Mahdiyya rule over Darfur did not last long and the time-
tested system of administration adopted by the Fur sultanate was too deeply 
rooted to be affected by the newly created system (Morton, 1992).  
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Native Administration and the Indirect Rule policy 
The Mahdiyya rule was ended by the British took control of Khartoum in 1899. 
In the same year Ali Dinar, descendant of the Fur sultans, took power in Darfur 
(O’Fahey, 2008:285). Less than two decades later; in 1916 Darfur became part 
of the Condominium Sudan. The Mahdiyya represented a real challenge for 
British rule in Sudan not only because they fought them fiercely before being 
defeated, but more importantly because they had the potential capability of 
motivating and mobilizing a national movement against the new rulers. For the 
first time in the history of modern Sudan, the Mahdiyya had created a state 
that joined northern and central territories together with the western regions 
that had previously been organized as two separate sultanates; Funj and 
Darfur (El-Tom, 2009:3). 
Thus, in order to consolidate their control, and to avoid any possibility of 
resistance, the main objective of Condominium rule became that of eradicating 
the Mahdiyya influence in the Sudan in general and Darfur in particular.  
Accordingly, British administrative policy seemed to be shaped by this overall 
supreme goal. The idea was to focus eyes and attack what was alleged to be 
the source of the threat, which was Darfur, as the base of the ‘trans-ethnic 
mobilization’ for the Mahdiyya revolution (Daly, 2007:125). This fear was 
further cemented by a series of pro-Mahdiyya uprisings that took place in many 
areas of the country, especially in Darfur from 1914-1920 (O’Fahey, 
2008:299). As it was further explained by the Governor General of the Sudan 
at the time, Sir John Maffery “… the policy of indirect rule would have the 
advantage of splitting the country into so many units, each safely quarantined 
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from political agitators” (Mamdani, 2009: 160). These ‘political agitators’ were 
more likely meant to be the educated elites, especially in Darfur. There are 
good reasons to claim that the British policy persistently favoured tribal leaders 
at the expense of other elites, as is explained below, by the practical 
implementation of the indirect rule policy. Within these units collaborative 
trustworthy allies were needed to provide support against such resistance. The 
British found such allies in Darfur among tribal leaders, particularly “the largest 
tribes and those who joined the pro-British coalition during the Mahdiyya” 
(Mamdani, 2009: 167), such as the Rezeigat, Massalit, and Birgid (Daly, 
2007:127).   
 In this regard, it seems that the main feature of colonial rule in Darfur was a 
policy that aimed to maintain stability at minimal cost, with dependency on 
inherited administrative structures in which power at the local level was left to 
local people and their indigenous administrative structures and institutions 
(Young et al, 2009: 41). Young, (2009) asserted that “the British maintained 
the core of the Fur land tenure system based on pre-existing hakura, but also 
established the present-day tribal boundaries which have institutionalized 
inequitable land rights” (Young, 2009:42).The tribal leadership system 
therefore prevailed after the annexation of Darfur to Sudan in 1916 (see figure 
5 below which shows NA structures continued from 1922-1970)  
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Figure 5: Structure of NA in South Darfur, 1922-1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: I developed this figure for the purpose of this study and the source of 
information is: (Musa, 2005) 
 
The British administration relied on tribal leaders for three main reasons: 
“1/ It would be cheap, 2/ it would keep out the Egyptian personnel, the 
despised “effendis class” [educated people]; it would thereby insulate the 
population from disturbing foreign trends-nationalism, 3/ it would combat 
home-grown Mahdism, which most Darfur tribal chiefs considered a threat to 
their own authority” (Daly, 2007: 122). 
In 1922 the colonial government changed the name of the tribal leadership 
system of administration and named it the ‘Native Administration’ (Abdul-Jalil 
et al, 2007:39). Typical of several other African colonies at this time, the British 
did not change the key structures, institutions or staff, as the main objective 
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was simply to maintain peace and stability in Darfur at minimal cost (Collins, 
2008:276). This could best be illustrated by the following two quotes:  
“ Most of the native civil servants who had served the Sultanate went on to 
work with the new authority , which in any case was not very keen to do 
anything that would represent any form of change or break with the past….. 
During condominium rule, the immense territory was divided into ‘Dar’ (tribal 
homelands)…and handed over to a variety of nazir, sheikh, maqdum 
[magdoom], mandub and umda [omda]” (Prunier, 2007: 25-29).  
Collins, (2008) indicated that “During the forty years of British rule in Darfur 
there were never more than a dozen British political officers in any year to 
oversee the administration of the traditional leaders in a region the size of 
France” (Collins, 2008:277). 
 In order for the old system to cope with the aims of the colonial administration 
however some modifications were introduced. These changes were related to 
the new role assigned to the NA, which became more focused on maintaining 
law and order (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:44).  Tribal leaders were entrusted to 
maintain law and order within their own tribes, and between them and other 
communities. Furthermore, they were also assigned responsibility for the 
protection of the environment, tax assessment, and tax collection. Hence in 
order to do their job properly, they were supported by a system of “native 
courts” with guards that governed in accordance with local customs and 
traditions. These modifications were introduced gradually through series of 
ordinances in 1922, 1925, 1927, 1928, and 1932 (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:45). 
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According to “Arab Sheikhs ordinance of 1922”, tribal boundaries were 
officially institutionalized and tribal leaders were authorized powers of judges 
of the third class to look into local disputes and to maintain order and stability. 
Furthermore the 1927 ordinance attached small tribal units to larger tribes 
(Young, 2009:42). Nevertheless, the British administration was very keen on 
the need for some checks on the NA. For example, they introduced omda as a 
middle rank and a modified measure to check on the nazirs’ power. “We have 
made one vital change by introducing omdas. The previous scheme was a 
Nazir, supported by his relatives as mandubs, forming an executive entirely 
under his control. The omdas provided a class better able to control a head 
strong Nazir” (Morton, 2004:6). An omda was to be selected from among the 
members of each sub tribe or minority tribes to stand as their representative 
before the nazir, a practice which continued up to the present. Additional to all 
these measures, the most crucial factor was that arms were monopolized by 
government, security and justice implementation institutions during colonial 
period maintained neutrality; hence the government institutions were perceived 
by different tribal groups as being neutral and capable of serving as guarantor 
for these arrangements and for agreements reached between conflicting 
parties through ITRC (Mohammed, 2009:175). These were part of the most 
important measures that were applied by the colonial authorities and made the 
ITRC to be more effective in dealing with tribal conflicts during this period, as is 
reflected in the next chapter (chapter 4). 
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The “Native Courts Ordinance of 1932” established four types of local courts 
with clear hierarchy started by the Multi-member Court of sheikh at the lower 
level, then the sheikh’s Council Court, followed by the Village Court, and finally 
came the Special Court at the top with all of them relied on customs and 
traditions as reference point for adjudication (Rabah, 1998:53).  In coincidence 
with this new colonial policy, land rights were associated with communities, 
such as tribe, sub-tribe or village, and accordingly distinction was made 
between “native” and “settler” tribes (Mamdani, 2009:  166). Through this 
measure the status of some indigenous native tribes was shifted to “settler 
tribes” and accordingly two new functions were assigned to land: “land became 
tribe’s asset and the exclusive marker of the tribe’s political identity” (Mamdani, 
2009: 168-69). These new arrangements of Native Administration officially 
distinguished between inhabitants who were members of “native” tribe and 
those who were not. Accordingly, two “customary” rights were restricted to the 
native tribe. These were the ownership of land and appointment to key 
positions in the tribal leadership (Tubiana, 2007:79).  
The colonial authorities introduced some alteration with regard to the tribal 
leadership system in order to cope with their policy of indirect rule.  They 
renamed it as Native Administration to distinguish it from the civil 
administration, which coexisted at the same time. The former was applied to 
rural areas whereas the latter was applied to urban areas. The most significant 
change in this respect was the effort made by the colonial authorities to 
change the antagonistic relationship of the tribes, which was based on raiding 
and aggression, into a peaceful one that was based on mutual respect and 
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shared interests.  This meant government became involved directly and 
positively to encourage the trend towards building peaceful relations amongst 
tribes at the local level (Mohammed, 2009: 21). In line with this policy ITRC 
was adopted as a measure of conflict containment. It was during this period of 
British colonial rule in Darfur that the government started to sponsor judiyya. 
Judiyya means the process of intervention by a third party to mediate a conflict 
situation (Ali, 2002:39). The aim was to mediate major tribal incidents which 
occurred between or amongst tribes. The colonial administration introduced 
some modifications to the judiyya such as to be held under the auspices of the 
government, so that it became government-sponsored mechanisms called 
‘reconciliation conferences’ (Mu’tamarat alsulh), a practice which continues up 
to the present. The first government-sponsored conference was held in 1924 
(Naeim, 1978). Collins argued that from the colonial period up to the end of 
1960s different ethnic groups usually settled their disputes, including conflicts 
over natural resources, by using tribal conferences or ‘Mu’tamarat al-sulh’ 
(Collins, 2006:6). As such, judiyya has subjected to modification (Bradbury et 
al, 2006:3).  
In connection to ITRCs, tribal annual conferences (which locally known as al-
maarid al-qabaliya) were also introduced by the colonial authorities. These 
used to be organized in a form of ceremonies and cultural events; “some of 
these were annual affairs, at which, building on tribal traditions, outstanding 
issues could be resolved” (Daly, 2007:130-132). In order to help build and 
maintain good ties and relations among tribal leaders and consequently the 
communities, these tribal annual conferences and festivals were attended by 
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tribal leaders and representatives of their communities (Mohammed, 
2009:175). An informant indicated that: 
“Some issues of conflict between tribes and allegations of aggression were 
looked at during the annual gatherings of tribes and tribal leaders; locally we 
call it “al-maarid al-gabaliya” (tribal carnivals), which used to take place twice a 
year during the colonial period” (KI/8: 5/6/10).  
Neighbouring tribes and that of similar common characteristics and shared 
interests used to be brought together in one place to perform their folklore and 
discuss issues such as seasonal migration routes, pending complaints and 
allegations as well as review of the implementation of decisions taken in 
previous meetings (Mohammed, 2009:175). Standard diyya (blood money) and 
compensations amongst these groups of tribes used to be agreed in these 
annual meetings.  It was during these events for the first time standard diyya 
and compensations were set up and agreed amongst tribes, some of these 
agreements in this regard continue up to the present day (Takana, 1997:36). 
In 1937 Local Government Ordinance was passed and accordingly rural 
councils, townships and municipalities were established (Abdul-Jalil et al, 
2007:45). According to this ordinance, tribal leaders were guaranteed 
administrative and tax collection responsibilities however they remained 
unhappy about this development on the basis that their powers might be 
reduced due to the establishment of these new institutions (Rabah, 1998:53). 
The source of the raised concern perhaps was the British administration itself. 
They perceived these developments as a reformation of the NA system and 
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that administration had been shifted from tribe to territory which would allow 
incorporating the educated elites in the new system (Mamdani, 2009: 162-63). 
This was also provoked by fears that Egyptians were supposed to be in charge 
of these newly created positions. During the early years of British colonial 
period administrators at the lower level who used to get in touch with people 
on the ground were Egyptians. Tribal leaders had no trust of Egyptians due to 
the previous experience of Turkish/Egyptian Rule. In spite of these 
developments, as asserted by Abdul-Jalil, 2007, “traditional tribal leaders with 
their executive, financial, and legislative powers remained an integral part of 
the reformed system” (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:45). Further, to make tribal 
leaders more comfortable the British administration passed “The Municipalities 
Ordinance of 1941” which put all authorities and powers of local government in 
the hands of British directors (Abdullah, 1986:115). Thus, in the end, the 
positions of tribal leaders remained the same, and the claim that a shift 
towards local government system would allow educated elites to take part in 
administration was pre-empted. 
 
In 1951 Local Government Act was passed. This was based on what came to 
be known as the “Marshall Report”, and refers to a British Local Government 
expert called Marshall. He was commissioned by the British administration to 
conduct a survey and make recommendations with regard to the local 
government in the Sudan (Abdullah, 1986:115). The report made a definition of 
the local area, identified these areas, and classified them into groups 
according to the geographical, demographical and relative development 
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characteristics of each local area (Abdullah, 1986:115). According to this Local 
Government Act, local councils took over the executive and financial powers 
previously allocated to tribal leaders (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:45). In practice and 
for some areas like Darfur the situation did not change much because the local 
council as defined in this Act can be “one person- a government employee, 
local community leader or tribal leader or corporation who could assume the 
powers of the council and act in the full capacity of the council” (Rabah, 
1998:118). The Act identified five stages in order for the local government 
system to be developed to full capacity (Abdullah, 1986:115). In the first stage 
local government powers granted to a person (for example, a staff of the 
central government or a local tribal leader) who exercises the powers of the 
local council and depends on funds allocated by the government. The second 
stage: the local government authorities remain in the hands of one person, but 
the area should be given an independent local government budget, after the 
central government is convinced by the person's performance in the first stage. 
At this stage the government allows the person/council to use funds collected 
from the area to provide services in their area. The person/council should 
appoint an advisory council from the people of the area to provide them advice 
with regard to their job. The third stage the government should assigned 
responsibility to one person to form a local council, members of which are half 
elected and half appointed, however decisions made by the council still need 
to be endorsed by that person. The fourth stage indicates that local 
government authorities assigned to a council with two-thirds of its members to 
be elected and one third including the chairman to be appointed. In the final 
  
98 
 
stage, local government authorities should be assigned to a council in which 
two-third of its members were to be elected and one-third appointed with the 
council’s right to elect the president from among its members. 
As most of the areas in Darfur came under the first and second stages, many 
of them assumed the powers of the council, and consequently tribal leaders in 
Darfur continued to play the same role as before, just four years prior to 
Sudan’s independence. 
Following the 1951 Local Government Act, the role of the NA was summarised 
as follows (Abdul-Jalil et al, (2007:45) :  
1. Assure good management of tribal community affairs; 
2. Allocate land for agriculture and grazing; 
3. Maintain security; 
4. Communicate with the local council, and the province-and state-level 
governments; 
5. Collect taxes and other levies; 
6. Settle conflicts related to land tenure; 
7. Mobilize communities; and 
8. Chair tribal and sub tribal courts. 
This indicates that during the British colonial period, tribal leaders enjoyed the 
responsibilities of local government as well as the role of official agents for the 
provincial and central authorities in their respective areas (Prunier, 2007:25). 
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The hope that the shift from NA towards local government would allow 
participation of educated elite did not materialise. Instead, the role of native 
administrators expanded. It was this expanded role of the NA that brought 
tribal leaders into formal politics at the end of the colonial period and led to 
their confrontation with the educated elites who led the nationalist movement. 
This confrontation opened the door widely for political manipulation of the NA 
to continue following Sudan’s independence, as is explained below.  
 
Involvement of tribal leaders in politics 
By the end of the colonial era and during the debate over Sudan’s 
independence, tribal leaders were directly involved in politics. This manifested 
itself in their remarkable presence in the first Advisory Council2 of Northern 
Sudan which was established by the British administration in Khartoum in 
1944. In the same year, it happened that twelve out of the eighteen 
representing the councils in this institution were tribal leaders, with Darfur 
representatives as mainly tribal leaders (Prunier, 2005:34). These 
representatives were “chosen by hastily convened Province Councils 
assembled by British officials from leading local personalities who duly 
                                                          
2 The Advisory Council of Northern Sudan was established by the colonial 
authority as a purely advisory body and “the Governor General of the Sudan, 
who was British, determined its convening, schedule, rules and 
regulations”(Prunier, 2005:34). 
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produced a majority of leading native administrators” (Woodward, 1990: 74). 
Also tribal leaders backed by the British authorities, formed the Socialist 
Republican Party (SRP) to provide support to British policies with regard to the 
future of Sudan and more importantly to weakening the influence of the Umma 
party in particular because of their call for speed up the process towards 
independence, which did not match with the colonial plan at that time 
(Woodward, 1990:69-70).  
This direct involvement of tribal leaders in politics during the colonial era, and 
particularly during the key political debates which took place in the build-up to 
independence period (1942-1955), caused many problems. Firstly; the leaders 
of the nationalist movement, particularly the graduate Congress, considered 
tribal leaders as colonial agents (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:49). The ‘Graduate 
Congress’ was an organization emerged in 1938 which consisted of social 
groups such as graduates of Gordon College, high and intermediate schools 
and government employees. They organized themselves in what came to be 
known in Sudan the “Graduate Congress” (Woodward, 1990: 58). Secondly; 
and following the emergence of national political parties in 1940s, the radical 
parties-especially the leftists and later on the Islamists- such as Muslim 
brothers-considered the tribal leaders as the supporters of what they call the 
‘traditional sectarian parties’. They referred particularly to the Umma Party 
(UP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which were mainly supported 
by the two major religious sects in Sudan; Ansar and Khatmia respectively 
(Woodward, 1990: 66-69), and were to remain crucial in Sudanese politics for 
many years to come. Thirdly, the criticisms of the NA system by the elite in 
  
101 
 
Khartoum coupled with the exclusion of the political parties, due to the 
intervention of military regimes, gave rise to resistance to NA and competition 
over leadership at the local and grass-root levels by newly emerging educated 
elites of local communities such as school teachers and students of higher 
education. This further undermined the leadership position of the tribal leaders 
and created a gap of mistrust between the newly educated people in Darfur 
and the tribal leaders (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:50), especially recently, at least in 
the last two decades, as will be explained later in this chapter.  
Due to the selective nature of indirect rule with regard to the recruitment of 
staff at local levels, which favours tribal leaders at the expense of other elites, 
new social groups such as graduates and government employees started in 
1938 to organize themselves in what came to be known the Graduate 
Congress, which claimed representation of the Sudanese people as a national 
liberation movement (Woodward, 1990: 58).The colonial authority were by 
then aware of the negative consequences of their policies, in particular that of 
indirect rule. They had even anticipated such consequence as reflected in the 
following quotation made by De La Warr, Commissioner to Sudan in 1937, 
who warned that: 
 “continued pursuit of indirect rule would lead to a danger of the bifurcation of 
the Sudan, at this early stage of its growth, into Native Administration in the 
countryside and the relatively small but influential groups of effendia 
{intelligentsia} in the towns and the government departments” (Mamdani, 2009: 
161).  
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For the sake of pursuing their own interests, the colonial authorities had paid 
attention much earlier to the importance of not widening the gap between the 
educated class and the tribal leaders. The aim was to provide stability and to 
avoid unnecessary struggle between an educated class and tribal leaders, as 
both of their support was crucial for the continuity of the colonial rule. The way 
to achieve such an objective was to incorporate the educated classes into the 
colonial administrative system; nevertheless they should not be allowed to 
assume leadership. In fact, it seems that this was among the strongest motives 
behind what was perceived by the colonials as administrative reform on the 
side of the NA system; mainly the shift towards local government which was 
reflected in the legislation, ordinances and associated regulations that followed 
from 1932 onwards up to 1951(Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007: 45). From a theoretical 
point of view, the aim of this change was to indicate that the base of 
administration had been shifted from tribe to territory and consequently to 
incorporate the educated elites in the new system. This aim was not achieved 
in the country at large or Darfur in particular. In fact it turned out to be 
superficial. Mamdani argued that in Darfur, this policy had barely resulted in a 
cosmetic effect as the educated elites incorporated into the state bureaucracy 
were not from Darfur; they were brought from outside the region (Mamdani, 
2009: 162-63).  This was an inevitable result of the colonial educational policy 
which, to large extent, excluded Darfur from the secular formal system of 
education they had introduced in the north and central areas of Sudan. Such 
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policy was intentionally adopted to keep the allies of the colonial power, i.e. the 
tribal leaders, at the top of the ladder (Daly, 1986:107).  
 
In Sudan, Darfur became the model of indirect rule. However the overall 
framework of tribal governance and administration was not limited to Darfur 
alone. It seems that what had been implemented in Darfur was part of the 
colonial rulers’ broader agenda. This agenda aimed to keep regional blocks 
apart from each other; the north from the south and the west from the centre 
(de Waal, 2009:9). By adopting this policy colonial authorities aimed to achieve 
two objectives at one time. First, to maintain control over peripheries through 
the divide and rule policy through using tribe as an administrative unit for 
organizing NA .Second, to keep the regions at a distance from each other 
through implementing restriction measures embodied in the ‘closed district 
ordinance’, which aimed to put further constraints on any possibility of a sense 
of nation developing across the country. In reality, this was obviously reflected 
in the series of legislations during the 1920s; namely native administration 
ordinances, the closed district ordinance, and the southern policy. 
The above described arrangements in Darfur were actually what came to be 
known as the indirect rule which was adopted by the British administration. 
“[Indirect rule] is a practical form of administration and control that would leave 
the local population free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, 
but under the guidance of the British staff and subject to the law and policy of 
the administration” (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007: 44).  
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The Lugardian model (refers to Frederick Lugard, who used to be the British 
high commissioner in Nigeria) of indirect rule was fundamentally based on the 
following (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:44-45):   
1) A political hierarchy of local chiefs that would derive their power from the 
central government and be in charge of the maintenance of law and order, 
organization of labour, and collection of local taxes.  
2) A parallel hierarchy of native courts, which would deal with minor criminal, 
civil, and personal cases in terms of customary law and general principles 
of justice. 
3) A native treasury that would manage local revenues and pay out the 
necessary expenses of local authorities and social services. 
4) A team of local staff, which would carry out its duties under the guidance of 
British field officers and remain subject to the laws and policy of 
administration.  
In spite of the claim that indirect rule was based on customary law and 
traditions, and that it implied no interference in people’s own affairs, the British 
colonial administration introduced some key modifications as explained above. 
The people in Darfur ended up with conflicting perceptions with regard to NA 
and the indirect rule policy. For example, the Fur saw the development as a 
demotion for their status in terms of political and economic influence and that 
they lost political power and became no more than a tribe similar to many other 
tribes in the region (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:46). The ultimate result of this is that 
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they lost their power and most importantly their economic and administrative 
privileges. Other ethnic groups, such as tribes of Arab origin, however, saw the 
changes introduced by the NA system as something positive. The perception 
of this group is that these changes resulted in increasing their power and 
status (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:46). This might be a reflection of “ the decision 
made by the British colonial administration which anointed the paramount 
chiefs[nazirs] of the leading Arab groups with titles that put them on a par with 
the sultan, malik, and shartai of the non-Arabs” (Tubiana, 2007:81). 
Punier, (2005:29-30) argued that during the colonial period, the NA benefited 
both from having a ‘traditional’ legitimacy and from the support of the colonial 
administration, which made it most capable in dealing with disputes’ 
settlement. This success was associated with the mechanisms of conflict 
resolution and conflict management, and the ability of tribal leaders to use their 
native courts to deal effectively with the settlement of land-related disputes. In 
the last two decades (1989-2009) they have been denied this role as the 
current ruling military regime prefer to place pro-government persons “with 
minor knowledge of local customs and traditional institutions” to lead mediation 
committees in Darfur (Collins, 2008:284). Furthermore, the provisions of the 
“2004 Act for Town and Rural Courts” exclude land ownership disputes from 
the jurisdiction of the native courts” (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:65). 
The Native Administration system, however was criticized on the ground that 
although described as an administration, the basis for the NA system was in 
fact judiciary (Prunier, 2007), with exception of focusing on issues such as 
disputes settlement, all aspects of development were completely neglected. 
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Regarding provision of services such as education, health, transport, and 
livelihood related issues, people were left more or less to their own indigenous 
strategies of survival (Prunier, 2007); a matter which, I would say, has led to 
the dilemma of sustaining a subsistence economy of dichotomised livelihoods 
and identities; sedentary farmers of African origin versus pastoralists tribes of 
Arab origin.  
The division of tribes into native and settlers was another problematic issue. 
Without consideration for the number of years or generations they had lived in 
an area, those believed to have immigrated into others’ homeland at one time 
in the past (which was and is still decided by the native tribe) or attached to 
largest tribes according to the 1927 ordinance, were considered settlers and 
accordingly deprived from the above mentioned rights; the ownership of land 
and appointment to key positions in the tribal leadership (Mamdani, 2009: 
167). Right to access land was conditional on permission from leaders of 
‘native tribe’ and submission to traditions and customs of the native tribe as 
described earlier. One might have expected the definition of “settler tribe” in 
this case to be limited to the newcomers who immigrated very recently, or was 
only meant to be applied to those who might move later on to another dar 
following the official demarcation of the dars by the colonial authorities. On the 
contrary, the label of settler was allocated to those classified as minority 
groups within the newly institutionalized tribal homelands including those who 
had already been living in these places long before this arrangement. 
Regarding NA, colonialism had introduced two important changes, the 
consequences of which are still on-going in Darfur. These were the source of 
  
107 
 
power of the tribal leaders and the definition of dar.  The tribal leaders’ source 
of power was shifted away from that related to kinship within the leader’s own 
group, to that associated with colonial official power (Mamdani, 2009: 168). 
During the Fur sultanates the term dar was associated with ‘home’, but not 
identified with a single place (de Waal, 2009:10). In this sense dar could mean: 
an administrative unit, the specific territory of a tribe or a group of people, a 
location which might be the whole sultanate or part of it. It has been argued 
that it was only during the colonial period in Darfur that the term dar became 
identified with a single place related to territory of an ethnic or a tribal group, 
named after that group who then claimed supremacy over the land and local 
governance (de Waal, 2009:10). This policy of political interference in the tribal 
administrative structures and the demarcation of tribal homelands, was in later 
decades to result in two types of conflicts: conflict over land and over local 
power (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:57), as I shall show in chapter 4 and 5. Also, in 
spite of its success at that time, such policy opened the door for the political 
manipulation of the NA system in the long run, which was to result in gradual 
erosion and malfunctioning of its role. This has in turn over time affected 
negatively the role of tribal leaders, and the mechanism of the Inter-tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs), as I shall show in chapter 7. 
 
NA and Local Governments in independent Sudan, 1956-2009 
The manipulation of the NA by central governments is not something new. As 
described earlier, manipulation for tribal leadership existed long before the 
British rule in Darfur. However, the systematic institutionalized approach is 
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associated with British colonial rule (1916-1956). Based on their potential for 
providing political support to the new colonial authorities, tribes were treated 
differently, with officially recognized homelands being allocated for the first 
time with specific boundaries. Smaller tribes were annexed to the biggest and 
so lost their independent status and rights over land. As the smaller tribes 
were not content, this arrangement generated disputes; however, due to the 
oppressive nature and strong security control of the colonial regime, these 
groups were unable to protest violently against such decisions (Mohammed, 
2009:27). 
 
The Local Government Act of 1951 continued to be in effect after 
independence and even following the enactment of the Provincial Government 
Act of 1960, the former Act was only replaced in 1971(Abdullah, 1986:123). 
However immediately after independence, the debate over NA surfaced and a 
committee was formed to look into the issue and make specific 
recommendations in this regard (Bakhiet, 1969:56). Two positions emerged in 
this respect which were: reformation of the system and complete abolition of 
the NA. The committee came up with a report summarised the situation as 
follows (Bakhiet, 1969:56):  
Based on the socio-economic and cultural situations, areas in Sudan could be 
divided into three groups: 1/ Areas inhabited by sedentary people where in 
terms of cultural and economic development people were better off; 2/Areas 
inhabited by pastoralists who were less developed; 3/ Areas which could be 
located in between the above mentioned two groups. Accordingly, the 
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committee recommended that NA should be abolished with regard to the first 
group of the area and reformed in relation to group 2 and 3.  
The report was produced shortly before the military coup of 1958 and it was 
not taken into consideration by that government (Bakhiet, 1969:56). However 
the most dramatic attempt to change the NA and local government system was 
in 1960s and 1970s. Following the collapse of the first military regime (1958-
1964), the transitional government, which was leftists-dominated, legally 
abolished the NA system in 1965 (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:50). The decision 
made was not implemented as the government was short-lived, but the 
consequences of that decision lived long (Mohammed, 2009:27). Also, the fact 
that the two major conservative parties; the UP and the DUP, who were allies 
of tribal leaders, won the elections in 1965 was another reason why this 
resolution had not been implemented. The above mentioned decision, together 
with other developments such as small tribes in Darfur starting to demand the 
restoration of their perceived loss of rights over land and leadership positions, 
made the situation tense. One of the striking examples with regard to the latter 
situation was the devastating conflict between the Maaliya and the Rezeigat 
tribes over land in South Darfur in 1965. At this stage most of top tribal leaders 
from all over the country were gathered together in Khartoum and announced 
what they came to call  “Itihad zu’ama al-gaba’il” (Union of Tribal Leaders). In a 
memo to the Council of Ministers issued by the Union on 19/1/1969, tribal 
leaders expressed their dissatisfaction and that “they fed up with intimidations 
made by central government, from time to time, to dissolve the NA, which has 
made them feel frustrated and confused in doing their job” (Rabah, 1998:56). 
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In spite of these developments, tribal leaders continued to enjoy legal and 
administrative authorities until 1970. They only lost their powers when the 
People’s Local Government Act of 1971 was passed; accordingly the region 
was divided into two districts (provinces) and area councils which formally 
replaced the old system of NA (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:50). The following 
diagram (figure 6 below) shows districts and area councils after the above Act 
was in place.  
 
Figure 6: Administrative set up of local government in Darfur, 1974-1980 
 
                                                                        
North Darfur Province South Darfur Province 
Elfashir area council Nyala area council 
Umkaddada area council Eddein area council 
Kutum area council Zalingei area council 
Al-Geneina area council Buram area council 
 Wadi Salih area council 
Source: (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007) 
 
The 1971 Act, combined with the Provincial Government Act of 1960, allowed 
no possibility for genuine grassroots local governments to emerge, as both 
came under an umbrella of military regimes; the Abood regime (1958-1964) 
and Numeiri regime (1969-1985). Both regimes had banned freedom of 
association and those who selected as members of local governments were 
Central Government 
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either to be appointed, as was the case during  Abood regime (Musa, 
2005:66), or elected from within the circles of the single ruling party “al-itihad 
al-ishtraki” (Socialist Union Party-SUP) as was the case during the Numeiri 
regime (Mohammed, 2009:95). Unlike the Provincial Government Act of 1960 
which allowed for the 1951 Act to continue with exception of members of local 
councils to be elected, the People’s Local Government Act of 1971 dismantled 
the NA and replaced the former Act as well, thus ending the hope of a gradual 
development of local government system towards a democratic form of 
governance. Such hope was explicitly included in the last three phases of the 
five stages’ system of local government included in the 1951 Act, as I 
described earlier.  
 
Only one year before the dismantling of the NA, the central government 
enacted the Unregistered Land Act (ULA) of 1970 which required that land 
should be formally registered. The British administration had done the same 
when it passed the Land Settlement and Registration Act of 1925 when it was 
seeking to ensure its control over land (Tubiana, 2007:81). Nonetheless they 
only implemented the Act in areas where their control had economic 
significance and where large scale government-owned irrigation schemes were 
set up, such as the Gezira (located in central Sudan between the Blue and the 
White Nile) and Tokar (a seasonal river in eastern Sudan) (Tubiana, 2007:78). 
The same thing repeated itself after independence, as the ULA was again 
selectively implemented; in some cases tribes were deprived of the right to 
claim landownership and at the same time other tribes continued to exercise 
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supremacy over land because they were powerful and the government 
avoided confrontation with them for security and political reasons (Mohammed, 
2009:27-28). This situation provided justification for some tribes to take the law 
into their hands and to change reality on the ground in an attempt to make the 
authorities to accept the new arrangement of their choosing (Mohammed, 
2009:27-28). What made the situation worse in Darfur was that during the 
course of 1970s and 1980s, there was an emergence of armed militias due to 
the repercussions of civil war in Southern Sudan and the Civil war in Chad (de 
Waal, 1993:142).  
 
The abolition of the NA and the enactment of the ULA did not change the 
reality of tribes’ supremacy over land and leadership in their respective areas 
in Darfur. For example, in 1980s the Banihalba and the Habaniyya tribes of 
Arab origin (known as Baggara in South Darfur) prohibited other pastoralist 
tribes – even those of an Arab origin - to enter their homelands. Particularly, 
the announcement prohibited camel herders (known as Aballa) migrating from 
the northern part of the region to come into Banihalba and the Habaniyya 
homelands in the south, although this would normally be acceptable. This was 
because of the shortage of grazing land and because of what had been 
described by the latter group as the unacceptable behaviour of the former 
group (KI/9: 6/6/10). In this way competition over natural resources-with the 
land taking a paramount importance- has obviously become one of the 
important factors of tribal conflicts in Darfur from the mid-1980s up to date 
(Mark et al, 2006:8). During the colonial period a clear arrangement was made 
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to avoid clashes between pastoralists and sedentary farmers. In 1936 
seasonal migration routes for nomads and pastoralists were identified with 
places for temporary residence during their journey and agreed specific times 
of coming into the areas of sedentary farmers (Takana, 2009:39). Of course 
these measures were implemented in order to avoid damage of crops and 
conflict between pastoralists and farmers over water source and grazing land. 
With the profound environmental and demographic changes, started early 
1970s, these arrangements were no longer in place or suitable to resolve the 
problem, as is further discussed in chapter 5. 
 
This situation was further provoked by the waves of internal migrations from 
the north to the south of the region due to drought and famine which took place 
mid-1980s.The argument of these new immigrants was that they are 
Sudanese and the land is belonging to state, therefore they have the right to 
stay and use the unoccupied land. Perhaps, the ULA paved the way for such 
understanding to prevail among this segment of population. The ULA states 
that “all land that is not registered before the enactment of this law becomes 
the property of the government by default” (Abdul-Jalil, 2006:18). In reality, 
however, this was and is still not the case. In Darfur land was in general not 
registered and the system of tribal homeland that prevailed all over the region 
proved to be deeply rooted. It should be noted that the abolition of the NA 
coincided with the Unregistered Land Act of 1970, which shows the very close 
association between land and power in Darfur. Someone might ask why 
newcomers did not know this. The answer is they certainly knew, but did not 
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want to admit it. For example3, the Zaghawa in north Darfur refused to accept 
the demand of the Erigat (sub tribe of Rezeigat camel herders) for hakura in 
Jineik area in the Zaghawa homeland (Dar Siwaini) on the basis that this 
contradicts their historical right over land. Meanwhile the Zaghawa, who have 
been hosted by the Birgid in Sherriya area, following their migration towards 
the south, demanded for the hakura system to be abandoned because it 
contradicts the right of citizenship, as will further be elaborated in chapter 7. 
This example, I would argue, is applicable to all tribes in Darfur. When it comes 
to their own homeland, they refused to refer to the right of citizenship as 
stipulated in the constitution and the ULA. On the other hand when it relates to 
others’ homeland they made the constitution and the ULA the reference point 
of their argument. In terms of rule of law the state is very weak and what made 
the situation even worse is the proliferation of arms in the hands of the 
individuals and the fact that governments depended on tribes to secure power, 
as is explained below.  
 
 In 1974 Darfur was divided into two separate provinces; North Darfur and 
South Darfur (see figure 6 above) and the area councils remained the same 
(Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:55). However the Regional Government Act of 1980 
resumed the status of Darfur as one region with two provinces; North and 
South Darfur (see figure 7 below) (Mohamed, 2009:28). One year later, 
“People’s Local Government Act of 1981 was passed which superseded the 
                                                          
3  This was the reason behind the conflict between the Erigat and the Zaghawa 
in 1996 (for more details see Tubiana, (2007:76). 
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“People’s Local Government Act of 1971 (Musa, 2005:71). The only new thing 
with regard to this Act was that the Regional Executive Authority (the regional 
government) became responsible of making decisions with regard to creation 
of new area councils (see figure 7 below, which indicates additional area 
councils were created) and allocating them budgets and powers as appropriate 
as they saw fit (Musa, 2005:71).  
 
Figure 7: Administrative set up in Darfur, 1981-1994  
 
 
 
North Darfur Province South Darfur Province 
Elfashir area council Nyala area council 
Umkaddada area council Eddein area council 
Kutum area council Zalingei area council 
Geneina area council Buram area council 
Mellit area council Wadi Salih area council 
 Idd elghanam area council 
 
Source: (Abdul-Jalil, 2007). 
 
 Since then regional politics have become increasingly based on ethnic 
polarization. This was made possible because of the restrictions put on 
freedom of political association and formation of civil society. As mentioned 
The Central Government 
Darfur Region 
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before during the Numeiri regime people were only permitted to exercise 
politics through the dominant ruling party; Socialist Union Party (SUP). As all 
candidates belonged to the SUP, they used their ethnicity to identify difference 
and mobilize voters. This made people in Darfur tended to divide along ethnic 
lines into three groups Fur, Arabs and Zaghawa with each group supporting a 
candidate for the position of Regional Governor from their own ethnicity 
(Mohammed, 2009:28029). This situation contributed to the emergence of “the 
Arab Gathering”, where about thirteen tribes of Arab origin met in 1987 with 
the intention of removing what were described as “grievances; political and 
social marginalization” that Arab tribes face in Darfur (Ateem, 2007:37-38). 
Prior to this event, The Darfur Development Front (DDF) was formed in 1965. 
Although led by a Fur leader, the DDF enjoyed the support of many Darfur 
intellectuals from different ethnicities as the main aim was to lobby for the 
interests of the people of Darfur in their struggle over power with the central 
government (Mark et al, 2006:12). The DDF contributed significantly in 
mobilization for the uprising in Darfur that forced Numeiri regime to appoint its 
leader Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige as governor for Darfur in 1981. When the DDF’s 
leaders assumed power, some intellectuals belonging to tribes of an Arab in 
Darfur complained that ‘Arabs’ were marginalized and the DDF became Fur 
dominated organization (Mark et al, 2006:12).  
 
In 1987-88 a war broke out between the Fur and a broad coalition of Arab 
tribes (Tubiana, 2007:70). Again land was central issue in this conflict (El 
Amin, 1992:82). Arab tribes used all means including destruction of farms and 
  
117 
 
burning of villages to force the Fur to leave their land and described territories 
that they took over by force as “liberated land” (Mohammed, 2000: 358). “By 
1988, law and order was breaking down, especially in the north and west of 
Darfur due to the negative impacts of the war in Chad and the presence of 
Libyan troops in Darfur” (Woodward, 1990:219).  
 
In this time (1987) a new arrangement was made whereby the NA system was 
reinstated (Ateem, 2007:33). The restoration of the NA was welcomed by tribal 
leaders; nevertheless they were not completely content with the new 
arrangements because their powers were reduced significantly. “The 
[reinstated] NA system was not empowered to play its traditional role 
effectively; numerous reasons contributed to this, including the limited powers 
granted to tribal chiefs and unclear legislative frameworks” (Ateem, 2007:33). 
The new arrangements provided limitations to the jurisdictional authority of 
tribal leaders and election of tribal leaders at all levels was- for the first time- 
officially recognized (Musa, 2005:50). It should be noted that there was an 
allegation that the NA system was re-established in 1987 by government as a 
‘reward’ for its political supporters, as political power had been retained by the 
two conservative parties; UP and the DUP. However, the elected government 
was shortly overthrown in 1989 and the damage was too huge to be reformed 
in such a short time. Furthermore, the government was criticized for allowing 
the Libyan-supported Chadian armed opposition in Darfur, which was alleged 
to be behind the escalated conflict situation in the region (Tubiana, 2007:70), 
as will be explained in the following chapters. 
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The colonial policy with regard to NA and local government seemed to be 
consistent with the overall government strategy applied to Darfur, unlike the 
policies applied by the successive governments after Sudan’s independence 
which lacked clear strategy and characterised by inconsistency. The following 
quotation by Morton describes best the difference between the colonial policies 
and the national governments:  
“The critical difference, in my view, between the 1940s and the 1980s lies in 
the fact that in those earlier years the administration put considerable if not first 
importance on strengthening the mechanisms necessary to deal with disputes: 
the police, the tribal administration and the judiciary. In the 1980s by contrast, 
various governments have looked upon the maintenance of law and order as a 
residual: something to be dealt with only when it forces itself on their attention 
as a result of major clashes” (Morton, 2004:4). Chapter 7 presents detailed 
account with regard to the experience of the ITRCs in South Darfur and to 
what extent the absence or weakness of these mechanisms, and check and 
balance measures have negatively affected their performance in resolving 
tribal conflicts. 
 
In connection with the above policy of the central authorities, and in an attempt 
to get people’s support in Darfur (from 1990s onwards), the new military 
regime which took over power in June 1989 has divided the region into three 
states, divided each state into numbers of Localities/provinces and 
administrative units. By 2006 there were three states, 24 localities and 70 
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administrative units (Ateem, 2007:33). This division was mostly done along 
tribal lines, especially in south Darfur (see figure 8 below).  
 
Figure 8: Structural relationships between NA and local government 
No Locality Tribe 
1 Nyala Multi 
2 Eddein Rezeigat 
3 Bahr Al-Arab Rezeigat 
4 Sherriya Birgid 
5 Belail Daju 
6 Adyla Maaliya 
7 Tulus Falata 
8 Buram Habaniyya 
9 Rehaidelburdi Taaisha 
10 Idd elfursan Banihalba 
11 Kass Fur/Arab 
12 Sharg Jabal Mara Fur 
13 Assalam (Abu Ajura) Tarjam 
I have developed this diagram for the purpose of this study. The information is 
based on my observations on the ground following my visit to South Darfur for 
field work in 2010. 
 
This coincided with the intensive mobilization for war in the South. Accordingly, 
in 1995 following the Naeema Conference (took place in Naeema village in Al-
Gazira-central Sudan) for tribal leaders, “the role of the native administrator 
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was redefined to be one of religious leader for each identity group, not only 
leading them in prayer but more importantly to prepare the youth to go to jihad 
(holy war) in the south” (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:51). Implementation of such 
policy, which was done through formation of ‘People defence Forces’, provided 
additional opportunity for people to obtain weapons. Access to weaponry and 
training was exploited by some tribes to grasp land, and therefore this policy 
has directly and indirectly enticed tribal conflict over land and power. It 
therefore appears as though a tribal homeland (hakura) has become a political 
constituency. The more territories a tribe acquires the more political 
representation and resources it can get both at state and federal level, as is 
further explained in chapter 7.  
 
Following the adoption of what came to be known the “Federal System of 
Governance” in 1994, the central government started to make unprecedented 
changes in the administration of Darfur, as will shortly be explained. This most 
likely came as a reaction against an armed resistance in Darfur alleged to be 
led by Fur and Massalit against the regime. In December 1991, an armed 
movement led by Daud Yahiya Bulad and Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu, from the Fur and 
the Massalit tribes respectively started operations in Darfur with the assistance 
of SPLM of the Southern Sudan (Daly, 2007:261). The government used Arab 
tribal militias to fight the rebels and was able to defeat their forces instantly 
(Daly, 2007:261). Since then the government in Khartoum has become more 
suspicious of the Fur and the Massalit. 
According to the “Federal System of Governance” Darfur was divided into 
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three states; North, South and West Darfur with the Fur tribe’s core homeland 
being divided into three parts each one belonging to the separate newly 
created States (Ateem, 2007:33-34).   Tribal tenancies (emirates) for 
pastoralists of Arab origin were created for the first time within the traditional 
homelands of other tribes; mainly Fur and Massalit, thus creating new forms of 
political tension  (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-57). It was in connection with these 
developments that another major war broke between the Massalit and a 
coalition of tribes of an Arab origin in west Darfur in 1996 onwards. The 
Zaghawa and camel herders of Arab origin have long been in competition over 
water resources in the northern part of Zaghawa homeland (De Waal, 
2005:77).  Following their alliance with the regime in Khartoum from the late 
1990s, the camel herders engaged in fierce war with the Zaghawa (Tubiana, 
2007:76).  
 
The common cause among the three victimized tribes, Fur, Massalit and 
Zaghawa came from the fact that they were all subjected to increasing 
violence by some tribes of Arab origin allied to Khartoum (Daly, 2007:268-69). 
These major developments; Arab/Fur conflict, Arab/Massalit conflict and 
Zaghawa/ Arab conflict, served as a triggering factor and paved the way for the 
eruption of the Darfurian armed movements in 2003. This has also contributed 
to the “Arab-African” dichotomy; as most tribes of the Arab origin in Darfur are 
pastoralists who are perceived to side with the government, whereby most 
tribes of the African origin are sedentary farmers most of whom are perceived 
to side with the rebel groups (Prunier, 2007:47). The eruption of armed 
  
122 
 
movements in Darfur has also negatively affected the position of tribal leaders. 
These movements’ leaders, who are mostly young and highly motivated, 
perceive tribal leaders to be allies of the government who pursue their own 
interests at the expense of Darfur people’s common interest (Flint, 2007:143-
144). This perception has further undermined the already distorted system of 
the NA, as will further be explained in chapter 7. 
 
South Darfur, particularly the southern part of this area, was known as the 
homeland of the cattle herders-Baggara-(Warburg, 1997:142). The rest of the 
area came under the Fur Magdomate which included Daju, Marrarit, Baigo, 
Birgid, Miseirriya, Tarjam, and Zaghawa-umkamalti tribes (Takana, 1997). 
From 1990s onward the situation has changed significantly (see figures 9 & 10 
below). All the above tribes that used to be under the administration of the Fur 
Magdomate have been officially granted a separate native administration 
status (Takana, 2007:70-72). In Kass area which used to be Fur dominated 
land, tribes of Arab origin were also guaranteed emirates; “in Banjadidi area 
native administration for Jalol Arabs was established in 1990s. This new native 
administration consists of Awlad Zaid, Awlad Rashid, Nawaiba, Erigat, Saada, 
Mahadi, Beni Hesein and Miseirriya” (Takana, 2007:29).  This is a fundamental 
change in the NA system of land tenure and has changed the political 
landscape considerably. 
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Figure 9: NA Structure in South Darfur, 1987-1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have developed this diagram for the purpose of this study. Source of 
information is: (KI/15: 8/6/10). 
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Figure 10: Structural relationships between the NA and local government 
in South Darfur after 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The information is based on the deliberations of the key informants 
together with my own observation on the ground following my visit to South 
Darfur for field work in June 2010. 
 
 
As was correctly observed, “Sudan, more than most other African countries, 
has witnessed proclamation of multiple acts of local government” (Abdul-Jalil et 
al, 2007:52). These were the acts of 1932, 1937, 1951, 1960, 1971, 1981, 
1994, 2003 and 2004. The main objective of these acts was to manipulate the 
system to serve governments’ political ends set in advance rather than 
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genuinely aiding local communities to achieve their interests. With the one 
exception of the local Government Act of 1951, which provided some elements 
of popular and freely elected councils at the end of a five stage process, the 
rest of the legislature throughout the history of Darfur since colonial period up 
to 2009, has denied this right.  
 
Following Sudan’s independence several Acts were passed with regard to the 
development of local government which coincided with what came to be known 
a shift towards decentralization. The shared factor in these attempts is that 
they were largely made by totalitarian governments therefore no genuine local 
government institutions were allowed to materialise. Abdul-Jalil et al, (2007) 
asserted that two reasons were behind the failure of “local government 
institutions”: they remained merely tools in the hands of central governments 
and that they constantly lacked adequate financial resources (Abdul-Jalil et al, 
2007:54). Ateem, 2007 identified “marginalization, eroded capacity, low 
credibility of local governments- as a result of being poorly funded and under-
resourced- as key governance constraints that have severely limited the 
capabilities of local governance structures to undertake development activities” 
(Ateem, 2007:31).  
 
The Marginalization of Darfur  
The colonial indirect rule policy not only affected the NA, land tenure and the 
local government structures, but the negative consequence of such policy has 
resulted in significant neglect and marginalization of Darfur. In terms of power 
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sharing and allocated financial and economic resources to the region, the 
successive central governments made no change in this respect. In relation to 
the country at large, and especially in comparison to the north and central 
Sudan in particular Darfur remains neglected (O’Fahey, 2008:300-301). This is 
beyond the scope of this research, even though I am highlighting some 
general aspects of this neglect and marginalization to give a holistic picture 
about the overall context in which this study has taken place. It has been 
suggested that it was the crucial role of the people of Darfur in the Mahdiyya 
revolution, and their consequent potential threat to colonial authority, that 
pushed the British to annex Darfur to Sudan (Collins, 2008:35, O’Fahey, 
2008:278-279). As suggested by Khalid, the decision made by the Darfur 
Sultanate to side with the Sultan of Turkey during World War1 further 
encouraged the British to conquer Darfur and consequently annex it to Sudan 
(Khalid, 2009:1). Therefore it seems likely that the overall political objective of 
the colonial policy in Darfur was to keep Darfur quiet, at minimal cost (Collins, 
2008:276). The focus was that of pacification and maintaining stability in Darfur 
in order not to allow Darfur to get out of hand and to be a haven for political 
agitators.  
As a backbone of the Mahdiyya revolution, therefore, the decision was that 
Darfur should remain marginalized (Mamdani, 2009: 164). This was reflected 
in the colonial government’s economic policy, which concentrated 
development projects in the northern and central Sudan; mainly Khartoum and 
the Gezira area between the Blue Nile and White Nile (Woodward, 1990: 126). 
In this area considerable efforts were exerted with regard to the provision of 
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health and educational services, as well as the construction of basic 
infrastructure such as bridges, roads and irrigated agricultural schemes.  By 
contrast, Darfur was neglected and left to be ruled by tribal leaders under the 
supervision of a few colonial officials. Following the leading role it played in 
shaping political development in Sudan, Darfur‘s role was reduced to a 
reservoir of cheap manpower (O’Fahey, 2008:300, Mamdani, 2009: 164). It 
became common for young men to migrate eastward to look for work. They 
were usually employed as seasonal workers during the cotton harvest in the 
Gezira irrigated scheme and other areas. They also often worked as soldiers in 
the military or as police officers. In numbers they represent the backbone of 
these institutions, however due to neglect and marginalization policy their 
enrolment in the Military and Police Academy for the years 1990-2000 was 
only 7% and 6% respectively (El-Tom, 2011:338).  
The above consequences were the direct result of the social policy adopted by 
the colonial authorities in Darfur, which might be described as one of enforced 
neglect. As colonial authorities deliberately refused to expand the system of 
state-run schools, Darfur people only had access to Islamic religious schools 
(Khalawi) which were provided and funded by the local community (Young, 
2009:43). In 1930 the number of religious schools (Khalawi) was 768 and up to 
1944 there were only two primary schools in the entire region (Mamdani, 2009: 
165). Out of 23 intermediate schools operating in the Sudan in 1952, only one 
was in Darfur (Prunier, 2007:32-33). By the end of colonial rule in Sudan in 
1956, the number of primary schools was 20 with two intermediate schools 
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(One of these two intermediate schools was built by self-help effort) for a 
population of 1,329,000 (Mamdani, 2009: 165).   
Lack of educational services and inequitable access to formal education was 
one of the major characteristics of the colonial period in Darfur. The following 
quotation attributed to the governor of Darfur (1934-41), provides more 
explanation in this respect: 
 “We have been able to limit education to the sons of chiefs and native 
administration personnel and can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling 
classes at the top of the education tree for many years to come” (Daly, 
1986:107).  
It could be argued that the colonial educational policy and the role of tribal 
leaders in accepting such policy were at the core of reasons responsible for 
the legacy of underdevelopment in Darfur. It seems that tribal leaders were 
incapable of implementing any form of technical or administrative progress or 
of dealing with problems of education. Furthermore, benefitting from the 
support of the colonial power as they did, they tended to be selfish. With the 
exception of being active and successful in resolving local disputes, the NA 
hardly did anything else for the people of Darfur. It was this legacy of economic 
and social underdevelopment that brought about future conflicts that faced 
Sudan at large and Darfur in particular (Prunier, 2007: 31-32).  
 
There were no developments of transport or other links between Darfur and 
central Sudan during the colonial era. The railway which was introduced to 
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northern Sudan in 1899-the beginning of the Condominium rule-was only 
partially extended to Darfur in 1959- after independence-to reach Nyala in the 
south of the region (Mamdani, 2009: 166).   
“Sudanization” (the replacement of higher ranking colonial officials by locally 
recruited Sudanese was what came to be known in literature as Sudanization), 
could best explain how colonial rule contributed to the persistence of Darfur’s 
marginal position. The British Governor General of Sudan appointed a 
committee (Sudanization Committee) in 1946 to look into the criteria for the 
replacement of higher ranking colonial officials with Sudanese. The committee, 
which consisted of three British officials and three Sudanese from the colonial 
civil service, put the criteria of selection as follows:  “three factors were 
necessary to the make-up of a good official: firstly, character and background, 
secondly, academic qualification, and thirdly acquired experience” (Mamdani, 
2009: 178). By giving priority to experience and academic qualifications, a 
merit nobody in Darfur had acquired at that time, all senior posts were 
allocated to people coming from northern and central Sudan. Only six out of 
800 posts went to southern Sudanese and none to Darfur (Mamdani, 2009: 
179). 
Following independence, Darfur was practically excluded from the circles of 
decision making. Thus, socio-economic and political marginalization continued. 
The elite in Darfur were quite aware of their marginal status with regard to 
entire Sudan. Immediately after independence, the Darfur people had started 
to call for equal right of political representation. The Darfur Development Front 
(DDF) was formed in 1964 with main objective being to lobby for the interests 
  
130 
 
of the people of Darfur in their struggle over power with the central government 
(Bradbury et al, 2006:12).  
From an economic point of view, and compared to Northern provinces, by the 
end of the Condominium rule, only 5-6% of the investment for the entire 
country reached Darfur (Prunier, 2007: 33). From1999 -2000, Darfur was the 
poorest region in the Northern part of the Sudan; the poverty rates in South 
Darfur, North Darfur, and west Darfur were 41%, 50%, and 51% respectively 
(Mamdani, 2009: 166). This inequality is still seen today in that more than nine 
thousand students from Darfur have graduated from universities in 1996-2006, 
yet less than six hundreds of these were formally recruited by government in 
ten years (Mamdani, 2009:: 166). In my own opinion, since independence and 
long before the higher level ranks in the civil service and other governmental 
apparatus, including military and police establishments, have continued to be 
occupied by people from central and northern Sudan, , thus perpetuating the 
colonial legacy of marginalization in Darfur. 
The following quotation from D-JAM report, 20074 describes at best the 
situations in Darfur up to date (at least up to the time this study was concluded 
in 2009):  
 
                                                          
4 This refers to a report prepared by the Darfur  Joint Assessment Mission (D-
JAM) commissioned by the UN to undertake general assessment of the 
Darfur’s need with regard to reconstruction and development in terms of 
services and capacity building. This assessment took place following the 
signing of the Darfur Peace agreement in 2006 between the government of 
Sudan and Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mini Minawi. 
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“The accountability and responsiveness of the Sudanese state to Darfur, 
and the capability, accountability and responsiveness of the state and local 
governments in Darfur to Darfurian citizens are both severely limited. 
Institutional checks and balances have failed, public sector management is 
ineffective and biased, political accountability is non-existent, the private 
sector struggles to operate in a non-transparent, monopolistic environment 
dominated by political interest. Decentralization has shifted responsibility 
but not improved service, civil society and the media are heavily 
constrained, traditional leadership has been eroded and is in crisis, and 
citizen participation is limited to pockets and disenfranchised by existing 
bureaucratic elements” (D-JAM, 2007:5). 
 
Conclusion 
The Turkish/Egyptian rule and the Mahdiyya regime did not last long; and their 
effects on Darfur were minimal. During British rule in Darfur (1916-1956) 
primarily through indirect rule, the administrative and legal systems of the old 
sultanate regimes persisted mostly with no fundamental change in structures 
and hierarchy, however there was highly significant political interference. 
The policy of indirect rule served the purpose of the colonialists in running the 
region and providing stability at minimal cost. Meanwhile, the period of the 
Condominium in Darfur was characterized by that of a very minimal of 
development; if not a policy of neglect, which resulted into huge legacy for 
Darfur. A part of this legacy is the creation of two different forms of power: the 
modern state machinery at the central level and the indigenous Native 
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Administration Authority at the local level. Those who live under the modern 
state, in the capital and the associated urban centres, were perceived by 
colonial authorities as civilized citizens. Civil law was adopted to this group. On 
the other hand, at the local level customary law was applied to those who were 
classified as natives. Customary law was dispensed by tribal leaders through 
the NA system. Tribes were enjoying a sort of self-rule whereby each tribal 
group was administered through their own leaders; as such this situation has 
resulted in many sets of customary laws and tribal constituencies.  
 
Following the independence of Sudan, the competing legal systems led to a 
clash between a formal statutory land tenure system and the customary land 
tenure system. The former was endorsed by the government and officially 
adopted in state-related circles which is also theoretically applicable to Darfur, 
but has never been enforced, and the customary system was officially 
abolished, yet remained in practice in Darfur. This is one of the major 
challenges that face Darfur today. As convincingly stated by Tubiana, “the 
acquisition of Sudanese citizenship has become a way to escape allegiance to 
other groups; in most cases African indigenous tribes- even if this allegiance is 
rather more symbolic, also calling into question the traditional tenure system 
carries a powerful message of emancipation for the Arab origin tribes in Darfur” 
(Tubiana, 2007:80). This indicates that, with regard to the on-going conflict in 
Darfur, land has become central issue. Many authors agree that, in Darfur of 
today, land issues need to be addressed as a prerequisite for any future 
attempt towards reconciliation among communities.  
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Opposite to the claim that colonial authority did not intervene in tribal affairs 
and their local structures, there proved to be highly significant political 
interference which resulted in significant changes on some of these structures 
and their roles. Although there were significant changes after independence in 
the various official approaches to land and political / administrative authority, 
these were not always fully implemented in Darfur; i.e. none of this happened 
in a straightforward manner that led to promotion of local government 
institutions. On the contrary, these interventions have led to distortion of the 
existing NA and local government structures and failed to bring about capable 
new institutions to replace them, a matter which further fuelled tribal conflicts, 
as I shall demonstrate over the next chapters, where I shall focus on these 
issues through the lens of the causes of violent conflicts and indigenous 
attempts to settle and/or resolve them. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ANATOMY OF CONFLICTS IN DARFUR: 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, 1916-2000 
 
Introduction 
This chapter mainly uses ITRC documents as a source of information to; 1) 
explore and analyse the causes of tribal conflicts in Darfur during the colonial 
period (1916-1955) and after independence (1956 up to 2000, and 2) to 
evaluate the performance of the ITRC in comparison to these two different 
periods. The focus is on major tribal incidents that took place in the region, 
those which required intervention through Inter-Tribal Reconciliation 
Conferences (ITRC). Through this period, tribes experienced different types of 
disputes: between individuals, between sub tribes, and disputes between two 
or amongst more than two tribes. With the exception of the latter, these ‘minor’ 
disputes were considered resolvable through judiyya, as will be explained in 
chapter 6. It was only immense tribal incidents that encountered high rates of 
human loss which necessitated such a response, the table below gives some 
idea of such losses. In the recent history of Darfur (1916-2009) there were 
many minor incidents that also took place and   continue, without being settled 
in a conference. This could still include deaths, but not expected to pose a big 
challenge of expanding into a wide scale conflict. 
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Table 1: Shows examples of human and property losses in connection to tribal 
conflicts in South Darfur 
Name of 
conference 
Tribes involved Human 
losses 
 
Injured 
persons 
People 
affected and 
Property 
losses 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between the 
Birgid, 
Miseirriya and 
Zaghawa, 2006 
Birgid, 
Miseirriya and 
Zaghawa 
 
1112(all 
together) 
 
- 
110 villages 
destroyed 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between  the 
Zaghawa and 
Zaghawa-
Umkamalti, 
2007 
Zaghawa and  
 
Zaghawa-
umkamalti 
164  
 
 
196 
 
181 
 
 
124 
53 villages 
destroyed 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between the  
Falata and 
Gimir, 2008 
Falata and  
 
 
Gimir 
25 
 
 
37 
06 
 
 
65 
186 huts 
burnt 
252 cattle 
looted 
 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between the 
Maaliya and the 
Rezeigat,2004 
Maaliya 
 
 
 
Rezeigat 
87 
 
 
 
49 
22 
 
 
 
- 
One village 
burnt/243 
persons 
claimed lost 
properties. 
 
100 people 
claimed lost 
properties. 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between Daju, 
Fur, Zaghawa, 
Tarjam, Huttiya 
and 
Taalba,2004 
Daju, Fur and 
Zaghawa on 
one side and 
Tarjam, huttiya 
and Taalba. 
159 44 2,399 
families 
displaced. 
4008 cattle, 
6491 sheep, 
4188 goats, 
96 horses 
and 544 
donkeys 
claimed 
looted. 
Reconciliation  
conference 
between the 
Salamat and the 
Salamat and  
 
Awlad Saadan 
(sub tribe of 
11 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
185 cattle, 
313 goats 
and 185 
sheep looted. 
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Habaniyya, 
2007 
the Habaniyya) 27 25 
Source: Al-musalahat al-ahliya alati tamat fi wilayat Janub Dar fur fi alfatra min 
2003-2008 ” (in Arabic), which I have translated as “ Tribal Reconciliations in 
South Darfur, 2003-2008” and referred to it in the text of this thesis as TRSD, 
2003-8 (Vol. 1 & Vol. 2). 
 
The following sections examine the experience of the ITRCs in Darfur region 
as a whole during the colonial period (1916-1955) and following Sudan’s 
independence (1956- 2000). These conferences will be presented in 
chronological order to identify whether there were any changes with regard to 
the factors which contributed to tribal conflicts over time. The analysis will also 
shed light on the parties involved in these conflicts and how tribal conflicts 
developed and changed over time, which will make it possible later (in chapter 
7) to explore whether ITRCs adapted to change in the way they dealt with the 
new factors.  This chapter is therefore fundamental for the rest of the study 
especially chapters 6, and 7 which will look into the functioning of the judiyya 
and the ITRCs respectively, the way they worked and the issues addressed 
with regard to resolving tribal conflicts.  
 
 Tribe: Concept and Context 
The number of tribes in Darfur is estimated to be between forty - ninety 
depending on how groups identify themselves; as “Arabs” or “Africans” (Flint 
and de Waal, 2008:6). However other estimates refer to more than one 
hundred tribes (Musa, 211:126).  The alleged dissimilarity of ‘Africans’ versus 
‘Arabs’ in Darfur is not accurate or very helpful distinction that would be 
understood by outsiders. It seems to be rather connected to perceptions. 
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Baldo, (2006:1) asserted that “All people in Darfur are black, Muslim, followers 
of Sunni Islam, and they for centuries lived in relative peace”.  Darfurians were 
divided to ‘Africans’ ‘and Arabs’ by politicians due to political manipulation and 
polarization, as explained earlier in chapter 3 and will be explained later in this 
chapter and the chapters follow. Porto (2004:9) stated that “the risk of civil war 
arises when the society is polarised into two groups, because polarised 
societies have around a 50% higher probability of civil war than either 
homogeneous or highly fractionalised societies”. On the other hand tribal 
affiliations remain strong in Darfur due to socio-economic and political factors. 
In Darfur, “tribe constitutes the main source of solidarity and also the main 
socio-economic unit…  the absence of reliable state institutions that can 
respond to people’s needs, made these people maintain their own tribal 
autonomy, tribal territory and tribal defence system” (Musa, 2011:147). 
 
Throughout the Sultanate period in Darfur (1650-1916) tribe was recognized 
as a social and a political entity and tribal leaders were guaranteed autonomy 
with regard to ruling over their tribes according to the communities’ own 
traditions and customs, a situation which continued unchanged in the period of 
Turkish/Egyptian rule (1874-1882) and the Mahdiyya (1883-1898) in Darfur; as 
both regimes were short lived (O’Fahey, 2008:275-281). During the 
Condominium rule (1916-1956), the role of the tribal leaders in the 
management of the affairs of their tribes in accordance with local customs and 
traditions was further enforced (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007: 45; Prunier, 2007: 25-
29; Young, 2009:42). In spite of the fact that the authorities of the 
Condominium rule had introduced new institutions of modern policing and law 
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enforcement such as courts, police and prisons, they allowed tribal leaders, 
especially in Darfur, to use indigenous mechanisms, such as judiyya and tribal 
conferences, derived from the local practices and experience in resolving 
problems in their societies (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007: 44; Prunier, 2007: 25-29).  
In this study these conferences are referred to as the Inter-Tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs). ITRC refers to a meeting that is specially 
organized for mediating a conflict between or amongst tribal groups. The main 
role of the ITRCs, as reflected in the archive (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 1 & Vol. 2) 
was to bring tribes involved in fighting together to the negotiating table with the 
aim to engage in a peaceful settlement for the conflict. This practice was taking 
place in a form of a big meeting sponsored by the government. The attendees 
of such meetings were representatives of tribes, tribal leaders and elders as 
mediators, and government officials; the attendance of whom might be limited 
to the opening and closing sessions only. My observation is that in most cases 
the meetings held in an urban centre rather in the peripheries where the 
fighting had taken place (see table 2 below which refers to the places where 
ITRCs took place). Detailed accounts of the ITRC practice are presented in 
chapter 7. 
 
The information provided in table 2 below presents the wider context within 
which the ITRCs in South Darfur took place and how these events were 
related to the situation of the inter-tribal conflicts and other conflicts in the 
region at large. The table includes the major and best known ITRCs held in the 
entire Darfur region from 1916 up to 2000. This is divided into two eras; 
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Colonial era in Darfur (1916-1955) and independence era in Sudan (1956-
2000).  
With regard to the entire region I have limited the analysis to the period from 
1916 until the year 2000, due to the availability of reliable information on the 
ITRCs. Meanwhile the region was divided into separate three states in 1994 
(North, South, and West Darfur), which made it more difficult to follow up on 
the ITRCs at the level of the region as a whole. Furthermore, this study 
confines itself to the South Darfur State as a case study particularly with the 
aim of covering the period from 1989 to 2009.  
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Table 2: ITRCs in Darfur, 1916-2000 
Conferences  
 
tribes involved causes of conflict 
No.  Name  Date and Place Insider Outsider Triggering 
factors 
Root causes 
ITRCs during colonial period( 1916-1955) 
1 Rezeigat and 
Dinka  
Conference 
1924 / Safaha/SD 1.Rezeigat 2. Dinka 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft 
 Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
2 Umgozain 
conference 
1932/ Umgozain 
/ND                  
 
1. Midob  
2. Berti 
3.Zayadiyya 
 
4. Kawahlla 
5. Kababish 
 
1. Dispute 
between 
individuals.  
2. Animal theft 
 
 Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
3 Almalha 
Conference 
1943/ Almalha/ 
ND 
 1. Zayyadiya 2. Kawahlla 3. 
Kababish 
1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
 2. Animal theft 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
ITRCs Following Independence, (1956-2000) 
4 Almalha 
Conference/2 
1957/ Almalha/ 
ND 
1. Midob  
2.Zayadiyya 
3.Kababish 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. Animal theft 
 Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
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5 Maaliya and 
Rezeigat 
Conference 
1968/ 
Elfashir/ND 
1. Maaliya  
2.Rezeigat 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2.Competition 
over power 
1. Land dispute 
 2. quest for 
Independent 
nazirate 
6 Zaghawa 
and Birgid 
1974/ 
Elfashir/ND 
1.Zaghawa 
 2. Birgid 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft  
3.Competition 
over power 
Land dispute. 
7 Rezeigat and 
Dinka  
1975/Safaha/SD 1.Rezeigat 2. Dinka 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
8 Zayyadiya 
and Midob 
1976/Elfashir/ ND 1.Zayadiyya  
2. Midob 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
9 Mahriya and 
Banihalba 
1976/Nyala/SD 1. Mahriya 
 2.Banihalba 
 Dispute between 
individuals             
 
10 Mahriya and 
Banihalba 
1980/Nyala/SD 
 
1. Mahriya 
2.Banihalba 
_ Dispute between 
individuals             
 
11 Taaisha and 
Salamat 
1980/ Nyala/SD 1.Taaisha 
 2.Salamat 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2.Competition 
over power 
1.Land 
2. Quest for 
Independent 
Nazirate 
12 Rezeigat and 
Miseirriya 
1980/Eldalanj/ South 
Kordofan 
1.Rezeigat 2.Miseiriya 
(kordofan) 
1. Dispute 
between 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
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individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
sources 
13 Rezeigat and 
Dinka 
1981/Babanosa/Sout
h Kordofan 
1.Rezeigat 2. Dinka 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
14 Mahriya and 
Banihalba 
1982/Nyala/SD 1. Mahriya  
2.Banihalba 
_ Dispute between 
individuals             
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
15 Mellit 1982/Mellit/ND 
 
1. Midob 
2.Zayadiyya  
3. Berti 
1.Kababish 
 2. Kawahlla 
1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animals’ theft  
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
16 Rezeigat and 
Miseirriya 
1984/Nyala/SD 1.Rezeigat 2.Miseiriya 
(kordofan) 
Dispute between 
individuals             
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
17 Umkaddada 1984/ Umkaddada 
/ND.  
1. Zayyadiya   
 2. Berti     
3. Kababish 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animals’ theft. 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
18 Milit2 1987/Mellit/ND 
 
1.Midob 
2.Zayadiyya  
3. Berti 
4.Kababish  
5.Kawahla 
1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
19 Falata/ 
Gimir and 
Marrarit 
1987/Nyala/SD 1. Falata 2.Mararit  
3. Gimir 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals            
2. Animal theft. 
Boundaries of 
tribal home lands 
(hakura) 
20 Kabkabiyya 1989/ 
Kabkabiyya/ND 
1. Fur  
2. Zaghawa 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
Competition over 
pasture and water 
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 individuals            
2. armed robbery 
sources 
21 Fur and 
Arabs  
1989/ Elfashir/ND 
 
1. Fur  
2. Arabs 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
 2. armed 
robbery  
3. Damage of 
crops  
4. closure of 
livestock 
migration routes  
1. lands (hakura) 
 2. Competition 
over pasture and 
water sources 
22 Kabkabiyya 1989/ 
Kabkabiyya/ND 
 
1. Zaghawa 2. 
Bidaiyat 
_  1. armed 
robbery  
2. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
23 Gimir and 
Zaghawa 
1990/Elfashir/ND 1. Gimir 2.Zaghawa _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. armed 
robbery. 
 Land dispute 
24 Gimir and 
Zaghawa 
1990/ 
El-Geneina/WD 
1. Gimir 2.Zaghawa _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
 2. armed 
robbery. 
 Land dispute 
25 Rezeigat and 
Bargo 
1990/Nyala/SD 1. Rezeigat 2. Bargo _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
Land dispute 
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2. Damage of 
crops 3. Closure 
of livestock 
migration routes. 
26 Gimir and 
Taaisha 
1991/Nyala/SD 1. Gimir 2.Taaisha _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. Damage of 
crops  
3. Closure of 
livestock 
migration routes. 
Boundaries of 
tribal home lands 
(hakura) 
27 Zaghawa  
and Maaliya 
1991/Eddein/SD 1. Zaghawa  
2. Maaliya 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2.Competition 
over power 
Land dispute 
28 Zaghawa, 
Mima and 
Birgid 
1991/Elfashir/ND 
 
1. Zaghawa 2. Mima  
3. Birgid 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
 2. armed 
robbery  
3. Competition 
over power. 
 Land dispute 
29 Zaghawa  
and Bani- 
Hussein 
1991/ 
Kabkabiyya/ 
N. Darfur 
1. Zaghawa 2. Bani- 
Hussein 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
 2. armed 
robbery 
 Competition over 
pasture and water 
sources 
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30 Zaghawa  
and  Birgid 
1991/Nyala/SD 1. Zaghawa 2. Birgid _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. armed robbery 
 3.Competiti-on  
Over power. 
 Land dispute 
31 Fur and 
Tarjam 
1991/Nyala/SD 1. Fur  
2. Tarjam 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2.Competition 
over power  
3. Damage of 
crops 
 4. closure of 
livestock 
migration routes  
1. Land dispute 
2. Quest for 
independent tribe 
administration( 
Nazirate) 
32 Zaghawa  
and Rezeigat 
(camel 
herders) 
1994/Kutum/ND 1. Zaghawa  
2. Rezeigat                          _ 
(camel herders) 
1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. armed 
robbery. 
Land dispute 
33 Massalit and 
Arabs 
1996/ 
Al-Geneina/WD 
1. Massalit 2. Arabs _ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. armed robbery  
3.competition 
over  power  
4. Damage of 
crops  
5. Closure of 
livestock 
Land dispute 
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migration routes. 
       
34 Massalit and 
Arabs 
1999/ 
Al-Geneina/WD 
1. Massalit  
2. Arabs 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2. armed robbery  
3.competition 
over  power  
4. Damage of 
crops  
5. Closure of 
livestock 
migration routes. 
 Land dispute 
       
35 Midob and 
Berti 
2000/Elfashir/ND 1. Midob  
 2. Berti 
_ 1. Dispute 
between 
individuals             
2.Local Power 
Land Dispute 
(Boundaries) 
        
I have developed this table exclusively for the purpose of this study; however source of information is (Mohammed, 2009; and 
(Takana, 2007). ND, SD, and WD stand for North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur respectively.
  
147 
 
 
 ITRCs during the British colonial Rule in Darfur, 1916-1955 
This period will be dealt with as if it was the initial period of colonialism in 
Darfur as the earlier rule of the Turkish Egyptian, 1874-1882 made no 
substantial change with regard to administrative structures and the role of tribal 
leaders and at the same time the Turkish Egyptian period was characterized 
by administrative and political instability (O’Fahey, 2008:275-282), as 
described earlier in chapter three.  
 
During the entire period of the British rule in Darfur which was almost forty 
years, only three conferences of a kind were held; two to mediate tribal 
disputes in the north of the region and only one in South Darfur. The average 
rate of the conferences was about one conference every 13 years. Also the 
information in table 2 suggests that the number of conferences was 
diminishing over time.  The final decade showed no conference had been 
reported.  
 
Scrutinizing the period 1916-1955, one can observe (see Table 2), that the 
triggering factors of these tribal conflicts were limited to animal theft and 
disputes between individuals. In the meantime the root causes were seen to 
be limited to the competition over natural resources (water sources and 
grazing land). With the exception of one tribe (the Berti of north Darfur), the 
parties to the conflict during this period were solely pastoralist tribes. This most 
likely indicates that the conflict was the result of friction amongst pastoralists in 
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their grazing areas, but was probably not due to an absolute lack of resources. 
During that time the northern parts of the regions of Kordofan and Darfur were 
not affected by droughts and desertification, while Bahr el-Ghazal and South 
Darfur as yet are still considered to be among the richest areas in terms of 
water and grazing lands in the Sudan today, let alone in the 1920s. Another 
observation is that none of these conferences was exclusively between or 
amongst the tribes of Darfur; the parties to the conflict were seven in total; 
namely the Dinka, the Kababish and the Kawahlla, the Midob, the Berti, and 
the Zayyadiya and the Rezeigat. The involvement of the tribes in conflicts was 
always equally divided between one party from Darfur and another party from 
outside the region (e.g. the Dinka belong to the neighbouring region of Bahr el 
Ghazal in Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, the Kawahlla and the Kababish were 
from the neighbouring region of Kordofan).  
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ITRCs in Darfur following Sudan’s independence (1956- 2000): 
The independence era will be divided into three successive  periods: (1956-
1968, 1969-1985, and 1986-2000) with the aim of identifying changes over 
time in relation to the factors (triggering and root causes) which contributed to 
the tribal conflicts, the stakeholders involved, and the frequency of the events. 
Another part of the rationale behind this division is that these periods were 
characterised by different regimes and different policies/strategies. In this 
regard such classification might help to draw attention to the effects of such 
policies on the intensification of tribal conflicts and the change in the way of 
dealing with them or the lack thereof. 
 
Figure 11: ITRCs in Darfur, 1956-2000 
 
Source: I have developed this diagram for the purpose of this study and the 
source of information is table 2 above. 
 
  
150 
 
The first period (1956-1968) 
Two conferences were held during this period (over twelve years). These 
conferences were distributed in the north of the region and the south equally. 
Regarding the frequency of the occurrence of tribal conflicts during this period, 
compared to the colonial period, records suggest there was a remarkable 
increase; an average of one conference each six years instead of an average 
of one conference per 13 years as in the previous period, although perhaps 
not all tribal conflicts were recorded during the colonial period. 
 
Tribes involved in conflict during this period were the Kababish on the one 
hand and the Zayyadiya and the Midob on the other, and the Maaliya against 
the Rezeigat. With regard to the first conference, compared to the previous 
period, the main features of the tribal conflicts remained unchanged. For 
example, triggering factors were animal theft and disputes between individuals. 
While the root causes were identified as competition over water sources and 
grazing land, the parties involved were pastoralists from inside and outside the 
region. However the second conference shows that new elements with regard 
to the triggering factors and root causes came to the surface. These were 
rivalry over local power and conflict over land ownership respectively. Another 
important point to be mentioned in this respect is that it was the first time in the 
documented history of this kind of conferences that parties involved (the 
Maaliya and the Rezeigat) were both from inside the region; south Darfur in 
particular.  
The emergence of competition over local power and land as triggering factor 
and root cause respectively took place in the context of the slogans of ‘liberty 
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and democracy’ raised by the 1964 uprising in Sudan. Following the first 
military coup in 1958, the debate over NA calmed down for a while. However, 
the 1964 uprising, which came to be known in Sudan as the ‘October 
Revolution’, brought the issue to the surface again and a decision was made 
by the leftist-dominated transitional government to abolish the NA system in 
1965 though has not been implemented (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:50), as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Ateem argued that “since 1960s competition between 
local elites has been detrimental to the social harmony of the region (Ateem, 
2007:39).  The Maaliya, inspired by these developments and slogans, took this 
issue further to call for freedom and rights of citizenship. They claimed that 
their freedom had been restricted due to certain arrangements made by the 
colonial power which abolished their independent separate Nazirate and 
amalgamated their tribe into the Rezeigat’s administration (Morton, 2004:7; 
Naeim, 1978:76). 
 
These situations in Darfur should not be isolated from the political 
developments that followed Sudan’s independence. Attempts were made by 
central governments such as the decision of the transitional government of 
1965 and May regime in 1970, which aimed to reduce powers and the role of 
tribal leaders. However, to a large extent, tribal leaders managed to preserve 
their powers and roles during this period due to their alliance with the 
conservative parties; the UP and the DUP that took over power following 
Sudan’s independence, as has already been explained in chapter 3 of this 
study. It seems that the direct involvement of tribal leaders in politics during the 
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colonial era, and particularly during the key political debates which took place 
in the momentum prior independence period (1942-1955), put these leaders in 
confrontation with the new emerging educated elites. 
 
Tribal leaders were considered by leaders of the nationalist movement as 
colonial agents. Following Sudan’s independence they were perceived by 
radical political parties (both Communists and Islamists) as supporters of 
‘sectarian reactionary’ political parties, specifically the Umma Party and 
Democratic Unionist party led by Al-Sadig Al-Mahadi and Mohammed Osman 
Al-Mirghani respectively. It should be noted that the government that made the 
decision to abolish the Native administration in 1965 was described as leftist-
dominated government. Again the government that abolished the NA system in 
1970 was supported by the leftists at the time, whereas the one that made 
profound changes with regard to NA structures and role following 1989 coup 
was an Islamist (Muslim brothers/Islamic National Front) led government 
(Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-57). As convincingly described “Both nationalists 
and radicals acted relentlessly to attack the native administrators and 
undermine their leadership position….This gave rise to resistance to native 
administration at the local level by the newly emerging educated and politically 
conscious segments of local communities” (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007: 49-50).  
 
The Second period 1969-1985 
In this period and as shown in table 2 above, a total of 12 ITRCs took place, 
particularly during the period of 1970s to mid-1980s. With only two incidents 
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reported in the northern part of the region, the rest of the incidents (ten) were 
in South Darfur. 
 
It looks that the number of the conferences increased during this period from 
two conferences in the previous period (12 years), to 12 conferences during 
this period (15 years). Six conferences were for parties inclusively from inside 
Darfur and the remaining six conferences were equally divided; one party from 
Darfur and another party to the conflict from the neighbouring regions 
(Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal). Tribes involved were 14 in total; ten from 
Darfur and only four from the neighbouring regions. The tribes involved in 
these conflicts were the Zaghawa, the Birgid, Rezeigat, Zayyadiya, Midob, 
Mahriya, Banihalba, Taaisha, Salamat, Berti (all from Darfur), Dinka (from Bahr 
el-Ghazal), Kababish, Kawahlla, and Miseirriya (all from Kordofan). 
 
There was a repetition of the occurrence of conferences between the same 
parties to the conflict; for example, the Dinka against the Rezeigat 
(1975&1981), the Mahriya against the Banihalba (1976, 1980 and 1882), and 
the Miseirriya against the Rezeigat (1980 and 1984).  In comparison with the 
previous decade, where competition over land ownership was reported only 
once as a root cause for tribal conflict, competition over land during this period 
was reported in two events as a root cause, which raised cases of this kind to 
three (all in South Darfur). However the competition over natural resources 
(water sources and pasture) remained the major root cause of tribal disputes in 
this period (reported in ten cases out of 12).  In connection to the triggering 
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factors, competition over local power continued to be reported and has been 
reported twice, whereas it was only once in the previous period. 
 
Regarding the parties to the conflict, with exception of the Berti and Birgid 
tribes, who are sedentary farmers, the rest (12 tribes from inside and outside 
the region) were pastoralists; both camel and cattle herders. Compared to the 
previous periods, conflicts among tribes exclusively from within the region had 
increased from one case in 1968 (in south Darfur) to six cases by 1984 (also, 
all in South Darfur). Perhaps the internal migration of considerable segments 
of population from the north into the south of the region due to drought had 
contributed to the intensification of the disputes amongst tribes in south Darfur. 
As explained below in this chapter, these waves of internal migration were 
prompted and pushed by the drought and desertification of the early 1970s in 
the northern parts of the region, which culminated in the famine of 1984. Tribes 
such as the Mahriya, the Zaghawa, and others were forced to move from the 
north towards the southern part of Darfur in search of pasture and water 
(Takana, 2009:15-19; Osman, 1990). Other factors include repercussions of 
war and political instability in Chad on Darfur such as banditry activities 
(Woodward, 1990:219; Oxfam Report, 1984). Also the proliferation of small 
arms in the hands of the local people, especially the pastoralists, due to the 
war in Chad, and the activities of the Sudanese armed opposition coming from 
Libya across Darfur, was likely to have contributed significantly to the increase 
of tribal conflicts (Hagar, 2007:113-114).  
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These developments coincided with other policies and decisions made by the 
Numeiri military regime/May regime (1969-1985) in connection to the NA and 
local government systems. The Numeiri regime took over power in a military 
coup in 1969. One to two years later, the new regime announced the 
dissolution of the NA (1970) and the establishment of a local government 
system instead (1971). This came to be known as ‘People’s Local Governance 
Act’ of 1970 (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:50-51). This development was described 
as one of the most crucial actions that negatively affected the long lasting 
indigenous system of tribal conflict management and resolution in Darfur (de 
Waal, 1993:142-143).  This situation has been elaborated by one of the 
informants interviewed by this study as follows: 
 
“The Peoples’ Local Governance Act was introduced in early 1970s, whereby 
most of the powers were given to the newly created institutions called ‘people’s 
local governance institutions’. These were balloon institutions with no 
experience in governance and were mainly dominated by figures from the 
Socialist Union party (the ruling party at the time) which lacked popular 
support. Civil servants were left with little role to play in the administration. At 
this stage the government monopolized business in basic commodities such 
as sugar and wheat. Commercial activities went into the hands of those 
supportive to the ruling party. As a result there was a competition over how to 
exert control over these newly created institutions. The competition was based 
on tribal affiliation which resulted in damaging the social fabric” 
(KI/23:11/06/10). 
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One example in this respect was the case of the Salamat and the Taaisha 
tribes in South Darfur. As explained by Morton, (2004:10), the triggering factor 
of the 1982 dispute between these two tribes was dispute between individuals. 
However, the root cause of the dispute was claimed to be related to land. The 
dispute between individuals was provoked by competition over the control of 
the local councils. It was reported that the Salamat won the elections in one of 
the local councils in the area of Rehaid elburdi. Morton, (2004:10) concluded 
that “as controllers of the local council, the Salamat control the sugar 
allocation”.  Maybe such fears were the real reasons behind the violent 
reaction of the Taaisha to a greater degree than the incidents of individual 
quarrels. 
 
Another example was the dispute between the Gimir and the Falata tribes in 
1984. It was also related to the local council’s elections and allocation of sugar 
quota. The Gimir claimed that Majabi area belonged to their dar though it was 
inhabited by Falata. Following the establishment of the rural councils each 
tribe demanded that the area should be considered part of their constituency; 
“Probably more important, which council was going to get their sugar ration: 
the Gimir council at Katila or the Falata at Tulus” (Morton, 2004:11).  These 
separate incidents of political manipulation culminated in what came to be 
known the Fur versus Arabs conflict in 1987/88 due to wider political 
polarization along tribal and ethnic lines, as will be explained later in this 
chapter.  
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The third period 1986-2000 
Following the collapse of May regime (1985), in 1986 a new civil democratic 
government was elected. In connection to Darfur, the Native Administration 
was re-established in 1987. The political power had been assumed by the 
major conservative parties: the UP and the DUP, therefore, this was 
considered as a ‘reward’ made by the two conservative parties for its political 
supporters (tribesmen and native administration leaders). However, the elected 
government was shortly overthrown in 1989. Furthermore, that government 
was criticized for allowing the Libyan-supported Chadian armed opposition in 
Darfur, which was alleged to be behind the escalated conflict situation in the 
region (Tubiana, 2007:70). During 1986-1989, there was no significant change 
with regard to the security and escalation of conflicts; hence the situation on 
the ground in Darfur continued to go from bad to worse. 
As could be observed from table 2 above, during this period 18 conferences 
were held to mediate conflicts amongst tribal groups in the entire region. The 
distribution of these incidents was four in West Darfur, six in North Darfur, and 
eight in South Darfur.  
Referring to conferences during this period the following observations could be 
made: firstly, regarding triggering factors, disputes between individuals came 
at the top of the list; it has been reported in every single incident. Based on 
close scrutiny one may argue that this might be attributed to the proliferation of 
arms and the use of automatic weapons in disputes between individuals, which 
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often resulted in death and serious injury, which provoked kin to retaliate in a 
violent way and consequently the circle of violence expanded. Disputes 
between individuals appear to be more likely to have happened when an 
argument took place between individuals at market centres or between farmers 
and herders at water points, and during the seasonal migration of the herders, 
due to crop damage or closure of migration routes, etc. Armed robbery also 
appears to have been a new additional factor and was repeatedly reported in 
ten incidents out of the sixteen. The damage of crops and the closure of 
livestock migration routes were playing an increasing role in triggering tribal 
conflicts, and were reported six times. Also competition over local power has 
been reported six times; jumping from two times in the previous period.  
 
Secondly; the involvement of parties from outside Darfur reduced from six 
incidents in the previous period to only one during this period (see table 2 
above). With the exception of one dispute (in 1987 between the Midob, 
Zayyadiya, and Berti (all from Darfur) on one hand and the Kababish and the 
Kawahlla (from Kordofan) on the other), tribes involved in the rest of the 
incidents during this period were exclusively from within Darfur. This might 
explain the shift in the trend of tribal disputes from competition over water and 
pasture as the main reason to the focus on land ownership and demarcation of 
boundaries within the tribal homeland as a central issue. Even though the 
competition over water sources and grazing land continued to be amongst the 
root causes of tribal conflicts, disputes over tribal homelands (hawakeer and its 
boundaries) have become increasingly the more important issue.  
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Thirdly; during the above mentioned period, land related issues were reported 
to be the main cause behind tribal disputes in 14 incidents out of the 18. Unlike 
the previous periods, whereby the phenomenon was described as one that 
was mostly dominated by pastoralist tribes as main parties to the conflict, this 
period looks to have witnessed a shift in the trend of tribal conflict to one that 
mainly involves sedentary farmers against pastoralist groups.  14 out of the 18 
above reported ITRCs were amongst farmers versus pastoralists. This fact 
supports the argument that from the mid-1980s up to the end of 1990s, 
competition over natural resources-with the land taking a paramount 
importance- has obviously become one of the important factors of tribal 
conflicts in Darfur (Mark et al, 2006:8). Perhaps, it was this situation of 
antagonism between sedentary farmers and herders which contributed to the 
growing perceived tendency of the “Arab-African” dichotomy; as most of the 
Arab origin tribes in Darfur are pastoralists whereby most of the African origin 
tribes are sedentary farmers. In this respect reference should be made to the 
conflict over land between a broad coalition of Arab tribes (alleged to be about 
13 or 27 tribes as referred to by the two authors below respectively) and the 
Fur tribe which broke out in the period of 1987-1988 (Ateem, 2007:38; 
Tubiana, 2007:70).  
 
Another important point related to the development of the tribal disputes during 
this period was that for the first time in the recent history of the region (1916-
2000), tribal conflicts spilled over to the western parts of Darfur; to cover the 
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entire region at the same time (West Darfur, North Darfur, and South Darfur).  
The first incident of this kind in Western Darfur was reported between the Gimir 
and Zaghawa in 1990, which was followed by other major devastating 
incidents in 1996 and 1999 between the Massalit and coalition of tribes of Arab 
origin in and around Al-Geneina (the capital of Western Darfur State).  
  
This period therefore saw a new dynamic of tribal conflicts: in terms of the 
parties involved (mostly from inside the region); the issues of conflict shifted 
from interest-based conflicts to one that came to be perceived as identity-
based one with land as central issue; and the expansion of area covered by 
disputes to include the entire region. These new dynamics need to be 
considered in the light of the government policies adopted during this period; 
especially with regard to the local government and NA.  
 
In 1989 a new military regime took power and established what they called a 
‘federal system’ of governance. Consequently Native Administration was 
subjected to profound change in terms of role, institutions, structures, and 
jurisdictions (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-57). In1994 the region was divided into 
three states, with the Fur core homeland being allocated along these newly 
created states, and the Fur people becoming minority in each of these states.   
This was probably a reaction to armed resistance allegedly led by the Fur and 
Massalit against the regime in 1991, as previously mentioned in chapter 3. 
Tribal tenancies (emirates) for pastoralists of Arab origin were created for the 
first time within the traditional homelands of Fur and Massalit, thus creating 
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new forms of political tension (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-57). It was in 
connection with these developments that another major war broke between the 
Massalit and a coalition of tribes of an Arab origin in west Darfur in 1996 
onwards. The Zaghawa and camel herders of Arab origin have long been in 
competition over water resources in the northern part of the region (De Waal, 
2005:77; Tubiana, 2007:76). The common cause among the three tribes; Fur, 
Massalit and Zaghawa came from the fact that they all subjected to an 
increasing violence alleged to be perpetrated by militias of an Arab origin allied 
to Khartoum (Daly, 2007:268-69). These major developments; Arab/Fur 
conflict,1987/88, Arab/Massalit conflict, 1996/99 and Zaghawa/ Arab conflict, 
late 1990s, served as a triggering factor and paved the way for the eruption of 
the Darfurian armed movements in 2002/3. This eruption of insurgency further 
fuelled and escalated tribal conflicts in the entire region, especially in South 
Darfur as is explained in chapter 5 and 7.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that tribal conflicts in Darfur persisted throughout the 
recent history of the region (1916-2000). During the colonial period the 
conflicts were amongst pastoralists equally divided from inside and outside the 
region and the triggering factors were limited to animal theft and disputes 
between individuals. Meanwhile the root causes were related to competition 
over water source and grazing land. These causes developed over time, 
especially after Sudan’s independence, to include competition over local power 
and land ownership as triggering factor and root causes respectively. Parties 
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involved increasingly becoming insiders.  The drought and desertification and 
famine that hit the northern parts of the region at the beginning of the 1970s 
and mid-1984 respectively, which coincided with the dissolution of the NA, 
further aggravated the situation especially due to internal migration and 
activities of the armed robbery that surfaced in this context, the latter was 
further motivated by repercussions of conflicts in Chad.  
 
Another factor was the manipulation of the structures of the NA, which has 
been a persistent factor since the colonial period and throughout the 
independent era. It appears that the political instability which resulted from 
changing regimes at the centre, coupled with changing policies regarding NA 
and local governance, were to a large extent responsible for the declining role 
of the NA in the conflict resolution/management and – perhaps consequently - 
the reduced success of the ITRC in resolving these conflicts over time. The 
overall analysis in this chapter stands as an account of the success of such 
approaches, at least during the colonial period and early years of 
independence, in spite of the political interference by the British and 
independent governments.  
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CHAPTER 5: ANATOMY OF CONFLICTS IN SOUTH DARFUR, 
1989-2009 
 
Introduction 
The main argument of this chapter is that analysis of recent tribal conflicts 
(1989-2009) in South Darfur should not be separated from the wider political 
conflicts in the region. Also without overlooking other factors, it seems that 
during this particular period, tribal conflicts were further fuelled and escalated 
due to government political intervention. These conflicts were enticed by 
political manipulation of the NA and local government to enact the agenda of 
the central government, rather than being based solely on resources or 
identity. Successive national governments focused on development efforts in 
the centre, whereas peripheries, including Darfur, were excluded from an 
equivalent delivery of socio-economic and security services (see chapter 3- 
Section of marginalization of Darfur).  Accordingly exercise of effective control 
over conflict or the imposition of law and order by the government over 
peripheries has not been achieved. Instead tribes were used as agents for 
governments to perform the job; a process started by the Fur sultanates, 
recognized and legitimized by colonial rule (the Indirect Rule) and it has 
continued in one way or another up to the present day. In contrast to chapter 
4, this chapter indicates that after independence and particularly in the last two 
decades (1989-2009), ITRCs have become less successful in dealing with 
tribal conflicts in Darfur. Perhaps, a part of the reasons behind this is political 
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manipulation of NA and local government structures and lack of check and 
balances that used to be in place during the colonial period, as is further 
explained in the next chapter. 
 
Data generated from the archive and the deliberations of the key informants 
suggests that there were root and proximate causes as well as triggering 
factors for the phenomenon of tribal conflicts. This chapter focuses on the 
ITRCs in South Darfur in particular for the period 1989-2009. ITRCs held 
during this period will be thoroughly described. Triggering factors, proximate 
causes, and root causes of the tribal conflicts and parties involved will be 
identified and analysed. This analysis has not been undertaken in such a 
comprehensive manner previously and I am here relying on the archival 
sources described in Chapter 1 as well as interviews with key informants.  
Table 3 below, shows the sequences of the ITRCs, where they took place, 
tribes’ involvement and the related factors which contributed to these conflicts 
in connection to South Darfur.   
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Table 3: ITRCs in South Darfur, 1989-2009 
No. Year Conference 
Place 
Parties to the 
conflict 
Ethnic labels of the 
conflict parties 
Triggering factors Root causes 
1 1989 Elfashir/ND  
 
Fur/Arabs Af/o vs. Ar/o 4. Armed robbery 
5.  Closure of livestock 
migration routes. 
6. Damage of crops 
 
Land dispute 
2 1990 Nyala/SD Gimir/Bargo Af/o vs. Af/o  Competition over land use for 
grazing and cultivation. 
 
Land dispute 
3 1991 Nyala/SD Gimir/ 
Taaisha 
Af/o vs. Ar/o Dispute over boundaries of tribal 
homelands  
Land dispute 
4 1991 Eddein/SD Zaghawa/ 
Maaliya 
Af/o vs. Ar/o Dispute over local power Land dispute 
5 1991 Nyala/SD Zaghawa/Birgid Af/o vs. Af/o local power Land dispute 
  
166 
 
6 1991 Nyala/SD Fur/Tarjam Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Damaging of crops 
2. Closure of migration routes 
3. Armed robbery. 
Land dispute 
7 1997 Eddein/SD Zaghawa/ 
Rezeigat 
Af/o vs.  Ar/o Competition over Local power Land dispute 
8 Jan. 
2003 
Kass/SD Fur/Arabs Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
sources and pasture (allegations 
and counter allegations of 
closure of migration routes and 
damage of crops and farms) 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
Land dispute 
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9 April, 
2003 
Kass/SD   Fur/Arabs Af/o vs.  Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
sources and pasture (allegations 
and counter allegations of 
closure of migration routes and 
damage of crops and farms) 
 
 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
Land dispute 
10 2003 Shataya/SD  Fur/Arabs  Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
Land dispute 
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sources and pasture (allegations 
and counter allegations of 
closure of migration routes and 
damage of crops and farms) 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
11 2003 Nyala/SD Maaliya/ 
Rezeigat 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1. Disputes between 
individuals  
2. Struggle over local power 
Land dispute 
 
12 2004 Nyala/SD Maaliya/ 
Rezeigat 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 3.Disputes between 
individuals  
Land dispute 
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4.Struggle over local power 
13 2005 Kas/SD  Fur/Arabs Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
sources and pasture (allegations 
and counter allegations of 
closure of migration routes and 
damage of crops and farms) 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
Land dispute 
 
14 2005 Singida/SD Fur/Arabs Af/o vs. Ar/o 1 Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
Land dispute 
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(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms). 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
15 2005 Umdafog/SD Taaisha, Falata, 
and Banihalba 
tribes (Sudan)/ 
Kara, Ronga, and 
Gilla tribes(CAR) 
N/A 1.Armed robbery  
2.animal theft 
3. Damage of crops and looting 
properties.  
Competition 
over water 
sources and 
pasture 
 
16 2005 Al-Malam/SD Fur/Arabs Af/o vs. Ar/o 1 Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
Land dispute 
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sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms). 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
17 2005 Sani- 
Dalaiba/SD 
Fur, Daju, 
Zaghawa/ 
Tarjam, Huttiya, 
and Taalba 
Af/o vs. /Af/o 1 Armed robbery  
2. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
Land dispute 
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crops and farms). 
3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
18 2005 Nyala/SD Zaghawa/ 
Zaghawa-
Umkamalti 
Af/o vs. Af/o 1.Armed robbery 
2. Competition over local power. 
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
3. Attack on villages burning 
huts and looting properties. 
4. Abduction and torture to 
death.  
 Land 
dispute. 
 
 
 
 
19 2005 Nyala/SD Tarjam/ Rezeigat Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery/ 
 
2. Disputes between individuals 
Land dispute 
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20 2006 Buram/SD Falata/Habaniyya Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery and  
2. Disputes between individuals 
3. Rape allegations 
Land 
dispute-
homeland 
boundaries  
21 2006 Al-sunta/SD Habaniyya/ 
Rezeigat 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
 2.Disputes between individuals 
 
Land dispute 
–homeland 
boundaries. 
22 2006  Safiya/SD  Fur, Miseirriya 
Jabal, Banihalba 
and the Rezeigat 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Rape allegations 
2. Armed robbery 
3. animal theft 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
5. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms). 
 
Land dispute 
 
  
174 
 
23 2006 Ditto/SD  Falata, 
Habaniyya 
Mahadi, Rezeigat 
vs.  
Massalit 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery, 
2.animal theft/  
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
4. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms). 
 
Land dispute 
24 2006  Nyala/SD Nyala 
locality(Fur)/Idd 
elfursan 
locality(Banihalba
) 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2.Animal theft 
3.Damage of crops 
Land 
dispute-
homeland 
boundaries 
25 2006 Buram/SD Banga/ Kara Af/o vs. Af/o Disputes between individuals Land dispute 
26 2006 Bulbul- 
Abjazu/SD  
Tarjam/Tarjam Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Competition over leadership 
between the Nazir and his 
deputy 
Competition 
over Local 
power 
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27 2006 Nyala/SD Fur and Kinana 
(Hijair 
Tunu)/Zaghawa- 
umkamalti(Marla) 
Af/o vs. Af/o 1.Armed robbery 
2. Animal theft 
3. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms) 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
 
1.Land 
dispute 
 
28 2006 Nyala//SD Shatiyia/ 
Umahmed(Rezei
gat sub tribes) 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o Disputes between individuals Competition 
over Local 
power 
 
29 2006 Nyala/SD Etifat/Sudan N/A 1.An attack on nomads’ Unknown 
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Armed 
Forces(SAF) 
settlement by SAF 
30 2006 Tiwal/SD  The Fur, Marrarit, 
Banihalba, 
Falata, Sharafa, 
Bargo, Tama, 
Massalit, Gimir, 
Daju, Birgid, and 
Barnu 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1 Armed robbery 
2. Animal theft 
3. Competition over water 
sources and pastures 
(allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms) 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
Land dispute 
31 2006 Nyala/SD Birgid, Miseiriya 
and 
Zaghawa 
Af/o& Ar/o vs. Af/o 1. Armed robbery  
2. Animal theft 
3. Allegations of closure of 
migration routes. 
Land dispute 
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3. Burning huts and looting 
properties. 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
5. Allegations of abduction, 
torture, and assassination. 
32 2006 Juruf/SD  Daju and Birgid/ 
Rezeigat camel 
herders 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1. Allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms. 
2. Allegations of attack on 
settled farmers burning their 
huts and looting properties. 
 
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
Land dispute 
33 2006 Nyala/SD Birgid/ Tarjam 
and Rezeigat 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1. Allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
Land dispute 
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crops and farms. 
2. Allegations of attack on 
settled farmers burning their 
huts and looting properties. 
 
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
. 
34 2006 Nyala/SD Gimir/ 
Falata 
N/A 1.Disputes between individuals 
2.Attack on villages,  
damage on farms and looting of 
properties 
Land-
boundaries 
of tribal 
homelands  
35 2007 Umziaifa/SD Tarjam/Rezeigat 
camel herder 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery  
2.abduction 
Land dispute 
36 2007 Nyala/SD Zaghawa/ 
Zaghawa-
Umkamalti 
Af/o vs. Af/o 1 Armed robbery 
2. Competition over local power. 
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
3. Attack on villages burning 
Land dispute 
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huts and looting properties. 
4. Abduction and torture to 
death. 
37 2007 Nyala/SD The Rezeigat/ 
Birgid 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1. Armed robbery 
2. Allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms. 
2. Allegations of attack on 
settled farmers burning their 
huts and looting properties. 
 
3. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
Land 
dispute- 
boundaries 
of tribal 
homelands 
38 2008 Nyala/SD Falata/ Gimir Af/o vs. Af/o 1.Attack on villages,  
2.damage of crops, 
3.looting of properties 
1.Land 
dispute-
boundaries 
of tribal 
homeland  
39 2008 Alfardos/SD Rezeigat/ 
Habaniyya 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Disputes between individuals 
2.Animal thefts  
 
Land 
dispute- 
boundaries 
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of tribal 
homeland 
 
40 2008 Al-obeiyed 
(Kordofan) 
Rezeigat/  
Miseirriya(Kordof
an) 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Disputes between individuals 
2.Animal theft 
3. competition over water 
sources and pasture 
Land 
dispute- 
boundaries 
of tribal 
homeland 
41 2009 Katila/SD Gimir/Gimir Af/o vs. Af/o 1. Competition over leadership 
within the tribe. 
2. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
 
Competition 
over local 
power 
 
42 2009 Nyala/SD Habaniyya/ 
Salamat 
Ar/o vs. Ar/o 1.Disputes between individuals 
2.Local power 
Land dispute 
43 2009 Abu Ajura/SD Miseirriya, 
Zaghawa, 
Massalit, Marrarit, 
Tunjur, 
Musabaat, and 
Birgid 
N/A 1.Armed robbery 
2.damage on farms and 
properties/  
3.local power 
Land dispute 
44 2009 Asalaya/SD Birgid and Baigo 
vs.  
Rezeigat 
Af/o vs. Ar/o 1.Armed robbery,  
2. Allegations and counter 
allegations of closure of 
migration routes and damage of 
crops and farms. 
3. Allegations of attack on 
Land 
dispute-
boundaries 
of tribal 
homeland 
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settled and looting properties. 
 
4. Political manipulation and 
polarization (Rebels vs. 
Government). 
. 
Source: I have developed this table solely for the purpose of this research. However the information is generated from: 
TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1 & 2; and other documents collected separately for each conference and made available from the 
informants). SD: refers to South Darfur. Af/o: refers to tribes of African origin, Ar/o: refers to tribes of Arab origin. 
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Trends and Dynamics of Conflicts 
Based on table 2 in chapter 4, one could make the following analysis with 
regard to South Darfur in particular. There was only one ITRC held in this area 
during the entire colonial period (1916-1955), which was the Rezeigat/Dinka 
conference of 1924. The tribes involved were solely pastoralists from inside 
(Rezeigat) and outside (Dinka) the area-equally represented and the triggering 
factors were principally disputes between individuals and animal theft, whereby 
the root causes were attributed merely to competition over grazing land and 
water sources.  
 
Following independence, the first period (1956-1968) also witnessed only one 
conference in South Darfur which was between tribes exclusively from the 
area, one pastoralist (Rezeigat) and the other semi-pastoralist (Maaliya). At the 
end of this period, struggles over local power and land ownership appeared as 
new additional triggering factors and the root causes respectively, as the case 
of the Maaliya and the Rezeigat. The second period (1969-1985) showed that 
ten ITRCs were held in this area. Tribes involved were nine (two outsiders and 
seven insiders), and were all pastoralists except one. Triggers were: dispute 
between individuals, animal theft and competition over local power. Root 
causes were: competition over landownership as well as land use (water 
source and pasture).  
 
In the third period (1986-2000) eight ITRCs were reported. 14 tribes were 
involved, mainly pastoralists and sedentary farmers, and were exclusively from 
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inside the area, which considered shift in the dynamics of conflicts with regard 
to the parties involved and issues. New triggering factors were: armed robbery 
and closure of livestock migration routes. Land became increasingly the main 
root cause, however, with a shifting of focus from competition over water and 
pasture to competition over land ownership, with a perceived ethnic dimension 
of the conflicts in the region at large.  
 
From 1989-2009 (see table 3 above), 44 ITRCs were held in South Darfur, and 
only two events out of this number involved outsiders; Umdafog conference in 
2005 which involved tribes from Central Africa Republic (CAR), and Al-Obeyed 
conference in 2008 which involved the Miseirriya of Kordofan. The total 
number of the tribes involved was 36 (some events were repeated amongst 
the same groups); only four tribes were from outside the area. Triggers were: 
armed robbery which counted for 22, disputes instigated by competition over 
pastures and grazing land were reported 17 times. Meanwhile, animal theft 
and rivalry over local power were reported nine times and seven times 
respectively.  Disputes between individuals as a triggering factor shows a 
remarkable decrease during this period; it has been reported only ten times. 
 
From 1990s onwards there were new triggers such as political manipulation 
and polarization due to conflict between government and rebel forces. This 
political polarization actually started earlier in 1987/88 with the Fur/Arab 
conflicts (as explained in chapter 3 & 4), however it became a more dominant 
perpetual factor after the eruption of the rebel armed movements, first in 1991, 
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which was supressed immediately, and again from 2002 up to the present. 
These include allegations that government forces committed acts related to 
abduction, rape, burning of huts and looting of properties/or animals against 
alleged rebels or their sympathizers. These same actions were reportedly 
committed by rebels and their supporters against other groups on the grounds 
of their being janjaweed or sympathizing with the government which all 
together were reported thirty nine times. Such allegations were expressed in 
different ways such as accusation of engaging in banditry activities and 
provision of spy services to either of the conflicting parties. Sometimes 
allegations were about provision of any kind of support in forms of logistics, 
supplies, shelter and exchange of information. Connections or perceived 
contact in different forms with either rebels or government could provide the 
justification for provoking enmity and thus triggering conflict (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol. 1, 6, vii: 2). In this regard abduction and rape were reported three times 
and two times respectively.  With regard to the root causes, competition over 
land has been the most dominant in South Darfur during this particular period; 
1989-2009 (see figure 11 below). Tribal homeland has become political 
constituency; therefore local power struggle has been inveigled also by land 
related issues, as will be explained later.  
 
Disputes over land ownership took two dimensions: firstly, minority groups 
demanding for separate Nazirates, or more autonomy within the homelands of 
dominant tribes, and secondly, demarcation of boundaries for the recognized 
tribal homelands. Besides this the use of land as a reward for some groups to 
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take part in fighting beside the government was another factor, as will be 
explained in more detail later in this chapter and the following chapters. 
Competition over water sources and grazing land is no longer among the main 
root causes, but a triggering factor, as the ultimate aim shifted from 
accessibility to water source and grazing land to control over land (see root 
causes of tribal conflicts as reflected in table 3 above). Even though the crucial 
observation here was that there is no clear evidence either from the archival 
documents or from the statements made by informants that indicates there is 
an ethnic dimension for tribal conflicts in South Darfur, something contradicts 
the recent growing literature on Darfur that portrayed the conflicts in the region 
as ethnic-based conflicts.   
 
The disputes in South Darfur seem to indicate that the ethnic-based dispute in 
Darfur is an exception rather than a rule. The apparent shift in tribal conflicts 
towards ethnic polarization and confrontation that characterized the period of 
the late 1980s upwards in Darfur at large seemed to be diminishing in this 
area. Tribal disputes in South Darfur suggest that conflicts in this area involved 
all against all, i.e. tribes of Arab origin (Ar/o) fought against tribes of African 
origin (Af/o) as well as with others claimed to be Arabs. Also tribes claiming to 
be of an African origin fought with those of an Arab background and with 
others from their own ethnic group as well. Out of 44 conferences held in 
South Darfur in the specified period above, 19 were amongst tribes of Af/o vs. 
Ar/o, 11 were amongst Ar/o vs. Ar/o, and nine were amongst Af/o vs. Af/o (see 
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table 3 above). The other five conferences do not fit into these categories as 
they include mixed tribes on either side.  
 
Causes of Tribal conflicts 
From the many factors that were behind tribal conflicts in Darfur at large and 
South Darfur in particular, I have identified the most common and important 
ones in connection to proximate, root causes and triggering factors. I have also 
made a distinction between ‘conflict-as-start-up conditions’ (Sandole, 1999) 
and ‘conflict- as- processes’ (Porto, 2002:19). The former term is associated 
with the triggering factors whereby the latter is connected to the proximate and 
structural factors or root causes of the conflict. 
 
Proximate causes 
By proximate causes is meant the factors that make situations conducive for 
tribal conflicts to erupt and escalate. These are “Factors likely to contribute to a 
climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes 
symptomatic of deeper problems, for example, uncontrolled security sector, 
light weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, destabilising role of 
neighbouring countries, war economy, refugee flows, massive population 
movements, etc.” (Framework for conflict analysis-UNDP, 2004:5). Here the 
focus is on the negative role played by of the neighbouring countries; mainly 
Libya and Chad, tribal militias and the rebel groups in the escalation and 
expansion of the tribal conflicts in Darfur. 
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As described by Woodward (1990:219), by the end of 1980s “law and order 
was breaking down” in most of the region. This was especially due to the influx 
of armed groups into Darfur as a result of the civil war in Chad (1962-1991) 
and the Chadian-Libyan war (Haggar, 2007:113). Libya provided haven for the 
opposition forces against the Numeiri regime in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
Numeiri regime had adopted the same policy towards Chadian opposition 
groups (Lesch, 1991:59). During the same period Gadaffi (Libyan president at 
the time) provided support to other Chadian rebels who operated from Darfur, 
thus Darfur became an increasingly open battleground between Khartoum, 
Tripoli and Ndjamena. Further explanation is provided below.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Libya, which borders Sudan in the north-west, 
was interested in annexing the Aouzzou region in northern Chad, which was 
an area of dispute between the two countries. Prunier (2007:46) argued that 
Gaddaffi’s increasing influence in the Sahel region had led to ethnic 
polarization, enhancing a sense of Arab supremacy among the tribes of Arab 
origin in Darfur. Hence, this tendency resulted in negative consequences with 
regard to the relationship between Arab and non-Arab tribes of the region 
(Rolandsen, 2007:155). One of the consequences of such polarization in 
Darfur was the conflict between the allied tribes of Arab origin and the Fur in 
1987–1989 as described earlier in chapter 4. Since the early 1990s Libya 
revised its policy with regard to its influence in the Sahel, or at least, “adopted 
a lower regional profile” (Marchal, 2007:174-175). This was made possible due 
to two factors: the sanctions imposed on them by the UN in 1992 and the 
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settlement of their dispute with Chad on Aouzzou region, which was achieved 
in 1994 (Marchal, 2007:174-175).  
 
The boundaries between Chad and Darfur region could be described as fluid, 
with an overlap and interaction between communities living either side of the 
official boundary. It therefore became easier for armed conflicts to spill over 
rapidly from Chad into Darfur and vice versa (Prunier, 2007). The existence 
and interaction among these tribal and ethnic groups between Sudan and 
Chad provided cover and facilitated freedom of movement of bandits to hide 
across the borders (Woodward, 1990:219). Immigrants have come from West 
Africa across Darfur on their way to Mecca in the Arab peninsula since the 
seventeenth century and some of them peacefully settled either in Darfur or 
other parts of the Sudan (Prunier, 2007:6). The migration of Chadians into 
Sudan and Darfur during this more recent period has been very different in that 
it has been associated with armed groups, involved in the power struggle in 
their own country, using Darfur as a base to launch their attacks (Daly, 
20007:246). Thus, Chadian rebels with their small arms, as well as refugees, 
found their way to Darfur. This was the case in early1980s when the Numeiri 
regime provided support to Chadian rebels led by Hussein Hebre (Prunier, 
2007:46). Hebre was able to launch his war from Darfur and to take over 
power in Chad. Later when they opposed his government, Hebre provided 
arms and logistical support to some ethnic groups to engage in war against the 
Zaghawa in Chad and in Darfur as well.  “He [refers to Hebre] allowed his 
troops to cross the border at different times to wage the only form of war they 
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knew, which included burning of villages, raping, looting, and mass killing” 
(Marchal, 2007: 181).   
 
In the mid-1980s the Libyan regime provided support to Jakoni and Ibn Omer 
(Chadian opposition leaders at that time), and both used Darfur as a base to 
fight Hebre’s regime (Hagar, 2007). Ibn Omer’s base was nearby at Kutum in 
north Darfur. He made alliance relationships with the Mahameed, a camel 
herder tribe of an Arab origin in Darfur, and when he went back his supporters 
handed over weapons to the Mahameed tribe (Hagar, 2007:127).  “It was Ibn 
Omer’s abandonment of the armed struggle at the beginning of 1989 that 
made possible the peace agreement reached in Darfur between the Arabs and 
Fur in July that year”(Hagar, 2007:127).  
 
Sudan and Libya provided support to Deby (the current Chadian president) 
who was able to take power at the end of the 1990 (Marchal, 2007: 178).  
However from 2005, following the appearance of armed movements in Darfur, 
there was an exchange of hostilities between Khartoum and N’djamena and by 
the end of the same year a proxy war started between Sudan and Chad 
(Marchal, 2007: 174).  The Sudanese government provided support to the 
Chadian opposition to prevent the increasing threat caused by the Darfurian 
rebel groups (Marchal, 2007: 174). The Chadian government in retaliation 
used the Darfur rebel movements; Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and 
Equality Movement (SLA and JEM) to restrict the advancement of their 
opponents across the borders (International Crisis Group, 2006: 6).  
  
190 
  
Tribal Militias and Arms Proliferation 
 
In South Darfur, tribes are claimed to have their own inherited military system, 
which is the “Ageed” institution (Masajid, 1995). Musa indicated that this 
institution “represents the military wing of the Baggara Arab tribes. The ‘Ageed’ 
-pl. Augada- is a supreme or chief commander of a group of Augada and their 
horsemen. Each Ageed represents a clan and commands one hundred 
horsemen…. A group of the Augada is chaired by ‘Ageed al-shoosha’, also 
called Ageed al-Augada” (Musa, 2011:306-307).  
Tribal militias were further encouraged and legitimized by the enactment of the 
Popular Defence Forces (PDF) Act of 1989 (Ateem, 2007:35), whereby 
civilians were militarily trained, and provided with small arms such as 
Kalashnikovs and G3s. Tribes allied to the government took the opportunity to 
train their community members, maintained weapons and further consolidated 
their institution of ageed.  De Waal (1993:143) argued that this practice of 
organized militia formation in Darfur started in the mid-1980s, and successive 
governments have adopted a deliberate military strategy in which tribal militias 
in Darfur have been armed in order to fight the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan. As mentioned earlier, in the course of 
1970s and 1980s, there was an increasing insecurity in Darfur, as the region 
became battle ground for proxy wars in the neighbouring countries. Also the 
Fur/Arab conflict in 1987-89 and the Massalit/Arab conflict in 1996-1999 over 
land, took a devastating dimension. The government used Arab horsemen to 
eliminate the armed resistance movement that erupted in 1991. Also the 
government used the same strategy to deal with the rebel movements which 
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emerged in 2003. These activities have ended up with the formation of 
organized armed militias in Darfur under the auspices and full support of the 
government (Hagar, 2007:113), as will be explained below.  
 
The rebel movements were dominated by tribes of African origin, and so the 
government built on the tensions and mistrust between some tribes of Arab 
origin and the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa, and created tribal militias mostly 
from the former group. The most notorious of these militias were those which 
came to be known as the Janjaweed (Hagar, 2007:113). Janjaweed, refers to 
horsemen (fursan- knights), and are militias recruited by the government to 
support Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in their operations in Darfur. Although the 
government denies this relationship, it has been confirmed that “the Janjaweed 
not only received weapons and logistics from the government, but they also 
have close ties with government officials” (International Commission of Inquiry 
Report, 2005: 34). So, under the pretext of fighting the rebels, tribes with 
access to arms exploited the opportunity to achieve their own agenda such as 
taking land and resolving their disputes with others by force rather than by 
conciliation (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:51-52).  
 
Rebel groups 
The eruption of rebel activities came at time when ethnic polarization was at its 
peak. It was unfortunate that this development followed the biggest violent 
confrontation between some tribes of Arab origin and the Fur in one hand and 
the former and the Massalit on the other hand, as previously explained. 
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Furthermore, the unrest in Darfur and the emergence of armed resistance 
(1991 and 2003) corresponded with the intensification of the civil war in 
southern Sudan. Also, in 1999 the National Congress Party (NCP) was split 
into two; the NCP led by the president Omer Al-Bashir and the People’s 
Congress Party led by Hassan Al-Turabi (the patron of the regime), which put 
the very existence of the regime at risk (Prunier, 2007:81). Additionally, there 
was an accusation made by the government that the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), one of the Darfurian armed movements, was the military 
wing of Al-Turabi’s party (Marchal, 2007:191).  All these factors together 
perhaps go some way to explaining why the regime reacted in such a dramatic 
way, as will be elaborated below.  
 
When the armed movements surfaced, they were dominated by Fur, Massalit 
and Zaghawa-in terms of leadership and supporters (Daly, 2007:278). This 
was understandable due to past grievances and the attack made by the 
government on these tribes. But the first problem faced by these movements 
was that the government started to describe them as military wings for the 
above mentioned tribes. The government led a huge propaganda campaign 
through different media including television, radio and newspapers (TRSD, 
2003-8:vol.1, 6, v: 48-59). The message was that the emergence of the armed 
movements is no more than a new phase of the tribal conflicts between Arabs 
and non-Arabs in the region. They added that the fundamental nature of the 
problem in Darfur is a tribal conflict over natural resources between settled 
farmers, mostly of African origin, and the pastoralists, mostly of Arab origin. 
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The rebels have denied this view saying that their movements are political 
organizations and that what was on-going in Darfur is a political problem 
related to the marginalization of the entire region in terms of wealth and power 
sharing. Unfortunately, “the first field study carried out in Darfur  during 
September and October, 2004 showed that the prevailing opinion among both 
non-Arabs and Arabs was that the war was primarily  a broad struggle for land 
that had grown out of earlier, more localized conflicts” (Tubiana, 2007:71).  
 
The source of the conception that this conflict was a continuity of the “Arab” 
pastoralist tribes against the “African” sedentary tribes over land was not only 
the government and ordinary people, but also the rebels themselves (Flint, 
2007). Following the failed attempt of rebellion  in 1991 and the catastrophic 
consequences for the people at the grass root levels, the Fur in particular were 
very reluctant to repeat the same experience. Therefore during the early stage 
of the preparations and in order to convince the Fur and others to take part, 
rebel leaders intentionally announced that the arrangements were of a 
defensive nature and were only targeting the Arab militias/Janjaweed (Flint, 
2007:144).  
 
On the other hand, and faced with such a difficult moment, the regime adopted 
the theory that the ‘end justifies the means’.  Daly, (2007: 276) asserted that 
from January, 2000 heavy weapons were provided strictly to Arab militias. He 
added that non-Arabs were not only excluded from this process but efforts 
were exerted to disarm those who had already been able to obtain arms. “The 
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government began a massive and indiscriminate program of arming the 
Popular Defence Forces. In the first months, they armed Arabs and non-Arabs 
alike. Most non-Arabs lost no time in defecting to the SLA and JEM with their 
weapons” (Flint, 2007:153). 
It was quite possible that the government took such behaviour as an excuse to 
change tactics. With an ideal atmosphere and fertile ground for ethnic division 
in Darfur, tribes of Arab origin were selected by the regime as strategic allies 
(TRSD, 2003-8,). Those who were already involved in conflict with the Fur, 
Massalit and the Zaghawa, were convinced by the position taken by the 
government. The government made them believe that these movements were 
receiving support from outside, especially the Zaghawa-dominated Chadian 
regime (Marchal, 2007:191). The government was of the opinion that if Arab 
tribes in Darfur did not move quickly to launch counter attacks they would very 
soon be removed from Darfur. These fears were consolidated by the practical 
alliance between the three tribes (Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa) on one hand 
and the name they first gave to their movement, which was “Darfur Liberation 
Movement” (Daly, 2007:278) on the other. This name was later on changed to 
“Sudan Liberation Movement”/ Army (SLM/A).  Furthermore, fears were fuelled 
by a letter which was widely circulated by the Sudanese authorities claiming 
that the Zaghawa were seeking to create a ‘Greater Zaghawa State’ in a 
territory that extended from Darfur into Chad (Flint, 2007:158).  The ill-
treatment by some rebels towards civilians, especially those of Arab origin, 
provided an ideal opportunity for the government to convince these groups to 
side with them seeking protection for themselves. 
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The rebels relied heavily on ethnicity as a dominant force for mobilization 
(Suliman, 2006) and the government stopped taking responsibility for 
protecting civilians. Instead they distributed arms to their allied tribes on the 
grounds that they needed weapons to defend themselves from the rebels. In 
this situation those who were accused of being rebels or sympathizing with 
them have become a target for raiding; subject to murder, looting of properties, 
their huts burnt and women raped. Also the cruelty by some rebels towards 
civilians, including “Arabized non-Arab tribes such as Falata, Tama, Gimir, and 
Kineen”, has made these groups seek protection from the government side 
(Tubiana, 2007:69). Non- Arab ethnicities such a Birgid in Sherriya and 
Massalit in Gereida, who sympathized with the rebels at first, received the 
same ill-treatment from some rebels (SLA/Minawi faction), which also pushed 
them to seek alliance with the government in order to receive weapons, create 
their own militias and protect themselves from rebels and outlaws 
(KI/10:6/6/10). The division of rebels along tribal lines has provided further 
fertile ground for the government to manipulate the Darfurian armed 
movements (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007), and more importantly to cement its 
alliance with the ‘Arabs’ and to gain support of some non-Arab tribes in their 
war against rebel movements.  
 
Some of the rebels gave the impression that they were aware of the 
government strategy. For example Abdulwahid Nour, the SLA leader, stressed 
that a long time before the fighting started, if non- Arabs in Darfur were to start 
armed resistance against the regime without Arabs being involved, the 
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government will mobilize the Arabs to fight them (Flint, 2007:143).  However, 
those who were quite aware of this strategy did not seem to be taking serious 
measures to counter it; either they were unable to undertake genuine 
precautions to anticipate the catastrophic consequences, or it was beyond 
their capacity to stop such plans from being materialized.  Some rebel leaders, 
encouraged by their rapid victory over government forces, have become 
dictators, unwilling to listen to the alerts made by reasonable figures among 
them and the aim of each group was to achieve a quick triumph over rival 
colleagues and assume the leadership (Flint, 2007:153-61). Such ambitions, I 
would say, perhaps were motivated by three factors: rapid victory over 
government, pressures exerted on the government by the international 
community due to the devastating situation on the ground, and the incentives 
provided by the government for those who defect from the rebels to join 
negotiations.   
 
Flint, (2007:163) emphasized that, for example, “Abdulwahid has gained 
political assets by default: people supported him due to lack of alternative, and 
the international community sympathized with him due to the humanitarian 
crisis and atrocities committed in Darfur”. These factors, coupled with the lack 
of coherence regarding the ethnic composition of the armed movements, made 
it possible for the internal competition over leadership to emerge.  The armed 
resistance started in Darfur in 2003 with only two groups: the Sudan Liberation 
Army led by Abdulwahid Nour from Fur, which was a broad alliance of Fur, 
Zaghawa and Massalit, and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Khalil 
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Ibrahim (Zaghawa) (Daly, 2007: 278-281). In six years the two movements 
both split along tribal lines and the number of movements jumped to 27 
factions (Birech, 2009:27). 
 
The emergence of armed movements in Darfur has also come at the expense 
of the NA. The leaders of the movements, who are mostly young and politically 
motivated, perceive tribal leaders to be allies of the government who pursue 
their own interests at the expense of Darfur people’s common interest (Flint, 
2007:143-144). This perception, together with the actions undertaken by the 
rebels, such as the execution or removal of some tribal leaders from their 
positions (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:49; Tubiana, 2007:72), has further 
undermined the already distorted system of the NA. Such behaviour has 
practically excluded traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution from 
operating, with no alternative system being put in place.  
 
Root causes 
This is a common term in the literature of conflict analysis. Some scholars refer 
to them as structural factors/causes or ‘underlying causes’ (Brown, 1996:1-33). 
Others term them ‘structural dimensions or sources of latent/open conflict’ 
(Goodhand et al, 2001:11). King, (1997:43) calls them ‘structural components’. 
In this study ‘root causes’ is defined as those factors, which “form the pre-
conditions of crisis situations, such as systemic political exclusion, shifts in 
demographic balance, entrenched economic inequities, economic decline and 
ecological deterioration” (Porto, 2000:19). The main factors selected in this 
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respect are competition over grazing land and water sources, competition over 
land ownership, and political manipulation of the Native Administration as an 
example of the political manipulation of local governance. 
 
Land  
In Darfur, competition between pastoralists and farmers, and among the 
pastoralist themselves over pasture and water sources, used to take place 
from time to time and is still the case up to the present. Sometimes such 
disputes may not necessarily be associated with scarcity of resources, but 
somehow related to cultural differences and perceptions related to supremacy 
over tribal homelands and its boundaries. Throughout the history of Fur 
Sultanates, throughout the colonial period and up to 1960s, agreements based 
on customary law were claimed to be capable of settling such disputes and to 
allow the smooth movement of pastoralists and their animals during seasonal 
migration (Collins, 2006:6). 
 
It was only from early 1970s and the mid of 1980s that new factors came into 
being, as will be explained below. The climate change of 1970s and mid 1980s 
resulted in drought and expansion of the desertification in the northern part of 
the region, with severe consequences for the population and their livelihoods 
(Takana, 2009:15-19; Osman, 1990). This situation forced part of the 
population, including pastoralist camel herders of Arab origin, to migrate 
towards the south of the region in search of water and grazing lands (Suliman, 
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2006).  Environmental consequences became more severe and traditional 
agreements were no longer capable to address them (Takana, 2009:22).  
 
The new phenomenon is that the facilitation of the pastoralists’ movements 
from one ecological zone to another is no longer sufficient, as pastoralists 
began to settle in some areas (the Jabal Mara range of mountains, for 
instance) for longer than in the past (Government report, 1988). Other 
immigrants of an African origin such as Zaghawa, who had lost their animals 
as a consequence of drought and desertification, were forced to move 
southwards looking for permanent habitation (Takana, 2009: 19).  In 1984/85 
alone a total of 384,010 people were forced to leave their areas in the north 
and moved to the southern part of the region (Oxfam report, 1984).The 
following table below (table 4) shows the registered number of the Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the north into the south of the region during 
1984/85. 
 
Table 4: IDPs moved from North Darfur to South Darfur in 1984 
Area where the IDPs moved to Number of Internally Displaced 
Persons(IDPs) 
Nyala 108976 
Buram   95240 
Eddein   72849 
Idd elfursan   42352 
Zalingei   64593 
Total 384010 
Source: (Oxfam Report, 1984). 
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The pressure on land due to over-grazing and farming resulted in shorter 
fallow and less fertility, a consequence of which was a decline in crop 
production and a persistent cycle of land degradation. Such practices led to 
more tensions and conflicts among communities, especially between 
pastoralists and farmers (Al-Mangouri, 2004: 46). Areas that received greater 
numbers of displaced persons were the most likely to witness tribal conflicts 
and tensions, as has already been explained and will further be explained 
later. 
 
 The challenges of drought and desertification were compounded by 
population growth. An increase in population numbers was not only because of 
the normal rate of growth, but due to migration from Chad into the region as a 
result of civil war (Jalaleldin, 2009:109; Abdul-Jalil, 2006:16). In this regard 
some reports showed that in the year 1984 alone about 10, 000 people arrived 
into Darfur from Chad (Oxfam Report, 1984). The number of livestock also 
increased for the same reason, especially in the south and south west of the 
region. In addition to the pastoralists who were forced by drought and 
desertification to move with their animals from the north of the region, Chadian 
migrants also came with their animals to these areas (Tubiana, 2007:69-70). 
The result was severe pressure on the land. The width of the livestock 
migration route before 1980s was only 2-4 miles, by the end of 1980s and 
early 1990s, in order for a livestock migration route to cope with the crowd of 
animals, pastoralists expanded the size of their seasonal migration routes to 
20 miles (Salih, 1999:89). Between the 1970s and the mid-1980s, there was a 
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relative increase in selling prices of agricultural and animal products due to the 
growth of urban centres in Darfur and Sudan at large; which increased the 
demand for land by farmers (Johnson, 2003: 139).   
 
Also war around and inside the region resulted in the proliferation of small 
arms, which became widely available. Thus, damage became greater and 
tensions started to emerge among the communities. This period coincided with 
the time whereby the May regime (1969-1985) abolished the NA in 1970 (see 
chapter 3). The “People’s Local Governance”, which adopted in the same year, 
was ineffective, in the sense that no competent institutions were established 
on the ground to replace the NA and take over the responsibilities instead (de 
Waal, 1993:142-143). The consequence of this situation was an administrative 
vacuum at the grass root level. There was no coordination between the 
leadership of the immigrants and the hosting communities on the one hand or 
between them and the government officials on the other. Such coordination 
would have made it possible to avoid the sensitivity related to land ownership 
and usage. It seems that new immigrants were considering that land was 
owned by the state and every individual or group had the right to move freely 
and to locate him/her where they found it suitable. Possibly, it was the 
Unregistered Land Act of 1970 (ULA) that paved the way for such 
understanding to prevail among this segment of population, as it entails that 
land that was not registered before the enactment of the ULA becomes 
government property by default. 
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In terms of ethnic background, the distribution of the population in Darfur 
corresponds with the ecological zones (Suliman, 2006), as already described. 
Camel herders, mostly from tribes of Arab origin, live in the further northern 
part of the region which is characterised by desert and semi desert. Fur and 
other smaller tribes of African origin, all settled farmers, live in the Jebel Mara 
zone which is range of mountains located in the middle of Darfur. This area is 
the richest in terms of water, fertile land and other natural resources. The cattle 
herders (referred to as Baggara) of Arab origin tribes dominate the southern 
part of the region. This ecological zone is characterized by relatively high rate 
of rainfall, but it can fluctuate considerably. The association of ecological 
zones with a population of certain ethnic background in Darfur made it easier 
for some disputes/ or competition over land and natural resources (water and 
pasture) between an allied group from one ecological zone against another 
group to take on the dimension of an ethnic conflict, even though the 
underlying reasons were essentially environmental and resource issues.   
 
Furthermore, regardless of ethnic background, tribes and individuals in Darfur 
are strongly socially and psychologically connected to land. A striking example 
occurred following the drought in mid 1980s. The Banihalba and the 
Habaniyya tribes of Arab origin (known as Baggara) prohibited other tribes, 
particularly camel herders of an Arab origin to enter their homelands. This was 
because of the shortage of grazing land and because of what had been 
described by the latter group as the unacceptable behaviour of the former 
group (as previously mentioned). Surprisingly, the same groups of the 
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Habaniyya (Buram area) and Banihalba (Idd elfursan) accepted other 
immigrants from North Darfur, as reflected in table 4 above. This time may be 
because they were farmers and expected to cause less harm to the land and 
maybe easy to control. However there are also examples which show that 
some people were flexible with regard to access to land .even after conflict 
situation, as is explained below. 
 
My own family and some relatives were granted land to farm in an area 
belongs to the Rezeigat tribe. Following the first conflict between the Maaliya 
and the Rezeigat in 1965 and for security reasons, the government adopted a 
relocation policy for families from both sides that were directly involved in the 
conflict and used to live across the borders of the homelands of the two tribes. 
A reconciliation agreement was reached between the two tribes in 1968. Since 
then such families were allowed to access their land again in the same area. 
 
However these examples show that the issue of land in South Darfur is much 
more complicated and the conclusion is that from the mid-1980s up to 2009 
competition over land has obviously become one of the important factors of 
tribal conflicts in South Darfur (see figure 12 below) 
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Figure 12: Distribution of root causes of tribal conflicts in South Darfur 
 
I developed this chart myself and the source of information is: Table 3 above. 
 
Political Manipulation  
In connection with the above policy of the central authorities, and in an attempt 
to get people’s support in Darfur, from 1990s onwards the ruling regime started 
dividing the districts (localities/provinces) along tribal lines, a policy which has 
directly and indirectly enticed tribal conflict over land and power (Abdul-Jalil et 
al, 2007:57). It therefore appears as though a tribal homeland (hakura) has 
become a political constituency. The more territories a tribe acquires the more 
political representation and resources it can get both at state and federal level.  
 
The manipulation of the NA by the central governments is not something new. 
As described in chapter 3, manipulation of the NA existed long before British 
rule in Darfur. However, the systematic institutionalized approach associated 
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with British colonial rule (1916-1956) was distinctive. Based on their potential 
for providing political support to the new colonial authorities, tribes were 
treated differently with officially recognized homelands being allocated for the 
first time with specific boundaries. Smaller tribes were annexed to the biggest 
and so lost their independent status. As the smaller tribes were not content, 
this arrangement generated disputes; however, due to the strong security 
control of the colonial regime, these groups were unable to protest violently or 
effectively against such decisions (Mohammed, 2009:27). 
 
These situations were aggravated by developments following independence in 
1956. Central government planned the abolition of the NA in 1965, abolished it 
and enacted the Unregistered Land Act (ULA) in 1970. What made the 
situation worse was that the ULA was selectively implemented (Mohammed, 
2009:27-28). In some cases tribes were deprived of the right to claim 
landownership. But, at the same time other tribes continued to exercise 
supremacy over land because they were powerful and the government 
avoided confrontation with them. This situation provided justification for some 
tribes to take the law into their hands and to change reality on the ground in an 
attempt to make the authorities to accept the new arrangement of their 
choosing (Mohammed, 2009:27-28). Also as described in chapter 3, until 
1970, tribal leaders enjoyed legal authority, which was only abolished by the 
passing of the People’s Local Government Act which divided the region into 
district and area councils in 1971 (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-50). 
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In 1987 a new arrangement was made whereby the NA system was reinstated 
(Ateem, 2007:33). The restoration of the NA was welcomed by tribal leaders; 
nevertheless they were not completely content with the new arrangements 
because their NA powers were reduced significantly. The executive decree 
provided limitations to the jurisdictional authority of tribal leaders, although the 
election of top tribal leaders and middle ranks (omda) was officially recognized. 
“The NA system was not empowered to play its traditional role effectively; 
numerous reasons contributed to this, including the limited powers granted to 
tribal chiefs and unclear legislative frameworks” (Ateem, 2007:33).  
 
By1995 the central government started to make unprecedented changes in the 
administration of Darfur. Tribal tenancies (emirates) for pastoralists of an Arab 
origin were created for the first time within the traditional homelands of other 
tribes; mainly Fur and Massalit, thus creating new forms of political tension  
(Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56-57). It was in connection with these developments 
that another major war broke out between the Massalit and a coalition of tribes 
of an Arab origin in west Darfur in 1996 onwards. The Zaghawa and camel 
herders of Arab origin have long been in competition over water resources in 
the northern part of Zaghawa homeland (De Waal, 2005:77).  Following their 
alliance with the regime in Khartoum from the late 1990s, the camel herders 
engaged in fierce war with the Zaghawa (Tubiana, 2007:76).  
 
South Darfur, particularly the southern part of this area, was known as the 
homeland of the cattle herders-Baggara-(Warburg, 1997:142). The rest of the 
  
207 
  
area came under the South Darfur Magdomate. According to the 
administrative divisions of the Fur Sultanate there were four Magdomates in 
the whole region, each one administered by a Magdoom appointed by the 
Sultan (Morton, 2011:15-16).  The South Darfur Magdomate had included a 
wide range of tribes, both of African and Arab origin such as Daju, Marrarit, 
Baigo, Miseirriya, Tarjam, Awlad mansour and Zaghawa-Umkamalti tribes 
(Takana, 1997). From 1990s onward the situation has changed significantly. 
All the above tribes that used to be under the administration of the Fur 
Magdomate have been officially granted a separate native administration 
status (Takana, 2007:70-72). In Kass area which used to be Fur dominated 
land, tribes of Arab origin were also guaranteed emirates; “in Banjadidi area 
native administration for Jalol Arabs was established in 1990s. This new native 
administration consists of Awlad Zaid, Awlad Rashid, Nawaiba, Erigat, Saada, 
Mahadi, Beni Hesein and Miseirriya” (Takana, 2007:29).  This is a fundamental 
change in the NA system of land tenure and has changed the political 
landscape considerably. 
 
Triggering Factors 
 
Triggering factors, in this study, are considered as single act or events that 
directly contribute to the break out of war between and amongst tribal groups 
in Darfur. 
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Competition over local power 
As mentioned in chapter three, the marginalization of Darfur in terms of wealth 
and power sharing started with British colonial rule. Lack of social services and 
infrastructure was one of the major characteristics of the colonial period in 
Darfur. Following independence the central government and higher rank 
positions (in civil service, military establishment and other security organs) 
were predominantly occupied by people from northern and central Sudan (Ali 
et al, 1990). Darfur was practically excluded from the circles of decision 
making. Thus, socio-economic and political marginalization continued.  
Following the announcement of the Regional Government Act in 1979, 
governors for all regions were appointed by central government from among 
the local population except for Darfur (Prunier, 2007:48). As a result 
demonstrations broke out with participation from hundred thousands of 
Darfurians in Darfur and across Sudan condemning their neglect and 
demanding a governor for Darfur to be selected from among the population of 
the region. The uprising, in which three students were killed, forced Numeiri 
regime to appoint the leader of the DDF; Ahmed Diraige as governor for Darfur 
in 1980 (Prunier, 2007:48).It was the first time in 64 years (since Darfur 
annexed to Sudan in 1916) that a figure from Darfur assumed the top leading 
position in the region. When the DDF’s leaders assumed power, some 
politicians from tribes of Arab origin in Darfur complained that Arabs were 
marginalized and the DDF had become a Fur dominated organization (Mark et 
al, 2006:12).  
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 Prunier, (2007:46-47) observes that since the adoption of regional governance 
in Sudan in the 1980s, local politics in Darfur has become increasingly based 
on ethnic polarization. In 1987 ‘The Arab Gathering’ or the Arab Alliance 
surfaced, which aimed to remove “the grievances, political and social 
marginalization that Arab tribes face in Darfur” (Ateem, 2008:37-38). With 
regard to competition over the position of the governor and ministerial 
positions in the region, people were divided along ethnic lines. Three main 
groups came into being, which were the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Arabs. 
 This politics of ethnic polarization, coupled with the consequences of 
environmental changes, in addition to other externally-driven factors such as 
the Libyan- Chadian conflict and the Chadian civil war (which are discussed 
below) led to conflict between the Fur and a coalition of tribes of Arab origin, 
both camel and cattle herders (Tubiana, 2007:70). War broke out between the 
two groups in 1987/88 with land as a central issue, to the extent that tribes 
which claimed Arab origin used all means possible, including the destruction of 
farms and burning of villages, to push the Fur off the land, and described 
territories that they took over by force as “liberated land” 
(Mohammed,2000:358).   
In December 1991, with the assistance of the SPLM, an armed resistance led 
by Daud Yahiya Bulad and Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu, from the Fur and the Massalit 
tribes respectively was carried out against the central government (Daly, 
2007:261). It did not take long for the government to suppress the rebels. 
Using Arab-based tribal militias, the government was able to defeat the newly 
emerged armed movement straight away (Daly, 2007:261). Since then 
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Khartoum has become more suspicious of the Fur and the Massalit tribes. The 
division of the region, and changes that made by the government with regard 
to the NA structures, as mentioned earlier should not be read in isolation of 
these developments. By 1995 the Fur tribe’s homeland being distributed 
among the newly emerging three states (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:56). The 
reaction against the Massalit, as will be explained later, was directed at their 
land and structures of their NA, to attack its core value and symbol of their 
unity.  
 
 Armed robbery 
The key negative consequences of the Libyan- Chadian conflict and the 
Chadian civil war in Darfur, from the end of 1960s up to 2009, were 
demographic changes, influx of refugees and internal displacement, arms 
proliferation, and rapid increasing rates of crime and violence (Haggar, 
2007:113-114). This situation overlapped the drought and the famine that hit 
the north of the region in 1984. As a result the phenomenon of armed robbery 
came into surface around the same period of time (see table 3 above). 
According to the police records, as an example, reported incidents of armed 
robbery in Darfur during 1990-1997 were 2824 with 58% of these incidents 
committed by elements from Chad (Mohammed, 2009:57). In a case study on 
“the armed robbery in Darfur”, however, within a sample of 32 persons, only 
three men admitted they were Chadian (Ibrahim, 2001:121-124). The analysis 
shows that poverty was one of the strongest reasons for the group to engage 
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in armed robbery. Proliferation of arms is another important factor that 
encouraged this phenomenon. 
 
One could argue that these wars (civil war in Chad and the Libyan/Chadian 
war) have enabled the proliferation of arms, making them available either free 
or at very low cost. The different military forces and militias also provided cover 
for armed robbery, especially as the presence of the Chadian opposition was 
permitted by the government of Sudan. Some of these militias were alleged to 
have been directly involved in banditry activities in order to secure food and 
resources, as they did not receive regular payments (KI/16: 8/6/10). This is 
also true of some of the Darfurian rebel groups, who were accused by their 
own colleagues of abusing civilians and looting their properties (Flint, 
2007:145).   
 
It could be possible that the overlapping of communities with open borders 
between Sudan and Chad has also contributed to armed robbery and 
consequently tribal conflicts in Darfur. The existence of some tribes in Sudan 
and Chad expands beyond the borders into the other country as is the case for 
most of the tribes, both of Arab and African origin, in Darfur, such as Massalit, 
Zaghawa, Rezeigat, Salamat, Tama, and Taaisha. In such a situation 
individuals or groups might be able to commit a crime in Sudan and hide 
themselves or the looted property or animals in Chad. If such speculation 
proves to be true, this causes further violence where an individual or a group 
from Chad commits a crime against a member of another tribe, and because of 
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the common features between the alleged group or individual and a local tribe, 
this makes the attacked people accuse the local tribe of being behind the 
incident even though they were not.  Local communities are aware of these 
social links and interaction between the tribal local groups and their relatives in 
Chad and Sudan. In such cases the attacked group retains the perception that 
they were either attacked by their neighbours or, at least, their neighbours had 
provided cover for the attackers.  
 
Conclusion  
The ITRC record from 1989 to 2009, suggests that patterns and issues of tribal 
conflicts in South Darfur were of a dynamic nature meanwhile these conflicts 
increased with the passing of time. Proximate causes were related to factors 
such as environmental degradation, internal displacement, insurgency, and 
more importantly the negative role of the wars in the neighbouring countries 
such as Libya and Chad which has led to influx of refugees and proliferation of 
arms. This negative impact of the situations in the neighbouring countries 
together with the civil war in southern Sudan encouraged militia formation in 
the region at large and South Darfur in particular respectively. On the other 
hand the most important triggering factors   behind the eruption of tribal 
conflicts were armed robbery and competition over local power.  
During this period, government political manipulation of administrative and 
tribal structures became an additional factor of the underlying causes of these 
conflicts. Therefore there was shift in the dynamic of tribal conflicts; issues and 
parties involved as well. Parties involved became predominately from inside 
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the area, both sedentary farmers and pastoralists, land has become central 
issue of conflict, and area covered by disputes expanded to include the entire 
state.  
 The systematic erosion of the NA, especially following Sudan’s independence, 
has led to the ineffectiveness of the system of NA in providing security, with no 
properly functioning alternating system put in place. The successive regimes, 
regardless of their nature, ideologies and declared policies, have remained 
heavily reliant on the political manipulation of tribes, with some amendments to 
tribal structures to suit their agendas. It appears that the ITRCs were more 
effective in resolving tribal conflicts during British period because they used to 
have well established mechanisms as well as check and balance measures 
were applied, which they began to lose following Sudan’s independence. 
  
214 
  
 
CHAPTER 6: BEYOND THE ITRC: INDIGENOUS MECHANISMS 
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION/MANAGEMENT IN DARFUR 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that although it could be described as the backbone of the 
tribal system of adjudication, judiyya represents only one form of the many 
other mechanisms and methods that have been in place to deal with conflict 
resolution and management within and amongst tribes in Darfur since the Fur 
sultanates (1650 to1873) up to 1960s. It seems that these mechanisms and 
means have not worked in isolation neither of one another nor of the overall 
socio-economic and political context of the tribal leadership system, including 
institutions and structures, as will be explained later. Rather, the judiyya has 
been used to work in a complementary manner within an inclusive system of 
tribal institutions and structures derived from communities’ own values 
(customary law). Perhaps this factor, which the ITRCs seem to be lacking, had 
contributed in the past (during the Fur Sultanates and the British colonial 
period in particular) to make this mechanism appear more capable of 
maintaining peaceful coexistence within tribes, and with the outside 
surrounding world, as claimed by some people in Darfur; the key informants, 
tribal leaders and academics included (Mohammed, 2009:128). 
 
In Darfur, as chapter 3 describes, the tribal leadership system of administration 
has a long history and has been based on family and tribe structures, with 
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tribes being administered by their own leaders (Iyob and Khadiagala, 
2006:134). As a result tribes develop their own system of governance that is 
informed by a specific set of values, traditions and customs. As a part of the 
socio-economic and political systems, tribes have their own customary based 
mechanisms of conflict management and resolution for settling disputes within 
their communities, or between them and other communities. Among these 
mechanisms, the most important and widely recognized one is the judiyya. 
As the tribal leadership system continues to be adopted in Darfur during British 
colonial rule, the judiyya continues to play the same fundamental role as 
before. Even after the establishment of the modern system of judiciary 
following Sudan’s independence, it appears that local communities use judiyya 
and perhaps deliberately avoid courts’ adjudication with regard to the emerging 
disputes. Mohammed, (2002:182) argues that this may be because they 
believe that there are only two outcomes from legal action either winning or 
losing, and such action leaves a feeling of bitterness to the loser. For them this 
means a continuing situation of sense of injustice, especially if the convicted 
person or group is not satisfied with the adjudication or the sentence passed 
against them. 
Before proceeding further, a couple of points need to be made clear regarding 
this chapter. The chapter is complementary to chapter 7, which focuses on 
ITRCs, and the aim here is to show that these indigenous conflict 
management/ resolution processes go further than the one-off, government-
sponsored events of ITRCs, which claim to follow the same principles. Another 
important point regarding this chapter is that the key informants often talk 
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about the past as though it has always been the same (hence the use of 
‘traditions and customs’). Maybe informants were not clear about the period 
they were describing or/ do not have a clear sense of the historical moments, 
or transitional periods, at which things changed. Based on my personal 
observation, a part of the reasons behind this problematic is that judiyya is a 
practice that is deeply rooted in the history of these communities and is still 
widely used in Darfur as the main indigenous mechanism of adjudication 
between individuals and between communities, even though in a modified form 
and with less success than before.  Perhaps this is why informants refer to 
events in the past by using present tense/or mixed between the present and 
past tenses in their deliberations. This made me confused about how to 
present their discussions and which tense should I use.  I have chosen to 
present the details in the present tense, unless referring to a specific historical 
event or period, and later in the thesis I will explore the extent to which current 
practice still follows along these lines. 
 
The Judiyya 
This title will be divided into subtitles, which will provide further elaboration of 
the judiyya as concept and practice.  Judiyya is “an Arabic term meaning the 
process of intervention by a third party to mediate a conflict situation” (Ali, 
2002:39).  Throughout the long history of Darfur (at least from 1650-2009) the 
judiyya is known for dealing with the settlement of tribal disputes, though with 
some alteration with regard to form, issues and efficiency.  Judiyya could be 
described as a type of open meeting for conflict settlement. It is a well-known 
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practice for conflict management and resolution among the different 
communities of the region of Darfur. However, as will be explained below, 
judiyya is not a one-step action. It is a process that implies a series of steps 
prior to and following the open meeting that it refers to as judiyya, although 
there is no documentation for the judiyya procedures and outcome, as I have 
personally observed. In most cases there has been no record of the meetings 
or decisions undertaken; people rely completely on their memories. Also these 
communities develop some social practices which help to enhance social 
interaction, coherence and peaceful coexistence, such as intermarriage, 
exchange of gifts and others (Mohammed, 2009:172), as  explained later in 
this chapter. 
 
The Role of the Judiyya 
Mohammed (2009:182) suggests that the modern state’s institutions such as 
police, courts and prisons have never covered the entire region of Darfur in a 
sufficient and effective manner which may be in part because judiyya is still 
seen as having reasonable acceptability, especially at the local levels, and 
even in the shanty towns in urban centres where internally displaced people 
are located. In a survey conducted by the UN in the IDPs’ camps in South 
Darfur (UN, report, 2007), new leaders (called camp sheikhs) were found to 
have emerged in these camps. In the areas controlled by government or rebel 
groups, these new leaders are directly connected either to government or to 
the rebel movements and are taking responsibility for everything in the camp, 
including disputes settlement. In the camps where there is no direct control by 
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either of the fighting groups, there are two parallel leaderships of a kind; camp 
sheikhs and tribal leaders each represents their own tribal group in the camp.  
Those who belong to the NA and move with their people to the camps continue 
to assume their old roles, while new leaders are selected for the groups which 
their leaders have left behind. The tribal leaders form a council which is 
responsible for dispute settlement among groups and between individuals. 
Meanwhile the camp sheikhs remain responsible for the provision of social 
services and contact with AU, relief and UN agencies. Also in a survey 
conducted by an NGO in relation to Darfurians living in refugee camps in 
Chad, “The majority of respondents believed that judiyya, ahleeya, and suluh 
[87 %] and diyya [85 %] are very important for enabling the people of Darfur to 
live in peace. However nearly no one [6 %] believes that these methods alone 
would be sufficient for dealing with the crimes that occur during the current 
conflict” (Darfurian Voices, 2010:28).  
All these examples indicate that situations have changed. Even though judiyya 
still plays a role in conflict settlement, it is not the same institution as before. 
The lack of other options is clearly a factor in its continued popularity, 
particularly in the case of the displaced people and refugees in the camps, 
where modern institutions of justice implementation are located far from the 
reach of the communities. Nonetheless judiyya is no longer playing the same 
role as before; its involvement appears to have become limited to certain areas 
and issues. 
Historically, the principal role of the judiyya is to resolve problems or disputes 
that arise amidst communities according to the prevailing customary law, but 
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cover a very wide range of issues. Based on the issue of contention, judiyya 
take different forms and involve various aspects of social structures and a wide 
range of people. Take the example of a woman who is divorced. The people 
involved would be individuals (the couple and their relatives), and the level of 
the relevant social structure would be the family. Family in this context means 
the social unit consisting of two adults; man and woman and their children as 
well as the extended family which includes close relatives of both couples 
(father, mother, grandmother, grandfather, sisters, brothers, aunts, uncles and 
cousins ), although only adults attend judiyya. If the dispute is between two 
individuals over land boundaries, then the people involved would be the sheikh 
and some mediators from elders who are knowledgeable of the history of the 
area and land related issues, and the level of the relevant social structure 
would be the sheikhdom. If the conflict is between two individuals over the 
leadership of their sub tribe, the people involved would be omdas from the 
tribe as well as elders from inside and outside the group involved in the 
dispute, and close relatives of the two rivals. The level of the relevant social 
structure would be the omodiyya (sub tribe level of tribal administration usually 
headed by omda). This indicates that judiyya dealt with problems that relate to 
different issues and various aspects of life, including socio-economic and 
political matters. 
 
Principles of the Judiyya 
Judiyya is a locally driven method of justice and reconciliation, based on 
customary law and informed by a community’s own values. It has developed 
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slowly over time and as communities abide by traditions and customs, usually 
when decisions are made by judiyya, everyone accepts and respects the 
outcomes. As  one of the informants says, “This submission for the Judiyya is 
associated with the belief in society’s values, therefore it would not be socially 
acceptable from anyone, an individual, a group of people or a tribe to refuse 
attend a judiyya or reject its decisions” (KI/8: 5/6/10). Commitment towards the 
decisions of the judiyya is also reflected and shown in the respectfulness 
towards those who are involved in the process such as the mediators and the 
parties to the conflict. To refuse to sit for judiyya, or to disobey decisions made 
by it, would put the individual/s or the group/s who do so in a position of 
confrontation with their  own community and other communities, as is 
explained below by one of my informants:  
“Anyone (individual, group or tribe) who disobeys decisions made by judiyya 
would be boycotted by the concerned party to the conflict, the mediators and 
the neighbours (individuals, families, groups or tribes). Which means such 
people (individual/ group or tribe) bring shame for their family, group or tribe, 
as they would be described as ‘kasar khawatir’ ” (KI/21: 10/6/10). “Kasar 
khawatir”, is an Arabic expression, refers to someone who refuses a request 
made by mediators in relation to the settlement of dispute. There was a 
common belief that such person will lose at the end; therefore this expression 
has become connected to the sense of pessimism (Mohammed, 2009: 177; 
Birech, 2009).  
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Based on my interviews in June 2010 with 26 key informants from South 
Darfur state, they separately agree on the following as common principles of 
the judiyya. 
 
1. Mediators are volunteers. 
2. Mediators must be voluntarily accepted by all parties to the conflict 
before their involvement in the arbitration process. 
3. Parties to the conflict must voluntarily accept to participate in the 
judiyya. 
4. Customary law constituted the reference for adjudication. 
5. The parties to the conflict participate voluntarily in the judiyya, but this 
also implies an obligation to accept its outcome. 
6. The implementation of the agreement reached in the judiyya is a shared 
responsibility of the parties to the conflict and the mediators. 
7. Higher level tribal leaders serve as guarantor for the implementation of 
the agreement in good faith with the mediators serve as witness in case 
of dispute over interpretation of the outcome.  
8. A mediator is expected to be a knowledgeable person with regard to the 
customary law and issues of dispute. 
9. The parties to the conflict decide on the agenda to be discussed without 
intervention from any other party. 
 
However, some of these points seem to be relevant only from a historical point 
of view. Currently, these criteria are contested on the basis of changing of 
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circumstances, issues and people. Mohammed (2009:180-181) argues that as 
of today these principles are not all pursued. This is because the communities 
are no longer ‘traditional’ but have moved to ‘transitional’ stage, whereby 
customary law is not fully adopted and respected as before, the NA has been 
subjected to government interference and is no longer enjoying full support 
from the government, nor does it have full respect from all spectrums of the 
communities. The proliferation of arms has also resulted in shift of power from 
tribal leaders to the militia leaders. 
Some informants also stress that situations have changed. One indicates that 
“Unlike these days, up to the 1970s, in the case of murder perpetrators used to 
be arrested and prosecuted even following reconciliation” (KI/7: 5/6/10).  Other 
informant pointed out that: 
“Currently the compensation for murder in the civil court is SDG: 
30,000($10,000). Meanwhile according to the customary law it was only SDG: 
15,000($5,000) which encouraged some people to go to the courts and not to 
submit to the customary law” (KI/8: 5/6/10). This same source emphasizes 
that: 
 “As of today customary law is not fully respected and obeyed by young 
generation. For example, the Alawna- sub tribe of the Banihalba-resides in 
Umjanah area, members of this group increasingly become interested in going 
to courts rather than to submit to judiyya. This is because their young 
generation have access to education and many of them have been employed 
by the police”.   
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Mediators and Mediation Process  
In the past (during colonial period and up to the 1970s) and to a lesser extent 
up to the present, when a misunderstanding or a tension occurred between 
two individuals, groups, or tribes, notable persons from elders and/or tribal 
leaders (at lower or higher levels, depending on the type of dispute) intervened 
to provide their service as mediators to contain the misunderstanding or the 
tension before it evolves or escalate into a full-scale dispute or conflict. 
Mediation here refers to a process of intervention by a third party.  This 
potential conflict situation might be demonstrated where a misunderstanding 
between two individuals, or groups, is seen to have negative impacts on the 
normal communication and relations between the two. Mediators are locally 
known as Ajaweed; Plural of Ajwad, which is an Arabic term meaning good 
faith mediator (Ali, 2002:39). The mediator might be one person or group of 
individuals (tribal leader-of lower or higher rank, leader of an extended family, 
Muslim scholar-sheikh/faqeer or faqi-, etc.) who enjoy respect and acceptance 
by both parties to the conflict/ potential conflict. Usually, the mediators are 
individuals or a group of people from the local community who are respectful, 
experienced and with a wide range of knowledge of customary law. 
Furthermore, to serve as a mediator such a person or group of people has to 
be accepted by parties to the conflict. A mediator may take the initiative on his 
own or he/ they may be requested by one of the two parties of the dispute to 
intervene. 
“When no direct confrontation happens, in most cases, mediators succeed to 
restore the relationship between the two individuals or groups with no need for 
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judiyya to be organized in a formal way” (KI/15: 8/6/10). If such efforts fail to 
stop the tension, then higher level leaders/elders will be notified about it (KI/21: 
10/6/10). In the case of individual disputes those who are notified may be the 
eldest in the family or an extended family and in case of groups, when sub 
tribes and tribes are involved the notification may be submitted to the sheikh or 
the omda of the group and top tribe’s leader.  In all these cases the notified 
person may either try to discuss the issue again with the concerned 
party/parties, alone or with the assistance of a new group of mediators (KI/21: 
10/6/10). Also, they may decide to submit the issue to the immediate highest 
level in the hierarchy of leadership. If the dispute involves tribes, the top tribal 
leaders of the respective tribes will be informed about the development.  
Usually mediators are men. The tribal community in Darfur has been 
patriarchal and this remains the case. Consequently, the tribal leadership 
system is pre-dominated by men with no room for women with regard to 
assuming leadership status of any kind, even at the lowest levels of the family 
and households. In this respect a female key informant says that “in spite of 
the education and changing situation, still men are reluctant to accept women 
representation in tribes’ delegations involve in judiyya or what comes to be 
known the Intertribal Reconciliation Conferences” (KI/22:11/6/10). Therefore, 
women are not selected as mediators and do not participate in the mediation 
process. However, if they are party to the conflict, women do participate in the 
judiyya. They may be involved in a dispute as opponents or witnesses only. In 
both cases and during the mediation process women are contacted through 
their male guardians (father, husband, brother or any other closer male 
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relative). 
 
Initiative for mediating judiyya 
If confrontation takes place, or if an initial effort of restoration of normal 
relations fails and the situation becomes more complicated, efforts are directed 
towards preparation for a proper judiyya. One of the informants (KI/15: 8/6/10) 
reflects on his own experience during the British colonial period by saying that: 
 “Sometimes, when there is an accusation that an action or behaviour is done 
repeatedly, the tribe or group that has a grievance submits a complaint to the 
formal or native authorities to explain what the substance of the grievance is. 
In this case the authorities start immediately gathering more information about 
the allegation in order to find out whether the situation is serious and if it 
requires immediate intervention. If they considered that immediate action is 
required, which means it is too urgent to wait for judiyya, the police intervene 
to contain the situation. The first thing they do is to identify the alleged 
perpetrators and detain them. Also they identify the place where the incident 
happens, and who is alleged to be the attacker” (KI/15: 8/6/10).  
This measure usually applies when violent disputes erupts between tribes or 
groups or in the case of a murder whereby a dispute between individuals or 
groups is expected to escalate into a full-scale conflict. If the authorities reach 
a conclusion that the issue is not urgent and there is no possibility that it may 
result in a conflict between tribes, such allegations are looked at during the 
annual gatherings (cultural ceremonies) of tribal leaders; locally referred to as 
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maarid or hikrat, which takes place twice a year during the colonial period 
(KI/8: 5/6/10). Based on my own observation, these procedures also apply to 
the more recent times except the referral of cases to the Maarid ceremonies, 
as Maarid no longer take place and also the response of the authorities of 
today is not as quick and efficient as before. 
Stakeholder involvement 
Stakeholders’ involvement in judiyya varies according to the level of dispute or 
conflict. However, the main stakeholders in a judiyya usually are individuals, 
groups and tribes that are concerned with the issue of dispute. Tribal leaders, 
elders and notable community personalities usually take part in judiyya on 
behalf of their tribes or respective groups. Also, local Muslim scholars (locally 
known as Fugara, plural of Fageer), such as those who lead prayers (imam) or 
teach Quran in the traditional religious school (Khalwa), are involved in judiyya 
as well. In judiyya, government direct involvement is not necessary; however 
involvement of government officials in ITRCs play crucial role. 
 
Key issues addressed by the judiyya 
Key issues normally include social, economic and political dimensions, rather 
than just one of these. Underlying these issues, as described by an informant 
(KI/15: 8/6/10), family related issues such as marriage disputes (refusal of a 
request or a dispute between couples) are commonly resolved in judiyya. 
Economic related issues such as damage of crops, debt settlement, dispute 
over business and compensations related to injury of individuals or animals, 
etc. are also settled in judiyya. Other issues that are resolved in judiyya 
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include: 
“dispute over power in case of rivalry among groups or individuals with regard 
to leadership, competition between farmers and pastoralists over natural 
resources (water and grazing land) , and disputes over land boundaries 
(farms) between individuals or groups or between tribes over tribal homelands” 
(KI/12: 7/6/10).  
The most important in this respect is that the parties to the conflict are the only 
ones to decide on the agenda of the judiyya; they preserve the full right to 
raise any issue that they consider as something of concern to them (KI/24: 
13/6/10). This is not the case in the ITRCs, where the government can 
intervene on the agenda, as will see in chapter 7. 
 
Representation and Participation 
The priority for participation in the judiyya is for the most important people, 
such as elders and tribal leaders (KI/1: 3/6/10; KI/6: 5/6/10; KI/15: 8/6/10; 
KI/21: 10/6/10). These informants emphasized that the belief within these local 
communities is that knowledge and wisdom most likely result from long life 
experience. More crucially, they add that elders are believed to be more 
knowledgeable in customary law. Also, unlike the youth, who are perceived as 
being mostly emotional and unable to control their reactions, elders are 
believed to be wiser, more reasonable and patient. However, parties to the 
conflict are free to select their participants in these meetings without 
interference from the top tribal leadership or government authorities (KI/5: 
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4/6/10). In a judiyya between tribes or sub tribes, usually the representatives 
included higher rank (Sultan, Malik, Nazir, and Magdoom), middle (Shartai, 
Fursha, Omda) and lower rank leaders such as sheikhs. The top leadership of 
the tribe leads his delegation to attend the opening ceremony, but never leads 
the negotiating team. Top rank tribal leaders distanced themselves from the 
direct involvement in the negotiation in order to serve as reference for their 
negotiating teams.  Relatives of the victims and those who are directly involved 
in the dispute are represented in the judiyya. “The participation of the victims 
or their relatives is a must. They are involved in every detail with regard to the 
discussions during the judiyya, when they agreed to reconcile that means they 
are quite satisfied” (KI/9: 6/6/10).  
 
Preparatory procedures for judiyya  
When direct confrontation between individuals, groups or tribes takes place, 
mediators intervene to separate the two parties to the conflict. One of the 
informants (KI/21: 10/6/10)  explains that if both of the parties are pastoralists, 
mediators identify grazing area, water points and market place for each party 
separately with the aim of not allowing direct contact between the two groups. 
He indicates that this process is locally known as “al-suf” (literally means ‘line’) 
which means physically separating people along a line by creating a buffer 
zone. Such a preventive measure is intended to reduce tension; helps to 
contain violence, maintain cessation of hostility, and consequently prohibit 
further escalation of the conflict.  Also, if the conflict is over land, the two 
parties usually deny access to the disputed land until a judiyya is carried out to 
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address the issue. The way to guarantee that such a measure is mutually 
respected is by making both parties to the conflict perform halifa/Qasam (take 
an oath). An equal numbers of persons (notable community leaders) from both 
parties to the conflict are selected and invited to take the oath. Having their 
hands put on a holy book (e.g. Quran) or any other means, they are requested 
to declare loudly the following (KI/15: 8/6/10):  
 “Neither I nor any person from my part will involve in any act or behaviour that 
might provoke the other party and by no means violate the restricted measures 
made by the mediators to contain the situation. Unless a judiyya is carried out 
to decide otherwise, I will respect these commitments and will make my group 
respect it too”. 
 
Proceedings of the meetings 
After the mediators are accepted by all parties to the conflict, the place, date 
and the time of the judiyya is usually decided by the mediators in consultation 
with the different parties. In most cases date and time for the meetings are 
connected to the days of the week, meal and prayer times respectively 
(KI/1:3/6/10). For example, the announcement would be that “the meeting is to 
take place next Friday after Dahur (midday) prayers or after breakfast at the 
omda’s home. Family related disputes’ meetings are usually held during the 
night time, shortly after sun set, whilst judiyya for disputes between groups or 
tribes may start during the day. The duration of the meetings depends on the 
nature of the dispute and the issues to be addressed. Family related disputes 
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may be settled in one session. In this case following the ceremonial 
procedures of the opening session, the meeting continues to listen to the 
parties to the conflict and a solution may be reached within few hours, after 
which the meeting ends. If the dispute is a complex one (e.g. between two 
tribes), the judiyya may take a whole day or many days. In this case many 
sessions are scheduled with breaks for food and prayers, as is explained 
below.  
The sessions  
The first session begins with the mediators selecting one of them to chair the 
meeting, who is most likely the eldest person or the most experienced and 
respected figure. Normally, judiyya is not confined to a fixed schedule of 
sessions; a session might continue for hours or even days (KI/24:13/6/10). 
Once everyone is seated and the chairperson announces himself as being 
selected by his colleague mediators, the session habitually starts with a 
ceremonial performance, which is generally a recitation of selected verses of 
the Quran. These are normally the verses that call for tolerance, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, and enhancement of social ties. Reciting of the Quran is 
followed by a statement made by the chairperson including popular proverbs 
that call for values of tolerance, forgiveness and peaceful coexistence. Also he 
encourages the parties to the conflict to cooperate with him and the mediators 
and to work in good faith towards the peaceful settlement of the dispute 
concerned.   
Before starting their work in the meeting, sometimes the mediators perform an 
oath on the Quran declaring that they are committed to work honestly and in a 
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good faith to reach fair settlement for the problem concerned. They usually 
emphasize the need and their commitment to remain impartial, just and fair in 
their proceedings during the meeting and in their final decisions and 
recommendations regarding resolution of the dispute under discussion.  
Following taking the oath, usually the mediators request full authorization as 
arbitrators and that the decisions they make is to be respected and accepted 
by the parties without any revision or rejection, in total or part.  Then the 
mediators start their work, which takes hours or days.   
If women are involved, as a party to the conflict or witnesses, they join the 
meeting but usually sit in the back seats (on floor mats) and separately from 
men. Women always sit behind the men and are sometimes located a special 
place behind a screen to separate them from men, so only their voices could 
be heard. When a woman is a part of the judiyya as a witness, sometimes, she 
is not allowed to attend the whole discussion. In such a case, she is only 
invited to provide her testimony when such point is reached in the discussions 
and then she will be asked to leave. 
 
In terms of procedures and principles, judiyya does not have standard criteria; 
it relies on the trust amongst the parties to the conflict or their leaders, and the 
competencies of the mediators. In this respect one of the informants reports 
the following example:  
“In 1964 a member of the Maaliya tribe killed a member from the Birgid tribe. 
The omda Ahmed Ajab of the Maaliya whose group the guilty person belonged 
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to, took the initiative and travelled  to the residence of the shartai Mohammed 
Ahmed Yaqoub of the Birgid tribe in Sherriya village with the aim of resolving 
the problem. When the session started Shartai Yaqoub requested omda Ajab 
to chair the judiyya. Furthermore, when it came to the decisions the shartai 
intervened again and decided that only half of the amount of the diyya should 
be paid by the Maaliya; because of the good neighbourhood between the two 
tribes” (KI/6:5/6/10). 
 This behaviour of the Shartai and the omda could be explained in the light of 
how friendly relations, mutual reliability and respect amongst tribal leaders 
could play crucial role in the success of the judiyya. Even though one of the 
fundamental principles of the judiyya (mediators) is not present in this case, yet 
the judiyya succeeds because of the good relationship between the two 
leaders and because of their personal qualities. Also it seems that the shartai 
wanted to reward the omda for his initiative and to make him feel that it is very 
much appreciated and well received.  
 
Fadfada session (pouring out your heart) 
Following the opening ceremony the floor usually opens for the representatives 
of the parties to the conflict to raise their concerns and grievances (KI/24: 
13/6/10). The process has been locally known as “fadfada”; an Arabic word, 
which literally means pouring out your heart, or expressing your feelings. Each 
party is given sufficient time to narrate their story, express grievances and 
raise concerns the way they want. Most of the time parties to the conflict 
express themselves openly, honestly, and -sometimes- use tough language 
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and make allegations against one another, to the extent that members of 
delegations or an entire delegation of one party threaten to leave the meeting. 
The above mentioned informant indicates that he personally attends a fadfada 
session includes two tribes, which starts at 08:00 o’clock in the morning and 
ends at 05: 00 o’clock in the evening. 
The same source adds that when the dispute is more complicated and could 
not be resolved in one session, the tradition is that by the end of the fadfada 
exercise there is a break. However, when “Fadfada” results in raising tensions 
between the two parties the break is only announced after everyone calms 
down and all parties reassured that they will continue the meeting.  
Second session 
If more than one session is required, breaks are to be taken for food and 
prayers. In this case both parties to the conflict are invited to make 
presentations on their cases with as much time as  needed and they are 
expected to point out the following (KI/9: 6/6/10): 
1. Their claims and complaint against the other party. 
2. Human and property losses and damages (if applicable) with submission of 
evidence/witness related to these claims (if available).  
3. Any other grievances. 
Submission of presentations in most cases is made verbally and in the 
presence of the other party to the conflict (KI/8: 5/6/10; KI/11: 6/6/10). The 
same informants add that usually the presentations are made by more than 
one person from each group and these people do not necessarily coordinate in 
advance with regard to who says what. Sometimes, individuals within the same 
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party disagree with each other on the account of events presented and also 
regarding which issues should be  raised in the meeting at all. In this case the 
mediators request that the group should have a separate meeting on their own 
to come up with a unified position (KI/4: 4/6/10). In this respect judiyya differs 
from the ITRCs, in the latter a written presentation is prepared in advance and 
only one person assigned to deliver it during the meeting, as will be explained 
in chapter 7. 
The presentations of grievances and claims by the two parties to the conflict 
usually take one session or more (KI/1: 3/6/10). Then the meeting continues to 
discuss the issues raised. Occasionally, mediators find it necessary to suspend 
the sessions in order to take time to look into the submissions made and to 
make their own judgements (KI/6:5/6/10).  To conclude the final proposal for 
settlement, separate meetings between the mediators and each party may  be 
needed to discuss details with an aim to bridge the gap between the two 
parties to the conflict (KI/1: 3/6/10). 
 Sometimes, mediators found it necessary and helpful to divide themselves 
into sub committees such as loss estimation and compensations committees, 
and boundaries identification and demarcation committee. The primary 
responsibility of these committees is to study the documents provided by the 
parties, to carry out site visits to see the situation on the ground, and to provide 
their findings and remarks to the team of the mediators. The findings are to be 
discussed by the mediators jointly and decisions are collectively made as well 
(KI/8: 5/6/10; KI/11: 6/6/10). 
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Outcome of the judiyya 
The outcome of the judiyya, whether decisions or recommendations, has to be 
compliant with customary law (KI/8: 5/6/10). This respondent further adds that 
in the beginning of the outcome session, mediators first start with an 
introduction which includes the background of the relationship of the two 
parties prior to the conflict, reflecting on the good sides of it. Then they give a 
brief account of the conflict: reasons and consequences from the deliberation 
of the discussions of the parties to the conflict and the judgement delivered by 
the mediators themselves. The mediators’ judgement includes the 
identification of the individual, group or tribe found guilty and individual 
perpetrators from both parties (KI/15: 8/6/10). This same informant indicates 
that the individuals, group or tribe found guilty are usually penalized in kind or 
cash, as there is no imprisonment penalty in judiyya. The same source 
concludes that sometimes punishment for the tribe that is found guilty will only 
be moral punishment (blame put on them by mediators for their bad 
behaviour/action). Usually the outcome of the judiyya is divided as follows 
(KI/9: 6/6/10): 
 
Decisions 
In most cases the decisions of the judiyya relates to an estimation of diyya, 
compensation, and the individual perpetrators, whose names are to be 
specified and punishment identified.  Procedures of implementation are also 
agreed, including clear deadlines for payments of diyya, compensations and 
steps towards normalization of future relationship between the parties to the 
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conflict. The latter start immediately by requesting the opponents shake hands 
and publicly announce restoration of the relationship.  
Recommendations 
Advice to the parties to the conflict in order to maintain good future 
relationships usually included in the judiyya’s recommendations. For example, 
from the historical background of the conflict, mediators pick up certain issues, 
such as boundaries and livestock seasonal migration routes, which they 
consider as triggering factors. In this particular case, recommendations may 
include proposals on the amendment of boundaries or direction of livestock 
migration routes, which should be decided by the two parties unanimously. 
Also, as a sign of forgiveness mediators may recommend one party or both to 
offer a reduction of the compensation (except the diyya) they are entitled to 
receive.  
 
Mechanism for implementation of agreements reached 
The mediators, in coordination with the leaders of the parties to the conflict, 
are collectively responsible for the implementation of the outcome of the 
judiyya (KI/9: 6/6/10). In complex disputes the mediators divide themselves 
into subcommittees. The same informant gave the following example:  
“Let us say the conflict is related to dispute over land boundaries between two 
groups and results in human losses and crop damage. In this case, mediators 
should divide themselves into two subcommittees: 1/ Losses estimation and 
compensation committee, 2/Boundaries identification and demarcation 
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committee. Each committee include representatives from each party to the 
conflict. The role of these committees is to follow up on the implementation of 
the decisions made by the judiyya”.  
Usually there is a time frame for the implementation which should be fully 
respected. This work is carried out in coordination with the leaders of the 
parties to the conflict. Sometimes, joint delegations form from the parties to the 
conflict (tribes) together with the mediators to tour different areas to 
disseminate the agreement and facilitate its implementation on the ground 
(KI/7:5/6/10). The same source further explains that: 
“If the implementation is lagging behind the deadlines, mediators look into the 
matter to identify who is responsible for it. If any or both of the parties to the 
conflict are found responsible for the delay, the direct leader/leaders of the 
concerned group/groups will be notified by the mediators to explain their 
position. In case the mediators are not satisfied with the explanations provided, 
they submit the issue to the highest level of the tribe’s leadership”.  
 
Council of Dimilijs 
 Dimilij is a middle rank position within the hierarchy of the leadership of the 
Fur tribe (see chapter 3).  For some tribes Dimilij is usually a knowledgeable 
person who stands out as a reference point for customary law related issues 
(KI/8: 5/6/10).  
“Mostly, tribe’s hierarchy including a dimilij who is supposed to serve as 
resource person with regard to the customary law, collection of diyya and 
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compensations, and the tribe’s Council of Dimilijs is the body that   brings all 
these dimilijs together. The primary responsibility of this council, among other 
tasks, is the review of customary law. For some tribes the council organizes 
annual meetings to look into issues related to diyya and compensations among 
groups within the tribe or between their tribe and other tribes, especially the 
neighbouring ones” (KI/15: 8/6/10). 
This council is responsible for the records, review and interpretation of the 
customary law. The Dimilijs’ council also looks into precedents and decides 
whether to endorse these precedents (locally referred to as sawalif) as part of 
the customary law or not (KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/8: 5/6/10). In effect then this means 
they could decide whatever they think is right. This shows the flexibility of 
customary law and the division of labour within the system of the NA; which 
means this institution is the legitimate body to decide what constitutes 
customary law rather than the top tribal leaders.  They also review the due 
amounts of diyya and compensations to make sure that these amounts are 
collected and received by the people concerned (KI/9: 6/6/10). Moreover, one 
of the main tasks of the council is to coordinate with neighbouring communities 
with regard to the customary law system such as to the amount of diyya and 
compensations agree on certain issues and cases (KI/6: 5/6/10; KI/8: 5/6/10) .   
 
 Advantages and disadvantages of the judiyya  
Indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution and management are described 
as being successful in resolving conflicts, and in maintaining peaceful 
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coexistence within and amongst local communities (e.g. Birech, 2009; 
Mohamed, 2002). However, this success is not cost free to all and had some 
limitations / disadvantages, as reflected in the following paragraphs. The 
perceived strengths and weaknesses are actually in the same thing; the 
degree of expertise of the local leaders and communities.  
 
Unlike more formal adjudication systems, judiyya is locally owned, copes very 
well with locally driven legitimacy, and responds quickly to the conflict situation 
as it depends on people who live among the community (Birech, 2009:47-48). 
Mohamed, (2002:182) argues that judiyya is known for ending disputes in a 
way that is accepted by both parties and hence contributes to a culture of 
tolerance and forgiveness among and within communities. I personally have 
observed that most informants indicate that one of the merits of the judiyya is 
the fact that it effectively uses local structures and elders who have sufficient 
knowledge and experience, which put them in a good position to understand 
the psychological background of the parties to the conflict as well as their 
concerns. 
 
However, one of the limitations of the judiyya is that it lacks standard criteria 
and relies profoundly on the competencies of the mediators and tribal leaders 
(Birech, 2009:46). I also observe that my informants emphasized that judiyya 
mainly depends on elders and the customary law. This could lead to another 
limitation of the judiyya because as time passes (especially from 1970s 
onward) the number of elders who are fully aware of customary law has been 
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diminishing and at the same time new generations are influenced by education 
and become reluctant to obey traditions and customs. Also, most informants 
mentioned that the enforcement of the judiyya’s outcome relies, to large 
extent, on the system of social control derived from the community’s beliefs 
and values. Over the same period of time -as mentioned above- younger 
educated people may not care as much about values such as ‘shame’ and 
“kasar khawatir”, which leaves the efficacy of the judiyya undermined. This 
applies to the overall social environment and indigenous knowledge and 
methods that support judiyya, as is explained below. 
 
Methods supportive to the judiyya 
 
These are the kinds of measures, procedures, actions and behaviour that 
contributes to consolidate peaceful coexistence and mutual respect within and 
amongst communities in the past (at least during the colonial period and 
following independence up to 1970s) as indicated in the following statement: 
 
“These means are served to make the society live in harmony and maintain 
friendly relationships. Also, they are the kind of actions and behaviour that had 
made communities realize the mutual benefits of social interaction and 
peaceful coexistence. Therefore such measures are found to reduce tensions 
within and among communities. Only when the situation goes beyond the 
control or is considered a threat to the safety of individuals or the community 
judiyya is opted to as a last resort of adjudication” (KI/8: 5/6/10).  
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Farsh al-khalag (laying down a cloth) 
Farsh al-khalag is an Arabic phrase which literally means laying down cloth. It 
was a way of expressing readiness to make concessions in order to resolve 
the concerned dispute. An informant explains it as follows: 
“Farsh al-khalag is a form of a judiyya, [though not an ideal one], in which one 
of the parties to the conflict takes the initiative to contact the other party with 
the aim to resolve an on-going conflict or potential dispute situation. This 
contact could be done either by the party to the conflict or by a mediator 
encouraged by the party to a conflict/potential conflict situation. In local 
communities and on many occasions individuals and groups   opt to  this 
process as a way  to contain potential disputes among individuals or groups 
due to a misunderstanding, which  may  evolve into full-scale dispute if not 
earlier addressed ” (KI/6:5/6/10).  
Usually this happens when an individual or a party observes that their 
relationship with a specific person or other party is not as it is supposed to be. 
Hoping to restore good relations with the individual or the group concerned, 
they request a third party whom they respect, trust, and believed to be 
enjoying respect and acceptance by the other party as well, to intervene. Such 
a person will be requested to go and make a clarification about the 
misunderstanding and what goes wrong. The initiator often provides the 
mediator with an offer that they are pleased to sit with the other party to listen 
and discuss any concern they want to raise. In most cases if the offer is 
accepted the meeting will be held at the premises of those who accept the 
offer or at the residence of the mediator. The following example explains the 
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process in more detail. 
In an interview I conducted with key informant in 1999 at a village call Hillal in 
Adyla locality, this person claimed that one day he was contacted by an omda 
who asked him to intervene to mediate a potential dispute between a certain 
family and the omda. Furthermore, the omda explained that as he was in good 
terms with the family concerned, they may accept his mediation.  The 
informant added that he had accepted the request, contacted the concerned 
family and they all agreed on a specific date to meet. On the specified date the 
omda arrived at the mediator’s home first and they both set off to see the 
family at their home. Upon their arrival, the family warmly welcomed them. The 
mediator explained to the group why they were there.  He began by saying that 
the omda wanted to listen to them and if they do not mind he would address 
them in few words to explain the purpose behind his mission. The omda 
confirmed that he came because he does care about his people, he has 
special respect for this family in particular, and that he wanted the relationship 
to be as good as it usually was. A representative of the family spoke next and 
thanked the omda and the mediator for their initiative, made some remarks on 
the historical relationship between the family and the omda, and concluded by 
pointing to the omda and saying that for the sake of your visit and the 
presence of your companion (i.e. The mediator), we agreed to dismiss our 
grievance. The informant concluded that the family changed their mind 
because of the recognition they had received from the omda. From this 
example, it seems that in these communities recognition and appreciation play 
a decisive role in resolving conflicts and the opposite (the lack thereof) also 
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appears to be true.  
 
The halifa of qasam (Taking an oath) 
This measure is used as a method for conflict resolution among individuals 
and groups, but is only referred to as last resort when no evidence is provided 
to support one’s claim, but the person or the group insist on going ahead with 
that claim (KI/15: 8/6/010). The same source indicates that taking an oath is a 
tradition which is associated with local beliefs. It takes different forms and in 
practice- sometimes- it is performed in a ritual way. Individuals or a group are 
asked to mention a name of a person who they consider as gifted with spiritual 
powers or to put their hands on something such as spear, piece of wood or the 
Holy book (the Quran, the universal print) or a version of Quran that is in 
handwriting, which belongs to someone (Sheikh/fageer or faqi) who is believed 
to be a blessed person, or someone with spiritual powers. A Muslim scholar 
(sheikh/fageer or faqi) for instance, is believed to be of spiritual powers. 
Consequently after his death people may come to believe that this holy 
spiritual power is transmitted to his belongings such as his prayer mat, his stick 
or his handwritten version of the Quran, etc.  
Taking an oath is usually required in the case where an individual or group of 
people accuses another individual or group of perpetrating certain actions or 
behaviour against them (damage of farm, animal theft, murder of person, 
insulting or harassment, etc.) without providing sufficient evidence to support 
their allegation. Meanwhile the alleged perpetrators deny that they were guilty. 
In this case the alleged perpetrator will be requested to take the oath in order 
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for the allegation to be dismissed by his opponents and the community at 
large. An informant (KI/21: 10/6/010) describes such process as follows: 
“When such an allegation is made publicly and the denial also is publicised, 
individuals who are closely related to the parties in conflict intervene to clarify 
the situation. They first contact the person or the group who makes the 
allegations in order to request for evidence. If no evidence is submitted or the 
mediators are not satisfied with the evidence, they try to convince those who 
make the accusation to withdraw their allegations on the grounds of no 
reasonable or sufficient evidence being provided. If the individual or the group 
concerned refused to withdraw their claim the opponent will be contacted. The 
mediators inform the other party that although no sufficient evidence is 
provided, their opponent refuses to withdraw their allegations. Consequently, 
the mediators propose taking the oath as the only possible way out of the 
disagreement. Upon the agreement of both parties, place, date and time are 
identified for a meeting in which taking an oath would be performed”. Another 
informant (KI/15: 8/6/010) elaborated the following:  
“When both parties are present, the mediators usually request those who 
make the claim to choose the means they prefer in order for the other group to 
take the oath. It is worth mentioning here that the individual or the group who 
make the allegations preserve the right to choose the way that they prefer 
taking the oath to be performed. However, regardless of the method of taking 
the oath, the accused person or group are required to say the following: ‘I did 
not commit the action/behaviour so and so. I have never been part of 
conspiracy that was related to this action/behaviour in any way; direct or 
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indirect’. If the individual or the group took the oath the way their opponent 
requested, the problem would be resolved and the two groups would shake 
hands as a sign of conciliation and forgiveness”.  
 Intermarriage 
Individuals from a sub tribe or tribe may undertake a reciprocal marriage 
relationship with individuals from another group within the tribe or outside their 
tribe. These arrangements are usually made by men, as these communities 
are patriarchal, and usually women/wives get swapped and move between the 
groups. Unfortunately, I do not know about the degree of the acceptance of 
this practice by women. This is another area that researchers know little about. 
In practice, intermarriage relationships are common amongst both tribal 
leaders as well as other members of the communities. For example, a tribal 
leader or a member of his family can get married to a member of a family 
which belongs to another sub tribe or neighbouring tribe.  
 
In Darfur intermarriage has a long history which is well-known. For example, 
the Sultan Suleiman Ahmed Almaagour, who is believed to be the founder of 
the Fur Sultanate (1650 to1873) was given the nick-name ‘Solungdungo’  
which means in the Fur language “the Arab” and was believed to be a product 
of an intermarriage relationship of an Arab and Fur origin parents (O’Fahey, 
2008:36).   Morton, (2004:6) indicates that Ali Senusi, Nazir of the Taaisha 
tribe (Ar/o) was brother-in-law to the Fur Sultan Ali Dinar and was a Malik (top 
tribal leader) of the Fur shortly before Darfur became under the British rule in 
1916. Mohammed, (2009:185) indicates that talking about descendants of 
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outsiders who came to live with the community was not allowed because the 
tradition was to encourage mixing and intermarriage rather than segregation 
between communities. A good example of the intermarriage could be seen in 
the case of some tribes such as Birgid and Berti tribes (Af/o) whose original 
language has vanished as they have adopted Arabic as their only language of 
communication, even though this might be encouraged much further as they 
embrace Islam. Islam encourages the use of Arabic language; for example, the 
Holy book (Quran) is written in Arabic language, worshipping practices such as 
prayers are preferred to be performed in Arabic language.  One of the 
informants (KI/6:5/6/10) mentioned that in Sherriya area, the homeland of the 
Birgid, more than 27 tribes had lived together and had intermarriage 
relationships. The same thing applies to some tribes which are referred to by 
some authors as being arabized, such as Gimir and Tama (Tubiana, 2007: 
69). Furthermore, it is reported that in Al-Geneina area of West Darfur, tribes of 
Arab origin such as Huttiya, Shattiya, Mahadi and Tarjam (all Ar/o) used not to 
accept diyya from one another nor from the Massalit tribe because they 
consider themselves as becoming one community due to intermarriage 
relationships (Takana, 1997:6). Another example, in Wadi Salih area of West 
Darfur, the Fatafru tribe had been incorporated into the Fur tribe due to 
intermarriage. “Up to the year 1938, this group used to have their own 
homeland and tribal leadership; shartai Abdulmawla Jaboar. When shartai 
Jaboar died [around the date specified above] the entire area was annexed to 
the Fur shartai of dar kubra and the Fatafru tribe voluntarily integrated into the 
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Fur community without any sign of complaint, at least,  up to 1990s” (Takana , 
1997:10). 
An informant indicates that it has become a tradition, especially within the Fur 
community to use this intermarriage strategy to consolidate power 
relationships. He gives the following example, the mother of Dabaka, the then 
Nazir of Banihalba tribe (Ar/o) was from the Fur tribe, and she was the sister of 
Adam Rijal, the then Magdoom of Fur in South Darfur (KI/24: 13/6/10). Another 
informant (KI/15: 8/6/10) indicates that Bushara Sayed was the first Nazir of 
the Falata in South Darfur and he was from Awlad Aish sub tribe of the Falata. 
This whole sub tribe was descendant of a Fur mother, who was sister of Sultan 
Mohammed Al-Fadul (grandfather of the Sultan Ali Dinar).  
 
Intermarriage is being used as a means to facilitate communications and 
encourage peaceful relations with neighbouring groups or tribes. Intermarriage 
serves to reduce conflicts among groups and tribes, in the sense that when 
disputes occur, these relations can positively contribute to contain it. 
Mohammed (2009:177) shows an example of a ‘half-caste’ woman who was 
able to stop fighting between two tribes. She stood in the middle between the 
two opponent groups and told them that she belongs to both of them as her 
father was from the group on her right hand and her mother from the group on 
the left side. She added that “anyone wanted to start shooting, please shoot 
me first because I cannot see you killing each other and I am still alive” 
(Mohammed, 2009:177).   
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Intermarriage continues to happen at all levels of societies within and across 
communities. However, to what degree this has been affected by the political 
manipulation and polarization along tribal lines encouraged by government 
policies for the last two decades is something that needs to be further 
investigated. One thing this study could confirm from the recent ITRCs’ reports 
is that some tribes such as Huttiya, Shattiya, and Mahadi on one hand and the 
Massalit on the other, who for a long time did not accept diyya from one 
another, because they considered themselves as becoming one community 
due to intermarriage relationships, were reported to be accepting the Diyya at 
least from 1996 onwards. This is due to fighting and deterioration in relations in 
the last two decades between Massalit and the tribes of Arab origin in West 
Darfur (reference is made to ITRCs in 1996 and1999 between the two groups 
as shown in table 2). 
 
 Tabadul al-hadaya (exchange of Gifts) 
Chiefs of different tribes as well as leaders of subgroups and normal people 
within tribes exchange gifts as a way of maintaining and building good 
relations amongst themselves and consequently amongst their communities. A 
gift could be a horse, a camel, a cow or a sheep and sometimes they offer 
their daughters as a gift in marriage (KI/21: 10/6/10). Similar to the practice of 
intermarriage, these arrangements are usually made by men. The information 
with regard to this study indicates that women do not have agency in this. 
 
Maniha (lend):  
  
249 
  
Maniha is an Arabic expression which literally means giving, donating or 
lending (a sense of making a grant or donating something to someone else). It 
is a local expression widely used among communities, especially the 
pastoralists, to mean providing food free of charge during the difficult times. In 
most cases it refers to a situation when somebody lends someone else a cow, 
a sheep or a goat to milk or farmers lend food such as sorghum and millet to 
their neighbours or to the pastoralists (KI/21: 10/6/010).  Leaders of the 
community are taking the lead in this respect. In the case of wealthy people 
who become reluctant to provide maniha to others, the customary law makes it 
obligatory for such persons to take care of their close relatives and  tribal 
leaders intervene to enforce the customary law (KI/15: 8/6/10). 
 
 The original of the maniha such as animals is usually returned after the 
situation improves and the targeted persons became better off (KI/21: 
10/6/010). Such practice is not expected to generate profit or compensation 
and only if the lent animal reproduces would the original of the Maniha be 
returned together with the reproduced generations (KI/21: 10/6/010). As such 
Maniha is considered to contribute to the feeling amongst people that their 
leaders knew their needs and was taking care of them, which consolidated 
leaders’ legitimacy and made them more respected among their communities. 
Also, maniha is believed to have encouraged friendly relations and peaceful 
coexistence within and amongst different communities at large. 
 
Tadeer (to stay temporarily): 
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Tadeer (this term originated from dar in Arabic language, which means home) 
is a local expression which refers to bringing animals to stay temporarily in the 
farm place with the aim of increasing soil fertility. Following the harvest season, 
farmers request pastoralists to bring their animals to stay for some time in an 
already harvested land to graze on the remains of the crops. While doing so, 
animals leave behind their waste. When it rains the animal dung mixes with the 
soil, and enhances the fertility of the land (KI/21: 10/6/010). This is also 
thought to reinforce good relationships between the two communities; farmers 
and pastoralists. 
 
Al-wadiaa (Deposit): 
Al-wadiaa literally means a deposit. However in this context it means a 
situation whereby farmers send their animals with pastoralists during their 
seasonal migration and the pastoralists leave behind sick, weak or  disable 
animals with farmers to look after them  until they  come back (KI/8: 5/6/10). 
This same source elaborates that usually, this exchange of animals takes 
place on a voluntarily basis without any group being paid in turn.  It is a type of 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ without a third party involves as a witness. They 
honestly take care of one another’s animals. When pastoralists come back 
they may find their animals, some or all of them, become well and fit. If that is 
the case, as an expression of gratitude they give one of these animals to the 
farmer or to his son or daughter who is involved directly in looking after the 
animals. The same thing applies to the farmers who send their animals with 
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pastoralists. Again this practice reinforces the co-operative relationships 
between communities which could be drawn on in times of dispute. 
 
 
Tahalufat (alliance): 
Tahalufat means an agreement or understanding between groups or tribes not 
to attack one another (KI/6: 5/6/10).  
“Tahalufat amongst tribes or groups means that the groups  commit 
themselves not to launch direct attack, conspire against or betray one another, 
including revealing of information to the authorities -in most cases this refers to 
the revelation of actual numbers of animals for taxation purposes and 
possession of unauthorised weapons” (KI/8:5/6/10).  
At the same time the two groups commit to stand beside one another against 
any opponent and/or enemy attack. Normally, the leaders of the allied groups 
will be invited to take the oath on the Quran or any other appropriate method. 
They are expected to state the following oath (KI/11: 6/6/10): 
 “We commit ourselves not to launch direct attack, involve in conspiracy or 
betray one another; by revealing information to the authorities or enemy. We 
will be one hand during the difficult times and during times of prosperity as 
well”.   
The alliance is often among pastoralists, however one of the good examples of 
an interest-based alliance was between Berti (a settler tribe of an African 
origin), Midob (camel herder tribe of an African origin) and Zayyadiya (camel 
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herder tribe of an Arab origin) of north Darfur in their war against the Kababish 
and the Kawahlla (both camel herder tribes of an Arab origin) of Kordofan in 
1932 and 19435. There were two types of alliance; brotherhood alliance and 
assimilation alliance as is explained below. 
 
Almu’akha (Brotherhood alliance) 
Brotherhood alliance is a situation whereby groups or individuals take the oath 
(on Quran or any other revered object) to ally to one another (locally referred 
to as becoming brothers), yet they remain two autonomous entities 
(KI/8:5/6/10). This informant indicates that: 
“If one party is not Muslim, it does not matter; they take the oath according to 
their own belief system. Sometimes people use ritual signs to show that they 
agree to be allied. For example, one of the methods of establishing alliance 
was mixing of blood. One man is selected from each group. Then blood is 
taken from the two men and mixed together. This is a sign of unity and that the 
two men become brothers and consequently their respective groups become 
allies to one another” (KI/8:5/6/10). 
This ritual of alliance perhaps is associated with an ancient local belief in 
Darfur prior to Islam. Another method of forming alliance is when individuals or 
people from two groups sit together with intention of becoming allies. They 
raise their hands up and cite selected verses of Quran (usually ‘Surat Elfatiha’; 
the first chapter in the holy Quran). In this case they call it brotherhood on 
                                                          
5
 CIVSEC2 Darfur-3 Kutum, A. 41/2/6, pp.282, Sudan National Records Office, Khartoum. 
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Elfatiha (which means swearing by God) (KI/8:5/6/10). Living in remote areas 
and distant from the direct control of the government authorities, both 
pastoralists and settler communities use brotherhood alliances as a means of 
protection.  
“Having strong alliance made other tribes think twice before attacking you. If 
the attack took place and they discovered that the attacked group maintained 
an alliance with another powerful tribe, the attackers would quickly opt for 
reconciliation” (KI/21: 10/6/010). Also, alliance formation is believed to have 
facilitated the movement and the temporarily residence of the pastoralists 
during their seasonal migration across settlers’ homelands. 
 
Ahlaf al-diyya wa’ al-waliyya (Assimilation alliance) 
Assimilation alliance is similar to the brotherhood alliance, however it differs in 
a sense that it refers to a kind of a voluntary incorporation of one smaller group 
into a bigger one.  
“This is the case whereby a group of people (individuals, extended family or 
sub tribe) decide to leave their original tribe, for one reason or another, and to 
attach themselves to another tribe and became an integral part of it. This is 
locally known as (ahlaf al-diyya wa al-waliyya)” (KI/8:5/6/10). ‘Ahlaf al-diyya wa 
al-waliyya’ is an Arabic local expression which refers to the unity of the parties 
in difficult times and happy occasions as well; al-diyya (diyya-blood money) 
refers to difficult times while al-waliyya, which means woman, refers to a 
marriage relationship and time of happiness. According to the customary law 
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such groups enjoy all rights that any original member of the tribe would enjoy.  
This practice is widely known in Darfur as I personally observed that most of 
the respondents claim that the majority of the tribes in Darfur, in one way or 
another, are a product of an amalgamation of groups of different ethnic 
backgrounds. However they assert that such information should be kept 
confidential due to the sensitivity of the issue of tribal affiliation in Darfur, 
especially nowadays. 
 
Diyya (Blood money):  
Diyya is an Arabic term with religious indication, which means compensation in 
money or in kind. In Islamic law and the Shari’a, if someone is killed by mistake 
the amount of money paid in cash or in kind to his family as compensation is 
called diyya. The same thing applies if someone is intentionally killed but 
his/her family chooses to withdraw the petition and receive compensation 
instead (KI/21: 10/6/010).  
According to the customary law, diyya has a similar meaning as the case in 
Islamic law and the Shari’a. However, in practical terms, diyya in customary 
law differs from that of Shari’a in the following regards: 
1. In addition to the human beings, animals are also included. If animals are 
killed deliberately or by mistake their owners are entitled to receive a 
compensation, which locally refers to as diyya (KI/15: 8/6/10). 
2. The estimated amount of diyya for human losses does not match with the 
amount identified by the Shari’a law (100 camels). Regardless of ethnic 
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divisions, according to the customary law in Darfur, the estimated 
amount of diyya is much less than 100 camels. The diyya for male- 
adult or child is the same, but it is not the same for women. A female’s 
diyya is considered half of the amount of compensation paid for a male 
(see table 5 below). Also, based on their own unique system of 
customary law, tribes differ with regard to the estimated amount of 
diyya. In South Darfur, for example the diyya for one person ranges 
between 70 cattle, 66 cattle, and 30 cattle (Ali, 1999:108).  The 
estimation usually is made in kind; nonetheless it could be converted 
into cash. Even though the market price does not necessarily apply. 
Neighbouring tribes usually agree on a certain fixed estimated amount 
of diyya for human losses (see table 5 below). 
 
Table 5: Examples of diyya arrangement between Fur and some tribes  
Fur vs. Other 
Tribes  
Man Woman 
Murder Manslaughter Murder Manslaughter 
Banihalba 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Taaisha 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Rezeigat 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Habaniyya 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
  
256 
  
Falata 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Miseirriya 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Tarjam 35 cattle 12 cattle 17.5 
cattle 
6 cattle 
Gimir 24 cattle 24 cattle 12 cattle 12 cattle 
Massalit 30 cattle 12 cattle 15 cattle 6 cattle 
Source: interview with key informant (KI/15:8/6/10). 
 
Conclusion 
In Darfur judiyya has been one of the most famous and widely used 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and management between individuals, 
groups, tribes and among different communities throughout the history and up 
to recent years.  Judiyya is described as a form of an open meeting for conflict 
settlement. However, it is a process that implies a series of steps prior to, and 
following, the open meeting that is referred to it as judiyya. As a method of 
justice and conciliation, the primary role of the judiyya was to implement 
customary law with the aim of maintaining law and order within and among 
local communities. Anticipated by many methods and measures to maintain 
peaceful coexistence within and among communities, judiyya seems to be 
dealt with as a last resort of adjudication.  
Historically perhaps the most important factors that contribute to the success of 
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the judiyya are the uncomplicated nature of disputes and the existence of well-
established, time tested system of tribal leadership, in terms of structures, 
values, powers recognized for tribal leaders and the legitimacy of these 
leaders. In terms of economy, local communities in Darfur are dependent on a 
largely subsistence economy, the backbone of which is farming and herding 
animals. The social structures are also not complicated ones, and include 
family, extended family, sub-tribes and tribes. The political system within tribes 
is based mostly on inheritance of leadership. As such people in these 
communities-individuals and groups- knew each other very well. Also, it seems 
that the hierarchical system of power and social relationships made it easier to 
exert control over individuals and groups. For example, the top tribal leader is 
responsible for his tribe. However, the tribe is divided into sub tribes, lineages, 
extended families, and households. Each of these levels has a leader who was 
responsible of his own group and held accountable to the highest level in the 
ladder of leadership. 
Customary law which constituted the reference point for adjudication is well 
accepted and respected by the entire community. The acceptability of the 
judiyya and its outcome is primarily driven from the fact that communities 
consider that they owned the process and it is coping very well with their 
values, traditions and customs. However, judiyya has its own limitations.  For 
example, there are no standard criteria for the judiyya; it is heavily reliant on 
the competencies of the mediators and tribal leaders involved.  The alteration 
in form and substance due to many factors, including but are not limited to, 
colonialism, modernization and civil wars in the region, have made the judiyya 
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less effective in resolving conflicts. Furthermore, there has been a shift with 
respect to the issues over which conflict arises. Disputes that are usually 
addressed by judiyya are short-term disagreements that involve interests and 
needs such as individual quarrels, competition over grazing land and water 
points. These issues are relatively negotiable and easy to resolve.  While long-
term, deep-rooted problems, such as the issues behind the on-going conflicts 
in Darfur including identity, wealth and power imbalances, and gross violations 
of human rights, apparently involve challenging issues of different dimensions. 
Such issues are not easy to compromise on or be tackled the same way 
judiyya did in the past.  
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CHAPTER 7:  CASE STUDIES OF ITRCS IN SOUTH DARFUR 
STATE: 1989 TO 2009:      
  
 Introduction 
 Chapters 4 and 5 considered first Darfur and then South Darfur at a general 
level, focussing on the anatomy of conflicts, meanwhile chapter 6 focussed on 
judiyya as an example of indigenous approaches to resolve these conflicts. 
This chapter looks at very detailed case studies of ITRCs in order to 
investigate the extent to which the general picture that I have formulated for 
Darfur is reflected on the ground in South Darfur.  
This chapter argues that the ITRCs have long historical roots with a track-
record of success at mediating conflict. Similar to the NA and local government 
situation, they have always been subjected to political manipulation by the key 
actors to some extent, but the checks and balances on this have become less 
since 1989. By subjecting this written record to a thorough analysis we can 1) 
uncover a detailed account of the major conflicts and their causes in South 
Darfur; 2) identify the different patterns that emerged with regard to identities 
of protagonists and the perceived causes; 3) assess the feasibility of the 
decisions and recommendations of the conferences and consider these within 
the context described in previous chapters. The written evidence is also 
complemented by the testimony of key informants, some of whom have 
participated directly in these conferences (see appendix for list). Furthermore, I 
have also observed some of these conferences directly.  
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The focus was on the ITRCs in South Darfur State during the period of 1989 to 
2009. The objective was to make an in-depth analysis of how the ITRCs 
addressed what have been identified in chapter 5 as proximate, root causes 
and triggering factors of the tribal conflicts in South Darfur. Furthermore these 
sub-sections include reflections and analysis on: principles of the ITRCs, the 
role and the way they were functioning; how the initiative for mediation 
between conflicting parties started, who was involved in such initiatives and 
how? Who were the mediators, their criteria, who selected them and how? 
Which tribes were involved, who represented them in the ITRCs and how? Did 
they select their representatives? Furthermore, the proceedings of the 
meetings will also be looked at; how did the meetings start, how were the 
discussions carried out? And how were the final outcomes reached? Political 
ambitions attributed to ITRCs will also be highlighted and examined. Key 
issues addressed by these conferences will be exposed, and how the 
decisions and the recommendations made by these conferences came to be 
implemented will also be analysed. 
  
Principles/Guidelines of the ITRCs 
ITRCs are generally thought to refer to ‘customary law’ for adjudication to 
resolve those problems through NA and to be under only a minimal level of 
political interference from the government. The archival records did not show 
that customary law was documented in written codes. Also, the informants did 
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not mention anything about such written documentation. In their discussions, 
and as reflected in the archives as well, informants referred to what they called 
“precedents” and “customary law”, however what constitutes customary law 
and how it was done, they did not confirm an existence of written account in 
this regard. It seems that such issues remained debatable and relied on oral 
accounts and key people to decide what they were.  Informants only referred to 
the dimilij council as an indigenous institution responsible for reviewing 
customary law in a sense that they look into the newly emerging issues and 
endorse “precedents” to become part of the recognized customary law (see 
section on dimilij council in chapter 6). Mohammed, (2009) mentioned that 
historians did not find any copy of “Dally’s code of law”. This was claimed to be 
an account of customary law written by one of the Fur Sultanates named Dally, 
and it is believed to have been the reference point for adjudication during the 
Fur Sultanates, and hence it is also believed to be the source of customary law 
in Darfur (Mohammed, 2009:124).  Some scholars such as Mamdani argued 
that during colonial period elsewhere in Africa, it was the “tribal Chiefs backed 
by colonial administration possessed the arbitrary power to decide the content 
of the customary law” (Mamdani, 1996:12).  
 
As far as Darfur was concerned, the intervention of British colonial authority 
included modification of tribal institutions as well as customary law, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. For example, the practice of setting up 
agreements amongst tribes in relation to diyya and compensation in cases of 
human and property losses was encouraged by the colonials and since then it 
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became part of the customary law up to present (Takana, 1997:36). They also 
introduced the demarcation of boundaries of tribal homeland and established 
fixed corridors for pastoralists to come through with their animals in their 
seasonal migration.  British colonials also introduced imprisonment as 
punishment in the local courts, something has not been known before because 
tribal indigenous institutions did not include police and prisons (Mohammed, 
2009). In such cases troublemakers used to be exiled from their areas to live in 
other areas beyond the boundaries of the tribe’s homeland and allowed to 
come back only after spending certain period of time, which extended to years 
(KI/15: 8/6/10).  Customary law in Darfur therefore fits the common African 
pattern of being a changing set of codes which operated differently at different 
times and settings-both without the interference of the colonial state and also 
with incorporating aspects that came from that era (see literature review 
section in chapter 2) 
 
 Similar to the situation of customary law, this study has not found in the 
ITRCs’ archive or the available literature about the ITRCs any formal or 
concrete document stating principles for the ITRCs, even though it is clear that 
this was originally an innovation that occurred under colonial rule, with direct 
government support. However, there were general guidelines that ITRCs were 
expected to follow, which resemble- in many ways- those of the judiyya, which 
is perhaps why they have entered the folk-memory of many Darfurians as 
being ‘traditional’. Such general principles were often embodied in the speech 
of the tribal representatives (TRSD, 2003-08: vol.1, 6, v: 1-5 & vii: 2), 
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government officials (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, iii: 54) and the mediators 
(TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1, 6, iv: 2). Further to that informants also reinforced this 
information (KI/1:3/6/10; KI/9: 6/6/10; KI/11: 6/6/10; KI/17: 8/6/10; KI/21: 
10/6/10; KI/25: 13/6/10). Accordingly, the informants claimed that the guiding 
principles of the ITRC were exactly the same as for the judiyya. The only 
exception was that unlike the judiyya, the government served as guarantor for 
the implementation of the outcome of the ITRCs and an implementation 
mechanism was to be established or endorsed by the authorities to follow up 
on the agreement implementation process.  
 
In this regard, some of the informants (KI/1: 3/6/10; KI/9: 6/6/10; KI/10: 6/6/10; 
KI/11: 6/6/10; KI/17: 8/6/10) referred to mediators, tribes’ representatives, the 
proceedings of the meetings, and conclusion of agreements which were 
customary law related.  Conventions and cultural values claimed to be 
remarkably influential in the two types of indigenous methods (judiyya and 
ITRC). However in practice the guidelines of ITRCs that were agreed to, 
expected to be followed and abided by-as generally referred to in these 
documents- were always similar to those of judiyya (see Principles of judiyya 
section in chapter 6). However, there were no written rules or law to prevent 
deviations from occurring. For example, in contrast to the claim that ITRCs 
worked “under a minimal level of political interference from the government” 
the records show an increasing level of government political intervention has 
occurred, as is explained below. Consequently, this study is restricted to 
analysing these general guidelines which have been implicitly reflected in the 
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written available documents of the ITRCs. The key documents concerned are 
the TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1 & 2, which were compiled by the office of the Wali’s 
advisor for Reconciliation and Tribal Affairs in South Darfur. These reports 
stand as the official archive of these meetings, and were held at the same 
office. Though other sources were referred to, the rest of this chapter relies 
mainly on these official sources and the informants for data. The statements 
and references have been translated from the Arabic by the author. 
Also, ITRCs are generally thought to tackle the major tribal incidents rather 
than minor disputes among sub tribes or individuals. In contrast to this claim, 
ITRC reports show at least three events where the dispute was between sub 
tribes and even between a tribe and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but were 
addressed through ITRC such as the Tarjam/Tarjam, Shattiya/ Umahmed, and 
Etifat/SAF conferences (see table 3 in chapter 5). In this regard the ITRCs 
became more like judiyya in a sense that the judiyya took different forms and 
involved various aspects of social structures and a wide range of people and 
issues. People involved could be individuals, family, extended family, clan, sub 
tribe and tribes and issues were socio-economic and political, but within tribe’s 
domain. In terms of procedures and principles, ITRC was similar to judiyya; 
both did not have standard criteria; they used to rely heavily on the 
competencies of the mediators, and trust amongst the parties to the conflict or 
their leaders. 
 Initiative, Mediators and Mediation Process 
“In most cases the neighbouring tribes started the initiative. Such efforts first 
started by formation of a committee called “Lajnat al-masa’i al-hameeda” 
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(Goodwill Committee), which consists of group of elders and tribal leaders who 
volunteered to mitigate the conflict. The aim of this committee was to assure 
the cessation of fighting and the complete separation between the two parties 
to the conflict” (KI/15: 8/6/10). 
After an agreement between the parties to the conflict was reached in this 
regard, the government had to be approached to facilitate the process towards 
a concrete reconciliation initiative. In response to the issue of who used to take 
the initiative for reconciliatory meetings, another informant provided that: 
“Sometimes the initiative might come from either of the parties to the conflict 
themselves. For example; Al-sunta conference between the Habaniyya and 
the Rezeigat tribes (5/8/06) started by an initiative from the Rezeigat’s [tribal] 
administration. The Nazir of the Rezeigat paid visit to the Nazir of the 
Habaniyya requesting for reconciliation. The Habaniyya tribe responded 
positively and visited the Rezeigat in return. They agreed to sit together for 
reconciliation in Al-sunta area in Habaniyya homeland. When the government 
heard about the initiative, they have sponsored it. The Wali made an executive 
decree that a conference had to take place in Al-sunta on the 5th of August, 
2006 under the auspices of the Wali’s Advisor for Reconciliation and Tribal 
Affairs (WARTA)” (KI/9: 6/6/10).  
A third key informant in this regard provided the following: 
 “The selection of the mediators and tribes’ representatives in the ITRCs was 
somehow dictated by the government. The Wali (The Governor) has a standby 
committee, called ‘the al-shartai’s committee’. The role of this committee was 
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to mediate conflict/dispute when erupted. However this committee intervened 
only after the conflict had reached the peak and a war had already taken 
place” (KI/2: 3/6/10).  
Another key informant made further explanation by adding that: 
 “The Wali [the Governor] in consultation with al-shartai [the Wali’s advisor] 
used to select the ajaweed (mediators). After that he asked al-shartai to show 
the list of the names of the selected mediators to the parties to the conflict to 
get their approval. The parties involved usually have the right to reject all the 
list or part of it. After the list was approved, the names of the mediators were 
announced on the radio and the television. Also official letters of invitation 
used to be sent to the mediators so as to come and take the oath” (KI/17: 
6/6/10).   
 
With regard to initiatives, it should be noted that in many of these ITRCs 
documents, efforts made by different people -tribes or individuals- have been 
mentioned and acknowledged (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 2, 10,iv:1-2; TRSD, 2003-
08: Vol.1,8,ii:4; TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 2,1,iii:1-3). However the process of 
mediators’ selection was not clearly elaborated in these documents. 
 
The key informants all separately identified three varied scenarios with regard 
to the initiatives to conduct an ITRC. One scenario was where neighbouring 
tribes started the process. The second scenario was where one of the parties 
took the initiative towards sitting down for peaceful negotiations. The third 
scenario was where the authorities pro-actively called together the parties to sit 
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together to resolve their differences peacefully. ITRC documents showed that 
the three scenarios all took place. In the last two decades, however these 
documents reflected that in most of the cases, it was the authorities who took 
the initiative.  Even in the cases where the initiative came from a party other 
than the government, the authorities immediately grabbed the initiative, 
adopted it and took over (KI/9:6/6/10, TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 3, ii: 1-2, vol. 2, 
2, ii: 1-2). This was also evident in the fact that the government of South Darfur 
had already created a bureaucratic permanent body to be responsible for the 
conduct and follow-up on what they came to call “Al-musalahat al-gabaliya” 
(tribal reconciliations). This was called “Mustashar al-wali lil musalahat wa 
alshu’oon al-gabaliya” (the Wali’s Advisor for Reconciliation and Tribal Affairs 
(WARTA) together with what came to be known as “sandog daam al-
musalahat” (a Reconciliations’ Support Fund -RSF) which were established in 
2003 (Takana, 2007:76).  
 
Another lower level office was also established in 2006 which came to be 
known as “al-maktab al-tanfeezi lil idara al-ahliya” (Native Administration 
Executive Office -NAEO); as indicated by one of the founders, this office was 
established with a main objective to assist in resolving tribal conflicts (KI/11: 
6/6/10). WARTA and NAEO were referred to by most of the respondents 
(KI/1/2: 3/6/10; KI/3/5: 4/6/10; KI/6/7: 5/6/10; KI/9/11: 6/6/10; KI/12/13/14: 
7/6/10; KI/15/16/17: 8/6/10; KI/21/22: 10/6/10) as the bodies where the names 
of the mediators were came to be listed and sorted out. Perhaps this was why 
some of the informants pointed out that the selection of the mediators and 
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tribes’ representatives was somehow dictated by the authorities through these 
two bodies, which contrasted with judiyya procedures as is explained below. 
The same informants called attention to the fact that WARTA assumed the 
chairmanship of the mediators in the ITRCs with the head of the RSF as 
reporter. The role of the reporter was to take the minutes of the meetings and 
to supervise the secretariat of the conference to make sure that all the facilities 
for the conference were made available and that the documentation for the 
conference was also taken care of. This format was certainly indicated in the 
ITRCs’ documents, as reflected in table 6 below. In relation to the above 
mentioned bodies, informants argued that these new institutions (WARTA, 
NAEO, and RSF) started to play coordination roles with regard to the ITRCs, 
however they denied that the government imposed their agenda with regard to 
the initiative and the selection of the ITRCs’ mediators (KI/1:3/6/110; KI9/11: 
6/6/10; KI/17:8/6/10).  
 
The above stated procedures of the ITRC were quite different from that of the 
judiyya. In judiyya there were neither bureaucratic institutions nor direct or 
indirect involvement of government officials in the selection of the mediators 
and the whole process. The “Goodwill Committee” used to take a coordination 
role with regard to the selection of the mediators (KI/15: 8/6/10). This 
committee proposed names, submitted them to the parties to the conflict, and 
the latter decided on them. They proposed alternative names for those 
rejected by either side or by both sides and the process continued till all parties 
were satisfied (KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/17: 6/6/10). Another point where judiyya 
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differed from ITRC was that in judiyya meetings there was no room for a 
government official in his full capacity to chair the meeting or to serve as a 
reporter. My observation was that judiyya from the starting point up to the end 
entailed no direct government involvement whereas; by contrast, ITRC mostly 
depended on government support. However in the last two decades the 
situations have changed and it seems unlikely to apply judiyya criteria in 
mediating current tribal conflicts, as explained below by the informants. 
 
It is noteworthy that  all the key informants, separately interviewed by this 
study, agreed that whether the initiative was made by the government or other 
parties, currently (refers to the situation in Darfur up to 2009/10) the role of the 
government in supporting the process remained crucial for the following 
reasons: 
1. To provide security and protection in a situation where tribes used 
heavy weapons in their fighting and presented a problem much greater 
than the ability of the NA to control.  
2. To provide logistical support for the mediators and participants. 
3. To serve as guarantor for the implementation of any agreement 
reached. 
Based on the interview discussions with the informants together with the 
information in the ITRC documents, it was evident that WARTA in 
coordination with NAEO was directly involved in selecting ITRCs mediators. 
Both sources indicated that the process of mediator selection was as 
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follows: WARTA consulted the Wali to get his approval to start the process 
(KI/11: 6/6/10). Following a green light, WARTA became involved in 
coordination with NAEO, which was assumed to be closer to the tribal 
leaders, to gauge views on the proposed mediators in terms of their 
suitability to do the job and their acceptability amongst the parties involved 
(KI/1: 3/6/10). Following this step, NAEO made submission of initial list to 
the WARTA (KI/11: 6/6/10). WARTA from their side submitted the list they 
had received to the Wali (KI/17: 8/6/10). Following the initial approval by 
the Wali, the list sent to the parties to the conflict through WARTA again to 
seek their consent (KI/1: 3/6/10; KI/11: 6/6/10). Whether fully agreed or 
amended the final list ought to be sent back to the Wali’s office for 
endorsement (KI/17: 8/6/10), as was clearly indicated in the ITRCs’ 
documents.  
Most of the ITRC documents showed a list of mediators endorsed by an 
executive decree issued by the wali’s office (see Table 6 below). This table 
shows, at least twenty one of the investigated ITRCs in south Darfur have 
referred to such decrees with copies of the decrees attached (as the 
documents seemed not to be well organized, it was possible that additional 
decrees were issued but omitted from the record) . The decree was signed 
by the Wali himself identifying the names of the mediators, their Terms of 
Reference, name of the chairperson, deputy chairperson, reporter and 
other members in the mediation team. Moreover, the same decree 
established a committee to work as supporting staff for the mediators 
(sometimes referred to as steering committee and their members mainly 
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selected from the Ministry of Local Governance); specific names and Terms 
of Reference for this committee were also included in the decree as well 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 2, 4, ii:1-2; Vol.1,8,ii:1-2). The supporting staff served 
as secretariat for the conference; doing paper work started by sending 
invitations to the participants, preparing the conference room and 
stationery, providing logistic support, accommodation, and refreshments for 
the participants. In most of these conferences, at least from 2003 onwards, 
the chairperson of the mediators was appointed by the Wali at the state 
level or by the Commissioner at the locality level.  Again table 6 below 
shows WARTA, RSF and politicians from the ruling party; National 
Congress Party (NCP) took the responsibility of the chairmanship of the 
mediators in relation to ITRCs.  
  
272 
  
Table 6: ITRCs in which mediators and chairpersons were endorsed by the Wali (governor) of South Darfur State 
No. Tribes involved Place Date Chairperson for the mediators Title 
1 Birgid vs. 
Zaghawa 
Nyala 2006 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
2 Zaghawa vs. 
Zaghawa-
umkamalti 
Marla 2007 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
3 Birgid vs. 
Rezeigat 
Sillai’a 2007 Ibrahim Adam Mahmood Alrihaid Member of NCP and 
State Legislative 
Council  
4 Birgid and Daju 
vs. Arab camel 
herders 
Juruf 2006 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
5 Falata vs. Gimir Nyala 2008 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
6 Maaliya vs. 
Rezeigat 
Nyala 2004 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
7 Falata vs. 
Habaniyya 
Nyala 2006 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
8 Daju, Fur and 
Zaghawa vs. 
Tarjam, Huttiya 
and Taalba 
Nyala 2005 Fadul Mukhtar Ibrahim Member of State 
Legislative Council. 
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9 Falata, 
Habaniyya, 
Mahadi and 
Rezeigat vs. 
Massalit 
Ditto 2006 Ibrahim Adam Mahmood Alrihaid Member of the State 
Legislative Council 
10 Idd al-
Fursan(Banihalb
a) vs. 
Nyala(Fur) 
Nyala 2006 Musa Jalis Nazir of Birgid tribe 
11 Tribes North of 
Nyala(Fur and 
Birgid vs. Saada 
and Rezeigat 
camel herders) 
Mershing 2007 Osman Al-tom Adam Head of RSF 
12  Banga vs. Kara Al-Radoam 2006 Abaker kamoon Member of NCP  
13 Tarjam vs. 
Tarjam 
Bulbul- 
Abujazu 
2006 Abdullah Abusakeen Member of NCP  
14 Habaniyya vs. 
Salamat 
Buram 2007 Mohammed Sati Member of NCP  
15 Fur and Kinana 
vs. Zaghawa-
Umkamalti 
Nyala 2006 Abdelrahman Ahmed Abdelrahman Member of NCP  
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16 Etifat tribe vs. 
Sudan Armed 
Forces(SAF) 
Nyala 2006 Musa Mohammed Ali Madibo Member of NCP and 
Nomads’ Commissioner  
17 Birgid and Daju 
vs. Miseirriya 
Nyala 2004 Osman Al-tom Adam Head of RSF 
18 Fur vs. Al-
Malam tribes 
Nyala 2004 Yosif Dawalbeit Abdelgadeem Member of NCP  
19 Habaniyya vs. 
Salamat 
Nyala 2009 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
20 Gimir vs. Gimir Nyala 2009 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
21 Habaniyya vs. 
Rezeigat 
Alfardos 2008 Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed WARTA 
Source: I have developed this table for the purpose of this study, and the source of the information is: TRSD, 2003-2008, Vol. 
1 & 2.  
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Representation and participation 
The tribes’ representatives in ITRCs were usually selected by the top leader of 
the tribe in consultation with the omdas, however practice in the last two 
decades (1989-2009) indicated that this process took place in consultation with  
tribe Shura (consultation) Council (KI/9: 6/610, KI/25:13/6/10). The tribe Shura 
council is a tribal institution body that was established in early 1980s on 
initiative of Darfurian educated elites (KI/9: 6/6/10) to work as a consultation 
body for the tribes. The top tribal leader and all the omdas were members of 
this body. Furthermore, it included some educated tribe members from the 
urban centres, especially the capital Khartoum. In most cases it was chaired by 
one of the educated members of the tribe, not necessarily from the staff of the 
NA.  
In  relation to representation and participation, informants (KI/1: 3/6/10; 
KI/6/8:5/6/10; KI/9: 6/6/10; KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/21:10/6/10; KI/24/25: 13/6/10) who 
have been involved in ITRCs, as tribal representatives and mediators, for  
thirty-forty years and more, reported that  the following  criteria were the most 
important in this regard: 
1. The delegation was reflecting a wide range of representation within the 
tribe. 
2. Participation of the omdas was given special importance, as they 
represented different sub tribes. 
3. Representation of the group who were directly affected by the conflict was 
to be given special consideration, including representation for the direct 
relatives of victims. 
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4. Negotiation skills and knowledge in customary law.  
5. Experience in previous similar conferences or judiyya. 
6. The delegation ought to include representatives from the educated people 
who lived among the community, aware of the events and 
developments in the area (mostly school teachers). These were the 
people who write letters and prepare speeches presented at the 
conference on behalf of the tribe. This group also used to prepare 
documents to support claims and grievances raised by their tribe. 
7. The NA’s clerk was by virtue a member in the delegation, an office which 
was responsible of documents and documentation within the concerned 
tribal NA. 
8. Tribal delegations, in most cases, were headed by the deputy leader of the 
tribe or an old experienced omda. 
 
Proceeding of the meetings 
Judging from the ITRCs’ documents and the deliberations made by some 
respondents (KI/1:3/6/10; KI/4:4/6/10; KI/9&11:6/6/10; KI/15&17:8/6/10; 
KI/21:10/6/10), the meetings were usually divided into phases and each phase 
was divided into sessions with a specific purpose, even though this was not 
always clearly indicated in the documents and there was no confirmation from 
the informants that this was always the case. This was also different from the 
judiyya process. Judiyya has not been confined to a fixed schedule of 
sessions; a session could continue for hours or even days (KI/24:13/6/10). The 
  
277 
  
duration of the meetings was dependent on the nature of the dispute and the 
issues addressed. Family related disputes were usually settled in one session. 
. If the dispute was a complex one (say between two tribes), sometimes the 
judiyya took a whole day or many days, but without a concrete fixed schedule 
of date, time or sessions. 
Phase one of an ITRC included opening and hearing sessions. The former 
was devoted to speeches by the chairperson of the meeting representing the 
mediators, government representative, and representatives of the parties to 
the conflict. Meanwhile, the latter was usually allocated for written submissions 
of parties’ positions with regard to their claims and grievances. Conference 
started with an opening session in which a government official made an 
opening speech. Often the government representative in this session was the 
Wali or a minister who could have addressed the conference on behalf of the 
Wali. Sometimes the government representative was a higher rank official from 
the central government- a federal minster or representative of the president - 
depending on the importance of the case from the government viewpoint, as 
will be explained later. In his speech, the government’s representative advised 
and encouraged the parties to negotiate in good faith in order to settle the 
conflict. Also he (I noted that the concerned ITRCs’ documents have never 
referred to a female government official assigned such responsibility) made 
commitments to adopt and implement decisions and recommendations made 
by the conference.  Representatives from the parties to the conflict (in most 
cases the head of each delegation) then addressed the conference.  They 
focused on expressing their claims and grievances, giving historical 
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background of their presence in the area and previous relations with the other 
party (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, vii: 1). Representatives of parties to the 
conflict usually ended their speeches by indicating their willingness and 
readiness to negotiate in good faith with the aim of reaching genuine 
reconciliation that would make the conference successful. Some of them used 
that moment to make demands, for example insisting that new things should 
be added to the agenda (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, v: 1-7). Also, the 
conference was addressed by the chairperson of the mediators expressing the 
impartiality of the mediators and called on both parties to cooperate with the 
mediators in a good faith. He usually explained the guidance and rules (though 
rarely detailed in the ITRCs documents) that were supposed to govern the 
conference (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol. 2, 8, ii: 3). In this regard the mediators took 
the oath before making further steps and calling for the representatives of the 
parties to the conflict to submit to them a signed written commitment that 
accepted the mediators as arbitrators to the concerned dispute. This entailed 
that in the event that the parties failed to reach a consensus they committed 
themselves to the final compromise to be made by the mediators/ arbitrators 
(TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol. 2, 8, ii: 3), and this session usually ended with break. 
The Second session was a hearing session, in which only one party to the 
conflict was listened to, while everyone was still present but no comment 
allowed to be made. Some informants argued that up to 1980s and early 
1990s this was not the case, as instead both parties to the conflict were invited 
in one session to present their cases. During that time presentations were 
made verbally with the right of each part to make comment on the submission 
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made by their opponent; sometimes the parties to the conflict exchanged 
accusation in a very tough manner (KI/9:6/6/10; KI/12:7/6/10; KI/15:8/6/10). In 
this session the invited party was expected to submit a written document, 
which was presented to the conference to point out the following (TRSD, 2003-
08: Vol.1, 6, v: 1-7&vii: 1-4; TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1, 7, IV: 1-9 & vii: 1-5): 
1. Their claim and complaint against the other party. 
2. Human and property losses and damages with proof such as 
documentation by police (summons).  
3. Any other grievances. 
The letter was usually presented by a representative from the tribe’s 
delegation. However, the members of the same delegation were to be given 
chance to add or clarify issues. The third session used to be devoted to 
listening to the other party to the conflict to do the same as explained above in 
the Second Session. 
 
 In the second phase, following all parties to the conflict having been heard, 
the mediators suspended the sessions for one to two days to study the claims, 
complaints and grievances made by each party, as well as the supportive 
documents submitted by each party. At this stage, based on the issues of 
dispute, the mediators usually divided into subcommittees; for example, 1/ 
Human and property losses committee, 2/ Land and boundaries committee 
(land-related issues). 
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In the third phase, having studied the claims and grievances officially 
presented by both parties, the mediators resumed the sessions by calling back 
the two parties separately to show them a summary of their presentations and 
to have a thorough discussion of all issues presented (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 
6, vii: 1-4; TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, viii: 1-7).  This intended to ensure that the 
mediators understood the issues to the satisfaction of the parties. This phase 
started by the fourth session. In this session the mediators invited one party to 
provide them with summary of their case. The mediators discussed the 
summary with the delegation to see to what extent it has reflected the issues 
and concerns raised by their tribe. The summary might lead to amendment or 
exclusion of some issues or points raised by the original presentation. The 
mediators continued discussion with the party concerned until they reached an 
agreement on all issues related to the summary of their case. The fifth session 
was devoted to discussion with another party to the conflict; to do the same as 
explained above in the fourth session. 
In phase four parties exchanged a case summary. At this stage and in one 
session, the mediators called on the heads of delegations and exchange the 
agreed summary of the cases. They gave each party a copy of the case 
summary of the other party. Each party took his time to discuss the other 
party’s viewpoint as summarized and agreed between them and the mediators. 
The time frame was usually proposed by the mediators and agreed by parties 
to the conflict however both parties were to be given sufficient time to study 
these summaries and make their comments. 
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Phase five was related to reply and submission of proposals. At this stage 
sessions held in the presence of all parties to the conflict to listen to the reply 
and comments made by each party with regard to other party’s claims. Also 
during these sessions the parties requested to submit their proposals for 
solutions; if everything went well a final closing session was to be held, in 
which the final outcome of the conference was to be presented by the 
mediators, signed by the parties to the conflict and the witnesses. The latter 
was commonly represented by the chairman of the conference and a 
government official. In this session the parties listened to one another 
comment on the submissions they had exchanged earlier. Also the parties 
were expected to provide their proposals for conflict resolution and 
reconciliation based on their own viewpoint. In most cases significant 
differences emerged with regard to claims and the proposed solutions made 
by parties to the conflict. If the two parties failed to narrow their differences 
(which often happened), normally subcommittees formed by the mediators 
(which ought to be fully authorised to decide on behalf of the delegation as a 
whole) from the parties to carry on further discussions on the issues of 
disagreement together with the mediators until they reached common 
understanding, as will be explained further in relation to agreements on the 
temporary closure of livestock migration routes. 
Following the subcommittees reaching agreement on the issues of differences, 
another session took place which was supposed to be devoted for proposed 
solutions and outcome. All proposed solutions, suggestions and 
recommendations were to be summarised by the mediators in one document. 
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This document was to be presented in this session in the presence of both 
parties to the conflict. When agreed by the two parties, it named decisions and 
recommendations made by the conference. Such a document was regularly 
structured as follows (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 1 & 2): 
1. The impacts of the conflict( file a/decisions): 
-Human losses. 
-Injuries, partial disability and permanent disability. 
- Property losses; huts and shops burnt or looted as well as 
damages on farms and crops, looted animals and money. 
2. Recommendations, mostly related to triggering factors as reflected by the 
parties and identified by the mediators (file b/recommendations). 
3.  End of conference declaration: This included brief account on the efforts 
exerted by different groups, organizations, and individuals to convince 
the two groups to sit together, thanks to those who have been involved 
in such efforts. This also included the conference secretariat, tribal and 
community leaders, politicians, government officials, mediators-
especially the chairman-, the representatives of the parties to the 
conflict and their   leaders. Also the statement represented an official 
announcement by the conference that it has successfully ended up with 
accomplishing an agreement agreed by the parties concerned (TRSD, 
2003-08:  Vol.1, 8, ii: 1). 
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Finally at the end of the conference there was the closing session. This 
session was similar to the opening session in a sense that all those who have 
addressed the opening session invited again to make closing speech they 
expressed and confirmed their satisfaction with the outcome of the conference. 
Decisions and recommendations of the conference were to be presented by 
the chairman of the mediators in the presence of both parties. This session 
was regularly attended by a government official to whom the mediators handed 
over the conference documents (mainly the decisions and recommendations). 
In some cases federal ministers, Ministers from foreign countries, 
representatives of regional and international organizations such as Arab 
League (AL), African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) were invited and 
attended such closing sessions, as will be explained below. 
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Stakeholders’ involvement and Political ambitions attributed to ITRCs 
 
With the exception of four cases, the documents suggest that parties involved 
in ITRCs in South Darfur were tribes belonging to variety of ethnicities; both of 
African and Arab origin. Tribes involved were belonging to South Darfur or 
Darfur region at large (only in two events were tribes involved from outside the 
region - a neighbouring region and a neighbouring country). The main interest 
of tribes belonging to the neighbouring regions inside Sudan was to maintain 
access to grazing lands and water sources. The main stakeholders other than 
tribes were the government, rebel groups and local politicians. 
Government involvement  
After 1989 government involvement, especially in the Darfur states, increased 
in the ITRCs; starting by initiative, selection of the mediators-as previously 
mentioned-and agenda setting, as will be explained later. This involvement 
seems to have been further encouraged by the first insurgency in Darfur in 
1991, whereby the government used tribal militias mainly recruited from tribes 
of Ar/o to suppress the rebels (Daly, 2007:261).  
 
The situation has been further aggravated by the eruption of a wide range of 
new rebel movements in the region in 2002/3, which were mostly dominated 
by tribes of an African origin. The government had provided weapons to some 
tribes, mostly of Arab origin, in order to launch counterattack on the rebel 
groups (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:52).  As has already been discussed in chapter 
4 and 5 of this study, most of these groups did not own recognized dars. 
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Therefore instead of focusing on fighting the rebels, they have used these 
arms also to settle local disputes, mostly over land, with other tribes. The large 
scale destruction caused by these groups has resulted in an increasing death 
toll and huge numbers of displaced persons and refugees (Takana, 2008:48).  
 
These actions have received a wide range of condemnation inside Sudan and 
worldwide. The government has been accused of fostering mobilization along 
ethnic and tribal lines (Collins, 2006:8). An alternative hypothesis was that 
internal and external pressures put on the government made them decided to 
adopt a strategy based on ITRCs to serve two different and potentially 
contradictory agendas. On the one hand they wanted to send dual messages 
to the inside and the outside world to say that they do care about their people, 
especially the tribes that fought one another. On the other hand they wanted to 
use the umbrella of the ITRCs to consolidate the alliance of the tribes that 
sided with them and to bring more tribes to their side to fight the rebel groups. 
As explained by one of the commentators “Many of the cases of ‘intertribal 
reconciliation’ in South Darfur are examples of how the government is 
organizing the native administration for military purposes” (Hagar, 2007:129). 
There was some evidence to support the above views in the detailed 
documents of the ITRCs conducted in South Darfur from 2003-2009. The 
following were very brief examples clearly indicated that there was a message 
to the outside world (see figure 13 below): 
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Figure 13: Examples of ITRCs used by the government for propaganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1&2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 1: 
On 12/12/ 2004 ITRC was held in Nyala. 
The gathering included Fur, Daju, and 
Zaghawa against tribes of an Arab origin 
which were Tarjam, Huttiya and Taalba. The 
closing session of this conference, which has 
witnessed intensive media coverage, was 
attended by the Wali of South Darfur, the 
Sudanese federal Minister of Defence, and 
the Norwegian Minister for International 
Cooperation; Hilde Jonson. The latter also 
addressed the gathering (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol. 2, 2, ii: 1-4).    
 
Example 2: 
In 2007 another conference was 
conducted for Tarjam and the Rezeigat 
camel herders (Aballa). This conference 
was attended by a representative of the 
President of the Sudan, the General 
Secretary of the Arab League, the UN 
Secretary General Special 
Representative in Sudan (TRSD, 2003-
08: Vol.1,4,ii:1-2).   
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Source: TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1 
 
It appears that there was an attempt to convince the Darfurians and 
International Community to support the strategy of the ITRCs. This was done 
through inviting UN, AU and AL representatives to attend ITRCs gatherings 
and made them listen to speeches seemed to be prepared in advance and 
delivered by government officials and tribal leaders. The presence of UN, AU 
and AL representatives was covered by government’s owned television and 
radio and portrayed by this media as if this presence is a support for the 
government strategy in Darfur. Such an attempt was clearly reflected in the 
ITRC carried out in December, 2006 in Nyala to mediate conflict amongst the 
Example 3: 
In December, 2006 ITRC was held in Nyala to mediate conflict amongst the 
Zaghawa, Miseirriya and the Birgid, which was attended by the Sudanese Minister 
of Justice. The front page of the conference’s recommendations included the 
following: “Our message to the world is that as Darfurians we are capable of 
resolving our problems through our reconciliation committees and according to our 
historical heritage. Furthermore we condemn the foreign intervention and the 
“Resolution 1706” which threaten the safety of Darfur and Sudan” (TRSD, 2003-
08: Vol.1, 6, ix: 1-2). 
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Zaghawa, Miseirriya and the Birgid. The front page of the conference’s 
recommendations included the following: 
 
“Our message to the world is that as Darfurians we are capable of resolving 
our problems through our reconciliation committees and according to our 
historical heritage. Furthermore we condemn the foreign intervention and the 
“Resolution 1706”6 which threaten the safety of Darfur and Sudan” (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1, 6, ix: 1-2). 
Among the recommendations made by the same conference was the 
following:  
“The conference appeals for the UN and the international community to 
advocate and support the reconciliations amongst tribes politically, socially, 
and financially as well as through media coverage” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, 
ix: 2).  
 
One could conclude that this was about presenting a different image to the 
international community from that portrayed via the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)7. 
                                                          
6
 This refers to UNSC resolution 1706 (31/8/2006), which proposed sending 
UN troops to Darfur, which was strongly rejected by the Sudanese government 
at that time (see: http://www.scribd.com/doc/15970244/UN-Security-Council-
Resolutions-on-Darfur-Sudan) 
 
7 According to the UNSC resolution 1593(31/3/2005), the Security Council of 
the United Nations decided to refer “the situation prevails in Darfur since 1 July 
2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court”. This resolution was 
strongly rejected by the Sudanese government and they launched huge 
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Involvement of rebel groups 
As previously mentioned, the rebel activities in Darfur surfaced at a time when 
ethnic polarization was at its peak. This was reflected in two of the biggest 
violent incidents to date, which were the Fur against Arab coalition in 1987/88 
in and around Jabal Mara, and the Massalit against another Arab coalition in 
and around Al-Geneina from mid 1990s onwards (Ateem, 2007:38; Tubiana, 
2007:70). The Zaghawa and Rezeigat camel herders (Aballa) conflict in the 
same period in North Darfur has made the already contested situation even 
worse (see chapter 5, Rebel groups’ section).  
The emergence of armed movements and more importantly with the 
domination of the above three biggest tribes of African origin in terms of 
leadership and support (Daly, 2007:278) has made the situation still worse. In 
this respect one could argue that three factors might have made the eruption 
of the rebellions have a negative influence on the relationship among tribes in 
Darfur. First, government campaigns described these movements as military 
wings for the above mentioned tribes and consequently used tribal militias 
(mostly from tribes of Ar/o) to launch counter attacks on the rebels. Secondly, 
some rebel leaders announced that their activities were of defensive nature 
                                                                                                                                                                        
campaign internally and externally to oppose it. Based on this resolution the 
ICC carried out an investigation on crimes against humanity including 
genocide allegations. The investigations led to indictment of some Sudanese 
officials including the President Omar Al-Bashir, for more information see 
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/15970244/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-
Darfur-Sudan). 
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and only were targeting the “Arab militias/janjaweed” (Flint, 2007:144).Thirdly, 
the rebels were divided along tribal lines. The latter issue has provided further 
fertile ground for the government to manipulate people in Darfur on a tribal 
basis, including the armed movements (Tubiana, 2007).  
More importantly such a situation has provided the government with a good 
opportunity to cement its alliance with some tribes of Ar/o and to seek the 
support of some tribes of Af/o in their war against rebel movements. A further 
point is that some rebel leaders have gained a negative impression of tribal 
leaders. They perceived most tribal leaders to be allies of the government, who 
did not care anymore about the common interest of their people (Flint, 
2007:143-144). This perception informed action undertaken by the rebels 
towards some tribal leaders in areas which came under their control, including 
execution or removal of some from their positions (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:49, 
Tubiana, 2007:72). This kind of behaviour has hampered indigenous 
mechanisms of conflict resolution from operating, as they largely depended on 
efforts exerted by tribal leaders.  
The following two examples from Sherriya and Marla areas perhaps explain 
how far the government/rebels struggle has negatively affected tribal 
relationships.  Sherriya and Marla were located north east and south east of 
Nyala respectively. 
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An Example from Sherriya 
Sherriya area was the homeland of the Birgid, which lies in the north east of 
Nyala the capital of South Darfur State and mainly inhabited by Birgid tribe, 
Miseirriya, Daju and Zaghawa. During 2003-2005, it was believed that Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), led by Abdulwahid Nour (Fur), was able 
to control about 90% of its land; including important towns such as Muhajiriya, 
Labado, Khor Abache and others with the government controlling its capital; 
Sherriya (UN report, 2005).  The Birgid tribe at first (during the period 2003-
2005) supported the SLM/A under the chairmanship of Abdul Wahid, and was 
perhaps behind the control of vast areas in Sherriya by the SLM/A.  It seemed 
that this was made possible because the Birgid were unhappy with the 
arrangements related to local government in their area; Sherriya.  Birgid 
claimed that since 1991 the key political and administrative positions went to 
the Zaghawa rather than allocated to personalities originally from Birgid 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, v: 2-3). Furthermore the Birgid explained that the 
reason why the government favoured the Zaghawa was due to their full 
support to the new regime took the power in 1989, as a result they not only 
occupied key political positions in Sherriya and other areas on behalf of the 
people of Sherriya, but the government appointed omdas for the Zaghawa 
within the Birgid’s homeland without consultation with the Birgid’s native 
administration (TRSD, 2003-08: vol.1, 6, v: 3).  
 
In November, 2005 the SLM/A split into two factions led by Abdulwahid Nour 
(Fur) and Arku Mini Minawi (Zaghawa) separately; these factions later on came 
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to be known as SLM -Abdulwahid and SLM –Minawi (Flint, 2007: 155-57). As a 
result the Sherriya area has become controlled by the faction dominated by the 
Zaghawa and led by Minawi. The Birgid and the Zaghawa fought over land at 
least twice between 1970s and 1990s (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1, 6, v: 1-3).  The 
Birgid began to fear that Zaghawa might use rebellion as cover to gain control 
over their land; as realistically expressed “the abusive behaviour of Minawi’s 
forces awakened old fears that the tribe had a hidden agenda- the creation of 
a greater Zaghawa State” (Flint, 2007: 158).  The government took this 
opportunity to manipulate the Birgid community and use them to weaken this 
faction by targeting the Zaghawa in the area (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, vii: 1-
4). The new arrangement, as asserted by the Zaghawa, was that the 
government have manipulated the Birgid and convinced them to fight the 
rebels on behalf, however they have targeted the Zaghawa instead (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1, 6, vii: 2-3). The Zaghawa claimed that reward was that a new 
Commissioner for Sherriya was appointed from the Birgid and his first decision 
was the dismissal of the omdas from the Zaghawa and the Zaghawa were 
denied from taking part in the Sherriya Locality Steering Committee (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1, 6, vii: 2). 
 The official report of the ITRC participated in by the Zaghawa and the Birgid in 
Nyala on 11-19/12/2006 showed how the government and rebels’ involvement 
affected negatively the relationship between the two tribes. Both parties 
expressed deep concerns about the negative consequences of the struggle 
between the government and the rebels on the civilians and the relations 
between the two tribes, as is explained below, the main points presented by 
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each party with regard to their grievances, the reasons behind the conflict and 
the political ambitions attributed to the above ITRC: 
A summary of the main points made by the Birgid tribe (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 
6, v: 1-7) were: 
1. The rebellions led by the Zaghawa have resulted in execution of Birgid‘s 
leaders and forced others to leave their dar in a predesigned plan to 
occupy the land and use it as a base to build what so called “Greater 
Zaghawa State” as provided in their maps and statements that have 
already been published in the newspapers. 
2. Based on the above points and in order to proceed in a negotiation with 
the Zaghawa, the following conditions were to be met first: 
i. Withdrawal of the military forces of the SLM/A (Minawi 
faction) from all areas belong to the Birgid tribe 
(Muhajiriya, Labado, Khor Abache, and Al-laloab). Rebel 
forces were to be replaced by government forces and 
police centres were to be reopened in the area. The 
security arrangements were to be implemented as agreed 
in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which had been 
signed in Abuja in 2006. 
ii. The Zaghawa were to admit the supremacy of the Birgid 
over their dar, including the right to exercise power in their 
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hakuras, towns and villages. The Zaghawa remained with 
no right except the right of ‘citizenship’. 
iii. Native administration was to be empowered and Birgid 
tribal administrators were to be allowed to go back to their 
areas to exercise their duties without any conditions or 
restrictions.  
iv. Government was to pay blood money (diyya) and 
compensation related to the previous reconciliation 
agreements between the Birgid and other tribes (cases of 
Hamada and Yaseen). 
v. Rehabilitation of the war affected areas in Birgid’s dar was 
to be accomplished. 
vi. Provision of necessary facilities to enable the return of the 
displaced persons to their areas and provide them with 
sufficient compensation was to be delivered. 
vii. Birgid Native administrators were to be allowed and 
enabled to select their participants to the negotiations from 
the areas where incidents took place. 
The last point means Birgid were seeking access to areas controlled by the 
rebels in their homeland. The Birgid’s position, as reflected in the above points, 
indicated clearly their main concern was land and it appeared to be that they 
were quite convinced that the Zaghawa were using rebel activities as a cover 
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to control over the land by force (which was typical of the propaganda 
publicised by the government). Also this shows that Birgid were closer to the 
government position, which called for withdrawal of the military forces of the 
SLM/A from the area and their forces were to be replaced by government 
armed forces and police. However, Birgid seemed to request a reward for 
taking this position by demanding that the government was expected to take 
the responsibility for providing them compensation and rehabilitation of their 
areas. The Zaghawa from their side (see the summary below) had a similar 
concern which was also land. However, they appeared to be supportive to the 
rebel groups (Mini Minawi faction). It seemed that they wanted to use the 
opportunity of the reconciliation process to legitimize the gains that they had 
achieved by force, especially by referring to “the rights of citizenship as 
stipulated in law and constitution” and that they were ready to collaborate with 
the government in regard to the implementation of the DPA. Though they 
appreciated the efforts exerted by the Wali of South Darfur state and his staff, 
in opposition to the Birgid they showed no confidence on the government. On 
the contrary, they held the government responsible for the outbreak and the 
instigation of the tribal conflicts. This explained why they suggested that a 
combined force from the AU, SLM/Minawi, and the government all together 
was to take the responsibility for security in the area, as is explained below. 
The Zaghawa tribe from their side raised the following main points (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1, 6, vii: 1-4): 
1. Zaghawa assured their support to the DPA. They intended to work 
together with the government and the SLM/A-Minawi- towards the 
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implementation of the agreement on the ground in order to eradicate all 
phenomena of chaos and insecurity in Sherriya area. The aim was to 
overcome tribal fighting and realize peace, security and development. 
2. The Zaghawa wanted to give assurance to the international audience 
that the people of Darfur were capable of resolving their problems, no 
matter how big they were, on their own. 
3. They appreciated the efforts exerted by the Wali, his government, and 
his Advisor (Mr Ibrahim Abdullah Mohammed-the chairman of the 
mediators), for their kind understanding of the problem in Sherriya and 
that they were working to resolve it. 
4. They assured that SLM/A-Minawi in collaboration with the government 
was leading political and social efforts in order to restore good ties 
amongst tribes in Sherriya locality. 
5. They gave assurance that the main reason behind this conflict was the 
competition over power between the government and the rebels. 
6. They asserted that the government strategy of political polarisation and 
mobilization along tribal lines to fight the rebel groups was responsible 
for the outbreak of tribal fighting amongst the tribes in Darfur. 
7. They proposed that a combined force from the SLM/A-Minawi, the 
government, and the African Union (AU) was to take responsibility for 
the security in the area. 
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8. The Zaghawa asserted that the concept of landownership and  hakura 
as interpreted by the Birgid tribe continued to be a problematic for the 
tribes which have migrated from north Darfur due to geographical and 
climatic transformation that took place in that area. Birgid did not accept 
that others have a right to live with them. The system of Native 
Administration needed to be re-established and based on clans and 
tribes, but not on the basis of hakura and dar.  Hakura and dar were 
only be maintained as historical nomenclature with no legal implications 
on the ground. When Omdas from the Zaghawa were appointed by the 
Commissioner, Birgid strongly opposed the decision on the grounds that 
it was against their wish and will. However, the decision adequately 
allows for the rights of citizenship as stipulated in law and constitution. 
The above summary of the positions of the two parties to the conflict; the 
Zaghawa and Birgid indicated that the key issues of contest were local power 
and NA and these issues were integrally interconnected with land. It also 
further pointed to the fact that the competition over power between the 
government and the rebels has made the situation even worse due to political 
manipulation and polarization of the tribes by these two competed parties. 
 
An example from Marla area 
Marla was located south east of Nyala. It was claimed to be the hakura for 
Zaghawa-Umkamalti within Daju’s dar (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, vii: 1-3).  It is 
mainly inhabited by Zaghawa-Umkamalti and Zaghawa. Sometimes in order to 
differentiate between the two tribes, which allegedly share the same historical 
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ethnic origin, the latter was referred to as ‘Zaghawa-Rattana’. During the 
Darfur wider conflict, Zaghawa-Umkamalti was alleged to be claiming Arab 
origin and sided with the government, whereby the Zaghawa-Rattana claimed 
to have sided with the rebel groups. As a result a parallel conflict has erupted 
between the two groups; Zaghawa and Zaghawa-Umkamalti. 
In this regard the Zaghawa have presented what they had described as clear 
evidence of government favouring the other group (the Zaghawa-Umkamalti) 
on the following points: (TRSD, 2003-08:  vol.1, 7, iii: 1-8).   
1. The government has supported the janjaweed militias, which killed the 
Zaghawa, burnt their huts, looted their properties and forced them to 
leave their land on the grounds that they were supporting the rebels. 
2. The police and security organs refused to protect or accept the reporting 
of alleged perpetrators whom they themselves had witnessed harassing 
people and looting their properties. 
3. The government has provided omdas of Zaghawa-Umkamalti with 
vehicles and security status while they refused to treat the omda of the 
Zaghawa in the same way. 
4. The Commissioner of Nyala locality (who belongs to Zaghawa-
Umkamalti) has prohibited the Zaghawa from participation in the 
membership of Nyala locality’s council, the membership of the Council 
of Belail administrative unit, and the membership of Peace Committees 
that were established at the local levels following the signing of Darfur 
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Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006. 
Accordingly, the Zaghawa stated the following demands (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1, 7, iii: 6-8):  
                1. The area and the surrounding roads were to be secured by joint 
force from SPLA/M-led by Minawi, the government of Sudan and the African 
Union (AU). 
             2.  Janjaweed militias were to be disarmed and rule of law was to be 
enforced. 
            3. The implementation of the DPA was to be fostered, especially with 
regard to the security arrangements. 
        4. IDPs were to be assisted, compensated, and guaranteed peaceful 
return to their land. 
On the other hand the Zaghawa-Umkamalti has a different perception as to 
why the conflict erupted between them and the Zaghawa (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1, 7, vii: 1-16). They claimed the following: 
1. The conflict started prior to the emergence of the rebel groups, and was 
mainly over the participation in the villages’ councils and committees. 
2. There were repeated incidents of armed robbery by the Zaghawa against 
members of Zaghawa-Umkamalti. 
3. When the rebels started their activities in the area, the Zaghawa welcomed 
them, encouraged  their sons to join them and provided them with 
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intelligence as they were speaking the same language (Zaghawa 
language), which Zaghawa-Umkamalti did not know. 
4. Rebels led by Zaghawa from the area treated Zaghawa-Umkamalti as 
government spies and labelled all members of Zaghawa-Umkamalti as 
janjaweed; as a result our leaders lost dignity and were humiliated. Thus, 
the Zaghawa-Umkamalti primary demand was that the area has to be 
secured by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the police. 
The case summary made by the Zaghawa and Zaghawa-Umkamalti again 
showed that issues of local power and land were central. Zaghawa-Umkamalti 
considered the hakura belongs to them, perceived Zaghawa as settlers and 
hence denied them power sharing. As assured by the Zaghawa-Umkamalti 
“the conflict started prior to the emergence of the rebel groups, and was mainly 
over the participation in the village councils and committees”. This probably 
explained why Zaghawa have supported rebels. It seemed that they were 
dissatisfied with the power sharing at the local level; exclusion from 
participation in village councils and that their omda did not receive equal 
treatment from the government as other omdas in the area. These were clearly 
issues of local governance related to local government and NA.  It seemed that 
the struggle over local power paved the way for the government and rebels to 
polarize the two tribes and further manipulate them for political and military 
purposes which led to the escalation of conflict between the two tribes. 
These two cases of Sherriya and Marla, served as an illustration of how tribal 
conflicts have been connected, and negatively affected by the 
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government/rebel struggle. Similar to the previous example of Sherriya and 
even worse (as the Zaghawa and Zaghawa-Umkamalti in Marla were sharing 
the same name and ethnic origin), it appeared that each group actually sided, 
or was perceived to have sided either with the government or the rebels. 
Though they differed with regard to the root causes of the conflict, both parties 
agreed that political manipulation and polarization was behind the escalation of 
the conflict between the two groups. The Zaghawa-Umkamalti has no 
confidence in the rebels, which explained why they had demanded that the 
area was to be secured by SAF and the government police (a similar 
statement was made by the Birgid in Sherriya). Meanwhile, the Zaghawa 
called for disarmament of the janjaweed militias and were to be replaced by a 
combined force from the AU, the SLM/Minawi faction and the government to 
provide security in the area (similar to the position taken by the Zaghawa in 
Sherriya). Competition over local power (participation in the village councils 
and committees) seemed to be the main issue of concern for both parties here 
again which was used by the government and the rebels as a point of 
intervention for further manipulation and polarization of the two groups. 
 
Key Issues addressed by the ITRCs 
 
As reflected in the ITRCs’ documents, factors contributed to tribal conflicts in 
South Darfur could be considered according to the following three groups: 
1. Proximate causes,  
2. Root causes  
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3. Triggering factors.  
The most influential approximate causes were identified as arms proliferation, 
eruption of the insurgency and the influence of the neighbouring countries. The 
root causes however, were summarized as three factors: competition over land 
(ownership of tribal homeland and demarcation of boundaries of these 
homelands), competition over pasture and water source and political 
manipulation of NA and local government. The third group of causes; the 
triggering factors, described the immediate reasons that made the situation 
escalate into violence. This included; dispute between individuals, animal 
thefts, competition over local power seats, armed robbery, damage of crops, 
and closure of livestock migration routes, allegations of land occupation, rape, 
and attack on specific groups-including killing, burning huts, rape and looting 
animals as well as properties. Attack on specific groups included all acts 
committed on the grounds of providing shelter and support either to the rebels 
or the government. Those who alleged to have been sympathized with the 
government were referred to as janjaweed and those supposed to have been 
sympathized with the rebels were referred to as turabora (a nickname locally 
used by groups of Arab origin in Darfur to refer to members of rebel groups).  
 
The proximate causes 
The proximate factors were those which make the environment conducive and 
suitable for the conflict to emerge. In south Darfur in particular, the small arms 
proliferation, eruption of the insurgency and rebel movements and the 
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influence of the neighbouring countries had prepared the ground for the tribal 
conflicts to grow. Below is a detailed account on the former two factors as an 
example. 
 
Eruption of the insurgency 
In the Kass conference between the Fur and some tribes of Arab origin in 
January 2003, the conference made two recommendations in relation to the 
issues of rebel movements’ influence which were (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1,1,iii:1-4): 
1) The conference recommended that both parties (Fur and Arabs) were to 
dissolve their military wings (the militias and the janjaweed respectively). 
2) In response to the claim made by the Fur that some Arabs migrated from 
Chad and occupied their land, the conference recommended that the 
authorities should directly intervene in Kargo area to fight criminals there 
and to investigate the identity of the inhabitants in the area. If non-
Sudanese were proved to exist in the area they were to be removed. Also 
physical presence of state authorities in Kargo Mountains was 
recommended in order to provide security and social services for the 
people. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of confidence in government security organs, as 
expressed by the Fur, and the lack of confidence between the parties to the 
conflict as identified by the mediators (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1, ii: 1-2), the 
expectation that the two parties may dissolve their militias on their own was 
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unrealistic. Also the Fur had made it clear that the government was part of the 
conflict by supporting the Arabs and providing them with weapons and 
logistics, and so it was not surprising that the same government could not be 
trusted to investigate and identify what the Fur described as Arab migrants and 
newcomers from Chad who took over their land by force, let alone to remove 
them from the land. These two recommendations needed a third party and a 
comprehensive mechanism in order to be implemented to the satisfaction of all 
parties, which did not happen. 
The failure of that conference was evident in April, 2003; only after three 
months, when the same parties came to sit for another conference to discuss 
the same issues. Among the points made by the Fur, and confirmed by the 
mediators in the outcome of the second conference, was that no progress has 
been made with regard to the implementation of the decisions and 
recommendations submitted by the first conference. The same and similar 
recommendations were submitted again, but the achievement of the two 
conferences remained non-existent. 
Another example was the ITRC between the Zaghawa, Birgid and the 
Miseirriya in Nyala, In December 2006, with regard to issues related to armed 
movements’ influence; the conference had made the following 
recommendations(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,6,ix:1-2): 
1. The conference made an appeal to all parties concerned in Sherriya 
locality (armed movements and tribes) to cease hostilities in order to 
pave the way for the implementation of the outcome of this conference. 
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2. The government was to organize and control the unauthorized arms. 
3. The conference recommended that the security arrangements as 
stipulated by the DPA were to be implemented no later than one month 
from the signing of the outcome of this conference. 
4. In relation to their contact with the citizens, the behaviour of the 
government security organs and the signatories to the DPA from the 
armed movements was to be controlled.  
The parties in the above mentioned conflict were three: the government, the 
rebels and the tribes. However, in the first point of the recommendations, the 
government has not been mentioned, which gave an impression that it has 
nothing to do with the cessation of hostilities. Contrary to such a conclusion, it 
was the government’s responsibility to assure cessation of fire and hostilities; 
as the DPA was signed by some of the armed movements and the government 
and not by tribes.  
More importantly, as reflected in the speech of the parties to the conflict, it was 
the struggle between the government and the rebels that provoked the current 
conflict amongst tribes in this area. Three months later in another conference 
between Zaghawa and Zaghawa-Umkamalti concluded in Nyala in March, 
2007, the recommendations number 2&3 above were repeated again but in a 
different expression which stated that; “the conference recommended the 
speeding up of the implementation of the DPA, especially the security 
arrangement part, and that armed militias were to be disarmed and any 
unauthorized arms were to be confiscated except for those who were part of 
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the DPA” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,7,xi:1-2). 
 In the former conference of December 2006 above, the recommendations 
indicated that “security arrangements were to be implemented no later than 
one month from the signing of the outcome of the conference”.  The outcome 
document of the conference concerned was produced and signed on 19th of 
December, 2006 which means by 19 January, 2007 security arrangements 
would have been already accomplished. However as late as March, 2007 
nothing had been achieved and the same recommendation came to be 
repeated again. 
In a conference between the Birgid and the Rezeigat in October, 2007, the 
issue of the armed movements was raised again “insecurity caused by the 
armed movements, especially by the SLM-Peace wing which was located in an 
area call “Kamal’s borehole” was to be controlled. The government was to 
push the armed movements to get out completely from areas of “Kamal’s 
borehole”, Kasib and Akoay” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 8, iii: 1-2). This meant 
seven months after the latter conference above, no security arrangements 
were made. In fact, after almost four years nothing has been achieved, as will 
be seen shortly.  
As the DPA implementation was lagging behind, the above mentioned 
decisions and recommendations were not implemented either. On 10/05/2010, 
WARTA made the following comment before the members of the 
Reconciliation Commission which was established sometime later following the 
signing of the DPA “The problem in Sherriya between Zaghawa and Birgid 
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remained pending. A reconciliation conference was carried out between the 
two tribes in 2006, and again in 2009. Now, the two parties have agreed to sit 
down again, however the renewal of confrontations in ‘Nigaiaa’ area, north of 
Sherriya, has hampered the movement of the mediators” (RC, 2010:5-7). He 
further explained that with regard to the conflict between Zaghawa and 
Zaghawa-Umkamalti in Marla area, the situation was very complex due to the 
repercussions of the struggle between the government and the rebels. The 
government and the rebels stopped fighting and reconciled, yet according to 
him, the two tribes of Zaghawa in Marla have not reconciled; “ the situation 
was very tense in a sense that every person from each party was carrying his 
weapon while going to his farm” ( RC, 2010:7). 
 
Arms proliferation 
Out of more than forty ITRCs investigated through archival evidence, only 
seven had addressed the issue of arms proliferation. Among these seven 
ITRCs, only two called for the confiscation of the ‘unlawful arms’ (Sherriya and 
Marla conferences). However recommendations related to these two 
conferences were made in connection to the DPA.  
In Darfur obtaining weapons through “lawful terms” was easy to the extent that 
the numbers of the weapons obtained and carried ‘legally’ from government 
sources were much greater than ‘unauthorized’ weapons. More importantly, 
the deliberations of the key informants interviewed by this study suggest that  it 
was ‘lawful arms’ that were responsible for the destruction in Darfur much 
more than unauthorized weapons. This was based on the exchanged 
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allegations amongst tribes (KI/7:6/6/2010) which indicated that government 
associated militias were much more involved in the tribal conflicts than ordinary 
tribesmen. By government associated militias they meant People’s Defence 
Forces (PDF) including People’s Police Forces, Border Guards Forces (BGF), 
Central Reserve Forces, and Mobile Police Forces (UN report, 2007). The 
recruitment for these forces used to take place locally in Darfur with some 
tribes representing the backbone of these bodies. For example the Rezeigat 
camel herders were accused of having dominated the BGF (KI/7: 5/6/10).  
The Rezeigat and Birgid conference in 2007 had addressed the issue of 
unlawful arms; however, this time the recommendation was not to call for 
confiscation, but advice for tribes not to use them against one another. It 
stated that; “The Rezeigat and the Birgid were advised to refrain from using 
arms against one another or carrying arms when they were in their farms or at 
the grazing areas or at water sources and markets” (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1,8,iii:1-2). 
In the Habaniyya and Falata conference in Buram town in April, 2006, the 
recommendation in this regard was as follows: “Without a good reason no 
public gathering with arms was to be allowed” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 5, ix: 1-
2). 
In the Safia conference in May 2006 which brought together the Fur, Rezeigat 
camel herders, Banihalba, and the Miseirriya Jabal tribes, among the decisions 
made by the conference was “arms were prohibited to be carried in markets 
and public places except for organized forces and the guards of Native 
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Administration”. The same conference recommended that “shooting in the 
open air during celebrations was prohibited; anyone not abiding by this 
recommendation was to be charged 200,000 Sudanese pounds-[about $66 at 
the time]” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 7, i: 1-3). 
Furthermore, the conference for border tribes in Sudan and CAR, in March, 
2005 stated that the two parties agreed on the following: “Both parties were to 
be committed not to carry weapons across the borders of the other country” 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 3, v: 1-3). 
However, in the Reconciliation conference between the two localities of Nyala 
(Fur) and Idd elfursan (Banihalba) in 2006, a recommendation in this regard  
stated: “Both parties were advised to stop ‘military manifestation’, cease 
hostility and work towards the reopening of markets, livestock migration routes 
and start exchange mutual interests” (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.2, 8, ii: 1-4).  
A remarkable observation in this regard was that with exception of the two 
recommendations made in relation to the DPA, it seemed that the rest of the 
ITRCs had tolerated the ‘unlawful’ possession of weapons. The concern was 
about their use but not their existence; ‘not to be used by tribes against one 
another and/or not to be carried in public places and not to be used in shooting 
during celebrations’. It appeared the explanation for these recommendations 
was that they came after repeated calls and appeals made in previous 
meetings (during late 1980s and 1990s) for the confiscation of these weapons 
but these had been ineffective. The most striking example was the Fur/Arab 
reconciliation conference in 1989 which “called for liquidation and disarmament 
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of all militias” (Daly, 2007:247).  As these recommendations have not been 
implemented; people perhaps became convinced that the government was not 
in a position to collect ‘unauthorized’ arms from individuals and groups. As 
suggested in chapter four this was because the government was not willing to 
do so and also because it became beyond the government capacity to do the 
job even had the willingness existed, as is explained below. 
 The unwillingness of the government to collect arms was evident in the fact 
that the government itself was the biggest provider of arms; they provided it to 
their allied tribes officially to enable them to fight rebels. The government of 
Sudan “ reaffirmed through their foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail in May 2008, 
that disarming the Janjawiid [janjaweed] is conditioned by the rebels laying 
down their weapons” ( Musa, 2011:172).  This means as long as the rebels 
were still active in the region, arms would have remained in the hands of the 
government’s allied tribal militias. Another reason might be the fact that these 
tribes and individuals who have been involved in fighting rebels were reluctant 
to give up their arms unless they felt safe and more importantly did get 
sufficient assurance for their safety in future, a requirement which seemed not 
likely to be fulfilled soon within the prevailing situation.  
Recommendations related to the rebel groups and their involvement in tribal 
conflicts could only present evidence to show the extent to which the 
government/ rebel struggle had adversely affected tribes’ relations. But there 
was no realistic proof to make someone argue that such recommendations 
might have assisted in mitigating or reducing such negative influences, as is 
further explained below. 
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One of the recommendations in the “Conference for Peaceful Co-existence, 
Crimes Control, Restoration of Social fabric and Security” held in Safia, South 
west of Nyala on 9/5/2006 was: “People ought to refrain from calling one 
another turabora or janjaweed” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 7, i: 1-3). This was not 
a typical ITRC; in a sense that no parties to the conflict were identified. As 
described on the front page of the outcome, the conference was attended by 
all tribes in the area; namely Rezeigat, Banihalba, Fur, and Miseirriya Jabal. 
About 200 persons attended the conference representing the NA, amirs, 
augada, and notable persons in the area. All these details together with the 
decisions and recommendations made by the conference were reflected in a 
letter addressed to the Wali of south Darfur state through the Commissioner of 
Nyala locality (TRSD, Vol.2,7,i:1). 
Another similar gathering included the tribes of Falata, Habaniyya, Mahadi, 
Rezeigat camel herders, and Massalit. It was held in Ditto, south of Nyala and 
no date was recorded, although it was probably 2006, as it mentioned the DPA 
which was signed in 2006. In relation to the rebels, the conference announced 
that all these tribes rejected the presence of armed movements in the areas of 
Gereida, Joghana, Alladoab, Doanki dirasa, Labado and Muhajiriya; “We 
appeal for the AU who pushed the SAF and the police out of these places and 
have taken over ‘authority’ in these areas, to push out the armed movements 
as well immediately” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 9, i: 1-4). A similar appeal was 
made in another similar gathering in Mershing, north of Nyala, which took 
place on 3/6/2007. Tribes attended this meeting were Fur, Saada, Birgid, and 
Rezeigat camel herders. No opponents were identified and the conference 
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was named “Peaceful Co-existence Conference for the tribes north of Nyala 
and the surrounding areas”. In this conference the tribes concerned also made 
an appeal to the government and rebel groups to respect their choice in 
leaving them to live peacefully. The Habaniyya/Falata conference in April, 
2006 has made an appeal to what they called “arms carriers” to sign the peace 
agreement (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 5, ix: 1-2). These calls and appeals then 
complemented the recommendations made in this regard by the Sherriya and 
Marla ITRCs, as discussed above, such as the need to speed up the 
implementation of the security arrangements in collaboration with the 
signatories from the armed movements as stipulated in the DPA etc.     
These recommendations were vague and idealistic; vague in a sense that 
most of the time the issue was addressed through making an appeal or calling 
upon the government and the rebels to stop their involvement without 
identification of specific responsibilities assigned to each part and without 
agreed mechanisms of implementation and schedules related to deadlines. 
 
 In the case of the DPA, modalities of implementation were set up with clear 
deadlines and with a third party to monitor and provide technical assistance, 
yet nothing much has been achieved. It seems unrealistic to expect that the 
rebels or the government can respond -on their own- to such appeals and 
recommendations made by the tribes. In two of the examples above, it was the 
government that called for others to push out rebels from certain areas, which 
they surely would have undertaken themselves had they been able to, rather 
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than calling on tribal leaders. In one case an appeal was made to the AU to 
make the rebels abide by their commitment. These kinds of recommendations 
and appeals only went to reinforce the view that the current tribal conflicts in 
Darfur were provoked by factors that were beyond the capacity of tribes 
themselves to address. 
 
The Root causes 
The root causes, as has already been identified, were related to three factors: 
competition over land (ownership of tribal homeland and demarcation of 
boundaries of these homelands), competition over natural resources (pasture 
and water sources) and political manipulation/polarization of NA and local 
government. 
Land dispute 
Land related disputes; competition over land ownership (hakura), boundaries 
of tribal homelands, and grazing lands seemed to have been the major 
underlying cause of conflict in Darfur in general and in South Darfur in 
particular where it counted for almost 90% of the conflicts (see table 2 and 
figure 11 in chapter 5). This competition over land has nothing to do with 
pressure on land linked to expansion of large scale commercial farms. Some 
proposals of agricultural projects were rejected by the locals on the basis that 
they refused to give up their land; the good example was Abufama and Wadi 
Salih projects in South and west Darfur respectively (Al-tiraifi, 1990:64-65). As 
tribes refused to cooperate in this regard such proposals did not materialize 
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and the ULA of 1970, as already mentioned in chapter 3, had not been 
implemented in relation to Darfur. Land dispute here was related to three 
interlinked aspects of land issues that this part of the study explains through 
several examples: firstly land ownership (dar/hakura), secondly land frontiers 
and border demarcation, and thirdly accessibility to natural resources (water 
sources and pasture).   
Based on their interests, tribes involved in conflicts within South Darfur were 
divided into two categories.  The first was those who own recognized 
homelands, whether sedentary or pastoralists, who wished to preserve the 
status quo. They insisted that historical rights over land must be honoured, in 
that those who owned homeland (dar) should continue to have supremacy 
over land and leadership in their areas. Their reference for adjudication was 
the customary law and the traditions adopted by the dominant tribe. This 
position has been expressed by these tribes and was documented in the 
letters of position submitted to ITRCs by these tribes, as has already been 
explained.  
Tribes in the second category, who did not own a recognized homeland, 
argued that land use ought to be based on the constitutional general rule of 
citizenship. Every tribe would have a right to have its own leadership in the 
place where they lived without permission from another tribe, and original 
settlers of the dar would not have the right to maintain special rights over land 
and leadership. The following examples could make it clearer. 
In the conference between Birgid, Miseirriya and the Zaghawa conducted in 
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Nyala on 19/12/2006, the Birgid agreed to proceed with the reconciliation only 
if the Zaghawa accepted these conditions: 
“The Zaghawa was to admit the supremacy of the Birgid over their dar, 
including the right to exercise power in their hakuras, towns and villages. The 
Zaghawa remained with no right except the right of citizenship” (TRSD, 2003-
08:  Vol.1, 6, v: 7-8), a thing which the Zaghawa strongly rejected on the 
ground that as Sudanese citizens their right to access and own land was 
preserved by law and constitution (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, vii: 1-4): A similar 
scenario was repeated in the conflict between Fur and Tarjam in 1991. Tarjam 
position was as follows:  
 “Fur tribe should recognize the Targum [Tarjam] as Sudanese citizens who 
were entitled to every right on these lands which belong only to God Almighty. 
The Fur ought to drop the claim that Targum [Tarjam] was to follow them and 
agree that Targum [Tarjam] would have a “Nazirate” independent 
administration of their own” (Morton, 2011:22).  
The third example was the conflict between the Maaliya and the Rezeigat, in 
1965 and again in 2002 and 2004, which was over land and independent 
“Nazirate”. The Rezeigat claimed historical right over land and further claimed 
that Maaliya did not own dar; and as a result they did not qualify for a separate 
independent “Nazirate” (Naeim, 1978:76).  The Maaliya, in return, claimed that 
they used to have their own dar (Naeim, 1978:76). This claim was confirmed 
by Morton, (2004) who indicated that the Maaliya did own dar and an 
independent separate “Nazirate” and that the British colonial administration 
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abolished their “Nazirate” and brought them under the Rezeigat (Morton, 
2004:7). 
Another type of dispute over land was related to the demarcation of tribal 
homeland boundaries. There has been an overlap between the demarcation of 
the boundaries of the newly created localities, especially during the last two 
decades, and the boundaries of the already existing historical tribal 
homelands. Policies adopted by the current regime in regard to administrative 
boundaries were described as “directed towards disintegration of the 
established bigger ethnic and tribal groups (especially non-Arabs). Tribal 
minorities which used to be part of the old tribal structures were separated in 
new native administration as a reward for their political allegiance” (Takana, 
2007:70). Nonetheless, in order to please bigger tribes which were not happy 
with such a policy, another arrangement was made. Most of the historical tribal 
homelands have been promoted to locality status with recognition of 
administrative borders that match tribal homelands’ boundaries. However, to 
cope with the policy of securing the political allegiance of minority tribes, 
further sub divisions (officially called administrative units) were created within 
each locality. Again this was a clear indication of to what extent NA and local 
government became merely an issue of political manipulation exercised by 
government to control over tribes and buy their allegiance. The result was 
further fuelling of tribal conflicts instead of managing or resolving them.  
This argument was reconfirmed by an informant who asserted that current 
tribal conflicts were to be understood in the light of the creation of new 
localities and administrative units (KI/17: 8/6/10). He added that about five 
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conflicts took place in the period 2006 to 2008 which were instigated by the 
demarcation of boundaries of localities and administrative units that have been 
established recently. These were Falata and Habaniyya disputes which was 
related to demarcation of boundaries between Tulus locality and Buram 
locality. Falata vs. Massalit was related to the demarcation of boundaries in 
Saadoon area, Gimir vs. Falata was connected to demarcation of the 
boundaries in Majabi area, Salamat vs. Habaniyya was connected to creation 
of new administrative unit in Alnadif area, and Abudarag vs. Habaniyya was 
related to creation of new administrative unit in Wadhajam area.  
In all of the above mentioned cases land was an issue. The Falata wanted 
control over the area south of Tulus-north of Gereida’s valley, which used to be 
part of Buram locality (KI/10:6/6/10, KI/15: 8/6/10). The Salamat were able to 
create their own administrative unit within Buram locality in Alnadif area 
(KI/17:8/6/10). The Rezeigat camel herders were able to get settled in 
Umdawanban and Rahad elsahab areas close to Gereida (KI/10:6/6/10, 
KI/17:8/6/10) . Abudarag tribe also gained their own administrative unit within 
Buram locality which was in Wadhajam (KI/17:8/6/10). Based on these 
elaborations made by the informants, it was quite obvious that the common 
agenda for the Falata, Salamat, Habaniyya, Massalit and the Rezeigat camel 
herders was land. Furthermore and in the same regard another informant 
made the following comment: 
 “The problem was that when a locality was proposed to be established, 
people’s first concern would have been the boundaries of that locality and 
whether it coped with boundaries of tribal homeland. The government usually 
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requested the inhabitants of the area to submit a draft for the proposed 
boundaries. For example the Saadoon area and its surrounding villages, which 
were areas of dispute between the Habaniyya and Falata, have been included 
in the proposals of Buram and Tulus localities that inhabited by the two tribes 
respectively” (KI/14: 7/6/10).  
In the ITRC between Falata and the Habaniyya in April 2006, the 
recommendation in this regard came as follows: “The concerned authorities 
will sort out the demarcation of the boundaries between the localities of Tulus 
and Buram” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 5, ix: 1-2).  This was because the 
government refused to allow the issue of land to be part of the agenda of the 
above concerned conference; thus following more than three conferences 
between the two tribes during the course of 2006-2009, the issue remained 
unresolved (KI/9: 6/6/10). 
In the instance of the conflict between Tarjam and Banihalba the demarcation 
of boundaries of the localities of Assalam (inhabited by Tarjam) and Idd 
elfursan (inhabited by Banihalba) was a fuelling factor. One of the informants 
(from Tarjam tribe) explained that: “Land was among the reasons behind our 
conflicts with the Banihalba and with the Rezeigat camel herders; namely the 
overlapping between the tribal homelands boundaries and the administrative 
boundaries of the localities” (KI/4:4/6/10).  
Another informant added that; “Our problem with the Rezeigat-Aballa [camel 
herders] was over land. They wanted to push the Tarjam out of their land by 
force in order to use it for settlement and grazing purposes. They have even 
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made a proposal to the government to annex the Tarjam to the Banihalba. In 
the ITRC in Nyala in 2008 between us (refers to Tarjam) and the Banihalba, 
we have agreed on the diyya, but the issue of the boundaries was transferred 
to specialized governmental committee to look at it on the ground that land 
boundaries were a sovereignty  issue that  was referring utterly to State” 
(KI/7:5/6/10). This example again confirmed government intervention in the 
agenda of the ITRCs. 
The ITRC in Sillai’a in 2007, between the Rezeigat who inhabited Eddein and 
Asalaya localities and Birgid, who reside in Sherriya locality, was another 
example of the overlap between the tribal homelands boundaries and the 
administrative boundaries. “This dispute was perceived as an administrative 
boundaries dispute between Yaseen area and Asalaya area. However, in 
reality it was a dispute over tribal homeland boundaries between the Birgid and 
the Rezeigat who inhabited the above mentioned two areas respectively” 
(KI/17:8/6/10). 
 The previous cases were but a few among many others, where demarcation 
of tribal homeland (dar/hakura) boundaries was the main issue. However none 
of the ITRCs covered was able to provide a clear resolution to any of these 
cases. The only recommendation which seemed that these conferences were 
able to make was to refer the land boundaries issues to what came to be 
called governmental specialized committees, which were supposed to be 
established by the government on its own. These committees were either 
never established or their recommendations were ignored (KI/14: 7/6/10). 
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Most of the participants in this study gave the same testimony in this regard. 
One participant (KI/17: 8/6/10) further claimed that; most of the time the 
government preferred to refer boundary disputes to special official committees. 
This was sometimes within the civil service bureaucracy such as the Livestock 
Migration Routes’ Committee. The informant added that this committee was a 
permanent body in the Nomads’ Commission, mandated to look into disputes 
between pastoralists and farmers with regard to access to grazing lands and 
water sources, and headed by the Secretary General of the above concerned 
Commission. He further explained that sometimes special committees were 
established by an executive decree made by the Wali to look into such issues. 
The same source continued: 
“It happened I was a member of a committee established by the Wali to look 
into the boundaries dispute between Idd elfursan locality (Banihalba) and 
Assalam locality (Tarjam). At the end of the mission, I came up with the 
conclusion that the prevailing understanding among the people at the 
grassroots was very clear that the administrative boundary of the localities was 
to cope with the tribal homeland boundaries. Unfortunately, the government at 
local, state, and central levels remained officially indecisive whether to accept 
tribal homelands as administrative units or to set up administrative units that do 
not necessarily match with old tribal homeland boundaries” (KI/17: 8/6/10). 
 Even though the government officially denied recognizing tribal homelands as 
official boundaries for the localities and administrative units, in reality the 
absolute majority of the localities and the administrative units divisions that 
have been established in the last two decades were divided along tribal lines 
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(see chapter 3, NA and local government section). This indicated that the 
colonial legacy with regard to demarcation of tribal homelands continued. 
However contrary to the colonial policy which used NA as an effective 
mechanism for pacification and maintaining stability, the NA and tribal leaders 
were exploited, especially in the last two decades, to serve opposite ends.  
The ITRC between the Rezeigat (Darfur) and the Miseirriya (Kordofan), which 
was described as one that was purely over grazing land and water source, was 
actually related to tribal homelands dispute and demarcation of boundaries. In 
this regard one of the recommendations of the ITRC held to mediate the 
dispute between the above two tribes in Al-Obeid (capital of north Kordofan 
State) in September, 2008 stated the following: 
“A proposal submitted by the two tribes with regard to the demarcation of the 
boundaries between South Darfur State (Rezeigat) and South Kordofan state 
(Miseirriya) was endorsed by the conference; accordingly a federal committee 
was agreed to be established in order to take care of this issue considering 
that five persons from each tribe were to be represented in the committee” 
(Rezeigat and Miseirriya conference, 2008:2). 
 
Competition over grazing land and water sources: 
In most cases, the root cause of the conflict might have shifted over time from 
pasture and water source to include demand for land, whether for permanent 
settlement or temporary. This was the case of Fur vs. some Arab tribes in Kass 
area and around Jabal Mara. Also, it was the case for the conflict between 
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Birgid and Fur in Mershing and Almalam areas respectively vs. Rezeigat camel 
herders. Another example is the conflict between the Rezeigat camel herders 
and the Birgid in the areas of Hamada, Adwa, and Juruf. In all these cases, the 
Rezeigat camel herders were looking for land to settle. As explained by one of 
the pastoralist “Arab nomads needed land so they could settle and send their 
children to school” (Tubiana, (2007:84) or at least to stay for a longer time than 
in the past when they used to move in their seasonal migration patterns. 
Further to this there was an allegation made by the Fur that some people were 
identified as coming from Chad who occupied land belonging to the Fur with 
the assistance of their relatives in Sudan (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1, iii: 1-4 and 
7, iv:1-8). 
 Nevertheless, the ITRCs continued to deal with these cases as a conflict 
between pastoralists, whose request was for accessibility to water and pasture, 
and farmers who denied them access to seasonal livestock migration routes. 
Let us put the above argument aside and assume that these conflicts were 
mainly caused by competition over water and pasture; as conceived by the 
ITRCs.  The following were some of the decisions recommendations made to 
resolve disputes amongst tribes in this regard. 
In ITRCs which were conducted in Kass in January and April, 2003 between 
Fur and some Arab tribes, the decision made in this respect stated the 
following: “The two parties (farmers and pastoralists) were to abide by the 
customary law that organizes land ownership and livestock migration routes. 
Those camel herders who migrated to these areas and remained without tribal 
administration were to be sent back to North Darfur in order to be reunited with 
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their tribal administration” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1,iii:1-4 and 7,iv:1-8 ). 
The above decision made a distinction between two groups of migrating Arab 
pastoralists; those who came accompanied by their tribal leaders and other 
groups who left their leaders behind in the north of the region. For the former 
group they were welcomed to stay in the Fur’s land, however the condition was 
they were to ‘abided by the customary law that organizes land ownership and 
livestock migration routes’. For the latter group ‘they were to be sent back to 
North Darfur’.  
The above mentioned condition was unrealistic and was not expected to be 
respected for the following reason: the customary law had identified specific 
seasonal livestock migration routes (locally known as Maraheel; plural of 
Murhal) for the pastoralists to follow with specified time for entry into cultivated 
areas and for the departure from those areas as well. Historically, in 1930s 
during the colonial period, camel and cattle herders recognized eleven Murhal 
going across the region from north to south (Takana, 2008:39). An official 
committee set up to investigate the conflict between the Fur and the Arabs in 
1988 reached the conclusion that due to environmental changes which related 
to drought and desertification that hit the northern part of the region in 1970s 
and again in 1980s, it had become very difficult for the northern Rezeigat to 
abide by their traditional routes (Takana, 2008:23) because of the fluctuations 
in rainfall. Bear in mind that these historical seasonal livestock migration routes 
were established in 1936 based on availability of water sources and grazing 
lands at the time (Young, 2005). However in spite of the huge demographic 
and environmental changes, these routes remained unchanged in terms of 
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length, width, direction, and time of access to pasture and water sources 
around cultivated land (entry and departure). 
It was also unrealistic to send back the second group of nomads. They were 
unwilling to go back and the Fur did not have the required power to remove 
them by force as they were more powerful in terms of weapons and logistics 
such as camels and vehicles. The government proved to be unwilling to force 
them to leave and these pastoralists were also their allies in fighting rebel 
groups; something that has already been explained earlier in chapter 3, 4 and 
5. In this situation the conference proved to be unrealistic by calling on the 
government to remove them. 
The ITRC between Taaisha, Falata, and Banihalba tribes (Sudan) on the one 
hand and the Kara, Ronga, and Gilla tribes (Central Africa Republic-CAR) on 
the other, which was held in 2005 in Umdafog, South Darfur,  was the only 
conference -among the forty four conferences this study covers- that  merely 
addressed disputes  over grazing land and water source. The 
recommendations made by this conference addressed four issues (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1, 7, IV: 1-8; Vol.2, 3, v: 1-3) related to the border trade, security, 
grazing and provision of services. With regard to the border trade, the 
conference had not directed any recommendation to the tribes involved and all 
the recommendations were addressed to the governments in the two 
countries. 
The second group of recommendations were related to security issues; from 
five recommendations announced by the conference only one directly 
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addressed the tribes concerned. It stated that individuals were prohibited from 
carrying weapons across the borders. The third group of recommendations 
included eight recommendations regarding grazing; however, only three 
recommendations addressed the concerned tribes; these were: 
1. According to an Act issued in 1960, camel herders were not allowed to 
move across the borders from Sudan into CAR. 
2. Pastoralists (cattle herders) were to abide by the livestock seasonal 
migration routes identified by CAR authorities. 
3. Every tribe was to appoint a recognized person as their representative 
when crossing the borders and this person was to be responsible before 
the authorities in the concerned country.  
The first two recommendations were clear indications that this conference was 
not an exception with regard to how ITRCs address issues of tribal disputes; 
by referring to arrangements that were almost out of date, such as calling 
tribes to abide by an Act that had been issued in 1960 or livestock migration 
routes that were set up in 1936 as previously explained, in practice meant 
these groups were left alone. The fourth set of recommendations was related 
to the provision of services for the pastoralists. This section included the 
digging of boreholes at the borders in Sudan and CAR, provision of education, 
health services, and construction of roads to link the two countries, which all 
remained merely false promises with no realistic possibility of being achieved 
in the near future. 
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Political manipulation and polarization 
The documentary and interview data under review here all suggested that 
political manipulation and polarization was one of the most important factors 
behind tribal conflicts in Darfur in general and South Darfur in particular, even 
though there was evidence in the documents that this issue had not been 
tackled. The only exception in this regard was the statement made by the 
Zaghawa in the ITRC between them and the Zaghawa-Umkamalti held in 
Nyala in 2007. In relation to the causes of the conflict, the Zaghawa mentioned 
the following (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, IV: 1-8): 
 
“The problem in Marla was not only an issue of tribal conflict amongst 
Zaghawa clans, it has a political dimension, whereby the government has 
become an integral part of the problem…The essence of the problem was a 
political one which related to the power struggle between the government and 
the opposition…The government was responsible for the conflict between us; 
through discrimination against us and polarization of our brothers Zaghawa-
Umkamalti. This polarization -on grounds of fighting the rebels- has led to the 
war between us and our brothers; Zaghawa-Umkamalti who have been used 
by the government as tools of war against their own brothers (the Zaghawa). 
Few of Zaghawa-Umkamalti have responded to this kind of political 
polarization for economic reasons while more others were driven by political 
reasons; looking for power” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,7,iv:1-8). 
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Against the above background, the Zaghawa made the following demands 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, IV: 6-8): 
1. Omdas of Zaghawa–Umkamalti were to be stopped from having the 
privilege of security status and special links with the authorities. 
2. Mr Mohammed Alaagib, Commissioner of Nyala, who belonged to 
Zaghawa-Umkamalti, was to be removed from office; because of his 
bias. 
3. A ‘rural court’ was to be established in Marla. According to the South 
Darfur State’s NA Act of 2005, this was a third class level court which 
supposed to be headed by an omda (NA Act, 2005:8). 
4. Omda Abdelkarim Abdalla of the Zaghawa was to be treated by the 
government in an equal manner to the way the government had treated 
the omdas from Zaghawa-Umkamalti; he was to be provided with 
vehicle to carry out his job.  
 
On their side, the Zaghawa-Umkamalti, though they admitted that the rebellion 
had fuelled the conflict between them and the Zaghawa, referred the root 
causes behind the conflict to the following (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, vii: 1-14):  
1. The conflict started earlier than the emergence of the rebel groups, and was 
mainly over the participation on the village councils and committees. 
2. The incidents of armed robbery by the Zaghawa against members of 
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Zaghawa-Umkamalti in 1980s and 1990s had put the two groups in 
confrontation. Accordingly the demands made by the Zaghawa- Umkamalti 
were as follows: 
1. Their area was to be developed and promoted to the status of 
administrative unit. 
2. They wanted to be represented at the levels of locality councils and 
State Legislative Council. 
The Conference had announced the following decisions with regard to the 
issues raised (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, x: 1-3):  
1. The mediators have decided that all political related issues raised in this 
conference had already been addressed in the DPA. 
2. The conference recommended that all omdas were to be empowered in 
order to be able to do their job properly; especially with regard to means of 
mobility and transport. 
In their stories with regard to what were the reasons behind their conflict, the 
Zaghawa and the Zaghawa-Umkamalti seemed to be agreed on one point 
which was the representation and participation in village councils and 
committees (see the points with regard to the claims made by the Zaghawa 
and point No.1 with regard to the claims made by Zaghawa-Umkamalti). If all 
other claims made by both parties were ruled out the claim that the conflict was 
over local power remained undisputed. Yet, the conference addressed it by 
simply stating that “...all political related issues raised in this conference had 
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already been addressed in the DPA” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, x: 1). It was 
true that the DPA has addressed the issue of power sharing but in a different 
context, which was the power sharing at the central and state levels, but it did 
not address it at the local level. All that was mentioned in the DPA with regard 
to local power was restricted to NA and came as follows: “Native administration 
shall have regard, where appropriate, to the established historical and 
community traditions, customs and practices. Where these are contrary to the 
provisions of the national or state constitution or law, the latter shall prevail” 
(DPA, 2006:12).To be more specific, according to the DPA, the issue of tribal 
relations and tribal homelands have been left to be addressed in what came to 
be known as Darfur/Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).  
“The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) shall be a conference in 
which representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders can meet to discuss the 
challenges of restoring peace to their land, overcoming the divisions between 
communities, and resolving the existing problems to build a common future” 
(DPA, 2006:80). 
 However, as the DPA collapsed in 2011 such a conference has never been 
accomplished. Thus we can see that political related factors, though clearly 
responsible for the escalation of conflicts in South Darfur, and recognised as 
such by conflicting parties, were never addressed directly in any of the ITRCs 
covered by this study.  
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Triggering factors 
Triggering factors for tribal conflicts in South Darfur, as mentioned in (chapter 
5, table 3), were disputes between individuals, animal thefts and armed 
robbery, competition over local power, land occupation, rape and abduction. 
They also included, burning huts and looting properties of specific groups on 
the ground of providing shelter and support to rebels and bandits, targeting 
specific groups on the ground of being janjaweed or sympathizers with the 
government. Additional triggers were rape, damage of crops and closure of 
livestock migration routes. The following section provides some details about 
how these issues have been addressed by the ITRCs. 
 
Dispute between individuals 
In most of the ITRCs in south Darfur when perpetrators were prosecuted or 
alleged perpetrators were in jail, the decision was that those convicts or 
alleged perpetrators were to be released either immediately or following the 
payment of the first instalment of the diyya and compensation decided by the 
relevant conference (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.2, 1,iv:1-2).  For example, the 
documents of the Fur/Arab conference in Kass in January, 2003, indicated that 
the detained alleged perpetrators were to be released first and each group join 
their party before the conference started, a step which was described by the 
mediators as an essential requirement to pave the way for reconciliation 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,1,ii:1-2). 
The document of the reconciliation conference between the Maaliya and 
Rezeigat in October, 2004 stated that “The offenders from both sides were to 
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be released immediately following the payment of the first instalment of the 
diyya” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 1, IV: 1-2). The Falata/Gimir conference in 2008 
and the Birgid/Rezeigat conference in October, 2007 provided that “alleged 
perpetrators from both sides were to be released and would not have to be 
subjected to questioning in future in connection to this dispute” (TRSD, 2003-
08:  Vol.1,8,ii:1-3).  
It seemed that perhaps one of the reasons that tribes joined these ITRCs was 
to get their alleged perpetrators released, although this would need further 
verification. However, there were indicators that this was an issue of concern 
for most of the tribes involved. One of these indicators was that a common 
shared outcome of these conferences was the guarantee of impunity for 
alleged perpetrators. Furthermore, once an alleged perpetrator’s release was 
guaranteed, nothing happened to question it afterwards. Also, based on the 
ITRCs documentary I observed that in the many cases where the alleged 
perpetrators were supposed to be released following the conference, this was 
actually conditional on the payment of first instalment of diyya and 
compensation. In most of these conferences the first instalment was paid on 
time and sometimes the government paid the money on behalf of the tribes to 
ensure this (KI/7: 5/6/10), however once the alleged perpetrators were 
released, reports showed that all parties were reluctant to make further 
payments of diyya and compensations (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 6, v:1-7). 
Longer term and wider range solutions in relation to disputes between 
individuals that ITRCs repeatedly provided included the following (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.2, 5, ix: 1-2):  
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1. Call upon the government to disseminate more military forces, establishing 
more police points with sufficient facilities and resources; this was to enforce 
the rule of law and assist in restoration of security and state authority. 
2. Government was called upon to encourage and to introduce obligatory 
education plans to eradicate illiteracy and to fight ignorance.  
3. Government subsidised education policy and free accommodation were to 
be adopted in order to encourage pastoralists to send their children to schools.  
4. Racism and discrimination on a tribal basis were to be condemned and 
controlled and dissemination of spirit of brotherhood and love amongst 
individuals from both tribes were to be encouraged.  
Further recommendations addressing social relations came up in various 
ITRCs as follows: when an individual was alleged to have committed a crime, 
the concerned individual was to be held responsible, not his tribe (TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.2, 7, i: 1-3). Some conferences recommended that when 
offenders were killed due to their own brutal criminal behaviour, nobody was to 
be held accountable for their death. This recommendation was made in Safia 
conference, 2006; more probably by ‘brutal criminal behaviour’ they meant 
rape crime. This was the only conference where rape allegations were dealt 
with seriously, at least by direct use of the word ‘rape’(Ightisab, in Arabic) in 
the recommendations as will be explained later.  
 
One can make a number of observations with regard to the ways in which the 
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ITRCs have dealt with disputes between individuals. First, some ITRCs 
decided to release offenders, and alleged perpetrators with the guarantee that 
they should not be pursued in future in connection to the events considered. 
Such a decision was seen as providing cover and secure immunity for 
perpetrators. Some informants made comments that due to this immunity 
conflicts repeated themselves again and again (KI/7: 5/6/10, KI/14:7/6/10). The 
same perpetrators involved in previous conflicts were caught committed the 
same crimes again as it became clear for them that they were not going to be 
prosecuted or condemned; on the contrary sometimes they were praised by 
their communities for being courageous in defending the tribe. The trend of 
leaving perpetrators free and unprosecuted contradicted the many other 
recommendations in these conferences that called for the enforcement of rule 
of law and the personal responsibility for crimes committed on individual basis.  
The second observation was that law enforcement was recommended by most 
of these ITRCs, but had not been attained whilst the same conferences 
recommended immunity to offenders.  The third  observation was that 
recommendations about education and illiteracy eradication may be a good 
means to reduce and eliminate tribal conflicts in the long run, but not as an 
immediate action. As has already been discussed in chapter 3 of this study, 
the social services and projects allocated to Darfur, south Darfur included, 
suggested clearly that unless government policies changed fundamentally 
these were unachievable objectives in the near future. 
Furthermore, the ITRCs called for “racism and discrimination on tribal bases 
were to be condemned and controlled”. Although they claimed to be unhappy 
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with the discrimination on tribal basis, in all these conferences it seemed that 
the ITRCs approved the same policy adopted by the regime which was alleged 
to be behind the strengthening of tribal affiliation and loyalty. These were 
policies that related to creating and dividing local government structures along 
tribal lines and expansion of NA’s base to include more omodiyyas, as a 
remedy for competition over local power. Such policies represented the 
primary source for the spread and persistence of tribal sprit and affiliation and 
intensification of favouritism along tribal lines.  
 
Animal thefts and armed robbery 
In most of the ITRCs recommendations, factors related to animal theft and 
armed robbery have been associated with either the absence or lack of 
efficiency of government security organs. Therefore the following 
recommendations were repeated in all the above mentioned conferences: 
1. Presence of government security organs with sufficient means and 
resources to enforce the rule of law was needed. 
2. Government was to secure highways and provide protection for civilians. 
3. Providing safe haven or protection for criminals was prohibited and 
suspected criminals were to be reported to the authorities. 
4. Thieves were to be dealt with according to the law. 
5. Establishment of mobile police to accompany pastoralists in their seasonal 
migration was required. 
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6. When going after thieves, customary law was to be followed. This meant 
when there was proof that the alleged thief has entered a village or 
nomad settlement, the inhabitants of the concerned place were 
requested either to locate the thief or they were to be held responsible 
of the consequences of the alleged incident. 
7. Encouragement of “fazaa”; which meant a tradition where group of people 
going after stolen animals or properties, especially the joint one which 
included individuals from a variety of tribes. 
8. Fazaa was not to be disrupted; those who disrupted fazaa were to be held 
responsible of the consequences if the disruption resulted in not 
achieving the specified aim.  
 
9. Tribal leaders in villages and nomad’s settlements were to be responsible 
for identifying the identities of strangers hosted by member of their 
communities.  
10. Different parties were to commit themselves to cooperate with organized 
security organs (SAF, Police, Security and intelligence) in crime control 
and tracing criminals. 
11. PDF was to be reorganized and controlled. Their roles and tasks were to be 
clearly identified by the headquarters and the commanders of these 
forces. 
In this regard it should be noted that a considerable proportion of the 
population in South Darfur, especially the IDPs, have lost confidence in the 
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government security organs and justice institutions (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1, 7, 
iii: 1-8). These communities have been attacked by government forces and 
government associated militias on the grounds that they were either providing 
support to rebels or sympathizing with them (see chapter 5 section: Rebel 
groups/eruption of insurgency). These were mainly tribes of African origin.  The 
majority of these communities were forced to leave their areas and joined IDPs 
camps. Those who were unable to leave their original areas had become 
under the mercy of the government associated militias. The tribes of Arab 
origin that allied with the government have also become more aware of the 
inability and incompetency of the government security organs to protect them. 
Receiving weapons from the government and other sources, this group has 
become increasingly dependent on their own militias to protect themselves and 
have taken the law into their own hands to retaliate against what they 
perceived to be their attackers (Mohammed, 2009:80).  
Against this background one can make the following comments with regard to 
the above recommendations in relation to resolving the issue of animal theft 
and armed robbery. Establishing a presence of government security organs 
with sufficient means and resources to enforce the rule of law seemed to be an 
appropriate response, but the disarmament of government associated militias, 
as a first requirement to achieving the rule of law, has been made conditional 
on the disarmament of rebel combatants. Therefore it was very difficult to 
realize enforcement of rule of law unless there was first a peaceful political 
settlement for the government/ rebel struggle.  The recommendation that 
suspected criminals were to be reported to authorities and would not have 
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been provided safe havens looked a reasonable response on the face of it, but 
it was not possible to implement. Based on informants’ discussions, I 
concluded that there were two hypotheses why this was not possible which 
were either they feared to report these bandit elements or were unwilling to do 
so. Some people feared retaliation if they report any armed bandit while others 
were unwilling to uncover them as these bandits belonging to the same tribe 
and instead provided them with protection (KI/2:3/6/10; KI/3:4/6/10; 
KI/5:4/6/10; KI/7:5/6/10).  
The other reason that this proposal was unrealistic was that the ineffectiveness 
of government security organs, and their lack of positive response to crimes, 
discouraged many people from taking such an initiative. A mobile police unit 
has been established to accompany pastoralists in their seasonal migration, 
however this has also proved to be impractical (UN report, 2007) as it was very 
costly to provide close police escort to every herd everywhere in the state.  
The encouragement of Fazaa, and especially the joint one that included 
members of diversified tribes and should follow customary law, was another 
controversial arrangement. First of all in the current situations it was well 
known that bandits were well equipped with very sophisticated weapons such 
as AK47s, G3s and RPGs (Birech, 2009:48), therefore, going after animal 
thieves and bandits encountered very high risk. In this respect calling for those 
whom animals or property were stolen to conduct joint diversified Fazaa made 
little sense to local people.  The obvious question was what happened if no 
one volunteered from other tribes to join, did this mean Fazaa was to be kept 
on hold?  In reality and contrary to this recommendation, traditions suggested 
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that usually those from whom animals were looted would have to seek Fazaa 
first and then others join or follow them. Another problematic issue was how to 
get the Fazaa to follow customary law when all surrounding conditions were 
chaotic and exceptional.  The ITRCs recommended that “When there was 
proof that the alleged thief has entered a village or nomad settlement, the 
inhabitants of the concerned place either locate the thief or they would have 
been held responsible for the consequences of the alleged incident”.  
Ironically, in most cases this was actually what made tribal conflicts erupt. The 
Fazaa sometimes made an allegation that the robbers have entered a village 
or nomad settlement, and they asked the inhabitants of that place to identify 
the thieves and hand them over to the Fazaa. When the inhabitants denied the 
accusation and refused to hand over the alleged perpetrators the fighting took 
place.  
The recommendation that the PDF was to be reorganized and controlled was 
another controversial recommendation. In most of the cases, it was the PDF, 
Border Guards Forces and other government associated militias, and even the 
SAF, who were directly responsible for violations against civilians including 
killing and looting their properties. These allegations were made by Fur in 
Kass, 2003, Zaghawa in Sherriya, 2006 and in Marla, 2007, and again in the 
Birgid and Rezeigat conference, 2007. Also the ITRCs documents included a 
conference identified the SAF as part  to a conflict with a pastoralist group and 
the former was agreed to pay compensation for killing members of the latter 
group. In this regard it seemed that it was not sufficient to appeal to the 
headquarters and the commanders of these forces to intervene, but rather the 
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overall policies that derive their interference and behaviour would need to be 
changed. 
The above mentioned recommendations illustrate that although people on the 
ground were quite well aware of the problems they faced, these kinds of 
recommendations looked completely unrealistic to resolve these problems. 
 
 Competition over local power  
Competition over local power seats has also been a prominent triggering factor 
of the conflict in South Darfur. Taking over local council seats, native 
administration positions or even local government positions were areas of 
contention and rivalry. In the cases of conflict over local power, some ITRCs 
recommended that “All tribes that live in this area were to be allowed to 
participate in political related public affairs, particularly the executive one so as 
to avoid a monopoly of political positions being held by certain groups to the 
exclusion of others” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 2, ii: 1-2 and 5, ix: 1-2). However 
the problem which remained unclear was how such participation could be 
achieved peacefully. An informant, who was a local government practitioner 
commented in this regard by saying that he had worked in his position for more 
than thirty years and he had never witnessed elections for local governments 
took place (KI/17: 8/6/10).  
Additionally, participation and representation in power at local levels has been 
constrained by the old traditions of the tribal leadership which gave the 
dominant tribe (that owns the dar) supremacy and leadership over other tribes 
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in the area.  This issue has been further aggravated by the expansion of this 
supremacy to local government institutions. This has happened due to the 
overlapping of the boundaries of the newly created localities with the 
boundaries of the already existing historical tribal homelands (Asalaya 
Reconciliation Conference, 2009: 11; KI/17: 8/6/10). As the newly created 
localities were created along tribal lines, the appointed top government official 
(the commissioner) was chosen from the dominant tribe, which has a 
recognized historical claim over land, even where such a group might no 
longer constitute the majority. This gave an impression that the tradition that 
the dominant tribe has the supremacy over land and leadership also applied to 
the newly created government institutions as they fall within the tribe’s dar 
boundaries. In order to buy allegiance, the government gave priority for 
recruitment in these institutions to members of the dominant tribe. The merits 
of professional qualifications were considered of low value here. This, in fact, 
coincided in the last two decades with the regime policy of restructuring of NA 
and local government institutions and appointments were used as rewards for 
establishing political allegiance, as has already been explained. 
In some cases the marginalization in participation or exclusion from power 
sharing resulted from the perception that a group or individual was not 
supporting the regime. In this respect those who supported the regime were 
favoured by government officials and were recruited to political positions as 
well as civil service government paid jobs whereby the alleged supporters of 
the rebels were denied such rights. In this case the rule that the bigger tribe 
(owner of dar) has to control tended to be ignored; i.e. if the bigger tribe was 
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not a government supporter it could not claim the benefits that large tribes 
achieved elsewhere (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2,5,ix:1-2; TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1,6,v:1-11).   
Furthermore, the ITRCs addressed this issue of competition over local power 
by calling for expansion of the base of the NA structures and local government 
institutions through the creation of more omodiyya, administrative units and 
localities. In this regard the following ITRCs are illustrative examples: the case 
of the dispute between the Rezeigat and Birgid in 2009, Salamat and 
Habaniyya in Buram, 2009, the dispute between the two groups of Gimir tribe 
in Katilla in 2009, and the conflict between Birgid and Zaghawa in Sherriya, 
2006. With regard to local government institutions these conferences called for 
the creation of new localities, or dividing the existing ones into smaller units 
(administrative units), to satisfy all parties’ demand for political participation. 
This was the case in the conflict between the Rezeigat and Birgid in 2009 
whereby a recommendation stated that “for security and administrative 
reasons, creation of more localities should be fostered” (Asalaya Reconciliation 
Conference, 2009: 11). A similar statement was made in the Salamat and 
Habaniyya conference in 2009 which recommended that for “security and 
administrative reasons” two more administrative units were to be established in 
Alnadif and Abujaila (these were the two areas that dominantly inhabited by 
the Salamat within Buram locality) (The Habaniyya and Salamat Reconciliation 
Conference, 2009:5). 
It appeared that these attempts were far from reaching genuine solutions for 
the issue of representation and participation with regard to power sharing at 
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the local level. Simply expanding the base of the NA by creating more 
omodiyyas and the division of the localities into smaller units did not change 
the reality of the domination of bigger tribes; as all these arrangements were 
still under the umbrella of  the old historical tribal boundaries. In other words 
more omodiyyas were created, but they were still under the leadership of the 
top tribal leader of the dominant tribe. The same thing applied to the 
administrative units; the dominant tribes agreed to the creation of these new 
units on condition that they remained part of the locality in which they 
dominated leadership positions. Regardless of the new administrative 
arrangements and names given to these newly created structures, the logic 
behind this was that these areas were inhabited by other minority tribes but still 
constituted part of the homeland of the dominant tribes.  
This understanding was clearly reflected in some of the recommendations 
made by the ITRCs, for example the Rezeigat and Birgid conference in 2009 
indicated that “administrative boundaries were believed to be a security threat. 
In order not to be exploited by tribes as a reason for dispute over land, the 
government was requested to speed up the demarcation of boundaries 
between the localities of Eddein, Asalaya and Sherriya” (Asalaya 
Reconciliation Conference, 2009: 10).  As has already been elaborated 
previously in this study, this referred to the demarcation of tribal homelands 
between the Birgid and the Rezeigat.  Eddein and Asalaya were two separate 
localities, yet both were part of the Rezeigat’s homeland. Sherriya was another 
separate locality, which was the Birgid homeland.      
 Furthermore, government intervention in the structures of NA and the 
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manipulation they have conducted to make the structures suit their strategy 
has resulted in weakening the structures of NA and leadership position of tribal 
leaders in South Darfur.  Add to this situation the fact that tribes of African 
origin were divided by war into two groups: One group was those who 
remained in their original places or moved into urban centres, and the other 
group was the refugees and the IDPs. The direct result of this divisive situation 
was the emergence of two rival groups of leadership within the former group, 
one associated with the government and the other closer to the IDPs and the 
armed movements.  
 
Damage of crops and closure of livestock migration routes 
Damage of crops and closure of livestock migration routes have been playing 
an increasing role in provoking tribal conflicts between sedentary farmers and 
pastoralists.  With the exception of one case where pastoralists were 
requested to retreat to  where they have come from (Kass Reconciliation 
Conference,2003), the rest of the decisions and recommendations in this 
regard were counting on  customary law to organize the relationship between 
farmers and herders  and was to be respected and  abided by both parties. 
The above mentioned conference, for example, further recommended that 
“Native administration instructions with regard to livestock migration routes, 
access to water sources and temporal habitation areas was to be respected 
and abided by” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,1,iii:1-4).   
Another decision in the same regard stated that  “Aballa; camel herders, were 
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involved in this conflict in a sense that they did not respect prevailing  
customary law in this area and they never have abided by the scheduled time 
for seasonal migration. As such they were prohibited to come across the area 
before the time agreed for their movement” (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 3, ii: 1-2; 
TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 2, ii: 1-2; TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1, iii: 1-4).  A genuine 
question in this respect was who has the power to enforce such decisions or to 
make different parties abided by customary law? The answer was that the 
pastoralists’ tribal leaders were to urge members of their 
community/administration to comply with the specified and agreed livestock 
migration routes. Sedentary tribal leaders in return, were to urge farmers in 
their communities to avoid obstructing or cultivating near these routes. 
However, as asserted by informants, the problem was that even the NA and 
tribal leaders were no longer respectful of or have the powers to enforce 
customary law (KI/8:5/6/10; KI/14:7/6/10; KI/21:10/6/10). Tribal representatives 
in these conferences seemed to be aware of this fact, thus many 
recommendations have been made with regard to adoption and respect of 
customary law.  
Another arrangement in this respect was a temporary suspension of certain 
seasonal migration routes as has happened between the Maaliya and the 
Rezeigat. The agreement prohibited the latter from using a migration route 
across the Maaliya homeland for three years (TRSD, 2003-08, Vol.2, 1, IV: 1-
2). This proved unrealistic as no alternative option was made possible for this 
group; some of them ignored such agreement and continued to use the same 
route which led to continuous tensions between the two parties up to 2010.   
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Further arrangements in this regard included creation of buffer zone between 
the two disputing parties, as could be explained by the following example 
elaborated by one of the informants who used to be a participant in the 
conference (KI/9:6/6/10): 
In the Al-Sunta reconciliation conference between the Habaniyya and Rezeigat 
in 2006, the Habaniyya proposed that there was to be a buffer zone (25 
kilometres width) extended from the north to the south between their homeland 
and the Rezeigat’s homeland. This land was to remain non-grazing and non-
cultivating land for either party for three years. From the Habaniyya’s point of 
view, the logic behind this arrangement was the following: 
1. The whole proposed buffer zone land was belonging to the Habaniyya. This 
land was left for the Rezeigat as a grazing zone. The numbers of 
livestock owned by the Rezeigat in this area have become much greater 
than those owned by the Habaniyya in the same area. Yet, the area 
became a place of disputes and tensions within the Habaniyya’s 
homeland.  
2. Due to the tensions and disputes in this area, the Habaniyya lost much 
more than the Rezeigat did. Therefore to prohibit the Rezeigat from 
coming to this area was a punishment for them. 
3. It was a rainy season and the Rezeigat have other alternatives with regard 
to grazing land and water sources. 
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The Rezeigat from their side have rejected the proposal on the following 
grounds: 
1. Separation between the two tribes would increase grievances and lead to 
lack of interaction. 
2. The cattle had become familiar with the area; therefore it was impossible to 
control them not to come to the area again. 
3. The buffer zone was to end up as fertile land for outlaws. 
With the intervention of the mediators a compromise was reached. The 
proposal was agreed with some amendments. The period of prohibition was 
reduced from three years to six months. This indicated that compromise was 
possible through this mechanism, although it was rare. 
 
Rape issue   
Rape allegations as a triggering factor of tribal conflicts looked like a newly 
emerging factor. It was only reported twice in 2006 (see table 3 in Chapter 5). 
Although recently, at least from 2002-2009, rape crimes in Darfur have been 
repeatedly confirmed in UN and other Human Rights organizations’ reports 
which described it as “widespread and systematic” (UNHCHR, 2005). 
 
One of the fundamental findings with regard to the ITRCs was that women’s 
representation and participation in these conferences was completely absent. 
This was connected to the fact that NA was predominantly a male domain. In 
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spite of the remarkable changes which have happened in Sudan in general 
and in Darfur in particular with regards to women’s representation in public 
affairs and politics, the situation of women’s representation and participation in 
the ITRCs has remained unchanged. However education has brought about a 
new generation of ambitious educated women who have already assumed 
political leading positions in government and other leading positions in the 
State bureaucracy, and so this situation may change. The emergence of civil 
society organizations that advocate for women’s rights to participate in public 
affairs may also have an impact in time.  
 
With regard to the on-going war in Darfur (government/rebels or tribal conflicts) 
women represented the majority of the victims in the IDPs’ camps and the 
refugee camps. It appeared that either due to the death of the male head of 
the family and/or his forced or voluntary absence, women assumed more 
responsibility and sometimes this has included taking up the leading role in 
family representation (Musa, 2011:225). However, out of the forty four ITRCs 
examined by this study in south Darfur alone, the women’s issues that were 
raised were restricted to rape allegations and even these have only been 
brought up twice in the ITRCs. The reports registered by the police in relation 
to Habaniyya/Falata conference in 2006 included one case of rape allegation, 
however no decision or recommendation was made with regard to this issue 
(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2,5,ii:1-6).  Nothing in the documents showed that the 
issue has been discussed; it has not been referred to in the decisions and 
recommendations and so we must conclude that the rape allegation was 
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ignored by the conference. The second case was reflected in one of the 
decisions made by Safia conference, 2006 as follows, “the rape offender and 
those who chased others for the sake of provoking disputes, were to be 
charged 5,000,000 Sudanese pounds [$1666.6 at the time]” (TRSD, 2003-
08:Vol.2,7,i:1-3).   The same conference decided that if such offenders were 
killed due to such criminal behaviour, nobody should be held accountable for 
their death (TRSD, 2003-08:Vol2I, 7, i: 1-3).   .  
Rape cases occurred much more frequently than these two cases, as was 
seen by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ reports 
(UNHCHR, 2005). However due to local traditions, tribesmen considered it 
shameful to talk about such issues publically (KI/16:8/6/10). The same female 
informant added that rape victims also found it hard to report, as it was 
believed to be a shame on them, as well as on their families and the whole 
tribe. Furthermore, legal obstacles hampering the reporting of rape have been 
highlighted by UN reports. This was described in their report (UNHCHR, 2005) 
which says that if rape was found not to be proved, then the reporter was to be 
convicted of “gross indecency” and also was to be convicted for spreading 
incorrect information. Further, if a pregnancy resulted from a rape that was not 
proved, then the alleged victim was to be accused of adultery, which according 
to prevailing laws in the Sudan, was a major crime. Therefore it was not 
surprising that most cases went unreported.  
Two female informants stated that they were not aware of tribesmen who 
committed rape crime in the context of tribal conflicts (KI/16:8/6/10; 
KI/22:10/6/10). However, the former respondent added that other parties to the 
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conflict in Darfur, including the Sudanese armed forces, police and their 
associated militias as well as some of the rebels, were thought to have 
committed rape crimes, even though only two conferences addressed rape 
allegations. The ITRCs documents showed no evidence that a rape victim or a 
particular representative of a rape victim has attended any of these two 
conferences. Furthermore even in connection to these two conferences there 
was no evidence that testimony of the victims was considered.  Also, no 
women’s representation or participation in any of these conferences has been 
reported.  
Another related issue with regard to women was that when it comes to the 
estimation of compensation for human losses, compensation received for a 
woman who lost her life in tribal dispute, or due to the consequences of a tribal 
dispute, was only half of that received for a man reported killed (KI/15:8/6/10). 
A female informant commented that the NA was and still predominantly a male 
domain (KI/22:10/6/10). She added that as long as these conferences claimed 
to be based on the heritage of NA, women also remained excluded. But she 
added that in the last five to ten years, some tribes began to include women in 
their Shura councils, although she knew only three tribes which have done 
this; one in west Darfur and the other two in South Darfur. The same 
respondent said that she and other female colleagues were selected to be 
members of their tribe’s Shura council and she attributed the decision to the 
contribution they had made with regard to their participation in defending the 
position of their tribe. They spoke to the media, submitted petitions to the UN 
and AU and provided legal representation for the victims of tribal conflicts from 
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their tribe. Nonetheless these remained isolated examples. 
 
Attack and counter attack by militias 
The ITRCs that addressed issues of conflict arising from accusations of 
supporting the opponent, came up with recommendations similar to those 
related to armed robbery and animal theft,  such as  the importance of the 
presence of government security organs with sufficient means and resources 
to enforce the rule of law (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.2,5,ix:1-2; TRSD, 2003-08:  
Vol.2,7,i:1-3; TRSD,2003-08:Vol.I,1,iii:1-4). Perhaps these recommendations 
indicated that ITRCs concluded that government security organs sided with 
one party against another during tribal disputes. This was on the basis of 
alleged support or sympathy with the rebels. Therefore one of the 
recommendations was to urge government security organs to remain impartial 
with regard to tribal disputes and in dealing with civilians (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1, 5, iii: 1). Another recommendation indicated that “top commanders of 
security organs were to put an end to the violations committed by their 
members of concerned organizations and also they have to make them abide 
by rules and law in their behaviour while doing their jobs” (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.1,1,iii:1-4).  Another important conclusion in this regard was that the 
government seemed to be held responsible for what has happened in some 
disputes, if not all of them. This was reflected in some recommendations as 
follows: “The government was to pay diyya and compensation for human and 
property losses to the victims and their relatives. However the reference for 
such compensations was to be the reports made and registered by the police” 
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(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.2, 2, ii: 1-2; TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1, iii: 1-4).  
Whether or not this was related to the security organs’ involvement in tribal 
disputes, no clarification was made by the ITRCs and so it was difficult to 
reach a conclusion about the view of the ITRCs in this regard. But an informant 
who was involved in ITRCs arrangements stated that this was related to the 
situation where no evidence was provided to identify the perpetrators; in such 
cases the government was held responsible (KI/1: 3/6/10).  The government 
was also requested to take responsibility with regard to the rehabilitation of the 
destroyed villages, and to assist IDPs to return to their lands following the 
provision of social services such as protection, water, education and health 
(TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.2, 2, ii: 1-2; TRSD, Vol.1, 1, iii: 1-4).  
The involvement of tribal militias in tribal disputes was responded to with the 
recommendation that “tribal leaders were to organize the role and tasks of 
Augada (leaders of tribal militias) and Fursan (horsemen) in accordance with 
the objective of realizing security, peaceful-coexistence and good neighbouring 
relations amongst tribes” (TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.2, 2, ii: 1-2; TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.2,5,ix:1-2). Some informants made remarks in this regard by saying that 
several  leaders of tribal militias were not under the control of their tribal 
leaders; they have direct links with security organs and government officials at 
state and federal levels from whom they took instructions (KI/7:5/6/10, 
KI/14:7/6/10). This situation made the above recommendations impossible to 
implement.  
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Land occupation 
Allegations of land occupation had been an issue long ago; it was raised by 
the Fur in Fur/Arab reconciliation conference of 1989 (Daly, 2007:247). In 
response to the claim made by the Fur (Kass Conference in 2003) that some 
Arabs who have occupied their land came from Chad, the conference 
recommended that the authorities were to intervene directly in Kargo area to 
investigate crime there and to identity newcomers in the area; if non-Sudanese 
were found living there they were to be removed (TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 1, iii: 
1-4). In the absence of trust in government security organs as expressed by 
the Fur and the lack of trust between the parties to the conflict as identified by 
the mediators (all this in the same conference), the expectations that the two 
parties might dissolve their militias on their own was unlikely to happen. The 
Fur made it clear that the government was part of the conflict by supporting the 
Arabs and providing them with weapons and logistics. So, how could the same 
government is to be trusted to investigate and identify what the Fur described 
as Arab newcomers migrated from Chad and occupied their land? These two 
recommendations would have required a third party and a detailed mechanism 
in order to be implemented. In April, 2003 the same parties came to sit for 
another conference to discuss the same issues, which indicated that nothing 
with regard to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations 
made by the previous conference has been achieved. When the Zaghawa in 
Marla made claims that their farms and shops were occupied by others, the 
recommendation was “following the return of the IDPs, disputes over farming 
and commercial land were to be dealt with according to the customary law” 
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(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 7, xi: 1-2). There was no clarification as to which rules 
of customary law were to apply here although they were probably referring to 
the hakura traditions. I concluded that it seemed as though the mediators 
found it difficult to settle the issue of land and that was why they have 
postponed it in order to avoid the failure of the conference.   
The third case of this kind was reported in the Juruf conference which included 
the Rezeigat camel herders versus Fur and Birgid. One of the 
recommendations requested the pastoralists to “give space” to others 
(yafsahoo in Arabic) in the deserted villages to allow IDPs to return (TRSD, 
2003-08:  Vol.1, 5, iii: 1). The first observation here was that they used very 
gentle soft language (the word ‘yafsahoo’ in the original Arabic language) for 
which I could not find the relevant equivalent meaning in English. Whether 
such language was used deliberately or not was not clear, however words 
such as move or to be removed were avoided, which might be interpreted as 
providing a green light for pastoralists to stay and share the same land they 
were alleged to have occupied by force with the original owners.  
 
Mechanisms of implementation 
With the exception of three conferences out of forty four ITRCs that took place 
in South Darfur, none has managed to establish or identify a mechanism of 
implementation for the decisions and recommendations they made. All that the 
majority of the ITRCs have done in this respect was to put a recommendation 
at the end of each conference to suggest that the government was urged to 
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establish a committee, including representatives of the parties to the conflict to 
take forward the implementation of the agreement reached (TRSD, 2003-08: 
Vol.2, 1, iv: 1-2; TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1,7, xi: 1-2).Sometimes these 
recommendations were vague, without identification of who was to be 
responsible for the establishment of the mechanism; such as “a Mechanism of 
implementation was to be established from the two parties; to follow up on the 
implementation of this agreement” (TRSD,2003-08: Vol.2,5,ix: 1-2; TRSD, 
2003-08: Vol.1,5,iii:1; TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1,6,ix:1-2;  TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1, 
1, iii:1-4).Others identified the Wali (the governor of the South Darfur State) as 
the one who supposed to form a mechanism of implementation and that the 
head of the mechanism was to be government official of higher level rank 
(TRSD, 2003-08:  Vol.1,7, xi: 1-2). None of these conferences was able to 
identify financial resources for the proposed implementation mechanism. 
There were three possibilities to explain the lack of seriousness and 
commitment with regard to the implementation of the ITRCs. One possibility is 
that the allegations made by the rebels, opposition parties and supported by 
some informants that most of these conferences were merely for political 
propaganda might be true. The government might just have intended to 
demonstrate that it was present and in command of situation. Another 
explanation was that these agreements might have been dictated by the 
government, a thing which discouraged the parties from implementation of the 
decisions and recommendations. The third possibility was that it was beyond 
the ability of the parties to the conflict to meet their commitment with regard to 
the payment of diyya and compensation, something which hampered the rest 
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of the commitments from being met (KI/1:3/6/10; KI/7:5/6/10; KI/9:6/6/10,). It 
was not clear from the evidence available whether all or none of these were 
the case. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter covered the major conflicts, their causes and the conferences 
(ITRCs) held to address these disputes, and thoroughly assessed the 
feasibility of the solutions made by these conferences within the context of the 
background that already described in previous chapters. Hence, it appeared 
that ITRCs were incapable of addressing tribal conflicts in South Darfur, 
perhaps because some of the issues in dispute were too far beyond the 
capacity of the ITRCs to deal with and most importantly maybe because 
situations have changed over time and the documents of these conferences 
show little evidence of changing their approach. On the other hand the 
influence of the government seemed to have put additional restrictions on the 
mandate of the ITRCs and subjected them to pursuing a political agenda 
rather than merely focusing on resolving tribal disputes.  
 
I arrived at the conclusion that NA, local government and ITRCs have always 
been subjected to political manipulation by different governments, at least, 
since British colonial (1916) rule up to 2009, but the checks and balances, 
such as neutrality of government’s institutions of justice and security organs, 
on this have become less since 1989. Further there appeared to be a greater 
degree of government interference on tribes’ affairs by favouring some groups, 
allowed militia formation, and land has been used as an incentive to convince 
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these groups to side with the government and take part in fighting against 
rebels. Another negative sign was the interference in the ITRCs under the 
cover of encouraging conciliation amongst tribes. This was in part intended to 
ensure certain outcomes and also in part to present an image to the world that 
the government was taking the Darfur issues seriously by respecting local 
custom and traditions.  
 
I have also shown how the ITRCs conducted in South Darfur in the period 
1989-2009 were influenced by the government and the rebels. The 
government/rebel struggle in Darfur has severely and negatively affected 
tribes’ relations. Political manipulation and polarization have resulted in 
weakening the structures of the NA and the leadership positions of the tribal 
leaders. This situation has been aggravated by enormous changes in people’s 
behaviour, governance system and environment. However, ITRC reports show 
that there were examples of genuine attempts made by mediators to identify 
and address difficult issues, even to the point of identifying that government 
forces bear some responsibility. But, the above mentioned factors and many 
other procedural issues together served to limit their capability of finding 
meaningful and effective ways to resolve tribal conflicts. Also, there were 
additional challenges faced the ITRCs in South Darfur, the most important of 
which were the on-going insurgency in the region, and the exclusion of 
important segments of the communities in Darfur, such as women, IDPs and 
refugees, from representation and participation in the ITRCs. Furthermore 
parties to ITRCs, including the government, were unable to mobilize resources 
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and meet their commitments to implement the outcome of these conferences. 
Commitment to customary law and the implementation of justice was another 
imperative part of these challenges. Due to the above factors and many others 
elaborated by this chapter, the recommendations and decisions made by the 
ITRCs in South Darfur in the course of 1989-2009 seemed most unlikely to be 
able to address the underlying causes of tribal conflicts in this area. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
This study, as mentioned in chapter one, aims to explore and critically examine 
the role of the indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution, such as judiyya 
and Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) in resolving tribal conflicts 
in Darfur of Western Sudan. The study particularly focuses on the ITRCs in 
South Darfur State. Specifically: to investigate the ways these mechanisms 
work and their effectiveness in resolving conflicts among different tribes, reveal 
different factors that contribute to the success/or failure of these mechanisms 
and to look into the impact of changes on NA and local government on these 
mechanisms. Further, to investigate their origins and the current philosophy or 
political ambitions attributed to them by different parties and consider the 
extent to which ITRCs still have the ability to deal with these conflicts and if so 
what kind of solution they offer. 
The study covered the major tribal conflicts in South Darfur, 1989-2009. Tribal 
conflicts, here, refer to those disputes which erupted between or amongst 
tribes over, for example, land-related issues or local power as underlying 
causes, even though they might be triggered by a single act such as dispute 
between individuals, animal theft or competition over grazing land and water 
source. The study uncovered how the ITRCs were conducted, the causes of 
the conflicts and how they addressed these disputes, and thoroughly assessed 
the feasibility of the solutions made by these conferences (chapter 7 offers 
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more insights and analysis in this regard). Methods used to obtain the data 
were review of documentation (Archive records and reports), literature review, 
semi-structured interviews and observation. However the study depends, to 
large extent, on archival data supplemented by interviews with key informants.  
This study concludes that what came to be known as resource-based tribal 
conflicts in Darfur, have changed into something much more complicated in 
terms of causes, actors and dynamics. The tribal conflicts in South Darfur 
suggest that these conflicts link and overlap with the wider political conflicts in 
Darfur and Sudan at large, yet no sign that the approach of dealing with it has 
changed too. In the following lines I highlight briefly some basic points in this 
regard. 
 
Approaches to conflict resolution: theory and practice 
From a theoretical point of view this study focuses on three main approaches 
in dealing with conflicts, which are conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and 
conflict transformation. The conflict resolution approach focuses here on the 
issues of conflict and the concern is how to resolve these issues rather than 
looking for a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and building of 
relationships (Lederach, 2006:24). Conflict transformation approach concerns 
itself with transforming the wider socio-economic and political structures that 
underlying a conflict, including changing patterns of relationships, interests, 
discourse and the very basic makeup of the society that supports the emerge 
and persistence of violent conflict (Miall et al. 1999:4). On the other hand 
conflict settlement aims to put an end to the different forms of apparent 
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violence, which does not necessarily imply that the underlying causes of the 
conflict are addressed (Zartman, 1989). It seems that the predominant 
approach adopted by the authorities in dealing with conflicts in the Sudan, both 
at national and local levels is through the imposition of state of emergency and 
security measures (Mohammed, 2009:33) which match very much with the 
conflict settlement approach.  
 
Further, analysis suggests that tribal conflicts in Darfur in general from the 
1980s, and South Darfur in the last two decades-(1989-2009) should not be 
separated from the wider political conflict in the Sudan at large and the region 
in particular respectively. This means what had happened in Darfur was due to 
a history of neglect of the region and political manipulation of the NA and local 
government as responses to the agenda of central governments rather than 
merely being a resource or identity based conflicts.  
The negligence of the region and the manipulation of tribes and local political 
structures are related to the question of nation-building and lack of strategy to 
achieve this broad goal in Sudan at large. Colonial rulers were driven by their 
own colonial interests; these interests were necessarily contrasting with the 
philosophy of building a nation (Collins, 2008:21). This was evidenced in the 
divide and rule policies and other related systematic efforts contributed to 
maintain society fragmented, as described in chapter 3. This was not 
something unique to Sudan, but a policy adopted in other African colonies 
(Duignan and Gann, 1975). Following independence of the Sudan it might 
have been expected that such policies would be replaced by new ones, to fully 
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integrate neglected and marginalized regions such as Darfur, in order for 
national unity to be achieved on a new basis. Contrary to such expectations, 
the indirect rule policy was continued, especially in Darfur, as is explained 
below. With the exception of the national ideological strategy (based on 
Islamic-Arabic culture), which was heavily relied on as a driving force to 
mobilize people to resist colonialism, no strategy for nation-building was put in 
place. This same strategy of national ideology, which in the case of Sudan is 
by virtue an exclusive one, continues to be adopted after independence. It is 
based on Islamic-Arabic culture even though Sudan is highly diversified in 
terms of ethnicity, language and religion. Sudan includes 70% Muslims, [with 
Arabs as minority] 30% Christians and other local spiritual beliefs (Ahmed, 
1988:16-19; Malwal, 1981). Following Sudan’s independence all successive 
national regimes, both military and civilian, reinvented this same strategy to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the ruling elites and as a basis for building a 
Sudanese nationalism, as they claimed (Musa, 2011:120-122). However the 
role of the modern nation-state extends to deliver what Robert (2002) came to 
describe as political goods. These include a range of services such as security, 
education and health services, economic opportunities, basic infrastructures, 
etc., in addition to “ a legal framework of order and a judicial system to 
administer it” (Robert, 2002:87).  
This role was neglected. Sudan has been unable to transform the multiple 
cultural societies within their inherited boundaries into a coherent political 
entity. Before and after independence, both the colonial governments and the 
successive national governments neglected Darfur. Darfurians were left more 
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or less to their own indigenous strategies of survival. It was probably this 
legacy of neglect that brought about conflicts that faced the region past and 
present. 
 
Beyond tribal conflicts: Consequences of neglect and marginalisation 
Since independence, due to neglect/or marginalization (in terms of 
development, power and wealth sharing) peripheries of the Sudan have been 
waging resistance against the domination of the centre in different ways and 
on different scales. Leaving southern Sudan aside, the 1960s witnessed the 
appearance of the regional political formations in the north demanding a fair 
and equitable share in power and socio-economic development. These 
include, for example, the Union of the Nubba Mountains in southern Kordofan, 
the Darfur Development Front in Darfur, and the Beja Union in eastern Sudan. 
Due to the fact that successive governments insisted on not granting the right 
of these groups to power and wealth sharing, peaceful political resistance in 
the above mentioned areas shifted to armed resistance movements; during the 
1980s, 1990s and 2002 respectively. Civil wars in Darfur, Blue Nile, and 
Nubba mountains are still on-going. One of the negative repercussions of the 
civil war in the South of Sudan was that some tribes, especially in South 
Darfur, received weapons from government to fight side by side with the 
Sudanese army in the South. Again the same scenario repeated itself when 
some pastoralist groups were provided with land as incentive and also 
received weapons from government to fight rebels in Darfur.  The continuity of 
civil war in Darfur, with its devastating consequences for different communities 
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and “because of the government failure to invest in Darfur, and most notably in 
Arab nomad communities, janjaweed Arabs and rebels are thus in agreement 
over a central point: the people of Darfur are second-class citizens in Sudan” 
(Tubiana, 2007:80).  
Changing land tenure/ significance changed nature of tribal conflicts  
This study analyses the nature of tribal conflicts and the main indigenous 
mechanisms of dealing with them. The analysis suggests that changes in the 
land tenure systems and the significance of land, has contributed to the 
changing nature of tribal conflicts. Thus, a part of the contribution made by this 
study is that, in contrast to the prevailing general idea that these conflicts were 
between sedentary farmers and pastoralists over pasture and of an ethnic 
trend, this research shows that tribal conflicts in south Darfur for the last two 
decades were much more complicated. It is true that almost 80% of these 
conflicts were over land-related issues, but certainly not merely over water and 
pasture, as the parties were not necessarily sedentary farmers versus 
pastoralists. Rather the conflicts were mainly over land ownership and the 
boundaries of tribal homelands (79%) which were provoked by political 
interests rather than economic interests (see figure 12 in chapter 5, which 
illustrates root causes of tribal conflicts in south Darfur), as tribal homeland has 
become political constituency. The remaining 21% of conflicts were over local 
power (7%), water sources and grazing land (9%) and proxy war-Government 
vs. rebels (5%).  The parties were farmers against farmers, pastoralists against 
pastoralists and sedentary versus pastoralists as well. 
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 In terms of ethnicity they were also diversified with tribes of the same ethnicity 
fighting one another and tribes of different ethnicity clashing against each 
other. However the fundamental finding here is that, contrary to the often 
portrayed claim, tribal conflicts in South Darfur have shown no simple ethnic 
rift. Tribal disputes in South Darfur involved all against all (see table 3 in 
chapter 5), i.e. tribes of Arab origin (Ar/o) fought against tribes of African origin 
(Af/o) as well as with others who claimed to be Arabs. Tribes claiming to be of 
African origin fought with those of Arab background and with others from their 
own ethnic group as well. Out of 44 conferences held in South Darfur in the 
specified period above, 19 were amongst tribes of Af/o vs. Ar/o, 11 were 
amongst Ar/o vs. Ar/o, and nine were amongst Af/o vs. Af/o. The other five 
conferences do not fit into these categories as they include mixed tribes on 
either side. This indicates that tribal conflicts have become much more 
complicated than the prevailing stereotype prescription. As such, tribal conflicts 
in south Darfur look like only one level of a wider conflict of three dimensions, 
which are overlapping and influencing one another, these are:  
1. National dimension/level of conflict, i.e. the government against the rebel 
groups in Darfur. This is a political conflict and relates to the power and wealth 
sharing agenda. 
2. Regional dimension/level of conflict, which concerns itself with an internal 
competition over power between tribes of Arab origin and tribes of African 
origin that started with the regional government policy in early1980s and 
generated political polarization along ethnic lines in Darfur at large, as I 
explained in chapter 3.  
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3. Tribal dimension/level of conflict, where the issues of conflict are local and 
the underlying causes are competition over local power and land (land 
ownership and demarcation of hakura boundaries). 
 
These three levels of conflict have influenced each other over time and the 
result has been overwhelming violence, such as: 
1. State violence against the rebels and alleged sympathisers of the rebels 
2. Rebel violence against government and alleged sympathisers of the 
government. 
3. Militia violence targeting rebels and civilians as well. 
4. Banditry violence making use of power vacuums and the chaotic 
situation in order to terrorise people and loot animals and properties. 
5. Tribal violence where tribes fight one another. 
 
Government playing duplicitous roles 
One of the differences between the British administration’s interference in tribal 
and local government structures in Darfur and the interference of governments 
after independence was that the British set up a strategic plan and consistently 
stuck to it. This was reflected in the allocation of dars and the adoption of NA 
as a system of indirect rule. Tribal leaders were assigned powers with clear 
responsibility and jurisdictions. After these arrangements, the government kept 
some distance from tribes, especially with regard to their internal issues and 
structures. In contrast to the experience under the British administration, 
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successive national governments intervention was characterized by 
inconsistency and duplicity. As I have demonstrated in chapter 3, they either 
abolished or altered the existing NA and local government structures and failed 
to bring about effective new institutions to replace them (Abdullah, 1986; 
Bakhiet, 1969; Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007; Mohammed, 2009). Also, this study has 
referred to some of the negative consequences of these interventions when 
considering the causes of conflicts in chapter 4 and 5. Unlike during the 
colonial period where land-related disputes were focused on pasture and water 
source, these two chapters show that after independence government political 
intervention and the manipulation of   local government and  NA has itself 
become one of the major root causes of tribal conflicts in South Darfur. In 
chapter 7 where I focused on these issues through the lens of the causes of 
violent tribal conflicts and attempts to resolve them through ‘indigenous’ 
mechanisms such as ITRCs, it appears that during the colonial period ITRCs 
were more successful due to clear colonial policy and less intervention by 
government on the procedures and the outcomes as well as because of the full 
support the communities and government offered for the implementation, as 
indicated by my key informants. In the last two decades, government policy 
towards traditional land tenure system has sent contradictory signals to the 
public. For example, in 2004 the deputy Wali in South Darfur state (from 
minority tribes), said “dars are nothing more than historical memories. 
Traditional leaders no longer have the right to allocate land. Only the 
government can give land. And it can give land to anyone it 
chooses.”(Tubiana, 2007:84). Another government official (from a tribe which 
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owns land) commented in support of tribes’ historical right over land by saying 
that “before the war [in Darfur], we had never heard of unhappiness with the 
traditional land tenure rights” (Tubiana, 2007:82). The government claimed to 
bring peace and stability to Darfur at the time they create Para militias to fight 
rebels on behalf of them; employed the hakamat and fursan (horsemen) to 
encourage such tendency (Musa, 2011).They claimed that they were building 
a modern state, but at the same time they call on tribes to give allegiance to 
State officials including the president. Government’s dependence on militias to 
support them has resulted in negative consequences for government’s ability 
to enforce the rule of law and the ability of tribal leaders to exert control over 
their subjects. This gave impression that the government was unable to 
provide security to their citizens and made them increasingly depending on 
tribal militias for protection. This situation consolidated the position of the militia 
leaders at the expense of tribal leaders. Availability of arms at lower prices 
encouraged the spread of arms in the hands of civilians. The excuse of fighting 
rebels, or protecting oneself from perceived threat posed by the rebels or 
bandits, was used as a cover to obtain weapons. Also, some groups used this 
for other purposes such as banditry activities and settling differences-including 
disputes over land- with other groups; hence taking the law in their hands. 
 
Co-existing legal systems and partial implementation of changes in 
Darfur 
Although there were significant changes after independence in the various 
official approaches to land and political / administrative authority, these were 
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not always fully implemented in Darfur. For example, only one year before the 
dismantling of the NA, the central government enacted the Unregistered Land 
Act (ULA) of 1970 which required that land should be formally registered. The 
British administration had done the same when it passed the Land Settlement 
and Registration Act of 1925 seeking to ensure its control over land (Tubiana, 
2007:81). Nonetheless the British administration only implemented the Act in 
areas where their control had economic significance and where large scale 
government-owned irrigation schemes were set up, such as the Gezira 
(located in central Sudan between the Blue and the White Nile) and Tokar (a 
seasonal river in eastern Sudan). The same thing happened with the ULA Act 
of 1970. It was only partially implemented. In Darfur, tribes continued to 
exercise supremacy over land because they were powerful and the 
government avoided confrontation with them for security and political reasons 
(Mohammed, 2009:27-28). 
Another good example here is the coexistence of the formal statutory land 
tenure system and the customary land tenure system, a situation which was 
one of the colonial legacies in Darfur. This situation led to a clash between a 
formal statutory land tenure system and the customary land tenure system. 
The former was endorsed by the government and officially adopted in state-
related circles which is also theoretically applicable to Darfur, but has never 
been enforced with regard to the tribal homelands. On the other hand, the 
customary land tenure system was officially abolished (1971-1985), yet 
remained in practice in Darfur. This is one of the major challenges that face 
Darfur today. As convincingly stated by Tubiana, “the acquisition of Sudanese 
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citizenship has become a way to escape allegiance to other groups; in most 
cases African indigenous tribes- even if this allegiance is rather more symbolic, 
also calling into question the traditional tenure system carries a powerful 
message of emancipation for the Arab origin tribes in Darfur” (Tubiana, 
2007:80). This indicates that, with regard to the on-going conflict in Darfur, 
land has become central issue. Many authors (e.g. Tubiana, 2007; 
Mohammed, 2009,; Abdul-Jalil, 2007 and O’Fahey, 2008) agree that, in Darfur 
today, land issues need to be addressed as a prerequisite for any future 
attempt towards resolving tribal conflicts and achieving reconciliation among 
communities.   
The decentralization policy is another failure. It created government institutions 
parallel to the NA. Responsibility has been shifted to newly established state 
and locality institutions, but with no allocation of real resources. Khartoum 
remains in control of financial resources; hence no improvement was achieved 
with regard to the performance of institutions and provision of services in 
Darfur (D-JAM, 2007:5). 
 
Confusion about changing of customs and traditions 
It seems there is confusion in many people’s minds, especially tribal leaders, 
about how customs and traditions have changed. My experience with the key 
informants interviewed by this study is that they often gave narratives which 
mixed up events from the past and present. They often referred to events in 
the past by using present tense. My conclusion is that perhaps they were not 
  
370 
 
clear about the period they were describing or/ do not have a clear sense of 
the historical moments at which things changed. Maybe there was a sense of 
nostalgia. Whatever the reason, this makes it difficult to research the history of 
change.  
What constitutes customary law and whether it was coded or not has remained 
a controversial issue? The archival records did not show that customary law 
was documented in written codes. Also, the informants did not mention 
anything about such written documentation. In their discussions, and as also 
reflected in the archives,  informants referred to what they called “precedents” 
and “customary law”, however what constitutes customary law and how it was 
conceived and implemented remains unclear, and they did not confirm an 
existence of a written account in this regard. It seems that such issues 
remained always debatable and relied on oral accounts and key people to 
decide what they were.  Some scholars such as Mamdani have argued that 
during the colonial period in Africa, it was the “tribal Chiefs backed by colonial 
administration possessed the arbitrary power to decide the content of the 
customary law” (Mamdani, 1996:12), although in many colonies such laws 
were actually codified and written. In Darfur it is true that the offices of local 
power- NA and local government- were manipulated by both colonial and 
successive national governments after independence, yet the only examples of 
‘customary’ matters being codified and written were the boundaries of tribal 
homeland and the livestock migration routes (animal seasonal migration 
routes), thus being ‘frozen’ in time. The colonial administration had also 
encouraged tribes to set up standard diyya and compensation, which had been 
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made obligatory, although the rates of compensation remained flexible and 
there is no evidence of these being written down in a codified manner. 
As has already been discussed through the different chapters of this study, 
situations on the ground have changed enormously over decades. Yet, ITRCs 
dealt with some issues according to the old provisions of what they call 
‘customary law’, which had been established for decades previously and in 
very different settings. Examples are: the livestock migration routes that were 
set up in 1936 and the boundaries of tribal homelands which were recognized 
in 1922, as explained earlier in chapter 3. More importantly, new generations 
have become reluctant to abide by customs and customary law at all.  
 
The confusion reflected in the narratives made by key informants therefore has 
practical implications with regard to the enforcement of customary law. I 
noticed that ITRCs and judiyya based their decisions and recommendations on 
the assumption that traditions and customs had not changed much, are 
assumed to work very well and also on the assumption that they are still widely 
and equally respected by all members of these communities.  When it comes 
to implementation of agreements, tribal leaders find it difficult to make their 
members abide by such decisions. This is because some of the customary 
practices were frozen over time and were no longer relevant to the changing 
situations (e.g. animals’ seasonal migration routes and the boundaries of tribal 
homelands). Also, some educated elites and those attached to urban centres 
were no longer enthusiastic towards traditions and customs; they prefer to 
submit to the judgement of courts rather than to ITRC or judiyya. Other groups 
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such as militias sometimes reject such decisions because they contradict their 
own interests and they know that the NA lacks the mechanisms and powers to 
force them to obey such decisions.  
Furthermore there is contention over leadership positions; the ambition of 
some of educated elites to acquire leadership positions within the NA system; 
or to develop a substitute to it. I observed that unlike during the colonial era 
and early times of independence, in the last two decades in South Darfur, 
educated elites have assumed top tribal leadership positions. Some of these 
were retired local government officers, such as the former Magdoom of Fur 
(Ahmed Abdelrahman Rijal). Others were high rank military or police retired 
officers, such as the Nazir of Habaniyya (Salah Ali Alghali), the Nazir of Birgid 
(Musa Jalis) and the Malik of the Massalit in Gereida (the latter has not retired 
yet). In addition to the many omda positions that went to school teachers.  
A good example of the increasing influence of the educated elite in this regard 
is the Shura councils (consultation councils) which in most cases are headed 
by educated persons with the presence of the top tribal leader as the only 
member in these councils. Also, the inclusion of women in tribal delegations, 
as confirmed by some key informants, is a new trend towards changing 
traditions. 
Greater significance of wars in neighbouring countries 
The repercussions of the wars in the neighbouring countries, such as Chad 
from 1960s onwards and Libya-from late 1970s, on Darfur were devastating 
(Lesch, (1991); Haggar, (2007); Marchal, (2007); and Prunier (2007)). 
However central government did not take sufficient measures to curb such 
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consequences. This was because the focus of these governments was on 
maintaining stability in Khartoum and the centre rather than giving due 
importance to security in peripheries as well. The impact on Darfur was a 
mixture of insecurity and social unrest such as banditry and armed robbery, 
tribal conflicts and influx of refugees. This continues for more than four 
decades, from 1970s up to 2010. In 1991 the Chadian government invaded 
Darfur and captured Al-Geneina city (capital of west Darfur), yet the 
government took no action; they did not change their policy and continued in 
support of the Chadian opposition at the time (Hagar, 2007). In May, 2008 an 
attack was launched by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on 
Khartoum. The JEM forces were in good terms at the time with the Chadian 
regime. The Sudanese government accused the Chadian authority of providing 
logistic support for JEM to attack Khartoum, which presented a direct threat to 
the ruling regime. It was only after this event that Khartoum took serious steps 
to normalize relations with Chad. By 2010, the two regimes reached an 
agreement to stop providing support to mutual opposition across their borders. 
The then JEM leader was denied access to Chad and the movement of 
Darfurian rebels across the Chadian borders into Darfur was restricted. In 
return, Khartoum banned Chadian opposition groups from engaging in any 
activities against the regime within Sudan’s borders.  
 
Direct political interference in tribal and local government structures 
Throughout the history of Darfur, tribe as social and political entity continued to 
serve a similar social and political role. . As asserted by Musa, (2011:100) “the 
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position of tribe is reinforced as a result of lack of reliable system of 
governance”. The tribal leadership system which has been in place since the 
Fur Sultanates, as a formal system of government administration, has perhaps 
assisted in the continuity of this role. This was a type of decentralized 
governance according to which tribes were enjoying a sort of self-rule whereby 
each tribal group was administered through their own tribal leaders and 
submitted to their own traditions and customs as reference points of 
adjudication (O’Fahey, 2008:163). With some modifications, tribal leadership 
continued to be adopted as a system of governance since Fur Sultanates 
(1650-1874, 1899-1816), along colonial period (the in direct rule in Darfur, 
1917-1955) and after independence. During the British administration and after 
Sudan’s independence the system was subjected to increasing political 
manipulation. It was dismantled for some time (1971-1985) and again formally 
reinstated in 1987 and continued up to present time (2010), but has become 
distorted and less efficient.  
According to the old tribal leadership system in Darfur, those who do not  have 
traditional tenure rights (most of them were pastoralists of Arab origin 
especially in north and west Darfur) were under the authority of the 
communities who own the land (mostly farmers of African origin). Access to 
land for grazing and farming purposes was guaranteed to everyone regardless 
to his/her tribe; as based on the rule “traditional land tenure system gives land 
ownership to tribes, but the use of the land remains open to all” (Tubiana, 
2007:79).  It is true that permission was needed from the tribal leaders who 
claim to own the land. However there was evidence this was not a big issue 
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and this permission was always granted. From my observations I can present 
two examples: My family and some relatives were granted land to farm in an 
area belong to the Rezeigat tribe. Following the first conflict between the 
Maaliya and the Rezeigat in 1965 and for security reasons, the government 
adopted a relocation policy for families from both sides that were directly 
involved in the conflict and used to live across the borders of the homelands of 
the two tribes. A reconciliation agreement was reached between the two tribes 
in 1968. Since then such families were allowed to access their land again in 
the same area. Most of these families did not go back to engage in cultivation, 
but they continued to visit the land, or send someone on behalf on regular 
basis, mainly to collect the gum Arabic8. This practice continued for more than 
30 years. As recently as 2000 my father told that he had received notice from 
the omda in that area in order to draw his attention to the fact that the land had 
been left deserted for about three years. The omda addressed my father by 
saying that “if you are still interested in keeping your land, you should show up. 
Otherwise, the land will be allocated to someone else to use it”. This indicates 
that even in a situation where two tribes have been involved in conflict, 
afterwards people can still enjoy access to land without constraints. Another 
example was from Kilaikli Abu Salama area. This area historically belongs to 
                                                          
8 In Sudan, gum Arabic is collected from a wild tree locally known as “shajarat 
Al-hashab”.  The scientific name of “shajarat Al-hashab” is “Acacia Senegal 
tree” (Cecil, 2005).  Cecil, (2005) added that while some gum flow naturally 
from cracks in the bark of the tree; normally farmers stimulate the flow by 
removing thin strips of bark. Usually, this process is done once a year; starting 
at the end of the rainy season. Gum collection begins about four weeks after 
stripping, and can be repeated every few weeks thereafter for several months. 
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the Maaliya and is inhabited by Agarba camel herders, which is a sub tribe of 
the Maaliya. In the last fifty years Zaghawa came from north Darfur. They were 
permitted by the tribal leaders of the area to access land and were engaged in 
agriculture. Following the eruption of the insurgency in Darfur, the area came 
under the control of the rebel groups (SLA-Minawi faction). When I was 
working with the UN and was on official mission to the area, we conducted 
meetings with the SLA and the civilians in the area and they all agreed to a 
main point which was that the majority of the farmers in the area were not from 
the Maaliya, but the sheikhs of land were always Maaliya. When asked why? 
The answer was because the land belongs to them. The sheikh allocates land 
to new arrivals and receives “ushur” in return; an Arabic word which means 
one-tenth of the production, as rent for the land. Some modification and 
changes occurred over time, even though this sharecropping practice is still 
common in Darfur at large.  
From 1922 the colonial government introduced some changes with regard to 
tribal leadership and tenure systems (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:39). Typical of 
several other African colonies at this time, the British did not change the key 
structures, institutions or staff of the old tribal system, as the main objective 
was simply to maintain peace and stability in Darfur at minimal cost (Collins, 
2008:276). In order for the old system to cope with the aims of the colonial 
administration however some modifications were introduced. These changes 
were related to the tribal homelands being officially recognised with clear 
boundaries, and a new role assigned to the NA, which became more focused 
on maintaining law and order (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:44).  Tribal leaders were 
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entrusted to maintain law and order within their own tribes, and between them 
and other communities. Furthermore, they were also assigned responsibility for 
the protection of the environment, tax assessment, and tax collection. Hence in 
order to do their job properly, they were supported by a system of “native 
courts” with guards that governed in accordance with local customs and 
traditions. These modifications were introduced gradually through series of 
ordinances in 1922, 1925, 1927, 1928, and 1932 (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:45). In 
coincidence with this new colonial policy, land rights were associated with 
communities, such as tribe, sub-tribe or village, and accordingly distinction was 
made between “native” and “settler” tribes (Mamdani, 2009:  166). Accordingly, 
two “customary” rights were restricted to the native tribe. These were the 
ownership of land and appointment to key positions in the tribal leadership 
(Tubiana, 2007:79).  
Today the situation has changed further with the changing of land tenure 
systems and changing significance of land itself, due to government 
intervention and other factors. As described by a tribal leader who is 
supportive of the historical tenure right “A piece of land to live off is not a 
problem. But today the Arabs want to register the land to their names” 
(Tubiana, 2007:78). Regardless these fears are real or perceived, land has 
become means of political manipulation to maintain political support for the 
government: either to be provided as incentive to those who do not own land, 
or conversely the historical right of tenure to be denied as a pressure on those 
who own land to compromise their political positions, especially with regard to 
allegations of supporting the rebels. From 1995, Darfur was divided into three 
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separate states, and changes in land tenure were deliberately introduced as 
well (Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:58-59). In north Darfur, the camel herders 
(Mahameed, Mahriya, Erigat, Etaifat, and Awlad Rashid were allocated a 
locality which came to be known “Alwaha”. This area was historical part of the 
Kutum area which came under the Fur. In west Darfur, the Massalit homeland 
was divided into 13 emirates with pastoralists of Arab origin equally named as 
amirs over some areas. In south Darfur five independent tribal administrations 
were created. Four out of these were in territories historically belonging to the 
Fur. Most of these areas came under the authority of the magdoom of the Fur 
in Nyala. The magdoom (Ahmed Abdelrahman Rijal) rejected the decision on 
the grounds that it contradicts the provisions of rebuilding of the NA of the 
1987 which states that “the rebuilding of the system started with the precept 
that no new chiefs would be named [without consultation with the existing 
ones]”; the magdoom had not been listened and instead he was dismissed 
(Tubiana, 2007:81).  
Regarding local government, the major changes were the 1971 Act, combined 
with the Provincial Government Act of 1960, which allowed no possibility for 
genuine grassroots local governments to emerge, as both came under an 
umbrella of military regimes; the Abood regime (1958-1964) and Numeiri 
regime (1969-1985). In 1974 Darfur was divided into two separate provinces; 
North Darfur and South Darfur and the area councils remained the same 
(Abdul-Jalil et al, 2007:55). However the Regional Government Act of 1980 
resurrected the status of Darfur as one region with two provinces; North and 
South Darfur (Mohamed, 2009:28). One year later, the “People’s Local 
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Government Act of 1981 was passed which superseded the “People’s Local 
Government Act of 1971 (Musa, 2005:71). The only new thing with regard to 
this Act was that the Regional Executive Authority (the regional government) 
became responsible for making decisions with regard to the creation of new 
area councils and allocating them budgets and powers as they saw fit (Musa, 
2005:71).  
 
In connection with the above policy of division and re-division adopted by the 
central authorities, and in an attempt to get people’s support in Darfur (from 
1990s onwards), the new military regime which took over power in June 1989 
has divided the region into three states, and divided each state into numbers of 
Localities/provinces and administrative units. In 2006 there were three states, 
24 localities and 70 administrative units (Ateem, 2007:33). This division was 
mostly done along tribal lines, especially in south Darfur, which was divided 
into 10 localities by 2010 (see figure 7 in chapter 3). By now Darfur is five 
states; north, west, east, and south as well as central state. The south Darfur 
which I started to study as one state is now further divided into two (in 2012); 
and became south and east Darfur states, each newly created state with more 
than 10 localities. 
 
Another negative aspect of government intervention in tribal affairs and local 
governance was that none of this interference happened in a straightforward 
manner that led to promotion of NA or local government institutions, as is 
explained below. 
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Looking at changes in NA and local government (since colonial period, 1916- 
to 2009), it seems that these changes were always politically motivated to 
cope with the agendas of central governments rather than to meet interests of 
the local communities. This was something that continued throughout Darfur’s 
history and has shaped the reality of today. Based on the analysis made by 
this study (see chapter 3 for more detailed account), one could argue that 
using land as an incentive to buy allegiance, and tribe as a political agent is a 
policy that is deeply rooted in the history of Darfur; since the times of the Fur 
sultanates, throughout the British period, following Sudan’s independence and 
up to the currently ruling regime (Al-Bashir military regime of 1989): the only 
difference is that of tactic and degree.  
The practice of each tribe to seek  supremacy over land and leadership in their 
respective homeland continued, but this time ( from 1989-2009) as  minority 
tribes began to resist such a policy violently in order to restore what they 
described as their right over land and autonomy that they lost due to 
oppression during the colonial period.  A second group of tribes argued that 
they are Sudanese living in Darfur for a century and as such they should have 
equal rights to land on an equal basis with others as stipulated in the 
constitution and law. A third group allied with government and used arms 
received in return to expand their territory or to grasp others’ land as the 
government turned a blind eye to their behaviour. 
Such interventions in tribal structures, by abolition and alteration, in the 
absence of an alternate efficient system of local government, paved the way 
for tribal conflicts and disputes to escalate. Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that tribal 
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conflicts increased from the 1970s, following the dissolution of the NA, and the 
acceleration and intensification of these conflicts was evident from the 1980s 
onward, due to the implications of drought and desertification as well as wars 
in the neighbouring countries (Chad and Libya) which led to arms proliferation, 
internal migration and influx of refugees into Darfur especially from Chad. All 
these developments resulted in a disastrous situation because the NA was 
dissolved but the new local government institutions were incapable of 
addressing these challenges.  This situation has reached its peak in the last 
two decades when the formation of militias was officially encouraged and 
recognized through the adoption of the Popular Defence Forces Law of 1989 
(Ateem, 2007:35) in an attempt to curb the escalation of the civil war in the 
South and in Darfur as well.  
It seems that the issues in dispute and the nature of tribal conflicts have 
changed dramatically from those of the colonial period and the first two 
decades of independence. New issues have emerged as triggers and root 
causes. These were struggles over land, power and political polarization a long 
tribal and ethnic lines, as well as government manipulation of tribal and local 
government structures to serve central government political agenda that often 
contradicted local interests and negatively affected relations amongst local 
communities.  
 
Therefore, one could conclude that social tensions in Darfur, including tribal 
conflicts, could be attributed to the vacuums in power resulting from the 
malfunctioning of modern state institutions. It appears that the political 
  
382 
 
instability that resulted from changing regimes at the centre, coupled with 
changing policies regarding NA and local governance, were to a large extent, 
responsible for the failure of effective incorporation of tribal indigenous 
institutions into the modern state’s institutions, their modification or alteration. 
Successive regimes, regardless of their nature, ideologies and declared 
policies, have remained heavily reliant on the manipulation of tribes, with 
amendments to tribal structures to suit their agendas.  
  
Judiyya and ITRC: Practice, similarities and differences 
Two main mechanisms used to deal with these conflicts were 1/ the judiyya 
and 2/ the ITRC. Judiyya has no limitation on the issues it can discuss and 
these issues can only be decided by the parties to the conflict alone, whereas 
in the ITRCs the government can restrict the agenda. For example, in the last 
two decades the government refused to allow land-related issues (mainly land 
ownership and administrative boundaries) to be discussed in these meetings, 
but insisted they should be decided by the government itself. Also unlike 
judiyya, which considered a wide range of disputes, the ITRCs are limited to 
major conflicts, mostly between tribes, and avoided involvement in minor 
disputes such as between individuals or sub groups. Even though judiyya and 
ITRC share some limitations, for example, there are no standard criteria for the 
judiyya or the ITRC; both rely heavily on the competencies of the mediators 
and tribal leaders involved. Both mechanisms heavily rely on elders as the 
communities’ reservoir of wisdom and experience and therefore assigned them 
primarily respectful position and responsibility in community leadership and 
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dispute settlement. Also, mechanisms marginalized women; with no 
representation allocated for them in the mediation or negotiation teams. The 
other limitation is related to the alteration in form and substance due to many 
factors such as colonialism, modernization and civil wars in the region. These 
factors made the judiyya and the ITRC less effective in resolving tribal conflicts 
over time. Chapter 7 covers the major conflicts, their causes and the 
conferences (ITRCs) held to address these disputes, and thoroughly assessed 
the feasibility of the solutions made by these conferences within the context of 
the background that already described in previous chapters, especially 
chapters 4 and 5.  
The Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) as a government-
sponsored mechanism were adopted during the colonial period (1916-1956) 
and continue up to the present (2009). The ability of the ITRCs to resolve tribal 
conflicts, as chapter 4 and 5 revealed, appears to have diminished over time.  
This was clearly evident in the sense that during the colonial period, these 
conferences seemed to be more successful in responding to tribal conflicts; 
disputes addressed were not soon repeated and the number of ITRCs 
addressing tribal conflicts decreased over time. Maybe this was made possible 
because during the colonial period only three conferences of a kind were held. 
None of these conferences was exclusively amongst the tribes of Darfur; the 
parties to the conflict were seven in total; namely the Dinka, the Kababish and 
the Kawahlla, the Midob, the Berti, and the Zayyadiya and the Rezeigat (see 
table 2 in chapter 4). The involvement of the tribes in conflicts was always 
equally divided between one party from Darfur and another party from outside 
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the region (e.g. the Dinka belong to the neighbouring region of Bahr el Ghazal 
in Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, the Kawahlla and the Kababish were from the 
neighbouring region of Kordofan).  
Triggering factors were limited to animal theft and disputes between 
individuals. Meanwhile the root causes were related to competition over water 
source and grazing land. Thus, with the full support provided by colonial 
administration to tribal leaders, including assigning them legal and 
administrative powers, they were able to resolve such disputes through ITRCs 
and achieved relative success at that time.  
Perhaps some of the disputes were beyond the capacity of the ITRCs to deal 
with. Situations have changed over time but the documents of these 
conferences indicate little sign of a changed approach of the ITRCs. In 
addition, the influence of the government seems to have put additional 
restrictions on the mandate of the ITRCs and made them subject to pursuing a 
political agenda rather than focusing on resolving tribal disputes. In this regard 
I arrived at the conclusion that ITRCs have always been subjected to political 
manipulation by different governments, at least, since British colonial (1916) 
rule up to 2009, but the checks and balances, such as neutrality of 
government’s institutions of justice and security organs in implementing their 
outcomes, have reduced since 1989. Further there appeared to be a greater 
degree of government interference in tribal affairs by favouring some groups 
and using land as an incentive to convince these groups to side with the 
government and take part in fighting against rebels. Another negative sign was 
the interference in the ITRCs under the cover of encouraging conciliation 
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amongst tribes. This was in part intended to ensure certain outcomes and also 
in part to present an image to the world that the government was taking the 
Darfur issues seriously by respecting local custom and traditions. This was 
evident in the fact that from 2005, following the decision made by the United 
Nations Security Council, which referred “the situation prevails in Darfur since 
1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court” (UNSC 
Resolution 1593(31/3/2005), numbers of such conferences increased and 
sometimes statements of condemnation of UN resolutions and ICC 
involvement included in the recommendations and declarations made by the 
ITRCs.  
 
I have also shown how the ITRCs conducted in South Darfur in the period 
1989-2009 were influenced by the government and the rebels. The 
government/rebel struggle in Darfur has severely and negatively affected tribal 
relations. Political manipulation and polarization have resulted in weakening 
the structures of the NA and the leadership positions of the tribal leaders. This 
situation has been aggravated by enormous changes on people, governance 
systems and environment. However, ITRC reports show that there were 
examples of genuine attempts made by mediators to identify and address 
difficult issues, even to the point of identifying that government forces bear 
some responsibility. But, the above mentioned factors and many other 
procedural issues together serve to limit their capability of finding meaningful 
and effective ways to resolve tribal conflicts.  
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The overall analysis in chapter 4 stands as an account of the success of such 
approaches, at least during the colonial period and early years of 
independence, in spite of the political interference by the British and 
independent governments. Additional to the reasons I have already mentioned, 
this success could also be attributed to the active complementary role which 
used to be played by the indigenous community sponsored 
mechanisms/institutions and methods of conflict resolution/ settlement and 
management. There was a range of institutions and mechanisms such as local 
courts, councils of elders and other indigenous tools of encouraging and 
enhancing interaction and peaceful coexistence amongst individuals and 
groups. One of these mechanisms which used to work and is still working 
parallel to ITRCs was the judiyya. 
 In Darfur judiyya has been one of the most famous and widely used 
mechanisms for conflict resolution between individuals, groups, and tribes and 
among different communities throughout the history and up to present, though 
with less efficiency.  Judiyya is described as a form of an open meeting for 
conflict settlement. However, it is a process that implies a series of steps prior 
and following the open meeting that refers to it as judiyya. As a method of 
justice and conciliation, the primary role of the judiyya was to implement 
customary law with the aim of maintaining law and order within and among 
local communities. Anticipated by many methods and measures to maintain 
peaceful coexistence within and among communities, judiyya seems to be 
dealt with as a last resort of adjudication.  
Historically perhaps the most important factors that contributed to the success 
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of the judiyya were the uncomplicated nature of disputes and the existence of 
well-established time tested systems of tribal leadership, in terms of structures, 
values, powers recognized for tribal leaders and the legitimacy of these 
leaders. In terms of economy, local communities in Darfur were dependent on 
farming and herding animals. The social structures were also not complicated 
ones; family, extended family, sub tribes and tribes. The political system was 
based on tribal leadership, as tribal leaders were the political leaders for their 
respective communities as well. As such people in these communities-
individuals and groups- knew each other very well. Also, it seems that the 
hierarchical system of power and social relationships made it easier to control 
over individuals and groups. For example, the top tribal leader was responsible 
for his tribe. However, the tribe was divided into sub tribes, lineages, extended 
families, and households. Each of these levels has a leader who was 
responsible of his own group and held accountable to the highest level in the 
ladder of leadership. Customary law which constituted the reference point for 
adjudication was well accepted and respected by the entire community. The 
acceptability of the judiyya and its outcome was, thus, primarily driven from the 
fact that communities considered that it was coping very well with their values, 
traditions and customs and they owned the process, a thing which the ITRC 
lacks. Most of the informants indicated that ITRCs lack legitimacy due to an 
increasing manipulation by government therefore the decisions made rarely 
respected.  
Contrary to the claim portrayed by government officials, and some tribal 
leaders, that ‘indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms’ such as ITRCs and 
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judiyya are  essentially the most relevant in dealing with tribal conflicts in 
Darfur, it appears that the judiyya and the ITRCs were incapable of addressing 
tribal conflicts in South Darfur-particularly in the last two decades. This was 
possibly because there has been a shift with respect to the issues over which 
people fight. Disputes that were addressed by judiyya and ITRC appear to be 
short-term disagreements that involve interests and needs such as individual 
quarrels, competition over grazing land and water points (as set out in chapter 
4 and 5). These issues were relatively negotiable and easy to resolve.  By 
contrast, long-term, deep-rooted problems and the issues underlying the on-
going conflicts in Darfur such as identity, wealth and power imbalances, and 
human rights, are not easy to find compromise for or be addressed in the same 
ways used by judiyya and ITRC in the past.  
Furthermore, causes of what came to be known as  ‘traditional tribal conflicts’ 
have also changed over time, especially after 1970s, to include competition 
over local power and land ownership as triggering factors and root causes 
respectively. ‘Traditional’ tribal conflicts used to be described as mainly 
between farmers versus pastoralists or outsider pastoralists against insider 
pastoralists over water sources and grazing land. In contrast to the above, in 
the last two decades the situation has become more complicated; parties 
involved increasingly becoming insiders, both sedentary and pastoralists with 
people from each group fought each other and within each group fought 
amongst themselves.  Following the drought and famine of the mid-1980s 
armed robbery became an additional triggering factor. Manipulation of the 
structures of the NA and local government, which has been a persistent factor 
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since the colonial period increased significantly in the last two decades (1989-
2009). As chapter 5 indicates, the ITRCs record from 1989 to 2009, suggests 
that patterns and issues of tribal conflicts in South Darfur in particular were of a 
dynamic nature meanwhile these conflicts increased over time. Proximate 
causes appeared which were related to factors such as environmental 
degradation, internal displacement, insurgency, and more importantly the 
negative role of the wars in the neighbouring countries such as Libya and 
Chad which has led to influxes of refugees and proliferation of arms. This 
negative impact of the situations in the neighbouring countries together with 
the civil war in southern Sudan encouraged militia formation in the region at 
large and South Darfur in particular respectively. On the other hand the most 
important triggering factors behind the eruption of tribal conflicts became 
armed robbery, competition over local power and other new factors such as 
abduction, rape, closure of livestock seasonal migration routes, damage of 
crops.  
All these new factors were mostly implications of the government/rebels 
struggle in Darfur (from 2002 onwards) which has resulted in further political 
polarization and dividing of the population along ethnic lines; tribes of Arab 
origin alleged to be sided with government and those of African origin alleged 
to be supporting the rebels. All these developments made tribal conflicts much 
more complicated and the old prescriptions for resolving them are no longer 
relevant.  Thus one of the contributions of this study is seeking to figure out 
which approach the ITRC employed to address tribal conflicts and where it fits 
with regard to the main theoretical approaches of dealing with conflicts. It 
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seems that the approach most adopted by successive governments to resolve 
conflicts at national and local levels was the top-down approach of conflict 
settlement. This study concluded that the ITRCs were not an exception. 
Contrary to the name attached to them (Reconciliation Conferences) the 
practical experience shows they are merely mechanism of conflict settlement 
rather than reconciliation. Thus, the causes of conflict as identified in chapter 4 
and 5 do not match with the mechanisms of judiyya and the ITRCs, as 
discussed in chapter 6 and 7 respectively.  
 
Security challenges and impediments  
Finally, a part of the most important fundamental findings of this study is that 
there are several challenges faced the ITRCs in South Darfur. The following 
sections identify some of these challenges and with a view to identifying areas 
for further research. The most important challenges are the on-going 
insurgency in the region, the exclusion of important segments of the 
communities in Darfur, such as women, IDPs, and refugees from 
representation and participation. Additional obstacles include: political 
manipulation of NA and tribal structures, lack of resources and commitment to 
implement the outcome of the ITRCs. The fact that considerable numbers of 
people have lost confidence in the state institutions of security and justice, as 
well as their lack of obedience to customary law as reference for adjudication 
represents another imperative challenge for the ITRCs, as is explained below.  
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The association between tribal reconciliation and the overall political 
settlement between the government and rebel groups has been one of the 
most challenging factors to the ITRCs in South Darfur in particular and the 
whole of Darfur in general. The direct and indirect involvement of the 
government and rebels has negatively affected reconciliation initiatives. Both 
parties show no willingness to demobilize their militia until a political settlement 
is achieved (Fadul and Tanner, 2007:292).  One of the major consequences of 
the on-going war between the government and the armed movements in 
Darfur has been the huge rift amongst local communities due to segregation 
i.e. that different communities in Darfur feel that they are treated in a biased 
way and do not enjoy equal   status. Those tribes and communities who were 
alleged or perceived to be supporting rebels or sympathizing with rebels were 
discriminated against by the government. Tribes and communities who 
supported the government enjoy and feel superior to the former group.  The 
latter group benefited from more opportunities with regard to access to state 
resources, political positions, and provision of services in their areas. They get 
direct contact with government apparatus and provide information to 
government officials and maintain strong links with the ruling class and the 
security organs (Sudanese National Security and Military Intelligence) 
(KI/14:7/6/10).  
For example, a senior tribal leader from the Fur tribe indicated that when he 
sought the total disarmament of the janjaweed as a precondition to enter into 
reconciliation with the Banihalba (Ar/o), the response from the government 
official (Commissioner of Nyala at the time) was that the Arabs need their 
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weapons to protect their livestock.  The tribal leader’s comment was that 
“whereas non Arabs were prohibited to possess weapons to protect their lives, 
Arab tribes were allowed to carry weapons for the sake of protecting their 
animals; this is a clear indication that the animals of the Arabs are more 
valuable to the government than the lives of the non-Arabs” (UN report, 
2005:7). For genuine reconciliation to be realized among tribes, a political 
settlement for the Darfur conflict (government vs. rebels) must be achieved first 
as prerequisite. This will make it possible for both sides to reach a ceasefire 
agreement, which must be fully respected by the government and the rebels, 
something which would pave the way for disarmament and save the civilian 
population from being accused of supporting either one group and hence 
targeted. 
 
The exclusion of a very important segment of the victims has been a major 
limitation on the ITRCs; the IDPs are estimated to be 2.7 million (UN Report, 
2011). In South Darfur alone, which is the least affected state in Darfur, the 
IDPs number about 820,580 (Takana, 2009:48). IDPs and refugees were 
considered to be prime victims, and they constitute the majority of the 
population affected by the conflicts.  However, the IDPs and the refugees have 
not been fully and formally represented in any of the ITRCs that took place 
over the last ten years. Therefore, their opinions and thoughts about conflict 
resolution and reconciliation have not been considered and incorporated in 
these conferences’ decision. More importantly, IDPs and refugees have lost 
confidence in government security organs and justice institutions as well as on 
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other communities and tribes sided with the government (UN report, 2007; 
Darfurian Voices, 2010). Thus, huge efforts need to be made to build trust first.  
A considerable amount of time and resources will be needed to create a 
conducive environment for reconciliation. Apart from that is restoration of 
communication with the aim to build mutual trust, first between the IDPs and 
refugees in one hand and their original members of communities who stayed 
behind in urban centres and between them and other communities sided or 
perceived to be sided with the government during the war. Such 
communications should start by exploration of common causes and interests in 
order to build on for future peaceful coexistence rather than focusing on 
differences for the time being. However a prerequisite for the return of IDPs 
and refugees is security and protection, which cannot be achieved without 
disarmament of the janjaweed and tribal militias; a good sign in this regard, 
when it comes to reconciliation, is that both the refugees and the IDPs spoke 
about justice in general terms which related to their rights over land and 
compensation for their human and property losses (Takana, 2007:18-19), as is 
explained below.  
 
Another challenge faced by the ITRCs was the inability to implement justice. 
There is an allegation that ITRCs have been used to guarantee impunity to 
perpetrators of violence (KI/8: 5/6/10; KI/15: 8/6/10; KI/21: 10/6/10 
KI/22:11/6/10). Considerable groups of people in Darfur, including the IDPs 
and refugees, were of the opinion that reconciliation should not substitute rule 
of law (Darfurian voices, 2010:20) and that some issues related to the current 
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on-going conflict in Darfur are beyond the capacity of the ITRCs to deal with. 
The refugees were quoted saying that ITRCs and judiyya would not be 
sufficient on their own for dealing with the crimes that have occurred in Darfur. 
The reason for this was that “indigenous mechanisms were never meant to 
deal with crimes of this magnitude; they were meant only to address disputes 
amongst tribes or between individuals, but not between tribes or individuals on 
the one hand and the government on the other” (Darfurian voices, 2010:20).  
 
Justice in the post conflict situation remains a controversial issue; as the 
question is what kind of justice is required in the post conflict situation? 
Academics and practitioners debate whether priority should be given to 
achieving peace and political stability or should the emphasis be on 
prosecution of perpetrators (Alie, 2008). Over the last few years a heated 
debate over justice and peace in Darfur was held at the international and 
regional levels (the UN and the African Union-AU- respectively). The UN 
referred the whole situation in Darfur to the ICC, as mentioned earlier, as a 
result Al-Bashir the president of the Sudan and other senior officials were 
indicted. So, the above mentioned debate was repeated which was should 
priority be given to achieving peace agreement first or should the emphasis be 
on trial of perpetrators. The AU supports the first position and the UN seems to 
be more supportive to the second position. However the people on the ground 
appeared to be less concerned about this debate and their priorities were 
different, as will shortly be explained. 
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As I mentioned earlier the conflict in Darfur has divided the population along 
tribal and ethnic lines, destroyed institutions and distorted norms and values, 
and hence undermined social trust and confidence between and within 
communities. While retributive justice focuses on formal court proceedings 
through criminal trials, the emphasis of the restorative justice is rebuilding of 
social trust, healing of social divisions and restoration of broken relationships 
(Malan, 2008:144). Transitional justice comes in the middle between these two 
versions of justice. Generally, as discussed earlier, TJ consists of policies and 
approaches pursued by post-conflict state to deal with atrocities and human 
rights violations occurred in the past and it combines together the principles of 
truth finding, justice, and respect for victims as well as formal court 
proceedings, reparations and apology (El Amin, 2010:94). As the indigenous 
conflict resolution mechanisms are mostly described as restorative justice- 
oriented initiatives, they can play a complementary role and could be 
incorporated as an alternative form of restorative justice especially in African 
countries where such practices are deeply rooted (Alie, 2008:03); bearing in 
mind that peace often results in a compromise agreement between the 
warriors (Pankhurst,1999). The “traditional mechanisms for justice and 
reconciliation thus may help to avoid the dangers of too much and of too little 
criminal justice” (Alie, 2008).  
 
In Darfur the scenario of transitional justice that includes the judiyya and ITRCs 
as part of the restorative justice components seems to be feasible. This is 
because in spite of the shortcomings that this study has already identified, 
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these mechanisms are still widely used and are relatively widely accepted, 
especially by mostly war-affected groups such as the IDPs and the refugees 
(UN report, 2007; Darfurian voices, 2010; Takana, 2007). It is true that these 
people were left with no other option and thus these mechanisms remain the 
only possible option to resolve their disputes. It is also true that in a post 
conflict situation time is needed to establish new competent and reliable 
institutions at local levels and therefore the only option in the short-term would 
be to deal with the old institutions until new ones emerge to replace them.  
 
The main issue raised in this regard was what were the issues relevant to be 
addressed by indigenous mechanisms and which issues fall beyond their 
ability? For example, in a survey conducted in 2009 by an INGO which 
targeted the Darfurian refugees in Chad, when they asked about the possibility 
of employing the indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution to deal with the 
situation in Darfur the answer was not a straightforward yes or no.  They stated 
that “indigenous mechanisms alone will not be able to deal with the legacy of 
conflict” however remarkably about 90% of the respondents considered these 
mechanisms to be very important in bringing about peace amongst 
communities in Darfur (Darfurian Voices, 2010:20). Another point was that 
when asked ‘whom they believed was most responsible for the violence?’ over 
80% of respondents answered the Government of Sudan or President Al-
Bashir and less than 20% assigned primary responsibility to the janjaweed 
(Darfurian Voices, 2010:20). Meanwhile over 75% of the population believed 
that reconciliation between the tribes of Darfur was possible (Darfurian Voices, 
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2010:20-21). This indicates that the majority of the refugees principally 
perceived the government as their enemy rather than groups of perpetrators 
from within their neighbouring communities, which I believe will make 
reconciliation possible. Additionally, when a survey was conducted with the 
major war-affected groups from within the region and their alleged opponents 
about what they considered to be their conditions for future reconciliation in 
Darfur, the answer came as follows (Takana, 2007:18-19): 
Fur asserted that reconciliation could be possible if the following conditions 
were to be met: 
1. There was peace and security 
     2. Disarmament of the janjaweed 
3. Recognition of hakura and land traditional rights. 
4. Change of government policies 
5. Compensation for their losses 
For the Zaghawa reconciliation could be possible only if: 
1. Change of government policies is achieved 
2. Recognition of their rights over land and native administration 
3. Compensation for their losses 
4. Janjaweed disarmament 
5. Traditional methods of reconciliation are acceptable 
For the group of tribes of Arab origin in South Darfur (Baggara), reconciliation 
could be achieved if the following were to be met: 
1. Control and disarmament of the armed movements (rebel groups) 
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2. Compensation for all those affected by war especially the displaced 
persons 
3. Reconciliation should start step by step in each locality 
4. Traditional customary laws are to be considered the best mechanism for 
such reconciliation. 
 For the group of tribes of camel herders of an Arab origin (Aballa), 
prerequisites for reconciliation in Darfur were: 
 1. Change of government policies 
2. Recognition of their rights over land and native administration 
3. Compensation for their losses 
4. Janjaweed disarmament 
5. Traditional methods of reconciliation are acceptable 
 
Three comments need to be made with regard to these statements. First, the 
four groups were asked these questions separately, yet they arrived at similar 
conclusions. They all agreed to disarmament as a prerequisite for 
reconciliation, which reinforces the conclusion made by this study that 
settlement of the wider Darfur conflict (government/Rebels) would made it 
possible to resolve tribal conflicts. Also three groups out of four pointed to the 
importance of the change in government policies; again this consolidates the 
analysis made by this study that government interventions and manipulation of 
NA and local government contributed to the escalation of tribal conflicts. 
Further, and this is also very important, all groups mentioned the importance of 
traditional methods of reconciliation or customary law in this respect; including 
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“Recognition of hakura and land traditional rights”, which is fundamentally 
based on customary law too. This analysis matches with the overall idea 
voiced by the refugees and the internally displaced people that if issues related 
to the major atrocities and gross human right violations, such as mass killings, 
destruction of villages and policies of segregation-which were all believed to be 
government-related, were resolved formally, the rest of the issues could 
possibly be dealt with through the indigenous methods of reconciliation. This is 
an additional contribution for this study which responds to the question of 
whether issues provoked by the current conflicts in Darfur could be addressed 
by the ITRCs or are they beyond the ability of the ITRCs.  
 
Also, one of the fundamental findings with regard to the ITRCs was that 
women’s representation and participation in these conferences was reported 
as nil. Women’s representation and participation in ITRCs represents another 
imperative challenge for the ITRCs. Musa, (2011:357) stated that women, 
particularly, the hakamat (women poets/singers of Arab origin tribes) were 
heavily involved in agitating tribal disputes and were still not involved in 
resolving them. This was connected to the fact that NA was (and still is) 
predominantly a male domain. With the enormous changes within 
communities, an increase in the role of women in socio-economic and political 
affairs, their participation and representation in future peace efforts is vital.  
Another big challenge for the ITRCs is the political manipulation and 
polarization of tribes. The armed struggle between the government and the 
rebels has made the political manipulation and polarization of tribes in Darfur 
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even worse. Efforts have been made by both parties, as mentioned earlier, to 
gain the support of tribal and community leaders even by getting rid of or 
replacing some of them. Tribes of African origin were divided by war into two 
groups: one group was those who remained in their original places or moved 
into urban centres, and the other group was the refugees and the IDPs. The 
direct result of this divisive situation was the emergence of two rival groups of 
leadership within the former group, one associated with the government and 
the other closer to the IDPs and the armed movements (UN report, 2005). 
Therefore, the confrontation between the two groups and their rival supporters 
has already caused enormous difficulties for the reconciliation attempts 
amongst these groups; ITRCs were accused by those sympathized with IDPs, 
refugees and the armed movements, of having been lacking on genuine 
representation and thus legitimacy. The allegation was that participation in 
these conferences was made obligatory or by providing incentives by 
government to participants (KI/6: 5/6/10; KI/9:6/6/10; KI/11:6/6/10).  
 
Lack of financial resources and lack of political will and commitment to 
implement the outcome of these conferences have been a challenge to the 
ITRCs. Some of the key informants argued that even in cases where all parties 
were genuinely represented and engaged in good faith to achieve 
reconciliation, no implementation of the agreements was accomplished (KI/6: 
5/6/10; KI/9:6/6/10; KI/11:6/6/10) .  This was due to the fact that the 
government failed to meet its commitment either with regard to the payment of 
diyya and compensations or establishing of mechanisms of implementation 
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with full government support in terms of resources and specified mandate. 
Therefore in order to achieve ITRCs’ ultimate goals, the government should 
put aside the required resources, take seriously other arrangements needed 
for the implementation of these agreements on the ground.  Furthermore, in 
most of the ITRCs investigated by this study, the government has failed to fulfil 
its commitments and obligations offered to the communities of the IDPs. These 
were the payment of compensation to victims or their relatives and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and making the situation conducive for the return 
of the IDPs, and so protection is also included.   
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APPENDIX 
Archival Reports of “Al-musalahat al-ahliya alati tamat fi wilayat Janub Dar fur 
fi alfatra min 2003-2008” (in Arabic) (Tribal Reconciliations in South Darfur, 
2003-2008(TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 1& Vol. 2) 
 
 TRSD, 2003-08: Vol.1: (this volume includes 9 Conferences) 
Conference1.............................................................................. Page: 1-16 
1. Conference description: 
This conference called Kass Conference for Peaceful Co-existence, which 
held in Kass town, west of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State in the 
period: 20-23 Jan., 2003. 
2. Papers included:    …………………………………………………..Page No                                                                                             
i. Introduction........................................................... ..........................01  
ii. Methodology...................................................................................2-3 
iii. Decisions & Recommendations......................................................3-6 
iv. List of the names of the mediators..................................................7-8          
v. Losses & damages’ evaluation Committee......................................09 
vi. Classification of Decisions & Recommendations…………...............10 
vii. Declaration by the parties to the conflict......................................11-12 
viii. Names of the negotiators from the Fur tribe.....................................13 
ix. Cessation of hostilities declaration...............................................14-16 
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Conference2….............................................................................Page: 17-25 
1. Conference description: 
This conference called the Final Conference for Peace amongst the tribes in 
Kass town: between the Fur and tribes located in and around Kass. The 
conference which considered as continuation for the first conference was also 
held in Kass in 21 April, 2003. 
2. Papers included:                                                                                          
i. Covering page............................................................................17 
ii. Introduction to the conference....................................................18 
iii. Decisions & Recommendations..............................................19-22 
iv. Declaration by the parties to the conflict...................................23-24 
v. Wali’s decree with regard to the mechanism of implementation...25 
 
Conference 3......................................................................................Page: 26-3 
1. Conference description: 
This conference called the Social reconciliation Conference between the 
people of the two administrative Units of Shattaya and Umlabasa which took 
place in Umlabasa on 11-13/December, 2003. 
2. Papers included: 
i. Introduction.........................................................27-28 
ii. Declaration of Commitment signed by representatives of the two 
parties………………………………………...29 
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iii. Final declaration to ………….…..............................30-31 
 
Conference4 ………………………………………………………. Page: 32-36 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Reconciliation between the Tarjam and the Rezeigat. It 
was held in Nyala during the period of 10/05/-03/06/2005. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page………………………………………………….....32 
ii. Speech by the  Chairperson of the Mediators…………….…..33-34 
iii. Speech by Tarjam tribe……………………………………………...35 
iv. Oath form……………………………………………………………...36 
 
Conference5 ……………………………………………………… Page: 37-41 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Juruf Conference for Peaceful Co-existence between 
the Tribes of the sedentary and Nomads. It was held in Nyala on 19/09/2006. 
2. Details of papers included contents: 
i. Covering page………………………………………………….37 
ii.  End of Conference Declaration ………………………….....38-39 
iii. recommendations of the conference …………………………..40 
iv. Signatories ...……………………………………………………….41 
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Conference6 ……………………………………………………….Page: 42-81 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference amongst the Tribes of 
Sherriya Locality (The Birgid, the Zaghawa, and the Miseirriya). It was held in 
Nyala on 11-19/12/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page…………………………………............................42 
ii. Speech delivered by the Chairman of the conference……….43-44 
iii. Speech delivered by the rebels signatories to the DPA………….45 
iv. Speech delivered by the Chairman of the Legislature and by the Wali 
………………………………………………………………………..46-47 
v. Speech delivered by the Nazir of the Birgid tribe……………….48-59 
vi. Summary of the letter submitted by Birgid tribe………. ………..60-64 
a. Summary of the letter delivered by the Zaghawa ………65-68 
vii. End of conference declaration…………………………………….69-72  
viii. Conference recommendations…………………………..................73-74 
ix. Declaration of Peace and Brotherhood………………………………..75 
x. Support of the Signatories to the Peace agreement (DPA) to the parties 
of the reconciliation in Sherriya Locality……………………...............76 
xi. Signature of representatives of the Mediators……....………………..77 
xii. Signature of representatives of the Birgid tribe……………………….78 
xiii. Signature of representatives of the Zaghawa tribe…………………...79 
xiv. Signature of the Birgid witnesses……………………………………80-81 
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Conference7 ………………………………………………………Page : 82-139 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Marla Conference for Reconciliation between the Tribes 
of the Zaghawa, and the Zaghawa-Umkamalti. It was held in Nyala on 
Feb./March, 2007. 
2. Details of papers included : 
v. Covering page……………………………………………………82 
vi.  Mediators’ Committee…………………………………………..83 
vii. Speech delivered by the Wali of the South Darfur State……84 
viii. Speech delivered by the Zaghawa …………………………….85-92 
ix. List of human losses of the Zaghawa ………………………….93-101 
x. List of fruits’ garden get damaged…………………………………102 
xi. Speech delivered by the Zaghawa-Umkamalti……………..103-118 
xii. Summary of the letter delivered by Zaghawa-Umkamalti …119-129 
xiii. End of Conference Declaration………………………………130-131  
xiv. Conference’s Decisions…………………………………..........132-134 
xv. Conference’s Recommendations……………………………..135-136 
xvi. Signatories from the two parties (Zaghawa &Zaghawa-
Umkamalti)……………………………………………………...137-138 
xvii. Signature of endorsement………………………………………….139 
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Conference8 ………………………………………………………Page: 140-147 
   1. Conference description 
This conference called Reconciliation Conference between the Birgid and the 
Rezeigat tribes. This conference took place in Sillai’a in Sherriya locality on the 
4th and 5th of October, 2007. 
2. Details of papers included: 
 
i. Covering page…………………………………………………..140 
ii.  End of Conference Declaration and Decisions...…………..141-142  
iii. Conference’s Recommendations……………………………...143-144 
iv. List of the names of the Birgid delegation………………………….145 
v. List of the names of the Rezeigat delegation………………............146 
vi. Signature of the witnesses…………………………………………...147 
 
Conference9  ……………………………………………………… Page: 148-166 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Reconciliation Conference between the Gimir and the 
Falata tribes. The conference took place in Nyala on 15-18/1/2008. 
2. Details of papers included: 
 
i. Covering page……………………………………………148 
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ii. End of Conference Declaration and Decisions...…….149-151  
iii. The Basic Document of the Agreement between the Gimir & 
the 
Falata…………………………………………………………152-
155 
iv. Recommendation of the conference………………….…..156 
v. Interpretation Note in relation to the Agreement Document 
……………………………………………………………..157-164 
vi. Names of the Gimir  representatives…………………….…165 
vii. Names of the Falata representatives………………………166 
 
TRSD, 2003-08: Vol. 2 (this volume includes 15 Conferences) 
 
Conference1 …………………………………………………………Page:1-15 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the Maaliya 
and the Rezeigat Tribes which held in Nyala on October, 2004. 
2) Details of papers included : 
i. Covering page…………………………………………………….01 
ii. Introduction………………………………………………………..02 
iii. End of Conference Declaration…………………………………03-05  
iv. Conference’s general recommendations………………………06-07 
v. Interpretation Note in relation to the Agreement’s Document..08-11 
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vi. List of the names of the Maaliya delegation……………………12-13 
vii. List of the names of the Rezeigat delegation…………………..14-15 
 
Conference2 ……………………………………………………… Page: 16-29 
3) Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the Daju, Fur, 
Zaghawa, Huttiya, Tarjam, and the Taalba tribes. The conference held in 
Nyala on 12/12/ 2004. 
4) Details of papers included : 
i. Introduction………………………………………………………16 
ii. End of Conference Declaration……………………………….17-20  
iii. General recommendations…………………………………………21 
iv. Declaration of Commitment by the tribes involved…………..22-23 
v. Names of the Tribes’ representatives with their signature…24-27 
vi. Speech delivered by the secretary of the conference…………28 
vii. Photos for the Wali of South Darfur and the Norwegian Minister for 
International Cooperation addressing the conference…………29 
 
Conference3 ………………………………………………………… Page: 30-42 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Peaceful Co-existence Conference between the 
Tribes at the borders between the Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR). 
The conference took place in Umdafog, South Darfur on 1-3/03/ 2005. 
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2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page…………………………………………………….….30 
ii. Wali’s decree of establishing a committee to prepare for the 
conference……………………………………………………………31-32 
iii. End of Conference Declaration……………………………………33-35  
iv. Reconciliation 
document……………………………………………………………..36-37 
v. The recommendations……………………………………………..38-40 
vi. Declaration of Commitment by the tribes at the borders of the Sudan 
&CAR…………………………………………………………………….41 
vii. Wali’s decree of establishing a committee to follow up on the outcome 
of the conference……………………………………………………….42 
 
Conference4 …………………………………………………………Page : 43-49 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Conference for Reconciliation amongst the tribes 
in and around Almalam Administrative Unit. The conference took place in 
Nyala on 4-05/2/2005 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page………………………………………………..……….44 
ii. Wali’s decree of establishing a committee to prepare for the conference 
……………………………………………………….……....................45-46 
iii. Criteria established for estimation of losses and compensations..47-49 
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Conference5 ……………………………………………………Page : 50-81 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Peaceful Co-existence Conference between the 
tribes of the Habaniyya and the Falata. The conference took place in Buram 
from 06-09/04/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page…………………………………………..……….50 
ii. Claims and counter claims made by the two tribes………….51-56 
iii. Details of human and property losses submitted by the Habaniyya & the 
Falata………………………………………………………………57-59 
iv. Closing Session Programme……………………………………….60 
v. Remarks on the closing session…………………………………...61 
vi. Decisions made by the ajaweed...................................................62-63 
vii. Decisions made by the conference……………………………………64 
viii. Appreciations by the conference……………………………………….65 
ix. The General Recommendations of the Conference………………66-67 
x. Telegraphs received by the conference……………………………..68-73 
xi. Names of the conference’s secretary……………………………………74 
xii. Names of the negotiators from the Habaniyya tribe…………………….75 
xiii. Names of the delegation from the Habaniyya tribe ……………………..76 
xiv. Names of the negotiators from the Falata tribe…………………………77 
xv. Names of the delegation from the Falata tribe………………………….78 
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xvi. Signature of the representatives of the Habaniyya, the Falata and the 
witnesses……………………………………………………………………79 
xvii. Names of the nominees from the Habaniyya in the investigation 
committee............................................................................................80  
xviii. Names of the nominees from the Falata in the investigation 
committee…..........................................................................................81 
 
Conference6 ………………………………………………………Page : 82-92 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the Banga and 
Kara tribes. The conference took place in Sango in al-Radom from 26-
30/11/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page………………………………………………………..82 
ii. Names of the conference’s secretary …………………………......83 
iii. Names of the Ajaweed………………………………………............84 
iv. End of Conference Declaration………………………………….....85-87 
v. Conference recommendations…………………………………………88 
vi. Declaration of Commitment by the two tribes…………………………89 
vii. Names of the signatories from the Banga tribe……………………….90 
viii. Names of the signatories from the Kara tribe………………………….91 
ix. Signatures of the witnesses……………………………………………..92 
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Conference7 …………………………………………………………Page : 93-95 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference for the tribes in Safia. 
The conference took place in Safia village South of Nyala on 09/05/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Letter addressed to the Wali of South Darfur State through the 
Commissioner of Nyala locality which includes the decisions and 
recommendations made by the conference, in addition to the names of 
the representatives of tribes involved……………………………93-95 
 
Conference8 ……………………………………………………… Page: 96-103 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the two 
localities of Nyala and Id al-Fursan. The conference took place in Nyala from 
20-27/7/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page……………………………………………………….96 
ii. End of Conference Declaration……………………………………97-100 
iii. List of the names of negotiators from Nyala locality…………………101 
iv. List of the names of negotiators from Id al-Fursan locality………….102 
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v. Signature of Head of the delegations of each party and the 
witnesses…………………………………………………………………103  
 
Conference9 ………………………………………………………Page : 104-108 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Peaceful Co-existence Conference. The conference 
took place in Ditto, South of Nyala in 2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Peaceful Co-existence Commitment….…………………………104-107 
ii. Signatures by representatives of the tribes involved………………..108  
 
Conference10 ……………………………………………………Page : 109-123 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the Tribe of 
Zaghawa-Umkamalti in Marla and the tribes of Fur and Kinana in Hijair Tunu. 
The conference took place in Nyala from 26-29/6/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. Covering page……………………………………………………..109 
ii. Speech delivered by the Fur and Kinana ………………………110 
iii. Speech delivered by the Zaghawa-Umkamalti…………………111 
iv. End of Conference Declaration…………………………………..112-113 
v. The Reconciliation Agreement…………………………………………114 
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vi. General recommendations……………………………………………..115 
vii. Declaration of Commitment…………………………………………….116 
viii. List of human and property losses for all parties…………………….117 
ix. List of the names of the negotiators from the Zaghawa-
Umkamalti…………………………………………………………..118-119 
x. List of the names of the negotiators from the Fur and Kinana 
tribes……..................................................................................120-121 
xi. Ajaweed committee from the Tarjam tribe…………………………..122 
xii. Signatures of representatives from each party and the 
witnesses…………………………………………………………………123  
 
Conference11 ………………………………………………….Page: 124-125 
1. Conference description 
This conference called The Reconciliation Conference between the Shattiya 
and Ummahmad sub tribes of the Rezeigat. The conference took place in 
Nyala from on 23/08/2006. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. An agreement signed by the two parties and witnesses…124-125 
 
Conference12 ……………………………………………………Page : 126-128 
1. Conference description 
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This conference called the agreement for resolving the Ettafat problem. The 
meeting took place at nomads’ settlement close to Nyala. 
2. Details of papers included: 
i. The agreement for resolving the Etifat problem …………..126-127 
ii. List of the names of the Ajaweed……………………………………128 
 
Conference13 ……………………………………………………Page : 129-135 
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This conference called Abujazu Conference for Peace and Development. The 
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i. End of Conference Declaration………………...........................129-131 
ii. List of the witnesses from the ajaweed………………………………132 
iii. List of the witnesses from Khartoum’s delegation………………….133 
iv. Signatures of representatives from each party and the witnesses 
……………………………………………………………………….134-135 
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Note. Two different dates (26/12/2006& 6/2/2008) for the conference were 
reflected in the headed printed paper. However the attached handwriting 
original document indicates that the conference was held on 26/12/2006. 
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i. An agreement of Peaceful Co-existence ………………………..136-137 
ii. An agreement of Peaceful Co-existence(handwriting document)…138  
 
Conference15 …………………………………………………… Page: 139-146 
1. Conference description 
This conference called Reconciliation Conference between Awlad Saadan 
(Habaniyya) and the Bargo on one hand and the Salamat tribe. The 
conference took place in Buram town, the urban centre of Buram locality on 
2/9/2007.  
2. Details of papers included: 
i. End of Conference Declaration ………….……………………..139-144 
ii. The Secretary of the conference……………………………………..145  
iii. Conclusion………………………………………………………………146 
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Data Collection Instruments 
Research Information Sheet: 
This information sheet consists of three parts:  
1) Information related to the researcher. 
2) Information related to the research. 
3) Informed consent Statement and consent form. 
 
Part 1 
Information on the Researcher 
Researcher: Zuhair Bashar Gado 
  
Contact:  Department of Peace Studies, School of Social and International 
Studies, 
University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, UK. 
Tel: +44 01274 232323 
Fax: +44 01274 236302  
 
Affiliation: PhD Research Student, Department of Peace Studies, University 
of Bradford, UK. 
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Part 2 
Information on the Research 
 
Title of the research: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION IN 
SUDAN: INTER-TRIBAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCES IN SOUTH 
DARFUR STATE UP TO 2009. 
   
Introduction:  In Sudan and Darfur region in particular, Native Administration 
(NA) or Tribal Leadership structures and their mechanisms of tribal conflict 
resolution/management have been described to me by some tribal leaders and 
identified by government officials as though they have remained unchanged 
since pre-colonial times. Particularly, despite the changes in life of the 
communities, issues of conflict, and government policies towards NA and local 
government, the Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) were being 
portrayed as an unchanging mechanism. This research claims that in fact there 
have been highly significant changes over time which may have affected their 
efficiency. 
 
Location of the Research: South Darfur state, Darfur region, Western Sudan. 
 
Period of Field work: June, 2010 
Primary aim: This study aims to explore and critically examine the role of the 
Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences (ITRCs) in resolving tribal conflicts in 
Darfur Region of Western Sudan. 
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Specific objectives:  
-To investigate the way these mechanisms work and their effectiveness in 
resolving conflicts among different tribes.  
- To point out different factors that contributed to the success/or failure of these 
mechanisms. 
-To look into the impact of governance on such mechanism, particularly the 
impact of decentralization policies on the systems of local government and 
Native Administration. 
- To investigate the origins of these policies and the current philosophy / 
political ambitions attributed to them by different parties? 
 
Participants:  Selected key informants. These are knowledgeable elders with 
regard to tribal conflicts and customary law, tribal and community leaders, local 
government practitioners, civil society activists, government officials and rebel 
leaders, who have directly dealt with tribal conflicts and reconciliation 
conferences. 
 
Expectation on the participants: Individual interview will be conducted 
separately with each participant. 
 
Expected Outcomes: Sudan is generally excluded from the many studies that 
have covered conflict resolution in Africa; in this respect very little literature on 
Sudan is available and this is where I expect to make a contribution. 
Furthermore, the term ‘traditional’ is a Eurocentric notion which tends to 
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describe an existence of static normative structure, however in reality these 
structures are subject to change (Wassara, 2007). The clarity of some issues 
related to concepts, methodology and terminology might be another area of 
potential contribution. It seems that there is a clear gap at the theoretical level 
as reconciliation process needs to be theoretically defined and framed in the 
context of Sudan in general and Darfur in particular in order to test its 
applicability in the new context of conflict. At the practical level, as conflict has 
been deadly in Darfur, the research may provide analysis that might possibly 
assist in identifying the most effective and sustainable ways to resolve it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3 
 
Informed consent Statement  
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 Participation: voluntary consent of the participant is central point in this 
research. You have the right to be provided with accurate information about 
this research so as to decide freely whether to participate in it or not. 
Voluntary consent here means your participation in this research based on 
voluntary decision and that you have the full right to withdraw from the 
research process at any point and at any time as well. Also you have the 
right to change, amend or withdraw any information provided at any stage 
in the research, including stages of writing up and publishing. I would like to 
assure you that your participation in this research will not affect your work 
or any work-related activities.  
 Confidentiality and Anonymity:  The information generated from the 
interviews and group discussions will be treated confidentially. All possible 
measures will be taken to ensure that the information will not be accessible 
to anyone else. In the group discussion, the researcher will ask each 
participant to respect the confidentiality of the information being revealed 
by his/her colleagues in the group. In case you feel worried that answers 
might easily be attributed to you, such answers will be paraphrased. Also 
all the names of the participants will be changed together with any other 
details that might identify his or her personality and codes will be put 
instead.  The researcher himself will transcribe the interviews on a 
password protected computer. This is to ensure that participants will not 
find themselves at risk due to public disclosure of any information they have 
made available to the researcher. 
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 Risks and benefits: The researcher sees no potential risk that might 
emerge from your participation in this research. However, if any participant 
(he/she) or the researcher on his own feels that a participant might be at 
risk-whether real or perceived- as a result of his/her participation in this 
study, the researcher will avoid inviting such person to take part in this 
research. No financial benefit or any other benefit will be offered to you by 
the researcher or anyone else related to this study due to your participation 
in this research process. 
 Archiving: The researcher himself will transcribe the interviews on a 
password protected computer. The computer where the information is 
stored will be located at the University of Bradford during my resident in 
UK. When I return home the computer where the information is stored will 
be located at the University where I work at my home country. This 
information will be kept for the duration of a PhD research project (2008-
2012). It will be used solely for the purpose of this project and then 
destroyed following a reasonable period of time. 
 
 Questions about the Research: If you have more questions about the 
research, please feel free to direct them to me or to my supervisor: 
Professor Donna Pankhurst through email or telephone as per her details 
below: 
Email : d.t.pankhurst@bradford.ac.uk 
Tel.: +44 (1274) 234176 
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Researcher signature:..................................... 
 
Date:..................................................... 
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Consent form 
 
Researcher:  Zuhair Bashar Gado 
  
Contact: Department of Peace Studies, School of Social and International 
Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, UK. 
Tel: +44 01274 232323, Fax: +44 01274 236302 
Home Tel: +44(1274)728437 
Personal mobile:          +447518724435 
Email:  zmbashar@bradford.ac.uk or zuhairbashar@yahoo.co.uk 
 
 
Affiliation:  PhD Research Student, Department of Peace Studies,  
University of Bradford, UK. 
 
I ……… (Name) confirm that I have read the information sheet provided. 
 I have the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and get 
clarifications. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary 
and that I have a right to withdraw at any time or stage of the study, including 
withdraw of information provided at writing up stage without prior notice and 
without any repercussions on my side. To my understanding all the information 
I will provide, will be treated as confidential and will be anonymous. I 
understand this research is for the fulfilment of PhD requirements and I agree 
to the use of anonymous direct quotes from my interview in publications .   
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By signing this form I confirm that I have read and understood the  
Information and voluntarily agree to take part in the above study. I recognise 
that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
 
 
Name of participant            Date                           Signature 
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Research questions 
 
 What were the key features of the Native Administration, 
the local government and the central government during 
the British colonial period?: 
 What was the role played by the colonial government in 
the ITRCs; particularly the enforcement of rule of law and 
the effectiveness of the government to serve as guarantor 
for the implementation of reconciliation agreements? 
                   What changes have been taking place in the government-Native 
administration relationship at central and local levels since Sudan’s 
independence?  
 What were the main factors behind these changes?  
 How far have these changes influenced the competency 
and the effectiveness of government institutions to 
enforce the rule of law and to act as guarantor for the 
implementation of the reconciliation agreements? 
 What have been the repercussions of these changes on 
the effectiveness of the institutions, structures, and 
consequently the role of the Native Administration? 
 Are the ITRCs valid as conflict resolution and reconciliation 
mechanisms? 
 Have these reconciliation conferences-at least for the last 
two decades- been able to address the root causes of the 
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conflict such as changes in land ownership, environmental 
degradation, and their impact on livelihoods? 
 Have they addressed new issues that have been provoked 
by the Darfur current crisis such as the mass killings, 
burning of villages, forced displacement, land occupation 
and rape cases?  
 What were the main impediments and challenges that 
faced the ITRCs in dealing with these issues?  
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Research Questions in relation to information needed and how to be 
obtained: 
Research Question Information needed How to Obtain it 
What were the key 
features of the NA, the 
local government and the 
central government 
during the British colonial 
period?  
 
Historical information 
about the establishment 
of NA during colonial rule 
and nature of its work 
and powers 
From Secondary 
sources such as 
books, archives, etc. 
What was the role played 
by the colonial 
government in the 
ITRCs; particularly the 
enforcement of rule of 
law and the effectiveness 
of the government to 
serve as guarantor for 
the implementation of 
reconciliation 
agreements? 
Historical information 
about the past ITRCs, 
their mechanisms and 
their effectiveness  
From secondary 
sources such as 
books, archives, etc. 
Have these reconciliation 
conferences-at least for 
How effective was the 
dealing of the ITRCs with 
From ITRCs archive 
documents + 
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the last two decades- 
been able to address the 
root causes of the conflict 
such as land ownership 
and environmental 
degradation and its 
impact on livelihoods? 
 
these issues based on 
the ITRCs documents, 
views of the affected 
people and parties of 
conflict. 
interviews with key 
informants 
Have ITRCs addressed 
current issues such as 
the mass killings, burning 
of villages, forced 
displacement, land 
occupation and rape 
cases? 
How effective was the 
dealing of the ITRCs with 
these issues based on 
the ITRCs documents, 
Views of the affected 
people and parties of 
conflict.  
Secondary and 
primary sources:  
generated from ITRCs 
documents, reports 
and interviews with key 
informants. 
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Interview Questions: 
Issue1: Native Administration (NA) during the British colonial period. 
 
Q.1. In your opinion, what were the key features of the NA during the colonial 
era? 
Q.2. what were the key features of relationship between NA, local government 
and central government? 
Q.3. what was the role played by the government in the ITRCs? 
               -probing: do you think the government was effective in law 
enforcement and to serve as guarantor for the implementation of the 
agreements reached during these conferences? 
Issue2: Native administration following Sudan’s independence. 
 
 Q.4. what were the key features of the NA following Sudan’s independence in 
1956? 
    Probing: What changes have been taking place in the government-Native 
administration relationship at central and local levels? What were the main 
factors behind these changes?  
 
Issue3: the repercussions of governance’s changes. 
 
  Q.5. How far have these changes in regimes and administration system 
influenced the competency and the effectiveness of government and NA 
institutions? 
  
432 
 
Probing:  with regard to the rule of law and for the government to act as 
guarantor for the implementation of the agreements reached in these 
conferences? 
Q.6. what have been the repercussions of these changes on the NA? 
   Probing: effectiveness on the institutions, structures, and consequently the 
role played by the Native Administration regarding management of tribal 
conflict or resolving it? 
Issue4: Main causes of tribal conflicts in Darfur. 
 
 Q7. What were the issues and triggering factors of the tribal conflicts in 
Darfur? 
 
Issue5: Established mechanisms and structures of tribal conflicts 
management/resolution. 
 
Q8.what was the established mechanisms and structures in dealing with these 
conflicts? 
 
Q9. Do you think ITRCs were part of the established mechanisms? 
 
Q10.Who initiates the ITRCs, decides date, venue, and timeframe, and 
provides logistical and financial support? 
 
Q11.Who selects the mediators, tribal representatives and how? 
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Q12.Do participants to ITRCs get paid? If yes, who pays them? 
 
Q13. How do ITRCs work; what were the procedures during the meetings? 
 
Q14. How do conclusions reached in these conferences? 
 
Q15. How do the agreements reached by the ITRCs get implemented? 
 
Q16. Have the ITRCs-at least for the last two decades- been able to address 
the root causes of the tribal conflicts in Darfur? If not; why? 
 
Probing: regarding issues such as conflict over land ownership/or boundaries, 
competition over natural resources resulted from environmental degradation, 
competition over local power/leadership?  
Q.17. Have the ITRCs addressed new issues that have been provoked by the 
Darfur current crisis? If not; why? 
Probing: Issues such as the mass killings, burning of villages, forced 
displacement, land occupation and rape cases? Have these issues ever been 
brought up as part of the agenda of the ITRCs?  
Q.18. In your opinion what were the limitations of the ITRCs? 
 
Q.19. what were the main impediments and challenges that faced the ITRCs?  
Probing: Is it organizational related issues, resources related, limitations with 
regard to agenda and mandate, political manipulation?  
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List of Key Informants (coded) 
 
Key Informants (KI) from South Darfur interviewed in June/July 2010. 
NO. Full Name Tribe Code Interview 
Date 
Title 
1. ….. Fur KI/1 3/6/10 Shartai of Fur  
2. ….. Birgid KI/2 3/6/10 Chairman of 
local NGO 
3 ……. Birgid KI/3 4/6/10 Member of 
the Executive 
Committee of 
the Farmers’ 
Union 
4 ……. Tarjam KI/4 4/6/10 Tribal leader 
and member 
of the South 
Darfur 
Legislative 
Council. 
5 ……. Fur KI/5 4/6/10 Retired 
Military 
officer 
6 …….. Birgid KI/6 5/6/10 Retired clerk 
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of local court. 
7 …….. Tarjam KI/7 5/6/10 Member of 
the tribe’s 
Consultation 
Council 
(Shura 
Council) 
8 …….. Banihalba KI/8 5/6/10 Retired 
school 
teacher 
9 …….. Habaniyya KI/9 6/6/10 Retired 
School 
teacher 
10 …….. Massalit KI/10 6/6/10 Tribal leader 
of Massalit-
Gereida area. 
11 …….. Bargo KI/11 6/6/10 Member of 
NA Executive 
Office in 
South Darfur 
12 ……… Fur KI/12 7/6/10 Shartai of Fur 
13 ....... Maaliya KI/13 7/6/10 Former 
combatant of 
the SLA/M-
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Minawi 
faction 
14 …….. Falata KI/14 7/6/10 Local 
government 
officer 
15 …….. Fur KI/15 8/6/10 Former 
Deputy 
magdoom of 
Fur 
16 …….. Bargo KI/16 8/6/10 Chairperson 
of local NGO 
17 ……. Maaliya KI/17 8/6/10 Local 
government 
officer- the 
Ministry of 
Local 
Government-
South Darfur. 
18 ……. Taaisha KI/18 9/6/10 University 
Lecturer, 
Nyala 
University. 
19 ….. Benihalba KI/19 9/6/10 Chairman of 
local NGO 
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20 ……. Barnu KI/20 10/6/10 Local 
government 
officer, 
Ministry of 
Local 
Government-
South Darfur 
21 …….. Falata KI/21 10/6/10 Tribal leader 
from Falata 
tribe. 
22 …….. Tarjam KI/22 11/6/10 Former 
school 
teacher.  
23 …….. Falata KI/23 11/6/10 Former local 
government 
officer.  
24 …….. Fur KI/24 13/6/10 Former 
magdoom of 
Fur 
25 ………… Zaghawa KI/25 13/6/10 Member of 
the Shura  
Council  for 
the Zaghawa 
in South 
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Darfur 
26 …………… Rezeigat KI/26 13/6/10 Omda and 
member of 
the South 
Darfur 
Legislative 
council 
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